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THE WILSON 

ADMINISTRATION AND 

THE GREAT WAR 



ERNEST W. YOUNG, LL.M. 

Author of "Comments on the Interchurch Report on the 
Steel Strike of igig" 




BOSTON 

RICHARD G. BADGER 

THE GORHAM PRESS 



CopvRiuHT, 1922, BY Richard G. Badger 
All Rights Reserved 



nfJ., 






Made in the United States of America 



The Gorham Press, lioston, U. S. A. 

JUN 27 1922 

(0)C1.AH74740 



POINT OF VIEW 

The following pages attempt to treat of Functioning — 
Governmental Functioning at a time of peculiar crisis in 
the nation's career. They do not assume to be a history of 
the Great War. They undertake, rather, to select a few 
of the greater matters which engaged the attention of the 
Wilson Administration in that notable period, those that 
came nearest the hearth, the heart-center of the great Re- 
public; those that the history of the future will necessarily 
select as the chief center of the impulses of the nation's 
throbs for humanity. 

As these touch upon matters of history, perhaps of 
statecraft, it is proper to add that it is not only war-time 
orders of the President of the mightiest republic of re- 
corded time, or the thrilling utterance of eloquent lips; not 
the laws of Congress or the decrees of a great and orderly 
Senate; nor yet the surge and urge of irresistible armies — 
not these alone constitute history. They are a part. No 
less a part thereof are the din and uproar and tumult in the 
busy places of trade or where crowds gather to hear their 
spokesmen — or the spokesmen of their opponents; the 
shout and noise and clash of opposing social and economic 
forces; the ringing of bells, the blasts of whistles, the toot 
of horns, the "confusion worse confounded" in the celebra- 
tion of victory or the signing of an armistice, yet order in 
it all — these constitute an essential part of history. 

But chief of all and center of all is that place where the 
child is taught its mother's tongue and lisps its early 
prayers; where father and son, mother and daughter are ac- 
customed to meet on common ground; where tears are shed 
and griefs are shared, where fond love first finds its joys; 



iv Point of View 

where the infirm case their pains and the strong learn to 
bear the burdens of the weak; where God is revered, and 
the nation's unassailable foundations are based — the fire- 
side. It is here that the historian who would seek the start- 
ing point, the very center and the whole circumference of 
the fabric of the nation's greatness, must search; omitting 
which, he fails of truth. Bolshevism, anarchism, destruc- 
tion of all kinds can never disturb the nation's balance, until 
they first shake these sure foundations. But once these 
finest elements are lost out of the nation's life, once the 
nation's women are nationalized, turned into cattle, then 
these foundations are shaken, the nation loses Its morale, 
and the Republic of the fathers is at an end. 

If the course of the Wilson Administration at any time 
caused depression because admitting the dernier forces to 
a partial temporary control, it passed with the breaking of 
the new day. The night of gloom is gone, let it be hoped 
forever. 

The author felt that when Mr. Bryan swung the Balti- 
more convention to Woodrow Wilson, after his chief com- 
petitor had a majority of the convention, he performed one 
of the most notable acts of our entire political history and 
for the public good. With an open mind, he was favorably 
inclined toward Mr. Wilson when he entered upon his first 
term in the presidency, and resented Theodore Roosevelt's 
first broadsides against the President after the European 
conflagration started. Yet, In common with millions of 
others, was compelled to admit the correctness of Mr. 
Roosevelt's position. 

In the matter of labor his sympathies always have been, 
and now are, ardently with the real working man as dis- 
tinguished from the professional agitator-man. Brought 
up on a hill farm in an eastern state, where, at the age of 
sixteen, and not yet grown, he cut the grain In the hilly 
fields by swinging the cradle with strong men, he knows 
from personal experience the hardest of manual labor. If 



Point of View v 

the following pages reveal the fact that he has no more 
sympathy with autocracy in labor circles than in industrial 
capitalism, the presidency, or Prussia, that is a necessary 
incident to this study. He has no sympathy with a so-called 
laboring man, who, merely because he is in an organized 
group, will smite an honest laboring man merely because 
he happens to be outside of that group, as the great majority 
are. "A man's a man for a' that." His brand of democ- 
racy is as broad and deep as humanity Itself. He regards 
America as the great hope of the world's democracy, be- 
cause she is free and her people unshackled. 

The Author. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I Coming Storm and Preparation 9 

II The Food Administration 28 

III The Fuel Administration 41 

IV Labor and Wages 51 

V Shipbuilding 66 

VI Government Railroading 83 

VII Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War . . 107 

VIII The Post-Office Department 140 

IX The Press and Public Opinion 154 

X Liquor and Vice 169 

XI Russia and Bolshevism 188 

XII Disloyalty 221 

XIII Looking Toward Peace 234 

XIV The World's Peace Congress 261 

XV The Treaty of Paris 300 

XVI The League of Nations 325 

XVII The Administration and Politics .... 346 

XVIII Wilson and Wilsonism 365 

XIX Profiteering 387 

XX Reconstruction 398 

XXI Insurance and Compensation 420 

XXII The Spirit of America 429 

Conclusions 45o 

Index 457 

vii 



THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION 
AND THE GREAT WAR 



THE WILSON 

ADiMINISTRATION AND 

THE GREAT WAR 

CHAPTER I 

COMING STORM AND PREPARATION 

The low, long roll of thunder was heard along the east- 
ern horizon on a morning of that fateful last week in July, 
19 14. The sound of it stretched across the sea and 
reached America and circled the globe. No cloud was in 
sight; no cause apparent. Yet the first peal grew into a ter- 
rific roar, the whole heaven was darkened, and the world 
was caught in an awful storm. Thick darkness was round 
about. 

The diplomatic battle, with Sir Edward Grey as the 
center of all the parleys having for their end the peace of 
the world, was ended within ten days. England held aloof, 
warning France that for her to advance toward Germany 
beyond the line of diplomatic prudence would endanger 
her support. The first week in August saw military force 
arrayed against military force. The usual poise of the 
world was upset by the fierceness and ruthlessness of the 
onslaught, and little Belgium was first made to feel the 
heavy blow of the cruel ravager; and her endurance for 
the first ten days of self-effacement, together with Eng- 
land's ready navy saved to the world that civilization which 
was the product of twenty centuries of human effort. For 
it enabled France to gather her forces and England to 

9 



lO The JVilson Admimstration and the Great War 

assemble her resources and to get her bearings in the new 
relationships. 

America was in a maze. To her the situation was 
stupefying. The Thing seemed unreal. It was like a tale 
from cloudland — impossible. The American was confused, 
baffled, tie knew that there was disordered movement in 
the world; that the world was out of joint. He witnessed 
a combat of giants on an unheard-of scale. The world was 
beginning to sway and reel like a drunken man. Events 
were not taking place in their usual course. History seemed 
to have come to an end; and history seemed to be begin- 
ning anew. Had mankind gone mad? Was civilization's 
very foundation to be destroyed? Was all that had been 
built upon the teachings of the Christ to be discarded? Was 
civilization itself sagging? 

These were the questions that ran through the mind of 
America from day to day and from week to week. 

Then came the quick and mighty forging forward 
toward Paris, once Belgium was prostrate. It seemed that 
nothing would stop the onward sweep, and that the French 
capital must be reached within a few weeks and surrender 
to the sword. But the marvel of it was that within a few 
miles of the city the tide was stemmed. And at this time, 
but a few weeks after the titanic struggle began, the dis- 
tinctively American citizen was glad that the tide had been 
turned back and that Paris was saved. For already, with 
incomplete knowledge, there was a growing feeling that 
Germany was in the wrong, that the outrage on Belgium 
would not bear the scrutiny of modern civilization, and that 
the German government proposed to use every means 
within its power, fair or foul, civilized or savage, to ac- 
complish its purpose. 

And treachery and propaganda were at work in Amer- 
ica, but by the Central Powers only. Cunningly devised, it 
was so insidiously operated as to mislead thoroughgoing 
Americans. Its purpose was to win America to the Ger- 



Coming Storm and Prcpai alion 1 1 

man cause; or, failing in that, so to confuse judgment and 
blur vision by falsehood and innuendo as to weaken any 
attempt to align American sentiment with the Allies. In 
fact, this had begun years before, when, by some means, 
even American textbooks used in the schools were prepared 
in such form as to laud Germany and things German. 
Thousands of American students attending German uni- 
versities imbibed of the materialistic and hideous doctrines 
which Germany, through her universities, had been foisting 
upon the world; and at the ripe moment many of them stood 
by Germany, eminent Americans, teaching public law in 
great seats of American learning, aiding in the literary 
propaganda prepared in Germany for American consump- 
tion. 

The extent of this treacherous propaganda was not fully 
known to the American public until the United States en- 
tered the war, and in its fullest extent will probably never 
be revealed. It was open and notorious in large population 
centers, but was by no means confined to the cities. North 
Dakota, an almost solidly agricultural section, was sedu- 
lously cultivated through the pro-German leaders of the 
Nonpartisan League; others soon became well known. 

Openly where it seemed best, elsewhere clandestinely, 
Germany zealously backed up these efforts. If it was not 
an attempt to frighten America with a vision of Japan 
reaching out for the Philippines, Hawaii, and even Cali- 
fornia, then it was a setting forth of how England was 
seeking to catch unwary America in an effort to break down 
her commerce, or to push the Irish question to the front. 

This persistent propaganda had a distinct anti-Ally in- 
fluence, both immediately and for the future. By dividing 
American sentiment, it served well its purpose at the begin- 
ning of hostilities in Europe, as well as when America 
should have entered the armed conflict, when the first steps 
toward peace were contemplated, and while the Peace Con- 
gress was in session, as well as in the execution of the Treaty. 



12 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

On the other hand, it was a potent force helpful to the 
cause of the Allies, in that it caused the organizing of the 
American forces everywhere as they had not been previously 
organized. And these, fortifying the American public with 
the facts in the case, cleared the way for a fairer understand- 
ing of the conflict in Europe and strengthened Allied senti- 
ment in America. 

For each time the Allies undertook to state the justice 
of their cause, there immediately came into existence a 
stream of literature and of pronouncements from certain 
pulpits that told how false was every statement thus made. 
On September 7, 19 14, the German kaiser himself pro- 
tested to President Wilson against the conduct of the enemy 
in using dumdum bullets. The sole purpose was to blur the 
vision, at a time when the American public was not aware 
of the dastardly attempts of the German Government, 
aided by the pro-Germans in the United States, to put forth 
any false statements that might tend to show the Germans 
right, the Allies wrong. 

And this influence reached Administration circles where 
it seemingly had more influence than upon the general pub- 
lic. Not only did it influence individual congressmen so 
that they were at all times pro-German, but it influenced 
Congress as a whole. 

The chief prop of this official propaganda in America 
was the German-American Alliance, whose wishes found 
expression in resolutions in the House offered by their chief 
spokesmen, Vollmer and Bartholdt. The Alliance at Minne- 
apolis telegraphed a member of the House : "In the name 
of Christian humanity and the spirit of neutrality we beg 
your support of Bartholdt's bill to stop munitions of war 
from America reaching Europe." It was not that they 
cared one iota about Christian humanity or the spirit of 
neutrality or the stopping of munitions from reaching 
Europe; what did concern these pro-German organizations 
was that Germany, barred by the effective naval operations 



Coming Storm and Preparation 13 

of Great Britain, was unable to receive these munitions. 
Germany made no objections to any neutral country, her- 
self included, shipping munitions of war in the Boer War. 

About this time a great neutrality meeting was an- 
nounced for Philadelphia by the newly formed American 
Neutrality League, and its secretary invited Dr. Rhine- 
lander, Bishop of Pennsylvania, to be one of its vice-presi- 
dents. But the good bishop saw through this neutrality 
scheme, and declared that from information which had 
then lately reached him it appeared that this agitation was 
chiefly "not really in the interest of neutrality, but in hos- 
tility to the Allied nations, and with the hope of helping 
Germany and Austria in their campaign." And further 
stated : "As an American citizen pledged to uphold Ameri- 
can ideals, I am altogether against Germany and Austria 
in this war, on the ground that they are threatening, and 
would destroy, as far as they have opportunity, those politi- 
cal and personal liberties and rights which we Americans 
have made the foundation of our government." 

Here was the reply of a real American who saw through 
all the jugglery of pro-Germanism. And, of course, in the 
opinion of the secretary of the League, this letter showing 
real Americanism placed the Bishop of Pennsylvania as a 
partisan and made him ineligible as a vice-president of a 
neutrality meeting. But eminent men were present, and to 
get them into such meetings was always a large part of the 
plan. Governor Brumbaugh presided, while congressmen 
made bitter anti-British speeches, and resolutions were 
adopted which were zealously anti-Ally and vigorously pro- 
German; and the enormous throng unable to gain entrance 
to the meeting turned itself into a overflow meeting which 
manifested its neutrality by singing "Die Wacht am Rheim" 
and "Deutschland Ueber AUes." The influence of such 
meetings entered very emphatically into Administration 
circles in Washington, 

Yet, the Administration presumably had at hand inti- 



14 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

mate knowledge of all the transactions of a foreign nation, 
a belligerent, in the country. But it was never explained to 
the American people why the Administration did not know 
what the German Imperial Government was doing by way 
of violation of the requirements of international law; or, 
knowing, why it did not put a stop to this underhanded, 
insidious campaign to drag America into the side that was 
wrong, and which men of the perspicacity of Bishop Rhine- 
lander and others, who at this time were proclaiming the 
inhumanity and heartlessness of the German Government 
and the justice and righteousness of the Allied cause, could 
see so clearly. 

The war in Europe had scarcely more than begun when 
the German-American Alliance, through its president. Dr. 
J. C. Hexamer, requested President Wilson to ask Japan 
to keep her hands off in the East at the time she demanded 
of Germany withdrawal of armed ships from that quarter. 
Immediately thereafter, on August i8, 19 14, President Wil- 
son delivered one of his notable war addresses to the 
American people. Coming at that time, it was regarded as 
the Administration's reply. Among other things, he said: 

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon 
what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves 
America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is 
the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all con- 
cerned, 

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn 
word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essen- 
tial breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out 
of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in 
fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. 
We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a 
curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might 
be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before 
another. 

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest 



Coming Storm and Preparation 15 

wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great coun- 
try of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our 
hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit 
beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the 
dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action; a nation 
that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own 
counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest 
and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world. 

As this address, in some respects of the finest, came after 
the ravishment of Belgium, the President was most se- 
verely criticised for asking red-blooded Americans to be 
"neutral in thought," as his address was understood to mean, 
after the brutality shown toward little Belgium; and to 
maintain the "fine poise of undisturbed judgment" and to 
remain "dispassionate" after the blood-thirsty methods of 
brute force exhibited toward innocent women and children 
of a prostrate people. One of the picture-posters after- 
ward used very effectively by the Administration in seeking 
enlistments, showing a stalwart young American, when he 
heard the tale of brutality, throwing off his coat to settle 
with the offender, accompanied by the injunction: "Tell it 
to the marines," was a very clear expression of the feelings 
of the real American. He was not dispassionate or neutral 
in the face of outraged conscience. 

And as the people now began to complain of the do- 
nothing spirit of the Administration, in the face not only 
of the great wrong in Europe but of the attempted violation 
of American neutrality by the outrageous German propa- 
ganda carried on officially In the nation's capital. Dr. Bern- 
hard Dernberg, the chief propagandist on the rostrum, was 
gently invited to discontinue his operations. But the propa- 
ganda continued In greater volume and with greater effect 
than ever. A great effort was made to control the leading 
newspapers of the country. 

On the other hand, the method was being delved into. 
The facts were being set before the Administration, not by 



1 6 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

its own agents, but by some of the shrewdest private detec- 
tives in the land. The revelations made by the Providence 
Journal astonished the country. Even the Administration, 
with the proof in its own hands, was slow to believe. It 
did not like to admit that while it was asking the people 
to be neutral in thought and undisturbed in spirit, there was 
being carried on, under the very shadow of the White 
House, by the accredited ambassador of Germany, a scheme 
to divide the Republic by enemies within and by force with- 
out. 

And when the notable book of James M. Beck, "The 
Evidence in the Case," set before the people the causes 
leading up to the open rupture in Europe, there was such 
a revulsion as is seldom seen, in so short a time. 

It is doubtful whether history can credit the Adminis- 
tration with dealing fairly with the American people in 
this matter. With all the evidence it had or should have 
had with the opportunities of knowledge, it is difficult to 
credit the Administration with the purpose of square-deal- 
ing with the people, in its effort to lead them in a direction 
not warranted by the facts. The President's own accred- 
ited and trusted minister to the Netherlands at the time the 
conflagration burst forth, in referring to the events of vast 
magnitude that were rapidly crowding upon each other 
beginning with the last week in July, 19 14, said: 

We who stood outside the secret councils of the Central Powers 
were both bewildered and dismaj^ed. Could it be that Europe of 
the twentieth century was to be thrust back into the ancient barbarism 
of a general war? It was like a dreadful nightmare. There was 
the head of the huge dragon, crested, fanged, clad in glittering scales, 
poised above the world and ready to strike. We were benumbed and 
terrified. There was nothing that we could do. The monstrous 
thing advanced, but even while we shuddered we could not make 
ourselves feel that it was real. It had the vagueness and the horrid 
pressure of a bad dream.^ 

^ Henry van Dyke's "Fighting for Peace," p. 45, Scribners, New York, 1917. 



Coming Storm and Preparation 17 

Doctor van Dyke was keenly aware of the unblushing bru- 
tality of the Hohenzollerns, and all that belong with them, 
whom he best knew as the Potsdam Gang. 

And yet, two years later the President went so far 
as to declare : 

This Great War that broke so suddenly upon the world two years 
ago, . . . has affected us very profoundly, and we are not only at 
liberty, it is perhaps our duty, to speak very frankly of it and of 
the great interests of civilization which it affects. With its causes 
and objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which 
its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search 
for or explore. 

Is that true? Was not Bishop Rhinelander's perception of 
the great moral issues involved the keener? And had It 
become true that America had no conscience? Where 
there is a lively conscience in a great people there is cer- 
tain to be a lively interest against a wrong-doer, whether he 
be a private or a public character, anci there will be an ever- 
Increasing volume gathering until the wickedness is swept 
away. At first the people resented Theodore Roosevelt's 
broadsides against President Wilson; but as the conflict pro- 
ceeded and the right and wrong of it became clearer, they 
swerved from Washington to Oyster Bay; they were learn- 
ing that It was not the President of the United States, but 
the sage of Sagamore who was to pilot America through 
safe channels in the storm that was rocking the world. 

Indeed, the President knew better, as witness his next 
inaugural expressions: 

The war inevitably set its mark from the first alike upon our 
minds, our industries, our commerce, our politics, and our social 
action. To be indifferent to it or independent of it was out of the 
question. 

And on the same occasion he described the German methods 
as "organized wrong." 

It was during this period that there came Into being 



1 8 The IVilson Administration and the Great War 

many societies with beguiling names to win American favor. 
Among these were American Neutrality League, American 
Independence Union, American Truth Society, American 
Peaceful Embargo Society, Friends of Peace, Friends of 
Truth.- That these influenced Mr. Wilson may be ac- 
cepted as fact. His sense of right was not so far gone that 
he did not know. It may have been blunted by an over- 
weening ambition. The course of the presidential campaign 
and the methods used by his managers and accepted by him, 
suggest that it was held in abeyance. He was unsteady, 
wavered when firmness in the right was the only safe course 
to pursue. It led to doubt, created uncertainty. This led 
a prominent member of Congress to declare, when urged 
to stand by the President, that he would gladly do so if the 
President would but take a stand for something. It was 
this wobbling that gave Germany her opportunity which she 
used to the full. The President, while in the attitude of 
what he described as "watchful waiting" in another interna- 
tional matter, displayed what became a marked character- 
istic of his as he remained the longer in the presidency — an- 
tagonizing the course which he admittedly knew to be the 
right, and showing favor to the admittedly wrong. 

At this time of serious business in the world's history, 
the President manifested a partiality for pacifists. He had 
them in all the cabinet positions that were of chief impor- 
trance at such a time as then marked the world. Mr. Garri- 
son, a fighting secretary of war, was displaced by a man 
so notedly a pacifist as to be known as antagonistic to the 
best Americanism. Henry Ford, who later received Mr. 
Wilson's support for United States senator, spent freely 
of his money, said to run into the millions, first in full-page 
advertisements in American newspapers, and then on his 
peace-ship trip to Europe, a plan that received adverse at- 
tention in the English Parliament. Prominent men in the 

*John B. McMaster's "United States in the World War," p. 140, D. 
Appleton & Co., New York, 1918. 



Coming Storm and Preparation 19 

President's cabinet were prominently connected with dis- 
tinctively pro-German meetings in New York, his former 
Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, openly identifying himself 
with one of them. 

These pacifists, who exerted a powerful influence In the 
Administration, sought to create in the United States a senti- 
ment that was at all times of the greatest value to Germany, 
whether before, during, or after the war. They divided 
sentiment when it should have been united and firm against 
the brute forces then seeking to overturn civilization; they 
weakened the already weak Administration in a clear per- 
ception of duty to country and to humane principles. 

But in time the forces of righteousness swept all bar- 
riers away. The dignity of the American nation had been 
flung to the winds. Her vessels on lawful missions were 
sunk. Her peaceful citizens lawfully travelling the high- 
ways of the sea were murdered. Even her government's 
representatives going to or from their posts of official duty 
were drowned in the depths. All these things were as noth- 
ing to a pacifist and pro-German. But the shame of it was 
that a national Administration permitted it. Good ringing 
notes were written by the American Government, and then 
the same outrages were permitted repetition. The Admin- 
istration faltered when it should have been strong in action; 
it wavered when it should have been clear and unhesitating; 
it talked when it should have performed. It led to the 
expression that became common throughout the land : "Oh, 
for a Roosevelt in the White House!" 

When, on May 7, 19 15, the "Lusitania" was sunk by a 
German torpedo, after advertisements in American news- 
papers by the German Embassy at Washington warning that 
American travellers on it would be endangered, and of the 
I' 1 53 persons who thereby lost their lives, 114 were Ameri- 
can men, women and children, a cry of horror mingled with 
rage went up from every quarter of the land. May 16 the 
Secretary of State sent his first "Lusitania" note to Germany 



20 The JV'ilson Admiinstration and the Great War 

on the outrage. Midway between these two events, Presi- 
dent Wilson in an address to a vast throng in Philadelphia 
used the words, "There is such a thing as a man being too 
proud to fight." This became known as his "too-proud-to- 
fight" speech. All other incidents connected with it were 
soon forgotten. But it was a sad commentary upon the 
President's shrewdness and mental acumen that he could 
not have seen that that was a poor answer to the German 
militaristic power which had already determined that no 
sense of right or honor or neighborly obligation or treaty 
obligation should interfere with its desperate purpose. 

Sinkings now come in rapid succession. On April 19, 
19 16, the President went before Congress with the whole 
question, declaring that "tragedy had followed tragedy on 
the seas in such fashion" and that "the roll of Americans 
who have lost their lives on ships thus attacked and de- 
stroyed has grown month by month until the ominous total 
loss mounted into the hundreds." And he declared that 
the severance of diplomatic relations was the only course 
open unless Germany immediately and radically mended her 
ways. And in this he met the best thought of the nation. 

But the presidential election was to be held that year, 
and again he dallied. And the campaign slogans of his 
party are suggestive of motives : "He kept us out of war," 
and "You are at work, not at war." He had repeatedly 
told the German Government that no further outrages would 
be tolerated, and there was the same reason for a war with 
Germany April 6, 1916, as April 6, 1917. 

After the election he sought to ascertain upon what 
terms peace between the warring nations could be made. 
To this end, he went before the Senate January 22, 19 17. 
It is not clear why he went or what he expected to accom- 
plish; but it is a part of the Administration's record. And 
in this address he used a notable phrase that has been fol- 
lowing him as a nemesis ever since, when he declared for 
"peace without victory" — willing to condone all the worst 



Coming Storm and Preparation 21 

horrors and brutalities imposed upon civilized society. It 
took a permanent place with h's "too proud to fight" and 
"with its causes and objects we are not concerned." 

When James J. F. Archibald, pro-German lecturer in 
the United States, was detained by the British in August, 
1915, he was found to possess high recommendations from 
the Austrian Ambassador Dumba and the German Ambas- 
sador BernstorfF. By papers found on him it was also dis- 
closed that Bernstorff, while making explanations to the 
State Department of his connections with compromising 
transactions, was seeking to purchase or destroy manufac- 
turing plants in the United States, and to cause strikes 
among the employes and disloyal union labor. It was early 
in 19 1 6 that the noted "sink-without-a-trace" messages were 
being sent, and that Bernstorff was a party to acts of war 
against the United States. He was a party to the infamous 
Zimmerman notes seeking to engage Mexico and Japan 
in disrupting the integrity of the American Republic. The 
President knew, the world knew, these things. 

But no step had been taken by the Administration look- 
ing toward preparation for eventualities. General Leonard 
Wood opened at Plattsburg, N. Y., the training-camp that 
became the model for the Government once war was de- 
clared. It brought down upon his head the wrath of the 
Administration. Colonel Roosevelt stirred the people to 
the importance of getting ready for the war into which the 
country was drifting, pleading for one hundred per cent 
robust Americanism, for a united front against German 
encroachments upon American rights, for substituting in 
the fighting departments of the Government fighting men for 
pacifists, and above all for preparation for the inevitable 
conflict. 

The Administration at first sought to neutralize the ef- 
fects of Roosevelt's speeches and his articles written for 
magazines and newspapers. He became the leader of 
robust Americanism, while President Wilson became the 



22 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

leader and exponent of diluted Americanism and robust 
pacifism. "The two stood for irreconcilable doctrines: the 
one for justice at any cost; the other for peace at any price; 
the one for decision and preparedness to enforce it, the 
other for evasion and compromise." The pacifist War Sec- 
retary Baker declared there was ample time to prepare, 
since the war was 3,000 miles away; George Creel, social- 
ist and internationalist, was chairman of the committee on 
public information. Men of this stamp at such a time cast 
a shadow over the entire Administration, which side-tracked 
the resolution of Representative Gardner for a National Se- 
curity Commission, introduced October 15, 19 15, for the 
purpose of ascertaining the state of the nation's prepared- 
ness. 

And the President, after seeking to lull the people to 
sleep, declared they did not want war. Meanwhile, Col- 
onel Roosevelt's editorials appearing in the Kansas City 
Star, with its wide circulation, were having a marked influ- 
ence through the central West. The President toured the 
central northwest and the section in which the Star circu- 
lated. He returned to Washington and stated that the peo- 
ple wanted war. The company Mr. Bryan was keeping in 
those large days of history-making was not up to Roosevelt's 
standard. After the sinking of the "Lusitania," Mr. 
Bryan issued an address to German-Americans stating that 
the President was their warm friend. At the moment they 
were seeking to destroy America, he received numerous tele- 
grams from German-American societies, and under the aus- 
pices of one he gave an address in New York City, presided 
over by the president of the United German-American 
Societies of that State. Others addressing this meeting 
were Frank Buchanan, later of rather undesirable notoriety 
for alleged unamericanism ; Henry Vollmer, noted pro-Ger- 
man; the notorious Jeremiah O'Leary of pro-German fame; 
and among the worthies at the meeting were the Turkish 
ambassador; Austrian Ambassador Dumba, who did all in 



Coming Storm and Preparation 23 

his power to destroy American integrity; Captain Boy-Ed 
and Captain von Papen, both notoriously active against 
Americanism. 

And these were the influences that were operating upon 
the President until he went out among the people where 
Roosevelt had been preaching by pen and by tongue that 
form of Americanism that always prevails when right is 
matched against wrong, and the people are permitted to 
see the truth. At a late day he admitted the dernier forces 
at work had "poured the poison of disloyalty Into the vari- 
ous arteries of our national life," and that the time had 
come to make greater preparation. And on Flag Day, June 
14, 19 16, he marched at the head of a parade in the interest 
of preparedness, in Washington. In an address on that 
occasion he said : 

There is a disloyalty active in the United States and it must be 
crushed. It proceeds from a minority, a very small minority but a 
very active and subtle minority. It works underground but it also 
shows its ugly head where we can see it, and there are those at this 
moment who are trying to levy a species of political blackmail, saying, 
"Do what we wish in the interest of foreign sentiment or we will 
wreak our vengeance at the polls." That is the sort of thing 
against which the American Nation will turn with a might and 
triumph of sentiment wlu'ch will teach these gentlemen once for all 
that disloyalty to this flag is the first test of tolerance in the United 
States. 

Herein President Wilson was speaking America's best 
thought. But soon thereafter came another sagging, as 
witness the campaign slogan of the party of which he was 
the head, "He kept us out of war." 

Diplomatic relations with Germany were severed on 
February 3. The McLemore resolution, seeking to block 
the President's policy of arming merchantmen, had been 
ardently debated in and out of Congress, and every force 
standing for Germany and pro-Germanism backed the 
resolution. The President was bitterly attacked by his own 



24 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

party, and every power Germany could exert was now used. 
Bernstorff sought to influence Congress and the newspapers. 
This was a year before diplomatic relations were severed. 
President Wilson replied to the vicious attacks: "You are 
right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to 
keep the United States out of war." But when the time for 
action came, he was ready to assume his part of the respon- 
sibility after the breaking off of diplomatic relations. 
April 2 he went before Congress and asked for the declara- 
tion that a state of war existed. This was granted by reso- 
lution on April 6. 

Thus the nation was thrust into the stupendous conflict 
without adequate preparation, a condition for which the 
pacifist Secretary of War Baker thanked God. And the cost 
in money and blood for this condition can never be com- 
puted. America was suddenly turned into a military camp, 
making "confusion worse confounded." At the nation's 
capital everything was topsy-turvy. Men were getting into 
each other's way in the attempt to do something. "The call 
to arms found our country ill prepared for the great work 
that lay before it." ^ The herculean task thus laid upon the 
nation by pacifism must be undertaken with the utmost ex- 
pedition. The military and naval forces in great numbers 
were to be gathered and trained. Money in unheard-of 
sums must be raised. Peace industries had to be placed on 
a war footing. Transportation facilities must be converted 
to war purposes. The Council of National Defense must be 
organized and set about its serious duties, and there came 
into being a great number of boards, and committees of 
various sorts and sizes. 

The President, on April 15, urgently appealed to pro- 
ducers of war material and foods to increase their output. 

Theodore Roosevelt was granted authority by Congress, 
in the face of strenuous opposition from the President's 
supporters, to raise a force of 100,000 men at once from 

^McMaster's "United States in the World War," p. 366. 



Coming Storm and Preparation 25 

men outside the draft age of 21 to 31 years, to go to the 
front in Europe. Men from every section of the land, 
even from Alaska, were eager to join his standard, and as 
soon as Congress acted some even took the long trip from 
Alaska. But the President said him nay: "The business 
now in hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific 
definiteness and precision." 

At once the country was immersed in the task of armies, 
airplanes, navies, finance. The order for mobilization of 
the navy showed a lack by 35,000 of the 87,000 authorized 
for peace. To put it on a war footing required substan- 
tially 100,000 regulars and 45,000 reserves. The work of 
enlistment began at once, with all the devices of novelty 
known to American ingenuity. The countryside was at- 
tracted by cartoons and posters put up on fences, trees, 
stumps, rocks, and in every other conceivable place where 
they would catch the public eye. In the cities they were 
displayed in shop window^s, at recruiting stations, in hall- 
ways of public buildings, on billboards, on vehicles. Naval 
men gifted in speech and song went in groups or singly in 
automobiles and caught the crowds on street corners where 
the throngs were passing, the hour of special value being at 
noon. And it was remarkable how the boys poured out of 
the unexpected places; as the lumber town of Bemidji, in 
the woods of northern Minnesota, or the prairie town of 
Pierre, South Dakota, both of which went quickly far be- 
yond their quotas. 

Appeals for army service were not less cogent, and vol- 
unteering went rapidly forward until the time for the draft. 
Meanwhile Congress, in a bitter debate over the selective 
draft measure, was closely divided, and compromise meas- 
ures were offered. All of these the President wisely turned 
aside and stood firmly by his position for the selective draft, 
and June 5 was made registration day. The Census Bur- 
eau estimated the number who would fall within the regis- 
try at 10,000,000. The number actually was 9,586,508. 



26 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

Mobilization began September 5, when five per cent of the 
men went to the sixteen instruction and training camps of 
the country, one-fifth of them starting each of five succes- 
sive days. After October 3, the remaining fifteen per cent 
went as soon as practicable. It was a new event in the 
nation's history to witness these young men — physicians, 
clerks, farmers, lawyers, laborers, business men, rich and 
poor alike — leaving their homes in every city, town and 
hamlet of the land, to go into training to be made fit to 
fight in Europe. 

Two days before the first men started for their camps, 
President Wilson took occasion to address them in this 
fine message worthy of place by every fireside: 

You are undertaking a great duty. The heart of the whole coun- 
try is with you. 

Everything that you do will be watched with the deepest interest 
and with the deepest solicitude, not only by those who are near and 
dear to you, but by the whole nation besides. 

For this great war draws us all together, makes us all comrades 
and brothers, as all true Americans felt themselves to be when we 
first made good our national independence. 

The eyes of the world will be upon you, because you are in some 
special sense the soldiers of freedom. Let it be your pride, therefore, 
to show all men everywhere not only what good soldiers you are but 
also what good men you are, keeping yourselves fit and straight in 
everything, and pure and clean through and through. 

Let us set for ourselves a standard so high that it will be a glory 
to live up to it and add a new laurel to the crown of America. 

My affectionate confidence goes with you in every battle and 
every test. God keep and guide you. 

But, true to their color, all who were willing to assist 
the German autocracy in every way possible, except to go 
to the German front and fight like men, were ready to do 
everything in their power to thwart the purposes of Amer- 
ica, once she had taken a definite stand, ready to stab her 
soldier boys in the back. Anti-draft, anti-war, anti-America 



Coming Storm and Preparation 27 

demonstrations were made by Socialists and slackers in every 
large city of the land. They paraded the streets carrying 
red flags with such inscriptions as, "War is Hell — We De- 
mand Peace." The Young People's Socialistic Society, or- 
ganized throughout the country in the larger cities, held 
secret meetings to protest the war, though unwittingly they 
furnished some of the best secret-service material the Gov- 
ernment had. Like the larger and more open meetings, 
such as that addressed by Mr. Bryan in New York, they 
were doing the things German autocracy liked best to have 
done. Some had taken their cue from men high in admin- 
istration circles, getting their inscriptions from pre-war 
utterances such as Speaker Champ Clark's that a conscript 
looked much like a convict. In Oklahoma there was open 
resistance that amounted to civil war, in which several were 
killed and some two hundred were made prisoners and held 
under a charge of treason to the United States. 

Everywhere pacifists, Socialists, Industrial Workers of 
the World, anti-war, anti-conscription, anti-America, pro- 
German organizations were busy with their propaganda, and 
operated under almost every conceivable name and designa- 
tion, chief of which became "conscientious objectors to 
war." They were usually of the radical type found in 
European countries, chiefly from the Central Powers. 

A call for funds with which to prosecute the war ear- 
nestly engaged the Treasury Department immediately the 
war was declared. Sums beyond the common reach of the 
American imagination, big as it is accustomed to view things, 
were asked. Seven billion dollars was asked by popular 
subscription, the largest sum any nation had ever under- 
taken to raise at one time in all the world's history. And 
it was over-subscribed, as were all the subsequent amounts, 
totalling some $30,000,000,000, part of which was loaned 
to the Allies. 

America's conscience must never be dulled to a great 
wrong, by a lulling pacifism in high places of power. 



CHAPTER II 

THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION 

Once the country had engaged in the world struggle, the 
Administration wisely perceived that food was a vital fac- 
tor In determining the tide of conflict. 

The Council of National Defense appointed Herbert 
C. Hoover chairman of the Commission on Food Supply 
and Prices. His experience and success at the head of the 
Belgium Relief Commission, until the brutal acts of Ger- 
many made it no longer possible for him to serve there, 
pointed to him at once as the individual best fitted for such 
service. His Commission was charged with the high task 
of gaining the co-operation of all food distributing agencies, 
and of securing an increased production of food while pre- 
venting profiteering and waste. And nine days after our 
declaration of war, in a public appeal, the President urged 
the supreme need to be "especially foodstuffs," calling upon 
men and boys, "to turn in hosts to the farms" and declaring 
that it was "the time for America to correct her unpardon- 
able fault of wastefulness and extravagance." To the 
South he particularly appealed to raise food as well as 
cotton. 

The nation gave quick and generous response. Gardens 
were intensively cultivated. Vacant lots became gardens. 
Front yards, boulevards, railway rights-of-way, even in 
the great agricultural states of Minnesota and the Dakotas, 
were turned into lots. A campaign was started to teach 
saving in the kitchen with printed instructions from the 
Food Administration. "Preach the gospel of the clean 
plate" became a cardinal principle of patriotic housekeep- 
ing. 

28 



The Food Administration 29 

In mid-summer, 19 17, the Food-Control Law was 
enacted, placing in the hands of Mr. Hoover so great 
powers over food that he was termed the Food Dictator. 
And he forthwith stated to the public that while it was not 
the purpose of the Food Administration to seek to apply 
punitive measures, he would not hesitate to apply in full 
measure "the drastic, coercive powers" with which Congress 
had invested him should occasion arise. And promptly there 
was mapped out a course of action for control of dealers as 
well as for conservation by consumers. Wisdom and tact 
marked the course of the Administration in dealing with 
the food problem during the war period. 

"Food Will Win the War— Don't Waste It" became a 
slogan on farm, in mill, in kitchen, everywhere. The peo- 
ple, a great people, always accustomed to plenty, merely 
upon a request denied themselves of what they had grown 
to be accustomed to. There was never a murmur, except 
in a few isolated instances. The administration of Mr. 
Hoover has become one of the bright spots in the national 
Administration during the Great War. His work was thor- 
ough and scientific. 

Once the American people were placed on a war diet, 
they were brought into immediate touch with one large 
meaning of war and understood the better. It brought war 
home to the people repeatedly every day. The form of the 
appeals made by the Food Administration, "for the boys 
over there," gave a patriotic turn to American thought in 
the saving of food. The importance of saving such prime 
foods as wheat, sugar and meat was advertised everywhere 
and all the time. It was before the people riding on trains, 
eating their meals in public places, in the thoroughfares of 
business, in the home. Corn bread and corn cakes, bran 
bread and bran muffins — these graced the tables of 
American eaters and were good for the health. They were 
aided by rye bread and rice cakes, and the value of barley 
as a food was soon learned. To all was added the joy of 



30 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

the humor of it; for there came the "wheatless days" and 
the "meatless days." 

"Sugar — save a lump every day for the boys over 
there," became a part of the daily menu. Sugar became 
scarce because of the wasted beet fields of Europe, and be- 
cause of the lack of ships to carry it where abundant. Fac- 
ing all passengers on railroad trains were large cards 
neatly printed in colors with this : 

SUGAR 

1. None on Fruits 

2. None on Desserts 

3. Less on Cereals 

4. Less in Coffee and Tea 

5. Less in Preserving 

6. Less Cake and Candy 

7. Use Other Sweeteners. 

SAVE IT. 

Errors were made here as elsewhere. While sugar 
was piled up in Honolulu because of no vessels to carry it, 
yet the refined product was being carried into the Hawaiian 
Islands, a large sugar producer with an abundance of the 
kind the people in the United States would have been glad 
to use. 

With the shortage, unnecessary confections were cut 
down, though to but a limited degree, soda-fountains were 
closed, sugar-bowls were removed from the tables in pub- 
lic eating places, and families were limited to three pounds 
per person a month, then to two, still later to three, then 
again to four, and at length the limit was removed. It 
was not until the month before the armistice was signed 
that the Food Administration discovered that by permitting 
the public to purchase sugar weekly at the rate of two pounds 
per person for each four weeks instead of for the calendar 
month, it was allowing the people to use approximately 
200,000,000 pounds of sugar extra, annually. Accord- 
ingly, new regulations went into effect October 15, 1918, 



The Food Administration 31 

requiring that thereafter purchases be made semi-monthly 
instead of bi-weekly. 

Admittedly, Mr. Hoover's administration was scarcely 
less than miraculous when the unpreparedness of the nation 
with which he had to contend in the first onrush of the war 
is considered. Notwithstanding this great efficiency, it was 
not understood why a limit was placed upon the price and 
use of primary food articles, such as wheat and wheat- 
flour, while substitutes which people were compelled to use 
were given an unlimited range in price. ^ This gave a solid 
basis for severe criticism of the Food Administration, and 
there grew up in the great grain-growing sections of the 
country, even, a feeling of antagonism toward the Food 
Administration that was akin to disloyalty, during the most 
stressful days of the war, because of the open profiteering on 
substitutes." 

Bacon was in first rank as the meat of the soldier, since 
most easily kept and most easily shipped. Readily the peo- 
ple granted the request to use less of it "for the boys over 
there." Already accustomed to heatless Monday, lightless 
Tuesday, wheatlcss Wednesday, meatless Thursday, the 
people, with light heart, talked of "eatless days" — which 
never came. For all through the campaign for food con- 
servation the people were admonished not to allow them- 
selves to be undernourished. 

Among the injunctions of the Food Administration were 
those of dispensing with the fourth meal, using simple hos- 
pitality in the home, at church and community suppers serv- 

* Under the Food Administration's orders, when bran was selling at $28 
per ton in carload lots, the housewife was compelled to pay for that same 
bran at the rate of $180 per ton. While this was put up in paper boxes, she 
could not purchase it in any other form, even at the world's greatest primary 
market, Minneapolis. She could not obtain this palatable substitute in 5-, 
IO-, or 25-pound packages as she could the wheat flour. 

At that period of the war, the author, while awaiting a belated 
train at the little town of Philbrook, Minnesota, listened to the townsmen 
engaged in a quiet discussion of this matter at the station platform. Their 
views were unanimous. While none of them objected to the use of rye flour 
as a substitute, they protested vigorously the permitted profiteering on an 
enforced substitute. 



32 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

ing the simplest kinds of home products well cooked and 
making such suppers a substitute for one of the three regu- 
lar meals. A new word coined, bearing a cordial signifi- 
cance, was "hooverize," meaning the clean platter. It 
meant even more in war time, signifying elimination of 
waste as in the injunction not to "nibble crackers" while 
waiting for one's order to be brought on the table. It 
meant eating just sufficient to keep life at its best, wasting 
nothing. 

Some splendid gains were shown as the result of this 
gastronomical self-denial of the people. For it was largely 
through the economies they practiced that in wheat and 
other cereals the fiscal year of 1917-1918 showed an in- 
crease over the preceding year of nearly 31 per cent in 
exports ; while in meats, meat products and fats there was 
an increase in exports of 844,000,000 pounds, or nearly 39 
per cent. And large as was this increase, it is still greater 
when contrasted with the conditions before the war. 

But it was in the increased production that the Food 
Administration's chief opportunity for winning the war 
lay. While politicians and statesmen were arguing about 
$2.20 wheat and a minimum of $2.50 a bushel for wheat, | 
the farmers, aided by the towns-people, were seeding and 
harvesting. For it became the practice, during the shortage 
of labor with the millions in the army and navy, for business ! 
men to close their places of business early and in automobile 
loads hurry to the fields to aid the farmers in caring for the 
crops. 

At the very beginning of America's share in the armed 
conflict, the President's call was sounded to 6,000,000 farm- 
ers. During that year, these farm units planted in food 
crops 23,000,000 acres more than in 19 16, and 32,000,000 
acres more than the five-year pre-war average. During 
19 1 8 this acreage was still further increased. Every farmer 
in the land was on the firing line of food production, with 
no pacifism and slackism in the task. It was well that it 



The Food Administration 33 

was so; for the appalling fact was later revealed that at 
the opening of the wheat harvest in 19 18 there was on hand 
but a ten-day wheat supply. It was one of the real crises 
of the Great War. Yet, there was a slight decrease in the 
production of all grains in 19 18, the difference as compared 
with that of 19 17 being 160,000,000, bushels. This, how- 
ever, was not a reduction in nutritive value; for the wheat 
crop of that year totalling 918,920,000 bushels was a dis- 
tinct advance; and the corn crop of 2,749,000,000 bushels 
exceeded the five-year pre-war average by 17,000,000 
bushels, and greatly superior to that of 19 17. 

And in the matter of live-stock, the total of beef, pork 
and mutton in 19 18 was 19,495,000,000 as compared with 
16,587,000,000 pounds in 19 14, the year preceding the 
European outbreak. On January i, 19 18, there were on 
American farms 23,284,000 milch cows, compared with 20,- 
676,000 of the previous five-year average; and 43,546,000 
other cattle as compared with the five-year average of 38,- 
000,000; also 71,374,000 swine to the previous five-year 
average of 61,865,000. In 19 18 the milk produced was 
8,429,000,000 gallons, or 141,000,000 more than in 1917; 
299,921,000 pounds of wool, or 18,029,000 more than in 
19 17; 1,921,000,000 dozen of eggs, which Is 37,000,000 
dozen more than In 1917; and 589,000,000 head of poul- 
try, exceeding the 19 17 product by 11,000,000. 

On the morning of January 29, 19 19, with President 
Wilson in Europe, the people were confronted with a news 
item of strange import. It was that a bill, drawn by the 
Administration and taken on the previous day to the capltol 
by W. A. Glasgow, chief counsel of the Food Administra- 
tion, asked for an appropriation of $1,250,000,000 to be 
available at once and to be used in such manner as Presi- 
dent Wilson should desire in carrying out the 19 18 and 
19 1 9 guarantees to the farmers, through such agencies as 
he might create, or to utilize any department or agency of 
the Government; by the terms of which the President was 



34 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

authorized to buy and sell wheat and wheat products and 
"foods and foodstuffs," and was given power to assume 
absolute control over dealers, millers, elevators, exchanges, 
and all others having anything to do with the distribution; 
and he was given complete control of all exports and im- 
ports of such articles of food. It placed in one man's hands 
virtual control of all the food of the country for a year and 
a half following. Compared with this proposed measure, 
the Food-Control Law of war time was mild in the powers 
delegated to the President. 

There sprang up at once general opposition and there 
was created in the minds of the people a suspicion touching 
the matter of appropriating a billion and a quarter dollars 
and telling the President to use it as he might see fit. The 
bill was passed only in greatly modified form by the Con- 
gress in which the President's own party was the majority. 

The average consumption of beans by the army was 
125,000 pounds per day. Dried beans were a favorite food 
with the soldiers, and their food value was high and they 
were especially suitable under intensive training. Early 
in October, 19 18, the War Department stated to the public 
that 2,000 carloads of potatoes and onions had been pur- 
chased for the army in the United States for that month, 
representing 36,000,000 pounds of potatoes and nearly 3,- 
000,000 of onions, supplying the 119 camps, training-sta- 
tions and posts. Nearly a thousand bids were received for 
delivery of these vegetables. 

A report giving the subsistence stocks on hand as of 
November i, 19 18, and covering the more important arti- 
cles shows the following, among others, for the camps and 
depots in the United States and France: 123,772,643 
pounds of bacon, 52,850,249 pounds of fresh frozen beef; 
26,247,563 pounds of canned roast beef; 44,664,577 
pounds of canned corn beef; 14,493,479 pounds of canned 
beef hash; 39,383,656 pounds of canned salmon; 353,- 



The Food Administration 35 

377,836 pounds of flour; 19,823,364 pounds of hard bread; 
9,722,521 pounds of corn meal; 3,816,785 pounds of oat- 
meal; 53,375,065 pounds of dry beans; 76,534,807 pounds 
of canned baked beans; 24,180,947 pounds of rice; 1,139,- 
224 pounds of hominy; 86,512,001 pounds of canned toma- 
toes; 27,306,466 pounds of canned peas; 17,778,075 
pounds of canned corn; 2,656,311 pounds of canned string- 
less beans; 4,105,064 pounds of dehydrated vegetables; 
12,597,987 pounds of prunes; 9,280,288 pounds of evapor- 
ated fruit; 12,364,599 pounds of jam; 2,560,160 pounds of 
canned apples; 2,051,543 pounds of canned peaches; 2,998,- 
299 pounds of canned apricots; 1,688,794 pounds of canned 
pears; 1,275,530 pounds of canned cherries; 1,170,034 
pounds of canned pineapple; 31,269,335 pounds of coffee; 
80,924,813 pounds of sugar; 82,355,725 pounds of evapo- 
rated milk; 7,368,108 pounds of lard and lard substitutes; 
3,099,960 pounds of butter and butter substitutes; 956,467 
gallons of vinegar; 572,155 gallons of pickles; 17,239,631 
pounds of salt; 2,693,793 gallons of syrup; 2,129,098 
pounds of candy and sweet chocolate; 752,371 pounds of 
full cream cheese; 4*317,556 pounds of chewing tobacco; 
18,982,095 pounds of smoking tobacco; 49,314,150 cigars; 
95,257,399 cigarettes. The meats included 465,604 
pounds of ham. 

Also, early in December, 19 18, it was announced that 
contracts were made for the purchase of 9,000,000 pounds 
of candy for the American Expeditionary Forces, to supply 
each overseas soldier with a half-pound of candy every ten 
days as a part of his regular ration. And later in the same 
month it was officially announced that the largest single 
order for candy of record had been given. This, too, was 
for overseas soldiers, consisting of the highest grade of can- 
dies, including bar chocolate, sweet chocolate, chocolate 
vanilla bars, almond bars and peanut bars, aggregating i,- 
412,000,00 pounds. At the same time announcement was 



36 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

made that the largest single purchase of chewing-gum in the 
history of the army had been made, consisting of 11,686,- 
000 packages of the most popular brands. 

Gradually, even before the signing of the armistice, the 
ban on the use of foods was lifted. In the early autumn 
of 19 1 8, in the use of flour there was a change made from 
the required 50 per cent of substitutes with 50 per cent of 
wheat flour to a proportion of substitutes as low as 20 per 
cent. Yet at this time it was found necessary to apply some 
strictures in order to conserve more fully essential foods 
of the nation, particularly in hotels and restaurants, it be- 
ing estimated that approximately 9,000,000 people ate their 
meals at public eating places. 

And on December 4 there went throughout the country 
from Washington the joyous dispatch that all restrictions 
on the use of sugar were lifted; for immediately prior 
thereto, grocers were required to keep a record showing 
the amounts of sales to Individual purchasers. And on 
December 25, new joy was added to Christmas by the 
sugar-bowls going back onto the tables in public eating 
places. 

In the first week in December, 19 18, the prices of some 
of the substitutes were these: ten pounds of barley, 65 
cents; ten pounds of corn-meal, 65 cents; ten pounds of com- 
mon buckwheat 83 cents; ten pounds of New York special 
buckwheat, $1.22, While bananas were 70 cents a dozen 
for a very common grade, eggs 70 cents a dozen, and but- 
ter 70 cents per pound. These were Twin City prices. 

And at his weekly conference with newspaper men, Mr. 
Hoover stated, on the afternoon of the day the armistice 
was signed, that since October, 19 17, from reports re- 
ceived throughout the United States, the combined prices 
per unit of twenty-four most important foodstuffs were of 
the average cost of $6.55 for the quarter ending June 30, 
19 1 8, as against $6.62 in October, 19 17. This showed a 
small drop, notwithstanding the fact that there had been 



The Food Administration 37 

a steady increase in costs : wages, materials, rents, and 
transportation. 

A fine quality developing from the necessities of co-op- 
eration during the war was the cordial spirit in which the 
United States Food Administration worked with various 
food administrations of the Allies. Ample food of proper 
nutritive quality for the fighting forces is always a matter 
of vital importance. And with the submarine menacing the 
food supply of our own men as well as the Allies, food must 
be sent to France, submarines or no submarines. There was 
cordial support from the naval forces of the Allies in giv- 
ing protection, there was no less cordial co-operation from 
our Food Administration in the distribution of the food 
from America. 

For the Food Controller of France, after the 19 18 crop 
had been gathered, reported to his government that the total 
nutrition value of the crop of cereals for that year, as well 
as of beans and potatoes, in France, was below the total 
nutrition value of those products for the preceding year; 
the potato crop yielding but 7,500,000 tons, while the aver- 
age for the ten preceding years had been 12,000,000, and 
yet they must supply all the armies in France, including Eng- 
lish and American troops, out of this decreased potato 
crop. 

And on September 24, 19 18, the United States Food Ad- 
ministration stated that under agreement entered into with 
the food controllers of the Allies our footstuffs-export pro- 
gram for the ensuing year was: — wheat, rye, barley and 
corn, and flours calculated as grain for breadstuffs, 429,- 
320,000 bushels, of which some 100,000,000 to 165,000,- 
000 might be cereals other than wheat. 

And it had become clearly apparent a full month before 
the armistice was signed that the necessity for feeding not 
only the millions of soldiers, but as well the hundreds of 
millions of less-than-half-fed peoples in Europe, would re- 
quire still greater food need. 



38 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

These obligations necessitated sending 50 per cent more 
food than was sent the year previous. Whereas 1 1,750,000 
tons had gone then, now 17,500,000 tons must be provided 
by America. And it was made plain to the people that vir- 
tually the same estimate would stand whether the war 
would end then or a year later, the Food Administration 
putting out this suggestive announcement : 

For 191 8- 1 9 19 we have a clear-cut, business-like program that 
calls for steady marching and hard campaigning. We have pooled 
food resources with the Allies and planned to distribute the food to 
meet the needs of the hour. That means to keep in full health and 
strength the Allies, the armies, and our people at home; and at the 
same time to build up safe food reserves in this country. .We know 
now how much food there is, where it is needed, and just how much 
can be shipped. The program agreed to calls for 67 per cent more 
meat and fat, 52 per cent more breadstuff, and 21 per cent more 
sugar than was shipped last year. . . . The army of women, trained 
by a year of food-saving in the United States, must forge ahead 
relentlessly, and sweep even laggards with them. 

While this program was planned before the armistice 
was signed, the Food Administration did not relax its effort 
after that event. Late in November it planned to have 
read in all the churches of the land at a fixed date a state- 
ment showing even an enlarged program to save famishing 
Europe. This statement informed the people that, — 

America's food pledge for this year is 20,000,000 tons, two- 
thirds more than last year; for the relief of more than three hundred 
million hungry people of the world will be brought home to the 
people of the United States during the first week in December. An 
intensive campaign to be known as conservation week for world relief 
will be carried on. 

With Europe famished, its millions dead from under- 
nourishment and absolute starvation, its many more millions 
in serious condition from lack of proper food, America 
would have been derelict in its moral obligations to the 
world had it not exerted itself as a great people to the 



The Food Administration 30 

utmost to serve Europe in its supreme distress when the 
clash of arms had ceased. And President Wilson's first 
legislative recommendation based on a study of conditions 
in Europe looked to the relief of distress of populations 
"outside of Germany." He asked for an appropriation of 
$100,000,000 to be used at his discretion to supply food to 
liberated peoples of Austria, Turkey, Poland and western 
Russia — peoples who had no recognized governments and 
were unable to finance international obligations. The ap- 
propriation was granted and on March 2 President Wilson 
appointed Mr. 'Hoover as Director-General of the Ameri- 
can Relief Administration. The United States food-relief 
ship "Westward Ho" arrived at Danzig on March 6, and 
it was the first vessel to pass through the Kiel Canal after 
the outbreak of the war. 

Public opinion was agreed that the national Food Ad- 
ministration was free in a remarkable degree from anything 
savoring of scandal, when the general Administration 
seemed like a seething mass of scandal in one form or an- 
other. This is peculiarly gratifying when it is remembered 
that the forces and individuals with whom and through 
whom it had to operate were so diverse in their char- 
acteristics. Perhaps the most scathing contribution to 
the literature of the subject is that of Alfred W. 
McCann,^ who declared that the last week in April, 19 19, 
witnessed a shameless drive upon the wheat necessities of 
the nation with no justification other than the greed of the 
grain speculators and millers, and accused Food Adminis- 
trator Hoover of predicting a needlessly high price for 
wheat. 

While profiteers in food have the age merit back of 
them, and are regarded with no less favor in modern days 
than they were in ages past, they have always been looked 
upon with detestation. Hoarders of food were severely 
punished in ancient days. Pericles, the Athenian, 450 years 

'Reconstruction for June, 191 9, New York. 



40 The IVilson Administration and the Great War 

before Christ issued a decree that persons found hoarding 
food should be compelled to drink the fatal hemlock; and 
some 700 years later the Roman Emperor Diocletian issued 
decrees similar to a modern "fair-price list" and directed 
that profiteers should be put to death. 

With alacrity America will feed a famishing world; 
with equal alacrity will she smite those who would tear 
her down from her pedestal of fairness and justice and 
generosity. 



CHAPTER III 

THE FUEL ADMINISTRATION 

But fuel became the inseparable and essential partner 
of food in winning the war. This fact became well estab- 
lished after some depressing delays. 

As in practically all things else when the country was 
hurried into war unprepared, it was to the Council of 
National Defense to which the country had to turn for ac- 
tion in the matter of fuel. Accordingly, in May, the next 
month after the declaration of war, this Council appointed 
a commission on coal production, which, in turn, called to- 
gether coal operators, some four hundred in number. 
These, through a committee, agreed upon a price for coal, 
of $3 a ton east of Pittsburg, and $2.75 west thereof. Sec- 
retary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane was chairman of 
the committee making these prices, with what was believed 
ample precaution to avoid congestion of traffic and to speed 
production to the utmost limit, so that ample reserve stores 
could be accumulated. The Columbus, Ohio, and other 
papers attacked the prices as too high, and Secretary of 
War Baker, chairman of the Council of Defense repudiated 
the agreement as fixing too high a price. He was unwilling 
that the operators should receive more than $2.45 a ton. 
The result was that many operators were compelled to close 
their mines, while those that continued operation could not 
increase their output as would have been done at the 
higher and previously-fixed price by the Lane committee. In 
consequence, a fuel famine followed with the loss of hun- 
dreds of millions of dollars to the industry of the country 
and the still further enforced and more serious delay in war 
equipment, incalculable suffering, disease and death. And 

41 



42 The IVilson Administration and the Great War 

after all the mischief was done, the Administration sanc- 
tioned an increase in price to a figure higher than had been 
provided in the agreement made with the Lane committee. 

It was in the midst of these chaotic conditions in Au- 
gust, that President Wilson appointed Harry A. Garfield, 
president of Williams College, to the position of national 
Fuel Administrator. 

Previous to this, orders for coal by the million of tons 
were cancelled and little coal was moving. But now, with 
the approach of cold weather, new orders came in great 
volume. And there followed such a congestion of freight 
on the Atlantic seaboard for lack of ships to take it abroad, 
and such a dearth of cars to haul the coal, that by the end 
of the year the situation, because of the coal shortage, be- 
came most threatening, and was particularly serious in New 
England and New York. 

On December 28 the Government had taken over con- 
trol of the railroads; and the Director-General of Railroads 
promptly directed such routeing of cars as would most 
promptly and effectually relieve the situation which arose 
from the disastrous fuel shortage then confronting the coun- 
try. 

In these circumstances, for the purpose of saving fuel, 
manufactured gas was burned in some cities for heating pur- 
poses. Churches were urged to consolidate; coal on the 
sidetracks or in transit was seized for local use; the use of 
electricity, whose production required the use of coal, in 
hallways and offices, and for advertising purposes on the 
streets as well as for street lighting, was ordered cut. But 
in this matter there was a very generous difference of action 
in different sections of the country, even in different cities 
of the same section of the country. In Indianapolis, saloons, 
poolrooms, and theaters were closed until further notice; in 
Philadelphia, office buildings were required to eliminate 
the use of steam for heating purposes from seven o'clock in 



The Fuel Administration 43 

the evening until seven in the morning, and all on Sundays 
and holidays except to keep pipes from freezing; in Michi- 
gan, churches were not allowed to be heated more than 
six hours a week, or business places more than nine hours 
each week day; in St. Paul there was a radical cut in street 
lighting, while in Duluth the streets blazed with light as 
though nothing had happened. 

So serious a situation developed that on January 16, 
19 1 8, the Fuel Administrator ordered a drastic cut in the 
use of coal and directed the order in which coal-sellers were 
to give preference in coal deliveries. In all the country 
cast of the Mississippi River, including Minnesota and 
Louisiana, all industrial plants, including those manufactur- 
ing war munitions, were required to shut down for five days, 
January 18 to 22, and in them no fuel was to be used ex- 
cept in the manufacture of perishable foods, the printing 
of daily newspapers and the current issues of other periodi- 
cals, rhe priority of deliveries was in the following order: 
railroads; domestic users, hospitals, food stores and hotels; 
public utilities; bunkers; municipal, county and state gov- 
ernments and public use generally; manufacturers of per- 
ishable goods. 

Immediate and angry protest came from all parts of 
the country affected by the order. Even newspapers In 
west-Mississippi territory voiced pronounced opposition. 
Industry declared that it was uneconomical and would have 
disastrous effects and entail great loss upon industry and 
hardships upon working men of whom It would deprive 
wages aggregating millions of dollars. The United States 
Senate by resolution requested the Fuel Administrator to 
"delay for five days the order suspending the operation of 
industrial plants in portions of the United States In order 
that protests may be heard, Investigation made and informa- 
tion presented." ^ Had this request been heeded, the whole 

' McMaster's "United States in the World War," p. 422, op. cit. 



44 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

purpose of the order would have been nullified. Winter and 
the emergency would have passed before hearings could 
have been completed. 

Holding to the order, Fuel Administrator Garfield de- 
clared that It was necessary in order to prevent a crisis and 
widespread suffering. And when appeal was made to the 
President, his reply was: 

This war calls for many sacrifices, and the sacrifices called for by ] 
this order are infinitely less than sacrifices of life which might other- 
wise be involved. . . . Halfway measures would not have accom- 
plished the desired end. 

In fact, the local fuel administrator in Chicago had an- 
nounced that in Chicago industrial plants and factories 
would be obliged to close in five or six days unless relief 
came. 

The fact Is that when the stress in the fuel situation 
came during the severe winter of 1917-1918, the industrial 
production of the country was greater than the available 
ships could transport, with the delay caused by the lack of 
coal. The measure was drastic; but it was a war emergency 
and anything short of a drastic measure would have been 
futile. 

Moreover, there immediately followed another order 
that for ten consecutive Mondays, beginning January 28, 
no fuel, other than necessary to prevent freezing pipes, 
could be used to heat business places except those used as 
public official offices and other specified places, such as for 
food supplies, physicians' oflices and drugstores. It was esti- 
mated that this would effect a saving of 30,000,000 tons of 
coal and return the supply to normal. 

Besides, It is doubtful whether there was any one single 
event, save the calling of the sons of the nation to arms, | 
that so completely brought the American people to a sharp 
realization of the kind of war that was upon them. 

To emphasize the seriousness of the situation yet 



The Fuel Administration 45 

further, "heatless Mondays" were followed by "lightless 
Tuesdays." Church services were greatly curtailed and 
many schools were compelled to close, while many other 
unusual conditions attended the Government's successful 
efforts to keep coal moving toward industrial establishments; 
particularly to munition plants and all those engaged in war- 
equipment operations, and to the seaboard for the country's 
naval and merchant vessels. The extensive industries that 
sprang up because of the war, the railroad congestion due 
to the heavy shipment of material across the continent to 
the Atlantic seaboard, the most severe and exacting of 
thirty winters, and unsettled labor conditions — all these con- 
tributed to the fuel famine the first year the country was in 
the war. The winter of 19 17-19 18 was probably the most 
difficult for the people to pass through of any experienced 
since modern appliances came into use. 

The saving effected by these several measures was 
large. In early August, 19 18, the Fuel Administrator made 
public the statement that from the records which had been 
kept there was shown a saving of more than 60,000 kilo- 
watt-hours, the equal of about 100 tons of coal, on the first 
of the "lightless nights" in the borough of Manhattan, New 
York City, indicating a saving in Manhattan alone of 40,000 
tons of coal a year. 

As a further means of saving as a war measure, day- 
light saving was put into operation by turning the clock one 
hour ahead. It was estimated that by this method, from the 
facts gathered from various sections of the country by the 
Fuel Administration to determine the saving in fuel that 
might be effected by the operation of the daylight saving 
law, a saving of 1,250,000 tons of coal had been effected 
during the seven months' operation of the law during the 
summer of 1918. 

Broadly speaking, farmers opposed the plan while city 
workers favored it. Laboring people in the cities probably 
received the greatest benefit from its operation — workers 



46 The IVilson Administration and the Great War 

in factories, shops, stores and offices, for it not only gave 
them more hours of daylight for recreation in the evening, 
or for gardening, but it meant a large saving to the house- 
holder in the matter of lighting. To the last, those who 
furnished artificial light were witnesses, for it entailed an 
appreciable reduction in the aggregate of their income. And 
the total of savings from it, in homes and places of busi- 
ness, is estimated as high as $60,000,000 each summer. 

The position of the farmers on this plan is well stated 
by a newspaper correspondent in the heart of the agricul- 
tural West: 

The daylight-saving plan takes an hour from the morning and 
adds it in the evening. When there has been a heavy dew during 
the night, which is true most of the time, we cannot begin work in 
the fields until this has dried off, usually between eight and nine 
o'clock by the old time. 

That wouldn't be so bad if one didn't have hired help. I stay in 
the field myself until seven or eight in the evening, but my men, 
hired by the month, insist that their day's work is done at five or six, 
and won't stay on into the evening. That is their right, of course. 
Not all of them are that way, but the majority of them are. They 
wait around until the dew is gone, for they are not hired to do chores 
in many cases, then go out and work in the field until twelve, and 
quit at five so that they can go to town in the evening.^ 

Also came "gasless Sundays," the requirements of which 
the people accepted with the utmost good nature. It was 
not by an order, but merly a request on the part of the Fuel 
Administrator, that the people forego automobiling on Sun- 
day, for the purpose of saving gasoline for war needs. 
Though criticism resulted, and some that was not good- 
natured, the result was more than the mere saving of essen- 
tials in war needs, important as was that. The people were 
alert, and keen to see who was unwilling to forego a mere 
personal pleasure for the sake of successfully carrying for- 
ward the war. On the first of the few Sundays it was in 

^ Sioux Falls, S. D., Daily Argus-Leader, July 21, 1919. 



The Fuel Administration 47 

operation, there was alertness on the part of the public to 
note to what extent the request was observed. Weight of 
public opinion was probably never felt more than in the 
matter of this one simple request. They were but few who 
ventured out; but whoever had the hardihood to ignore the 
request, whether rich or poor, were made to understand 
unmistakably that ignoring the request would not be tol- 
erated. This was made plain in the yellow stripes that were 
made to adorn the automobiles of offenders, in almost any 
town in which they stopped in any part of the nation. And 
if they did not stop, they were made to stop long enough to 
apply the yellow stripes of disapproval of disregard of the 
Fuel Administrator's course as to "gasless Sundays." 

On October 17, 1918, he withdrew his request for gas- 
olineless Sundays. The loyal response of the people to the 
appeal east of the Mississippi River, it was stated by the 
Fuel Administration, had saved at least 1,000,000 barrels, 
and to have made it possible to give to the men at the front 
the supplies required in the prosecution of the war. 

The Fuel Administrator found it necessary to fix the 
price of coke and coal even after the signing of the armis- 
tice. On November 15, 191 8, he ordered: 

Coke produced in Taylor County, in the State of West Virginia, 
may be sold at prices per ton of 2,000 pounds, f. o. b. cars at ovens, 
not to exceed the following, viz., for blast-furnace coke, $6.75; for 
selected 72-hour foundry coke, $7.75. 

Coke produced in Hopkins County, in the State of Kentucky, may 
be sold at prices per ton of 2,000 pounds, f. o. b. cars at ovens, not 
to exceed the following, viz.., for blast-furnace coke, $7.25; for se- 
lected 72-hour foundry coke, $8.25. 

This order shall be effective at seven a. m., November 18, 1918. 

Also this, pertaining to a wholly different section of the 
country: 

Bituminous coal mined by Temple Fuel Company, at its mine 
in the State of Colorado, may be sold at prices f. o. b. cars at the 



48 The JFilson Administration and the Great War 

mine, not to exceed $2.15 per net ton for run of mine, $3.40 per 
net ton for prepared sizes, $1.55 per net ton for slack or screenings 
passing through a 1.25-inch screen. To these prices may be added the 
forty-five cents allowance for wage increase if the producing company 
is entitled to add such allowance under the President's order of 
October 27, 191 7. The maximum price herein-above fixed for pre- 
pared sizes is subject to the following monthly summer reductions: 
April I, 70 cents; May i, 50 cents; June i, 35 cents; July i, 15 
cents. 

This order to become effective at seven a. m., November 18, 19 18. 

One of the best results of the Fuel Administration's 
efforts was the order against putting upon the market dirty 
coal. After the signing of the armistice it had not relaxed 
its vigorous dealing with mine operators who willfully ig- 
nored the regulations laid down for the careful prepara- 
tion of coal to free it from impurities before placing it on 
the market for consumers. During the week ending No- 
vember 16, 19 1 8, four mines were ordered shut down be- 
cause of this offense. After the Fuel Administration had 
placed the ban on dirty coal, a total of 119 mines had been 
closed, 12 of which, up to the week ending November 16, 
19 1 8, had received permission to resume operations. 

The order of the Fuel Administrator that coal might be 
delivered to the curb and dumped there without further ado, 
raised a furor in certain circles. But it was war time, and 
there was a great shortage of men; the people smilingly 
accepted any hard or undesirable situation that arose, while 
fortifying themselves for the next. But when the man 
ordering coal was informed by the dealer that he might 
have the coal but that he would have to put it into the bin 
himself because of the lack of man power, and that he 
would therefore have a reduction of thirty-five cents per 
ton, and the driver delivering It, when about to dump it on 
the sidewalk as ordered, said that for a dollar-and-half per 
ton he would put it into the bin, the householder looked less 
philosophically upon the new situation. 



The Fuel Administration 40 

The severe criticism heaped upon Fuel Administrator 
Garfield's shoulders, following his drastic fuel-saving order 
of January 16, 19 18, was hardly properly placed. The sit- 
uation in which the country was found was the logical result 
of the pacifist practices of the Administration for the previ- 
ous three years, long before Doctor Garfield had any connec- 
tion with the Administration's activities. It was only three 
days after this order that Senator Chamberlain made his 
notable speech in New York, declaring that the Adminis- 
tration had ceased to function in practically all branches, 
though his criticism was directed at the War Department. 

The serious fuel situation had developed before Doctor 
Garfield was appointed. When Secretary of War Baker 
overthrew the coal prices fixed by the Lane Committee in 
June, 19 1 7, two months before Doctor Garfield was ap- 
pointed, he committed the first serious blunder in the fuel 
situation, as he had constantly blundered in the War De- 
partment; and before Fuel Administrator Garfield could 
remedy the error, the railroads were ceasing to furnish full 
service to the country, either under private or government 
control. And immediately thereafter followed the ex- 
tremely severe winter eating into the coal stocks to an un- 
precedented extent. 

To-day scarcely anyone denies the wisdom of Fuel Ad- 
ministrator Garfield's course. As soon as the extreme win- 
ter was past, he began gripping the situation in a manner 
promising well for the months to follow. He had deter- 
mined that whatever difficulties might ensue for the follow- 
ing winter, the country would be well cared for in the matter 
of fuel. In October, 19 18, the nation's fuel supplies were 
adequate and well distributed, but he still urged the need 
of economy. The coal stocks then on hand were greater 
than ever before; but he urged that the needs were also 
greater. The upper Great Lakes territory which cuts most 
deeply into transportation, had received the greatest pro- 
portionate supply. Fewer workers than ever before had 



50 Tlie fVilson Administration and the Great War 

produced 38,000,000 tons more coal in the first six months 
of 19 1 8 than were produced in the corresponding months of 
19 1 7. But now the railroads, under public control, had 
awakened to the situation which Fuel Administrator Gar- 
field had tried to impress upon them before the desperate 
situation in the winter of 1917=1918, when the Director- 
General of Railroads failed to place an embargo upon the 
transportation of non-essentials. 

Bolshevism, whether of American citizens or aliens, must 
never be permitted to control an essential to all the activi- 
ties of the genuine American life. 



CHAPTER IV 

LABOR AND WAGES 

With two large movements President Wilson's name 
must be inextricably linked: Labor and League. The big- 
ness of the former was so lost sight of in the overshadowing 
importance of the other that, in large measure, it dropped 
from the public thought. In the form in which it was pre- 
sented it became a problem, the solution of which would 
have been sufficiently notable in the career of any one man 
to give him a worthy place in the history of his country in 
time of peace; doubly so in time of war. 

When, however, any man by his deliberate purpose, 
whether that purpose be high or low, creates his own prob- 
lem and seeks to make it the problem of society, he deserves 
no consideration from history, other than the bare record, 
if he fails to solve that problem for the future. And if his 
handiwork leaves incomplete the solution of a problem which 
is of his creation and not of the demands of either the pres- 
ent or the future, he cannot be assigned the role of states- 
man, but rather of blunderer or traducer. 

When, in the summer of 191 6, President Wilson under- 
took to secure an understanding between the railroads and 
their trainmen, the public at once took keen interest, hoping 
for a happy solution. When, however, he undertook to 
force through Congress the Adamson bill, the interest was 
no less keen, but it became a depressing episode in the 
Administration's labor activities. It then, for the first time, 
became plain to the great public that President Wilson was 
willing to play autocrat to favor a strongly organized body 
of voters. That a subservient Congress yielded in ill humor 
did not relieve of executive odium. This course on the part 

51 



52 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

of the President marks the labor policy, if it be worty of 
such designation, pursued by the Administration in time of 
peace. 

But the Administration's attitude on the matter of sal- 
aries, labor, and the wage problem was a strange jumble 
during the entire eight years. That its course was inconsist- 
ent was a matter of minor importance; that it was a matter 
of injustice was a matter of great importance; that it was 
a matter involving Americanism itself was a matter of prime 
importance. Even for his own reputation the President 
failed to see in advance the natural consequences of his 
driving through the Adamson bill in 1916. Or if he did see 
it, that was a matter of minor importance at that moment. 
It was the presidential election, then just before him, that 
was of leading importance. But when the same unions that 
forced his hand in 19 16, came three years later with a like 
demand for increase of wages, he woke to the peril he had 
stirred in 19 16. Now it was almost the time to begin se- 
curing delegates for the presidential conventions, and once 
more the organized labor forces deemed it time to strike. 
They again approached the President with well-defined 
threats unless their demands for increased wages were 
granted. This time they came with some basis for their 
demands: greatly increased cost of living. That the great 
mass of the people, the great unorganized public, had to 
meet this increased cost of living without the greatly in- 
creased pay granted to the railroad men by the President's 
action of 19 16 and by the Railroad Administration during 
the war and now by their new demand for increased pay, all 
of which must be loaded upon the public, did not disturb the 
trainmen. 

The Adamson law had given the Big Four Brotherhoods 
— firemen, engineers, conductors, and brakemen — a wage 
increase of about $70,000,000; to these was given a further 
increase of about $160,000,000 two years later upon the 
recommendations of the Lane Commission to Director-Gen- 



Labor and IVages 53 

eral McAdoo. While all this was added to the burdens of 
the public with little or no increrse in salaries or wages, the 
trainmen unblushingly came with the still larger demand of 
19 19, at which time the President was getting ready to 
tour the country in the interest of the League of Nations, 
and after Mr. McAdoo had added to the rail employes 
approximately $250,000,000 per annum in addition to that 
of the Lane report. 

Under these circumstances, the President did not meet 
the issue squarely as in 19 16. He went immediately before 
Congress with the matter, apparently to seek a way to re- 
duce living costs, so as to meet the complaint of the train- 
men that it was because of the increased cost of living that 
they came; and he frankly spoke of the "vicious cycle" 
which another increase of railroad wages would but con- 
tinue. And in order to rid himself of the matter until he 
could tour the country in the interest of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations, he agreed to call a conference of 
labor men, with others, to meet in Washington two months 
later. This met his immediate purpose. Always accommo- 
dating toward organized labor, the other laborers mattered 
little. Seeking to support the contention that while, under 
the enormous totals added to the railway pay-rolls of em- 
ployes, the increase of wages had been but fifty per cent 
while the increased cost of living was fifty-five per cent, no 
heed was paid to the more imperative demands of the third 
party, the great unorganized public. The Housewives' 
League of the country, the Consumers' League of the na- 
tion, representing the tens of millions of the common folks, 
had published far and wide the intolerable increases in the 
costs of living. To it all the President was deaf. One 
might have thought he would feel some interest in the em- 
ployes directly under his jurisdiction, the employes of the 
executive departments of the government, some of whom 
were receiving the same salaries that were paid before the 
Civil War with an increase of thirty-three cents a day; or, 



54 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

one might think that he would take an interest in a matter 
of supreme importance in the District of Cokimbia, at the 
very seat of government, where seventy-five per cent of the 
teachers are paid annually $800 or less. But they could 
not get his ear. Yet as soon as organized voters made de- 
mands, they had his attention. 

But this time the "rubber-stamp" Congress had gone 
out of existence. 

On the floor of the Senate, December 5, 1919, Senator 
Kellogg, of Minnesota, stated that while he had no criti- 
cism upon the wage increases given to railroad workers 
upon the report of the Wage Commission, of which Secre- 
tary Franklin K. Lane was chairman, he did criticise the 
Administration's issuing many orders reclassifying em- 
ployes, placing them in the higher-wage class without change 
in actual employment. In this connection he pointed out 
that office boys of twelve or thirteen years, studying short- 
hand or going to school part of the time, had their wages 
raised to as high as eighty and ninety dollars a month, and 
that in many Instances men in subordinate positions were 
receiving salaries higher than their superiors; he also added 
that these gross inequalities added greatly to the cost of 
operation of the railroads, created unrest, and had a bad 
effect on the morale of the service. Proceeding in his re- 
marks, the Senator further stated: 

Men are constantly being taken out of one class and placed in 

a higher skilled class In one case, men engaged in cleaning 

Pullman cars were taken out of the ordinary day-labor class and 
placed in the class of expert upholsterers and their pay raised from 
40 cents to 68 cents an hour, and they still continue to perform their 
old duties. . . . That is going on all over the country. 

As a matter of fact it was not a reduction in the number 
of hours of labor that the railroad men sought in their 
19 1 6 demands. What they put out for the public was just 
that. What they really demanded and obtained was a ten- 



Labor and Wages 55 

hour wage for an eight-hour day, and pay-and-half for all 
time over the eight hours. Indeed, they hoped to work 
every hour they could crowd in at that pay, up to the six- 
teen-hour limit.^ And they accomplished that, in the de- 
velopment of this personal policy of President Wilson. 

For there was no more demand for the President's 
backing a demand such as that made by the Big Brother- 
hoods of 19 16, as a public policy, than that his forced meas- 
ure should embrace all underpaid groups of workers or 
individual workers. Indeed, there was relatively less de- 
mand than for increased pay for such social forces of the 
nation as teachers who had to pay out large sums in prepara- 
tion for their work, while the others were always receiving 
pay while in preparation for their life calling. The Presi- 
dent's policy tended to develop the material side of the na- 
tion rather than the spiritual. 

As a further result of this policy, when the nation found 
itself suddenly thrust into the war it was thrown into as 
great a muddle, with all its opportunity for preparation, as 

^I had occasion to be in Williston, N. D., in November, 1918, from 
which town I took an early freight to a station a few miles east. In the 
caboose alone with a commercial traveller and myself, the brakeman was 
freely expressing his joy over conditions. He said the next day "the ghosts 
would be about," which he explained as meaning that it was pay-day, and 
he would receive $110 for half a month's work. He stated further that he 
had been on the railroad but a short time, that he had no experience as a 
railroad man, that he was aged about 22 or 23 years, that their trains were 
very light, and that unless they had at least one way-car they could not go 
out; that his run to Minot was very light, that they had to reach that point 
not later than 9 o'clock, since at that hour the 16-hour limit expired, and that 
they had to kill time on the way to make it cover the sixteen hours (a cold- 
blooded method of bleeding the people with which any intelligent travelling 
man of experience is wholly familiar). That evening I met him in Minot 
at 9 o'clock and when I asked how long he had been in, he hilariously re- 
plied: "Just now got in." 

In Minneapolis at the Soo shops worked a boy of 17 years, with little 
education, who had no one dependent upon him, and lived at home with his 
parents. He received upwards of $200 a month. His preparation had cost 
him nothing, and he was paid for every hour of his preparation for his 
work. 

In the P. R. R. shops at Sunbury, Pa., was a man engaged who gleefully 
wrote his friends that he had scarcely time to write as he was receiving 
$11 for every day he was at work. These three instances in three widely 
separated sections of the country came to my attention at about the same 
time. — Author. 



^6 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

was England or France with the shells dropping at their 
doors and the very integrity of their territory threatened, 
with not a day for preparation. In consequence, there was 
an immediate demand for labor in all branches of industry 
in war preparation; and labor, in turn, made immediate de- 
mands for increased pay to meet that allowed the railroad 
brotherhoods under the President's pressure in 191 6. It 
was confusion worse confounded; the "cost-plus-a-per- 
cent" plan was adopted by the Administration, under which 
grabbing contractors cared nothing as to how much they 
paid for labor for it was merely added to the cost and to 
that the per cent, which put into their pockets the more 
money as the cost became the greater — a plan under which 
even the cantonments were built by contractors, instead of 
having it done by the government's own engineer corps and 
other suitable branches of the service, thereby releasing 
hundreds of thousands of skilled laborers for essential 
work elsewhere, as was done in France. 

Nor was it till the war was well done that the Adminis- 
tration adopted a general labor policy. On June 15, 19 18, 
Secretary of Labor Wilson in a letter to the President 
stated: 

A dispensable industry competes for the labor of an essential 
plant. Instances are frequent where one government project secures 
men at the expense of another. As a result, the labor turnover is 
alarmingly great, with a loss in war efficiency which we cannot 
afford. 

And he added that one of the serious consequences of this 
situation was the effect upon the morale of the workers, 
producing and encouraging restlessness. And the Presi- 
dent responding to the Secretary's suggestion that a central 
agency should be established to determine where labor 
should go, pointed to the United States Employment Serv- 
ice. Prior to this, the Administration was fumbling to find 
a policy that would fit the emergency of backing up at 



Labor and Wages 57 

home the boys that were doing the fighting at the front. 

From this grew the "work-or-fight" order. When this 
policy was announced it met approval from one end of the 
land to the other. But some of the edge was taken from it 
by the announcement in early July that it would apply only 
to men of draft age. In his explanatory statement, Gen- 
eral Crowder said that it was not a satisfying spectacle to 
see a contingent of one class of men marching down the 
street to camp, while other men of their own age, watching 
them from the shop windows remained behind to sell cigar- 
ettes or dispense soda-fountain drinks. " 'Work or 
fight' — there is no alternative," he declared, to the delight 
of real Americans. 

And the later draft law meant the same principle was 
to become operative; for the conscripting of all men be- 
tween the ages of 18 and 45 was not so much a conscription 
of men to fight as it was of men to work. It meant work 
or fight and meant it with a certainty that could not be mis- 
understood.^ The new edict became effective July i, 19 18. 

And from about this time, the federal employment serv- 
ice became a most effective branch of government activity. 
Starting originally as a part of the immigration service, it 
was later placed upon a firm foundation that enabled it to 
render real service to the nation. As the harvest season 
of 19 1 8 approached, the director-general at Kansas City, 
as an example, was in receipt of daily reports from his 
representatives in the field whereby he was fully informed 
as to the stages of the ripening grain, the probable time 
when harvesters would be required, and the number at 
each place. It linked the mariless job with the jobless man. 
It did good service in aiding the returned fighters, at the 
close of hostilities, to get employment promptly and with 
little loss of time. 

'General Crowder stated it naively in this way: "I believe the effect 
of the additional registration will be to recruit industry up to the point 
where there will be no shortage of industrial man power." 



58 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

The growth of unionism was a notable result of the 
Adamson law. The government had opposed the unioniz- 
ing of its employes; but as soon as the railways passed 
under its control, the Director-General prohibited inter- 
ference with efforts of the employes to organize. If per- 
missible in one branch of the service, why not in all? Ac- 
cordingly, every branch of the service in the departments 
in Washington and out was unionized. The irony of it 
all was that it was done to protect the employe against the 
government's injustice itself — one of the sternest comments 
upon President Wilson's social-justice ideas in forcing upon 
the country the demands of the railroad brotherhoods in 
19 1 6, while some of the employes in his own executive de- 
partments were living on starvation salaries,^ established 
in 1857, when a $500 salary was as good as a $1500 salary 
in 19 1 6. And it was known that the greatly increased pay 
then allowed to the railroad men, in addition to the previous 
advances, $300,000,000 increase recommended in the Lane 
report, effective January i, 19 18, and still later another 
$500,000,000, with still other increases later, was all added 
to the increased cost of living, of which those whose sal- 
aries had not been increased had to pay the larger pro- 
portionate share. 

If President Wilson did not foresee some of the logical 
results of the policy which he inaugurated in 19 16 when, 
under threat of a strike on the part of the railroad men, 
he discarded the principle of arbitration, that fact does 
not add to his qualification as statesman. It was the threat 
that was repeated in 19 19 by the railroad workers, one 
of whose leaders declared they were using the method of 
the cavemen — sheer brute force to gain their ends. And on 
September 22, four days before the tie-up of the British 
railroads, the great steel strike in the United States oc- 
curred, led by one Fitzpatrick, a horseshoer who had never 

^Hearings by House Committee on Labor, spring of 1916. And in 1918 
cabinet and other high officials asked that salaries of department employes 
be based at least upon decency and humanity. 



Labor and IVages 59 

worked in a steel plant, and William Z. Foster, a syndicalist. 
These were followed by the soft-coal strike on November 
I, 19 19, in violation of a contract of the miners with the 
government. These were not bona fide labor moves, but 
plans to break the will of the public. And yet another con- 
sequence of President Wilson's labor policy was the inordi- 
nately high wages paid in industrial centers, withdrawing 
from the farms the essential help that would otherwise have 
remained on the farm. And the warning going out from 
the farms is that the farmers will produce what they may 
be able to supply the hungry world in the great depletion 
of help, but that if the world goes hungry it will not be 
their fault."* This is a serious problem for the future, 
created by President Wilson when he whipped the Adamson 
bill through Congress in 19 16 to aid a favored class. And 
from that day, classism has grown by leaps and bounds in 
the United States. It sought to control the Administration 
and to become the government during 19 19. By this time 
the Administration seeing its plight took the firm position 
it should have assumed in 19 16. It is well illustrated in the 
attitude of laboring men in the "outlaw" switchmen's strike, 
April, 1920. John Grunau, Chicago radical leader, de- 
clared that "the fight has become one between the new and 
old unions"; while W. G. Lee, president of the brother- 
hoods of railroad trainmen, demanded that some law be 
enforced against the "outlaw" strikers. Yet Lee was among 
the first to object to the anti-strike clause in the Esch-Cum- 
mins railroad bill. The logic of this is that he was willing 
that his brotherhood may strike against the interest of the 
public but that he rejected the idea that any organization 
might strike against the policy of his own brotherhood. In 
other words, he was ready to exalt his Brotherhood above 

*See Senator Capper of Kansas in the North American Review, August, 
1920. A serious omission in the review, as Senator Capper sees it, is that 
he fails to call attention to marked decrease in the number of farm-pro- 
duced boys and girls in the last two decades, a factor upon which the farmer 
and the whole nation has relied heretofore. 



6o The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

Government and People. If, as held by organized labor 
leaders, the unrestricted right to strike is "natural and in- 
herent," then it must be a right common to all and cannot 
be monopolized by some favored Brotherhood or Federa- 
tion. But this was an unworthy frame of mind into which 
they were led by the favoritism of the coddling Adminis- 
tration. 

Was labor loyal during the war? This was a question 
often asked by the public. Labor as a whole was thor- 
oughly loyal. Too many labor leaders were utterly disloyal, 
though they took every precaution to conceal it from the 
public. They adopted the camouflaging method character- 
istic of the National Administration. In support of this 
view are cited the Bridgeport strike which was completely 
demolished by the energetic action of President Wilson; 
the threatened strike of railroad laborers, in which Direc- 
tor-General McAdoo's prompt action was decisive ; and the 
letter Samuel Gompers, President of the American Feder- 
ation of Labor, wrote Senator Thomas when the news- 
papers were stating that the latter was about to introduce 
a bill to penalize workmen who absented themselves from 
their employment in war plants, which meant in war time, 
when stating: 

The workmen in the United States are doing their full share of 
service and duty. They are whole-heartedly supporting the war 
program. They are giving themselves, their sons, their brothers, and 
other blood relations on the firing line.^ 

In this pronouncement Mr. Gompers appears to proclaim 
the doctrine of vicarious patriotism, and to hold that men 
engaged in war plants were to be privileged above any 
other class in the country; that labor, per se, had a right 
to a preferred classification. And, like so many other labor 
leaders, he placed these highly-paid laborers above any other 

"Contrast, in Collier's Weekly for September 14, 1918, a statement of 
a shirk paid $9.90 a day — a method quite common by laborers on govern- 
ment work during the war. 



Labor and IF ayes 6i 

civilian class and even above the very men who, at that 
time, were giving their lives to the country and even for the 
high-priced shirks in war plants. Then, was labor loyal? 

It was common for labor, in its organized form, to 
point the finger at the men fattening in the munition plants 
and in war industries of all kinds. It was proper. Profiteer- 
ing by such industries was notorious. Yet these same labor- 
ing men were willing to fatten off the very life-blood of 
the boys who so earnestly put themselves into the conflict 
for civilization. The labor man was willing to grasp all 
he could in the hour of the Government's need, while the 
boys fighting for the very man who hid himself as a work- 
man in the munition plants at home was suffering and dying 
in the trenches for a miserable pittance. Nor was this all. 
While the so-called laboring man was squeezing the last 
possible nickel out of the Government through organized 
labor and was receiving it with commendable regularity, 
the man with the fighting forces found it difficult to receive 
his little pay from the government, because of the inefli- 
ciency of the Administration, for himself, his wife, and his 
babe at home.® 

Why the Administration of the war period should be 
willing to tolerate any such condition was inexplicable. The 
money was on hand for the government civilian employe who 

"This became so notorious as to amount to a national scandal. The 
Administration promptly advanced the pay of well-organized railroad men, 
at first by the tens of millions, then by hundreds of millions, and later by the 
billion; while the neglect of the pay to the fighting men tarnished the na- 
tion's fair name. No civilian officer of the Administration from President 
down went without his pay regularly, nor did well-paid laboring men 3000 
to 6000 miles from the firing line. One case illustrates the method. It is 
within my personal knowledge: No allotment was being paid '-the wife of 
the enlisted man until a law was enacted that all allotments to the wife 
should date back to the man's entry into the service. Then the Admin- 
istration, instead of acting in a straight-forward manner, took from the 
pay of the fighter the .$15 per month of governmental allotment due 
the wife, and dating this allotment from January 13, 1918, though he had 
been in the service a full month previous; and up to the following December 
he had not been able to get from the Government any of that due to his 
infant child. This is in marked contrast with the Administration's care 
to pay promptly and with enormously increased wages organized labor. — 
Author. 



62 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

remained away from danger and at a high salary or wage; 
why not for the fighting man who left wife and babe behind 
at one-third to one-fifth of the pay the other was receiving? 
Nor was this the only matter pertaining to labor and wages 
in which the Administration's attitude will not bear scru- 
tiny. The public, after hostilities ceased, asked why organ- 
ized labor was making so frequent appeals for amnesty for 
political prisoners of the Debs and Mooney type, and why 
the Administration was responding by the release of those 
of the type of Kate O'Hare. Other elements of the Ameri- 
can citizenship were not worried lest some disloyalist should 
serve in prison the sentence imposed by the courts in the 
regular course of legal procedure after full sifting of the 
case. The public also wanted to know why, after the Ad- 
ministration's marked favors to organized labor, the pay- 
roll of labor was two and a half times as high as before the 
war while labor was less efficient, the work produced per 
man being greatly reduced. When Lloyd George was fight- 
ing the bolshevistic tendency of workingmen in England, he 
won by the proof that every previous wage increase had been 
followed by a lessening of production: that with 100,000 
more miners at work at wages 172 per cent higher there 
was a decline of 16 per cent in production."^ His position 
was quite in contrast with that of the American Adminis- 
tration in favoring the coal strikers in the fall of 19 19. 
Fuel Administrator Garfield fixed, upon a scientific basis, 
the miners' wages at a 14 per cent increase. His position 
was favored by the cabinet. President Wilson, however, 
overturned all in favor of the radical element among the 
miners who were violating a contract with the Government 
and practically threatening rebellion. 

In that connection Doctor Garfield uttered the words of 
a statesman when he said : 

If one class of workers demands more than like workers are get- 
ting, that class is trying to levy tribute upon the people of the coun- 
' See page 78, 



Labor and Wages 63 

try and does not differ from corporations wliith seek profits for the 
few at the expense of the many. They certainly put themselves in 
the position of law-breakers. 

This attitude of sound sense was more than the Adminis- 
tration could bear, and Doctor Garfield promptly resigned 
his position of national Fuel Administrator, thwarted in 
his efforts to aid the vast unorganized public In its battle 
against organized labor and organized Industry; for it was 
becoming notorious that between these two the public was 
being crushed, and In some instances evidence was not want- 
ing that the two were working in harmony to squeeze from 
the purse of the public all It would endure. Garfield felt 
that sound principle had been deserted for a makeshift; he 
was unwilling to keep step In a march that was sure to be 
fatal to the future. 

The public was glad of the opportunity to meet with 
captains of industry and captains of labor, In the Industrial 
Conference called by President Wilson to meet In Washing- 
ton, October 6, 19 19. It was the first of the kind. The 
great steel strike was on at this time, and passions were 
aroused. The public group had little opportunity In this 
Conference, which was presided over by Secretary of the 
Interior Franklin K. Lane, representing this group. He 
stated practically the same principle as Garfield. He 
declared that "Increase In the wage rate does not always 
give relief. The more productive we are, the sooner we 
shall replace the wastage of war, return to normal price 
levels and abolish the opportunity of profiteering." But the 
conference was dashed to pieces on the rocks of selfishness 
of the Industrial and labor groups. 

It Is always thus. And It is doubtful whether the prin- 
ciple of the right to strike announced by Judge George W. 
Anderson,^ of the federal bench In Boston, Is as sound as it 
may appear at first sight. For in almost all Instances it is 
the great unorganized public that suffers, while the labor 

'Opinion in the deportation of aliens cases, June 23, 1920. 



64 The IVilson Administration and the Great IFar 

leaders and the industrial leaders continue to bleed this pub- 
lic. Says one writer touching this matter of the relations of 
the two selfish groups toward the public : 

Labor unions and manufacturers' associations are morally on a 
par. Both are recruited by a changing personnel concerned about 
gettmg on. ■" 

The public is coming to understand this unity of purpose 
on the part of these two groups, so well concealed under 
the cloak of a savage warfare in too many instances; and 
it is one of the items charged by the public sternly against 
the Wilson Administration from the time President Wilson 
undertook, as a personal policy, to favor strongly organized 
voters, while ignoring the general public and workers in 
more important positions at a greatly less salary or wage. 
The insolence of wealth may deserve all the anathemas 
hurled against it; but the relentlessness of the autocracy of 
organized labor cannot escape the scathing it is receiving 
from the great American public now arousing itself to 
the real situation. If the Administration has innocently 
brought this about, It should be so recorded as a matter of 
historical significance. 

During the spring of 1920, the cost of materials and 
of labor was so exorbitant that building operations were 
practically at a standstill. At that time builders would not 
assure any prospective building patron that material could 
be obtained, and owing to the uncertainty of the labor situa- 
tion some would contract to erect houses only on the cost- 
plus plan — an adaptation of the plan upon which the 
Administration operated during the war period. But It did 
not work. The people were better economists than the 
National Administration. And while the situation was 
eased as to material by July i, there was no change in 
the labor situation. Soon there was a shortage of houses 
in the United States estimated at a million. 

"H. M. Kallen, "The League of Nations," pp. 168-169, Marshall Jones 
Company, Boston, 1919. 



Labor and Wages 65 

Nor did the condition greatly change In the spring of 
192 1. It was only after the Railroad Labor Board ren- 
dered Its decision, effective July i, materially reducing 
wages on the railroads, that labor was forced to confess 
that it could not remain the only favored class In the coun- 
try. Though late In the season to begin building operations, 
there was a very perceptible increase In activities In July. 

Autocracy of labor controlling the Government and 
ruling the people means unfree labor and enforced sub- 
serviency of a helpless public. America must be kept free. 
The people are determined It shall be. The unwarranted 
threat of a strike October 30, 192 1, on the part of railroad 
employes was so heartily disapproved by the public as a 
strike against the public rather than against the railroads, 
that Its failure was foredoomed. 



CHAPTER V 

SHIPBUILDING 

Here are some of the familiar sayings uttered during 
the war : — 

President Wilson: "Food and other supplies must be 
carried across the seas, no matter how many ships are sent 
to the bottom." 

Edward N. Hurley of the United States Shipping 
Board: "The whole war depends upon ships — ships de- 
pend upon labor, and labor depends upon the ability of this 
board, through an adequate reserve, to supply the yards." 

David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain: 
"The road of victory, the guarantee of victory, the absolute 
assurance of victory, has to be found in one word, ships, 
and a second word, ships, and a third word, ships. 

"The collapse of Russia and the reverses to Italy make 
it even more imperative that the United States send as many | 
troops as possible across the Atlantic as early as possible." 

The Shipping Board made its promises and statements 
to the country extravagant enough to appeal to one of 
America's most fundamental characteristics — a spirit of 
boastfulness that likes to believe In its own ability to accom- 
plish anything that can be accomplished by man. The 
Shipping Board said, "We will build ships." America said: 
"Of course we will build ships." The Shipping Board said: 
"We will span the ocean with ships; we will carry grain and 
munitions and men to Europe over this bridge of ships, and 
not over a bridge of sighs." America said: "We will span 
the seas; we will carry grain and munitions and men to 
Europe over this bridge; we will send the pirates to the 

66 



Shipbuilding 67 

bottom of the ocean; we will back our Allies to the last 
dollar." But the bridge of ships became a bridge of 
sighs. ^ 

To any one knowing the real situation which was de- 
veloping, the game played by the chairman of the Shipping 
Board and his associates during the last half of 19 17 and 
early part of 19 18 was a staggering commentary on the 
power of publicity upon the people when administered 
through the governmental agencies of that day. It was also 
a somewhat disquieting commentary upon the intelligence of 
American public opinion, except for the fact that America 
had no standard by which to judge the propaganda put out 
by the Administration. 

Long before America entered upon the armed conflict 
of .the world, it was a recognized truth that the issue would 
be determined by the world's shipping. When it became 
an acknowledged reality that the ruthless de^struction advo- 
cated as a policy by the German naval leader Tirpitz had 
become the policy of his government, then the world under- 
stood. America then understood. 

Accordingly, by virtue of the Act of September 7, 19 16, 
the United States Shipping Board was created and it, in 
turn, created the Fleet Corporation. And as a consequence, 
America went Into shipbuilding as no other nation had ever 
previously gone into the business. 

But it was put aside for so long a time, that when the 
crisis came, affairs came to be a muddle and efforts had to 
be redoubled to straighten them out, at a very great ex- 
penditure. 

The upshot of the matter, however, shows that when 
America was aroused and set her shoulder to the wheel, she 
was capable of bringing to pass things hardly conceivable; 
that a prodigious program could be executed, even under 
the handicap of previous neglect and incapable management. 

^ff^ar tVeehl^. 



68 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

This chapter will seek to set out some of the things that 
should become a matter of permanent record for the gen- 
eral reader. 

In April, 19 17, when war was declared by the United 
States, there were in the thirty-seven steel shipyards of 
the country only 162 launching ways. In June, 19 18, there 
were 398 ways so designed as to permit the construction of 
steel ships, three-fourths of them on the Atlantic coast north 
of Norfolk, or on rivers directly tributary. Upon the 
operation of these depended the success of the nation's ship- 
building project for the purpose of prosecution of the Great 
War's aims — replacing the shipping which the Central 
Powers had been destroying at the rate of a million tons a 
month, and transporting to Europe food, soldiers, and war 
Implements. 

But at a time when prompt action was urgently needed, 
there arose an unfortunate and aggravating wrangle be- 
tween Mr. Goethals and Mr. Denman, men holding official 
positions of equal authority, as to whether steel or wooden 
ships should be built under the circumstances, including 
the great need of haste then demanded. Wooden ships, at 
first decided upon, were later discarded in favor of steel, 
for which Mr. Goethals contended from the first. 

The urgent need of united, prompt, and efficient action 
at this time was indicated by the wholesale destruction of 
shipping by the submarines of the enemy countries. At 
the beginning of the Great War, the total tonnage of the 
merchant marine of the Allies and neutral powers was ap- 
proximately 40,050,000. Of this, some 21,404,000 tons 
were destroyed, and the destruction was at an appalling 
rate when the Allies were not ready to replace it with new 
ships; this was what made it look, at one time, as if the 
toll of shipping which the enemy U-boats were taking would 
settle the war by starving the Entente Powers into submis- 
sion before the United States could furnish sufficient ships 
to replace the excessive losses. But when the ravages of 



Shipbuilding 69 

the under-sea enemy boats were slackened, there was a 
breathing space during which this country had opportunity 
to retrieve, in a measure, its past errors. 

But while more than half of the Allies' shipping was 
going to the bottom of the sea, it was replaced by two-thirds 
of the amount destroyed, or 14,270,000 tons of new ship- 
ping, besides 3,795,000 tons of enemy shipping seized. 
How much new shipping was constructed by the enemy is 
not known. 

An error made by the United States Emergency Fleet 
Corporation in the beginning of its existence was the policy 
of not using to the full the shipbuilding facilities which then 
existed in the country and expanding them to the limit. 
Instead, it constructed many and expensive and extensive 
new yards, some of which were located in mere swamps. 
This policy not only delayed the start in the construction 
of new ships, but it rendered less simple the problems of 
labor and management — most important factors at a time 
when the enemy was destroying 1,000,000 tons of ships 
a month. 

A man in the person of Edward N. Hurley, who was 
not a shipbuilder and who had had no experience in ship- 
ping matters, was placed at the head of the Shipping Board. 
As if this were not bad enough, he persistently ignored the 
advice of practical shipping men and began making the 
country the most extravagant promises, so that he led the 
people to forget that there was any submarine menace. 
Before he had been in office many weeks, the country was 
told that something like 10,000,000 tons had been con- 
tracted for. His press agents made the most of this prom- 
ise to convince the country that this amount of tonnage 
was to be expected in 19 18. Later the figure was reduced 
to 8,000,000, then to 6,000,000. Real shipbuilders warned 
the chairman against his unfounded promises, and urged 
him to save wrecking the facilities that already existed, since 
his policy was merely disturbing normal production without 



70 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

enlarging it, while it was hopelessly congesting transporta- 
tion facilities. But the warnings went unheeded, men who 
had spent their lives in shipbuilding were cast aside, and 
Mr. Hurley's press agents filled the newspapers with prom- 
ises which led the public to believe that a thousand or more 
ships would be available for transportation of troops and 
supplies during 191 8, of which number two hundred would 
be turned out at Hog Island yard alone. 

This method of misleading the people continued 
throughout the fall and winter of 1917-1918. And when 
the promises were not fulfilled, Mr. Hurley pleaded rail 
congestion, the most severe winter known and the labor 
situation, and at length, no longer able to hold back the 
demands of the country, he, directly or indirectly, laid the 
blame upon the shipbuilders, and in an address at South 
Bend, Indiana, middle of July, 19 18, he named 3,000,000 
tons, merely adding that Mr. Schwab "believes 3,000,000 
tons can be exceeded." 

The situation became acute by the early spring of 19 18. 
On March 26, just five days after the tremendous drive 
of the enemy began and within a few days of a year after 
we had entered the conflict, Mr. Hurley, in an address in 
New York before the National Marine League of the 
United States stated that all of the shipyards of the coun- 
try were full when the Shipping Board took them over, and 
added: 

It is only recently that America awoke to the vital needs of ships 
at a belated hour. At a belated hour came the realization that con- 
stant supplies must go to our boys already on the fighting Hne. At a 
belated hour came the realization that without ships we can neither 
keep up the line of supply nor get our new armies to the front. We 
are faced with the necessity of creating an entirely new industry. 
We had to undertake a job that would have daunted anyone but 
America. 

And his hearers knew that had the Shipping Board kept 
hands off, the ships then filling the yards would have slipped 



Shipbuilding 'jl 

off the ways a good deal sooner than they did. And the 
real shipbuilders of the country knew that the statements 
of the chairman were not based upon fact. The truth is, 
he was an amateur and easily accepted proposals of men 
who had nothing to lose by experimenting. 

Secretary of War Baker's serious error of judgment may 
have had something to do with the bad shipbuilding situa- 
tion in January, 191 8, when seventy 8,000-ton troop-ships 
were under construction. Believing that the war would be 
won without sending a large army to Europe, he changed 
the order for these vessels to cargo carriers, causing serious 
delay. Then when the great March German offensive 
showed the necessity for sending help quickly, the order for 
transports was renewed. And yet later it was again changed 
to cargo carriers. 

But though the plans of the Shipping Board may have 
been slightly interrupted by this wavering attitude of Mr. 
Baker, it was not sufficient warrant for the propaganda so 
vigorously put out by the Board to deceive the public, by 
taking credit for seized and commandeered vessels, as if 
they were ships constructed by the Shipping Board and 
added that much to what the country could not have had 
otherwise. 

But while the American public was being fed on false 
propaganda as to the amount of shipping that could be 
put out by the Shipping Board, the British admiralty was 
in possession of something akin to the truth. Sir Eric 
Geddcs, first lord of the admiralty, in discussing the sub- 
marine menace before the House of Commons on March 
5, 19 1 8, said, among other things: "Despite glowing re- 
ports in the American press, there is no doubt that a con- 
siderable time must elapse before the desired output Is 
obtained." 

The Shipping Board had actually built and placed In 
foreign service up to and including March 22, 19 18, two 
vessels aggregating 17,600 dead-weight tons. And this 



72 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

contribution to the world's supply of shipping in the months 
when it was needed by the million tons a month represented, 
according to the British admiralty's somewhat cryptic re- 
ports of the day, the amount that was being destroyed 
every eight hours by the submarines for the eighteen months 
just previous. 

In brief, notwithstanding the promises of what might 
have been success had the war lasted long enough, America's 
shipbuilding program was a failure. But the situation was 
so obscured by misleading propaganda, as were the failures 
in other important war branches of the government, that the 
public did not sense what was going on. It had no standard 
of measurement. 

And this system of camouflaging was so thorough in its 
operation that Congress was no better informed than the 
general public. Nor was this latter fact known until it 
came out in a hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce in March, 191 8, when Harris D. H. Connick, 
vice-president of the American International Corporation, 
which was responsible for the Hog Island yard, the most 
extensiye of them all, was called before the committee. It 
was his testimony that disillusioned the country. It ran 
in this fashion: 

Senator Nelson : When will we get the first ships? How soon 
will we get any on the water, so we can use them ? 

Mr. Connick: You are going to get twenty-five A ships the 
first of October, or, say, the first of November. 

Senator Nelson: Those are the first we will get? 

Mr. Connick: Those are the first you will get. 

Senator Nelson: And that will not be until next October? 

Mr. Connick: That will be next October. You get your 
twent}'-five B ships in the middle of December. It will be over seven 
months then before we can get any ships out of those ways. We have 
to build the yard and then build the ships. 

Senator Nelson: It will be over seven months before we can 
get any of these ships? 



Shipbuilding n^ 

Mr. Connick: Yes, sir; I would say up to that date. 

Senator Nelson : And then we may get as many as twenty-five ? 

Mr. Connick: You will get fifty. 

Senator Nelson: Within seven months? 

Mr. Connick: I will count up. (After making calculation.) 
It is going to be about eight months before you can get your first 
twenty-five ships, and it is going to be about nine and one-half 
months before you get your next twenty-five ships. We can not get 
them by October. In eight months you are going to get about twenty- 
seven or twenty-eight, and then you are going to get the fifty ships in 
the next six weeks. 

And after that they come very fast. You are going to have fifty- 
nine ships — that is, if the material and the labor functions as it has 
done before — by the first of April ; you will have your fifty small 
ships and your seventy big ships by the middle of July — that is, if we 
get the material and everything comes along the way it is supposed to 
come. We see no reason now why it should not do so. 

Senator Nelson: The main thing I am interested in — what 
are we going to get soon — this year? 

Mr. Connick: All you can expect are those fifty ships this year. 

Senator Nelson : And we will not get any until next winter? 

Mr. Connick: That is right, you will not get any ships until 
next winter; no, sir; not one. 

Senator Harding: We are not getting many ships this year 
at all except commandeered ships that have been completed ? 

Mr. Connick: I do not know what the Shipping Board is doing 
at other yards. 

Senator Nelson: Not over ten outside of the commandeered 
ships. 

Senator Harding: That is what I say — all of our ships put 
into service will be the requisitioned ships, English and Norwegian 
ships, which are built here in the yards, the biggest share being Eng- 
lish ships.^ 

And this was the most optimistic statement of the situa- 
tion that could be offered. That it was disheartening to that 
real veteran of heroic mould, Senator Nelson, is evident 
from his form of questioning. 

' War Weekly. 



74 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

When hostilities had ceased and the country was no 
longer fearful of permitting the light to shine in, various 
investigations were started to let the public know who 
was at fault in the serious delays and great waste that 
grew out of the perilous situation in which the country was 
found when the war was upon it. And then it developed 
how accurate had been the outlining of the situation by Mr. 
Connlck. 

In speaking to one such resolution adopted by the Senate 
on November 22, 191 8, Senator Harding severely criti- 
cized the shipping situation. Three great fabricating ship- 
building plants had been built by the government to save 
the nation from the ravages of the enemy submarines. Of 
these, to the end of 19 18, the total output was four ships. 
One plant which was to have delivered 124, delivered one; 
while another which was to have delivered 24, failed to 
deliver even one. 

It was frequently asked why the government during the 
crisis such as the world then saw often selected the wrong 
man for an important position. For the man selected is 
the heart of the program. Every problem is a problem 
of personnel. It appeared to be the politics that was at 
the bottom of it. 

The Administration discarded men of practical ship- 
ping experience, though it would have seemed to appeal to 
the ordinary intelligence that that was a most essential quali- 
fication, for a man serving in so important a position at a 
crucial time. There was no argument whatever for making 
up a shipping board of non-shipping members except the 
argument of prejudice. What was needed was a ship- 
ping board to centralize shipbuilding and ship-operating 
in the hands of a federal agency and to control rates and 
prices and to enter into arrangements with similar agencies 
in the Allied countries. American shipping men were the 
first to recognize this necessity. 

The conspicuous failure of the non-shipping board was 



Shipbuilding 75 

on the score of general policies. The board had, for the 
last half of 19 17 and early in 19 18, definitely starved the 
existing ship facilities of the country at the expense of new 
units which were its own creation. It had fostered competi- 
tion in the labor market, established immense new yards in 
the vicinity of old yards, diverted materials to the new 
yards, and at the same time failed to come to proper 
financial agreements with the old yards, thus making it diffi- 
cult or even impossible for them to hurry the work. 

But by mid-summer of 19 18, with Charles M. Schwab 
as director-general of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the 
Administration appeared to get a grip on the labor situa- 
tion and to prevent the labor turn-over which had been dis- 
astrous to shipbuilding and every other war energy at a 
crucial period in war time. 

^The main results of the Administration's shipbuilding 
policy were, first, less tonnage was launched in America 
during the last six months of 1917 and early 19 18 than 
would have been launched if the Shipping Board had not 
been in existence; second, the new units, children of the 
Shipping Board, were just getting ready to build ships when 
hostilities ceased, and had proved to be the prime profiteers 
of the war. Hog Island became a synonym of profiteering. 

After hostilities ceased, there appeared to persist the 
same lack of policy. There appeared to be no reason why 
shipping men, whose ships had been taken over by the gov- 
ernment during the war emergency, should not have their 
ships returned to them. They went to Washington to 
ascertain what they might expect. Mr. Hurley had gone 
to Europe, no one in Washington seemed to be authorized 
to speak on the matter. 

The purpose of the government to place at the dis- 
posal of all the forces opposing Germany's raid upon the 
cause of civilization was nowhere manifested more clearly 
than in prodigious plans for shipbuilding — such a large 
scheme of shipbuilding as the world had never before seen 



76 TJic JVilson Administration and the Great War 

or contemplated. In such enormous, almost inconceivably 
large, undertakings much must be allowed for errors in the 
human factor. The American people have always been 
generous in their estimate of what is accomplished in rela- 
tion to what is undertaken, whether in war or in peace, but 
particularly in time of war. 

Yet so ample had been the warning given to the Ameri- 
can Administration that the United States was almost cer- 
tain at any moment to be thrust headlong into the war, 
that the apparent indifference upon the part of the Adminis- 
tration to making adequate preparation for the inevitable 
conflict will always stand as a stigma upon America's fair 
name and upon her record for efficiency and energy. Had 
war been thrust upon America in a manner in which it was 
thrust upon France and Belgium and Great Britain, there 
would have been excuse for almost any deficiency In admin- 
istrative processes. But two years and a half of the terrible 
conflagration in Europe appeared to be no warning to the 
national Administration in America. Apologists for the 
Administration have been quick, when burning criticism was 
heaped upon Mr. Wilson's failure of accomplishment, to 
call attention to the blunders of the European Allies, as if 
they had had as ample warning to prepare for the conflict as 
America had. The two cases are in no respect parallel or 
even approaching a parallel. 

As a consequence of the tremendous scope of the gov- 
ernment's plan for shipbuilding, in the great effort to rush 
everything at top speed, there were failures that were so 
inexcusable that they must be set down in history as against 
American efficiency, though as a matter of fact it was simply 
administrative incompetency. It was in view of these facts 
that Senator Calder, about two months after the close of 
the armed conflict, called attention to the deplorable failure 
that was unfolded to the American public after the armi- 
stice was signed. Aggravating as were these failures, there 
was no one on the Democratic side of the Senate chamber 



Shipbuilding nn 

capable of or willing even to attempt a defense of Mr. Hur- 
ley, except Senator Fletcher of Florida. It was shown that 
virtually all the shipping that Mr. Hurley advertised as 
his own accomplishment was laid down in private yards, on 
private order, and was taken over by the Shipping Board 
and completed by virtue of the President's order com- 
mandeering all shipping. 

Leaving out of consideration altogether the gross waste 
of the people's money in construction of yards and ships, 
and discussing merely the results from this, the principal 
part of Mr. Hurley's endeavor, Senator Calder gave this 
resume: 

Complete failure to deliver ships in time to be of actual 
use in the war program. Ninety-three were promised, none 
was delivered. 

Failure to the extent of 87 per cent in the number of 
ships launched. 164 were promised, 22 were launched. 

Failure to the extent of 57 per cent in the number of 
ships placed in construction. 249 were promised, 107 were 
laid down. 

Failure to the extent of 66 per cent in the amount of 
steel erected and of 74 per cent in the number of rivets 
driven. 

The supply of steel from the mills was nearly up to 
scheduled requirements and much in excess of the quantity 
actually used in construction. 

The supply of fabricated steel was 2S P^"* cent short of 
estimated requirements, but always exceeded the actual re- 
quirements of the shipbuilders by many thousands of tons. 

Senator Harding in a statement on the floor of the Sen- 
ate in November, 19 18, said: 

No matter what the policy of the government may be in the 
future, and no matter how earnestly we all favor the construction 
of the largest mechant marine in the world, it is inconceivable that 
the government will go on appropriating money for ship construction 
at the present rate, which is from four to six times the normal cost. 



78 The JVilson Administralion and the Great JVar 

The shipbuilding costs became so notorious, during the 
war emergency, as to threaten to become a national scandal. 

In the case of a well-managed yard on the Pacific coast 
in which the number of men increased threefold in a little 
over a year, a comparison of wages and output with cor- 
responding items of two years before revealed the fact 
that before the signing of the armistice wages had ad- 
vanced seventy per cent of the former output. The result 
was a labor cost 2.4 times that of two years previous. In 
the case of two well-managed yards on the Atlantic coast 
the results in the one were: Labor advance, 120 per cent; 
output, 80 per cent; resulting labor cost, two and three- 
quarters times that of the former period. In the other, 
labor advance, 100 per cent; output, 66 2/3 per cent; re- 
sulting labor cost, three times that of two years ago.^ 

In defending the item of $660,000,000 for the Shipping 
Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation in the sundry civil 
appropriation bill. Representative Shirley, chairman of the 
Appropriation Committee, stated on the floor of the House 
near the end of February, 19 19, that while the investment 
of the completed shipping program would be nearly $4,000,- 
000,000, the actual value of the ships would not exceed 
$2,000,000,000. And he stated: 

That there has been great extravagance and waste in many par- 
ticulars, I haven't the slightest doubt. . . . The only justification 
was the great need for many ships at a period when it was feared 
the war would be lost without them. 

We authorized the expenditure altogether of $3,900,000,000 for 
the ship construction. Of this $2,800,000,000 was for building 
ships ourselves, $515,000,000 payment for requisitioned ships, $55,- 
000,000 was for yards, $75,000,000 was for housing at shipyards. 

Notwithstanding these dismal failures, whose lesson 
should not be lost on the future, America planned in the 
large; and had the war continued another year, her great 
weight could not have failed to impress itself with irresist- 

^ North American RevieiUj March, 1919. 



Shipbuilding yo 

ible power. Despite all efforts, the deadly problem of the 
submarine remained until after this nation began its ample 
shipbuilding operations. 

And the stupendous shipbuilding project of America 
grew into reality. Hog Island, the greatest plant of the 
kind In the world, rose like magic where there had been 
but a desolate swamp. The German leaders discerned the 
sign, and were convinced that this nation was at length in 
the war whole-heartedly, and that America's productive 
power had doomed the mightiest weapon of Prussianism 
on sea. This gigantic enterprise put fear into the heart of 
autocracy. The evidence that this country would be able 
eventually to launch a great ocean steamship every forty- 
eight hours was as much an Inspiration to America as It was 
a shock to their enemies. 

It was on the first Sunday in May, 191 8, that the 5500- 
ton collier "Tuckahoe" went into the waters of the Dela- 
ware at Camden, New Jersey. The launching of this boat 
formed the front-page stories for the newspapers of Amer- 
ica and lines for the bulletins of London and Paris and 
probably Interesting news for the consideration of royal 
eyes In Germany. 

This ship was built In twenty-seven days, and never be- 
fore in all shipbuilding history had a ship of Its size been 
done In that time, virtually a complete vessel in every de- 
tail, 330 feet long and 50 feet beam. On May 15, It 
steamed out of the yards of the New York Shipbuilding 
Corporation at Camden, ready to take her place In smiting 
the German pirates. 

On the same day, a few miles down the Delaware, there 
was a double launching at the shipbuilding yards at Chester, 
Pennsylvania. And from that time on the country was 
thrilled by the frequent reports given to the public on what 
was being done on shipbuilding, sometimes true, unfor- 
tunately often untrue. 

Yet the general trend was In the right direction. It 



8o The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

was not until the middle of 191 8 that the country was get- 
ting its swing in the shipbuilding operations. 

By August I, 1918, America's great chain of ship- 
building plants was approaching completion. At that time 
there were 118 fully-equipped yards in the United States 
and 44 others partly completed. Many of these were built 
from the ground up, while others were enlarged to so 
great an extent as to make them practically new plants. 
One of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation was au- 
thorized to add ten new ways at a cost of $20,000,000, and 
three more to the same company's yards at another point. 
The New York Shipbuilding .Corporation at Camden, New 
Jersey, was at that time building five new ways at a cost 
of $7,000,000. Of the 118 completed, the Pacific coast 
had 48, the Atlantic 38, the Great Lakes 16, the Gulf of 
Mexico 16. 

Then came such a rapid succession of broken records 
in the shipbuilding line as had never been known in all 
shipbuilding history. On July 25, 19 18, Secretary Daniels 
announced the breaking of the record in shipbuilding at the 
Mare Island navy yard, California, In these words: "Be- 
fore the war from 20 to 24 months were required to com- 
plete a destroyer. The keel of the "Ward" was laid at 
7:30 a. m. on May 15. The vessel was launched at 8:30 
p. m. June i — seventeen and one-half days after her keel 
was laid. She was put into commission July 24 — seventy 
days after the laying of her keel." 

And while men had been pinning steel-plates together 
for a generation with pneumatic hammers, one who could 
average more than sixty rivets an hour was a first-rate 
riveter. But by mid-summer, 19 18, there were riveters on 
the shipbuilding job who could drive 400 rivets an hour 
and exceed it. 

In the early autumn of 19 18, building had made so 
great strides in the United States that the country was 
then the greatest shipbuilding country in the world, having 



Shipbuilding 8 1 

leaped from third to first place in a little over a year. At 
that time the number of ships under our flag was 2,185, 
with a total dead-weight tonnage of 9,511,915, and there 
were over 200 yards engaged in construction work, with 
1,020 ways. 

'r> In the building of her merchant fleet, America was 
planning first of all, to win the war; after that her purpose 
was to overcome her own neglect in providing ocean trans- 
portation for her own trade. 

The outlook of the American merchant fleet as it stood 
in the first month of 19 19, was as follows: Steamers now 
owned by the United States, 3,000,000 tons; steamers under 
construction for the United States, 6,000,000 tons; steamers 
owned by private individuals, 3,000,000 tons; a total of 
twelve million tons dead-weight. 

April 29, 1 9 19, Mr. Hurley, chairman of the United 
States Shipping Board, announced the cancellation of 2,000,- 
000 tons more of shipping contracts, making a total to 
that time of 5,500,000 tons. 

The low estate to which our merchant marine had fallen 
prior to the Great War is common knowledge. Americans 
should feel a blush of shame when they realize that in the 
golden days before the Civil War 80 per cent of our com- 
merce was carried in American bottoms, and that prior 
to the outbreak of war in 19 14 only 9 per cent of our ex- 
ports and imports were carried under the American flag. 
But twelve million tons of ships is another picture. 

In the opinion of competent and impartial commen- 
tators, there were two achiev^ements of this country during 
the war that surpassed all others. One was the rapid and 
orderly registration of 10,000,000 men for military service, 
under a law which was a complete innovation in American 
history followed by another of 14,000,000; the other was 
the sending of more than 2,000,000 troops to Europe within 
a few months, an unequaled feat in transportation. 

Of the 2,079,880 men taken over up to mid-December, 



82 The IVihon A dm'tms\tration and the Great W ar 

more than 1,000,000 were carried on British ships, which 
were diverted to that undertaking from the vital work of 
conveying food. 

The performances wrought a decisive effect upon the 
world's history at one of its great critical junctures. Credit 
for this movement is assigned in large measure to the Allies, 
to the British in particular, since approximately half of the 
troops were carried in their ships. But of the cargo of 
5,153,000 tons, less than 5 per cent was carried by Allied 
ships. Of all the cargo shipped, only 79,000 tons were 
lost at sea. 

Just prior to the middle of December, 19 18, the Navy 
Department gave out the statement that of the men in the 
army transported from America to France, forty-six and 
one-fourth per cent were carried in American ships, forty- 
eight and one-half in British, the balance in French and 
Italian vessels. Of the total strength of the naval escort, 
the United States furnished eighty-two and three-fourths 
per cent, Great Britain fourteen and one-eighth per cent and 
France three and one-eighth per cent. 

It gave the people a rude shock to be informed that 
most of the transports used to carry America's soldiers 
were furnished by other nations. 

Developments by investigations of wastefulness, profit- 
eering and fraud in connection with shipbuiling, after the 
close of the war, pointed to the fact that the government 
should not engage in business that properly belongs to pri- 
vate enterprise. 

Socialism must not be permitted to throttle the best 
there Is in American initiative. The capacity Is In the 
average American. Yet, at the end of June, 192 1, the 
government was seeking to dispose of $300,000,000 worth 
of shipping and to eliminate the shipping board's monthly 
deficit of $16,000,000 for operating purposes. 



CHAPTER VI 

GOVERNMENT RAILROADING 

When, a few decades ago, a Senator on the floor of 
the United States Senate made the famous motion that, "If 
the Pennsylvania Railroad Company has no further busi- 
ness to come before this body, I move that the Senate do 
now adjourn," or words of similar purport, even when 
spoken Ironically, it was implied that the people had at that 
time come to believe that arrogance and gratuitous assump- 
tions were manifesting themselves on the part of the rail- 
road companies In operating a public utility under a public 
franchise. It was this Intolerable arrogance and these un- 
warranted assumptions that drove the people to compel 
Congress during the last quarter of the nineteenth and the 
first decade of the twentieth century to adopt regulative 
measures which became steadily more drastic, despite the 
strenuous and continuous resistance on the part of the cor- 
porations. And some of the States adopted regulations 
even more severe. 

This regulative process became cumulative in volume. 
So onerous were the resulting restrictions that the roads 
were hampered in obtaining credits necessary for extensions 
and Improvements. Then came the war with its extraor- 
dinary demands, the railroads were found inadequately 
equipped, the transportation system was unable to bear the 
strain, and the whole life of the nation was threatened with 
disorganization. It was at this point that the govern- 
ment stepped in and took over the country's transportation 
system. 

This control began December 28, 19 17, and ended 
February 29, 1920, with a modified control six months 

83 



84 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

longer, '^hen the federal Administration assumed opera- 
tion of the railroads, President Wilson announced that it 
was done for three chief reasons : To enable them to 
handle more traffic, to save the companies from bankruptcy 
and thereby prevent a national financial catastrophe, and to 
solve the railroad labor problem. The claim made by advo- 
cates of government operation was that under that policy 
the railways would be able to handle more traffic and to 
handle it better than under private operation, that the sys- 
tem would be operated more economically, and that under 
it labor would be treated better. 

William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, was 
appointed by the President the Director-General of Rail- 
roads, a position which placed him in possession of a power 
never surpassed by that of any manager of any industry, 
governmental or private, in all the world. One of the most 
forceful, aggressive and daring of men, Mr. McAdoo, 
with astonishing dash and thoroughness, proceeded in mas- 
terful fashion to administer the operation of the various 
transportation systems of the country, upon a plan favored 
by advocates of government operation by first of all unify- 
ing operation of the complication of systems. 

Not only the railway systems were involved in this con- 
trol. Besides the 397,014 miles of railroad controlled by 
2,907 companies and employing 1,700,814 persons, he 
swayed with a free hand steamship lines engaged in coast- 
wise transportation and navigating an inland waterways 
system which included fifty-seven canals aggregating 3,057 
miles, as well as many thousands of miles of navigable 
rivers, lakes, bays, sounds and inlets. And it was with prac- 
tically unnanimous approval that the public greeted the 
President's announcement that the government would take 
over the operation of the country's transportation system. 
The readiness of all parties for expected results — the labor 
men and the general public — was evident in the desire to 



Government Railroading 85 

waive all special preferences in a genuine purpose to co- 
operate for the common good and for the winning of the 
war. The public saw the government take over all these 
systems of transportation and advance almost immediately 
carrying charges from 25 to 50 per cent, a right which the 
interstate commerce commission had emphatically refused 
the companies. 

And it was freely stated by Administration officials that 
from the very beginning Mr. McAdoo had to contend with 
a practically broken-down transportation system, that the 
government caught and saved the wreck just as it was slip- 
ping over the brink, and that he then had to contend immedi- 
ately with the worst winter ever known to transportation 
circles, causing one of the worst freight blockades in eastern 
territory, with New York City as a center, ever known, 
with a resulting unparalleled transportation tangle. 

Mr. McAdoo declared his policy to be "to humanize 
the railways and negative the idea that corporations have no 
souls." He stated succinctly his purposes to be: First, 
the winning of the war; second, service to the public at the 
lowest cost consistent with the payment of fair wages to 
railroad employes and the maintenance of the transporta- 
tion system as a self-supporting, rather than a money-mak- 
ing, agency. In his report to the President after seven 
months of government operation he stated that under gov- 
ernment control the highest salaries, ranging from $40,000 
to $50,000 per annum, were paid to regional directors whose 
responsibilities were far greater than those of the railroad 
presidents who had been receiving as high as $100,000; 
and that the 2,325 officers receiving salaries of $5,000 and 
over, aggregating $21,320,187 yearly, were reduced in 
number to 1,925, with an aggregate of salaries reduced by 
$4,814,889. This was after he had performed one of the 
most spectacular acts of his administration in dismissing, 
in the spring of 191 8, the presidents of all the large lines 



86 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

of railroad. Whatever had been the salaries of some of 
the men dismissed, as President Ripley of the Santa Fe, 
no sum equaled his value to the road in its upbuilding, his 
constructive genius taking the road from the clutches of 
bankruptcy and making a property worth three-quarters 
of a billion, earning seven per cent annually, and at the 
same time winning popular support which is only too likely 
to be hostile to railroads. But Mr. McAdoo was at the 
head of all the nation's rail systems as a part-time employ- 
ment and without compensation — and he resigned. 

The Administration made large claims in efficiency and 
expedition in transportation after the passing of the exas- 
perating situation which developed from the congestion of 
traffic Immediately after the government took control. It 
deserves credit for many suggestions which railroads could, 
and In some Instances did, profitably adopt, both for their 
own benefit and to the advantage of the public. A poster 
that became an old familiar friend of everyone about rail- 
road stations and that was well known to all travellers 
contained many valuable suggestions. It appeared In 191 8 
in this form: 

SAVE A CAR A DAY AND HELP WIN THE WAR 

Transportation is a vital necessity and may be the deciding factor. 

1. Avoid Congestion. 

2. Unload Cars Promptly. 

3. Order Only What Cars Can Be Loaded Promptly. 

4. Load to Capacity. 

5. If Loads Are Light, Load to Cubic Capacity. 

6. Ship Direct. 

7. Give Shipping Directions in Time to Bill Same Day as Loaded. 

8. Avoid Shipping "To Order." 

We loaded one million, four hundred fifty-five thousand, three 
hundred eighty-one (1,455,381) cars in 1917. A saving of half a 
car a day would equal seven hundred tv^^enty-seven thousand, six 
hundred ninety car-days, equal to the continuous use of two thousand 



Government Railroading 87 

cars, and two thousand cars would handle fifty thousand additional 
car-loads in the same period. 

Few additional cars can be obtained. There is more freight to 
transport. Therefore Ave must 

"DO MORE WITH LESS" 

If the commerce of the countiy is to be moved 

YOU MUST HELP. 

This was suggestive of methods at all times urged by 
the government during its control of the railroads. But 
the autocratic powers which the Director-General exercised 
should have been entirely effective. His first great admin- 
istrative act was to sweep aw^ay all barriers that savored 
of competition and to unite all lines into one harmonious 
whole. By one wave of the magic wand, the law against 
pooling, theretofore looked upon as the very palladium of 
the liberties of the people, was cast into the discard; the 
whole structure of orders and decisions, so industriously 
erected through the years for the regulation of railroads, 
was thrown to the winds. After seven months of govern- 
ment operation, he estimated that the elimination of solicit- 
ing freight traffic and of exploitation of passenger routes 
iiad effected a saving of $23,566,633. For the saving of 
time and energy, all freight was routed most directly, re- 
gardless of the roads that were to carry It. 

At the same time there were given to the public reports 
of great improvement in freight movement, of cars in sup- 
ply abundant.^ For the two-month period of June-July 
the director of the Allegheny region reported conditions fair 
and improving, with no congestion, since business to the 
larger industrial centers and for export were governed by 

*The Georgia Fruit Exchange of Atlanta reported that it was about to 
complete, in the first week in August, 1918, the movement of the largest 
crop of peaches ever shipped from that or any other state, the largest 
single day's shipment being 600 cars, and a total to July 17 of 7,432 cars. 
Similar reports were coming from the West Virginia coal shippers and the 
Pacific Coast lumbermen. 



88 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

permits; and that the car supply had been met, with 64,187 
cars of anthracite coal loaded in June, as against 59,008 
a year earlier; and 191,767 of bituminous, an increase of 
22,781 over June, 1917, with a similar increase in July; and 
that the coal dumped at tidewater was increased by 223,537 
tons in June and by 444,916 in July. 

And as young men were being drafted for military serv- 
ice, the Railroad Administration opened schools for the 
training of women to take their places as ticket-sellers. 
But when complaints began to reach him in August of a 
lack of courtesy upon the part of the employes that was 
unknown under private operation, Director-General Mc- 
Adoo issued strict orders requiring the utmost courtesy at 
all times. In that connection he invited attention to the in- 
crease of operating expenses of over $475,000,000 per an- 
num because of increased pay. 

When the much-heralded efficiency of government opera- 
tion of railroads is written sight should not be lost of the 
fact that there was never known in railroad history in the 
United States such centralization of authority as was pos- 
sessed by the Director-General. To this the people did not 
object; but they felt that by virtue thereof they had the 
right to expect correspondingly better results. Not once 
did the public feel aggrieved over accomplishment, even in 
the most direct and drastic form. On the contrary, they 
approved when it brought results which they knew to be 
essential to success in the conflict across the seas. Pas- 
senger and sleeping-car service were severely curtailed in 
order to produce speed results in getting food to its destina- 
tion, in the transcontinental movement of lumber for ship- 
building," and in hastening the shipment of munitions ma- 
terial. 

^It was no unusual matter along northern routes of transcontinental 
travel to see residents gazing in amazement at double-headers pulling 
trains of great length that dashed through their towns loaded with lumber 
or grain with the speed of limited passenger trains. 



Government Railroading 89 

To this end every known means was brought into play. 
Waste was brought to a minimum, but through regulations 
that cannot govern in the free play of competition. Yet 
it seemed like good sense to which Director-General Mc- 
Adoo gave expression in his testimony before the interstate 
commerce committee of the Senate in January, 19 19, when 
he declared for heavy loading of cars, pooling of repair- 
shops, unification of terminals, consolidation of ticket-offices, 
universal mileage tickets, uniform rate classification, high 
demurrage rates, way-billing of freight from point of origin 
to destination, and the utilization of water routes for the 
relief of crowded rail lines. There is probably no civilized 
nation in the world with so little appreciation of the value 
of its water means of transportation as the United States. 

Though the Administration sought to discourage pas- 
senger traffic in order to speed the transportation of war 
materials and increased passenger fares 50 per cent, pas- 
senger traffic during the first calendar year of the war in- 
creased 16 per cent. And for the first nine months of 19 18, 
the number of persons carried one mile totalled 32,586,- 
390,878 as compared with 28,513,155,775 passenger-miles 
for the corresponding period of 19 17, a figure largely In- 
creased by the soldiers and sailors, as well as very many 
others carried incident to the war. In August, 19 18, the 
Railroad Administration stated that over 5,000,000 sol- 
diers had been transported on American railroads in four- 
teen months — half of which time they were under gov- 
ernment control. In the district west of the Mississippi 
the elimination of passenger-train mileage totalled 2,000,- 
000 a year, with further reduction to be made; while In 
the section east of the Mississippi the elimination aggre- 
gated 26,420,000. 

Mr. McAdoo was a man of very real accomplishment. 
Bold, energetic, courageous, he was undismayed in grap- 
pling with the largest problems of administration, whether 



90 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

Liberty Loans or railroads. And his leaving the govern- 
ment service was a distinct loss to the country, the removal 
of a chief pillar of the Administration. 

And yet, what became the general practice of the Wilson 
Administration of taking credit for accomplishment that 
did not belong to it, serving to the people in their homes 
news that was not fact, crept into Mr. McAdoo's depart- 
ment. Later developments led the country to ask whether 
government railroading was the success people had been 
led to believe it was. That it should have been was plain. 
The method was direct. Redtape was cut to bits. The 
power vested in the Director-General was autocratic. Pro- 
cedure was aptly described in this fashion by a leading 
weekly : 

Under government control, the Secretary of the Treasury merely 
dropped in on the Director-General of Railroads, handed out a cigar 
and a new story, mentioned casually that he would like a billion to 
meet railroad bills, and walked out with the increased-rate order in 
his pocket."'' 

But in time the people were disillusioned. They came 
to see the real accomplishment in railroading by the gov- 
ernment. The Administration had taken over stations, 
shops, rolling stock, rights of way, rails — all of which had 
been built up through long years of arduous effort by private 
enterprise. And when, in January, 19 19, Mr. McAdoo 
was giving his testimony before the Senate committee in 
favor of continued government operation, Edmond Pen- 
nington, president of the Soo system, was asking this perti- 
nent question : 

We hear much from the news bureau of the Administration. . . . 
The talk of economy has not been backed by a single set of figures. 
I should like to know where the money is coming from to meet the 
tremendous overhead expenses of the railway administration and the 
cost of the expensive oflice force maintained by the Director-General. 

^Leslie's Weekly, June 22, 191!?. 



Government Railroading! 91 

Within ten days after the adverse elections in the fall 
of 19 1 8, Mr. McAdoo resigned as Director-General of 
Railroads and as Secretary of the Treasury. This came 
as a real surprise to the public. Various reasons were as- 
signed for his action, such as that he had differed with the 
President over the latter's partisan appeal to the country 
immediately preceding the election, that he had urged 
against the President's contemplated trip to Europe, and 
that he himself had designs upon the presidential nomina- 
tion in 1920. The reason he gave was that his salary was 
insufficient. It was not publicly announced that the moun- 
tains of debt piling up in government operation of the rail- 
roads had anything to do with his resignation; yet there 
was a strong suspicion in the public mind that Mr. McAdoo 
did not care to shoulder the burden of the reaction that was 
sure to follow full knowledge of the situation of the rail- 
roads. Upon leaving office, he announced that the total 
sum advanced to December 31, 19 18, by the United States 
Railroad Administration to all transportation lines under 
government control was $689,034,759. 

In a long and carefully prepared statement to the Senate 
committee on interstate commerce, in January, 19 19, Mr. 
McAdoo asked Congress to permit government control for 
live years, instead of the twenty-one months authorized in 
the Control Act under which the government assumed con- 
trol in the first instance. The reasons he gave were, chiefly, 
that the twenty-one months period was insufficient time to 
give the matter a fair test, that the war period had required 
methods that could have little application in time of peace, 
and that the months immediately following the war were 
certain to be so abnormal in conciitions as to be practically 
worthless as a test. 

This was the signal for the two sides to align their 
forces, one for government control, the other for private 
control. Unfortunately for the merits of the matter, Mr. 
McAdoo expressed his purpose of turning back the roads 



92 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

at once to private control unless his wish as to the five-year 
plan were acquiesced in. For this threat brought forth 
a bill in Congress to prevent this action on the part of the 
Administration, action that would have tended to entail 
financial chaos upon the railroad world, if, indeed, it did 
not bring a financial crash upon the nation. This one stroke 
on his part unsettled the public's confidence in him as a 
public administrator. 

The prompt action of Congress was probably hastened 
by a letter from President Wilson in Europe, addressed to 
Congress, in which he declared that the roads "will be 
handed over to their owners at the end of the calendar 
year." 

Organized labor as a class had fared so well under 
Administration auspices that immediately after Mr, Mc- 
Adoo's five-year proposal, the railroad brotherhoods 
throughout the country made a drive on Congress to force 
its adoption. Beginning the very week next after the Mc- 
Adoo plan was submitted to Congress, a deluge of petitions, 
resolutions and individual letters began pouring in upon 
members of both branches of the national legislature. It 
grew to so great a volume that the Senate committee on 
interstate commerce began considering the advisability of 
investigating what source was responsible for this propa- 
ganda. There was a notable textual similarity in it all.^ 

On the other hand, at the same time the presidents of 
one hundred and twenty-five railroads, representing every 
large system in the country, with the single exception of the 
Southern Railroad, met in Philadelphia and drew up a list 
of proposals to submit to the Senate committee as the 

* These substantially uniform resolutions coming from all railroad cen- 
ters of the country began in these words: 

"Whereas, The public press is boldly circulating the news that the 
people want the roads back to private ownership; and, 

"Whereas, We consider this to be an injustice, because private owner- 
ship has proved a failure in peace as well as in war, it being demon- 
strated to everybody's satisfaction by facts" . . , 



Government Railroading 03 

recommendation of the rairroads of the country. Among 
them were these: 

1. Opposition to the McAdoo plan for a five-year extension of 
government control. 

2. Refusal to accept a return of the roads in their present 
"scrambled" state brought about by the Administration. 

3. Demand for thoroughgoing remedial legislation that will pre- 
serve all the good features of governmental control, with the inclusion 
of the benefits of private ownership. 

4. Inauguration of some form of national control that will per- 
mit pooling of stations, ticket-offices, and equipment. 

5. Rate revision upward to care for increase of expenses. 

6. Combination of the rate-making power with the legislative con- 
trol over railroads. 

7. Removal of railroads from politics. 

It was at this time that the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission was taking a firm stand against government owner- 
ship or operation of railroads. In its statement to the same 
Senate committee, it said: 

Considering and weighing as best we can all of the arguments for 
and against the different plans, we are led to the conviction that with 
the adoption of appropriate provisions and safeguards for regulation 
under private ownership, it would not be wise or best at this time to 
assume government ownership or operation of the railways of the 
country. 

This, however, was no simple problem of two and two 
make four. There were subtractions, divisions, and multi- 
plicity galore. Many diverse elements were involved — 
fairness to the companies, fairness to individuals, industrial 
justice, social justice, the destructive forces of radicalism 
then at work seeking to undermine the whole mighty indus- 
trial and governmental structure. To this last, the organ- 
ized railroad men, wittingly or unwittingly, gave their 
influence. 



94 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

And this last was a large factor in determining the 
problem. The matter of the increase of wages was brought 
to the front on all occasions. And as a final attempt the 
railroad unions placed themselves behind the Plumb Plan. 
The author of this scheme, Glenn E. Plumb, maintained 
palatial offices in Washington and was supplied with a large 
fund to care for all expenses. He proposed that the rail- 
road management be placed in the hands of three parties 
to be equally represented: employes, officials, the public, 
under government ownership. It was thought the public 
was in a frame of mind to take the bait. But the public was 
sitting by and quietly noting events. It had observed at- 
tempts at Winnipeg to overcome the public through de- 
stroying the railroads; it had noted the desperate attempt 
to overthrow the Seattle government; it had its eyes on 
the steel and coal strikes and the defiance of the United 
States government itself. It was in no mood for further 
trifling on the part of radicalism, whether found in Admin- 
istration circles, organized railroad employes, or elsewhere. 
Moreover, it was making up its mind to "be done with 
wiggle and wobble." It had its mind set upon steadiness 
of purpose and back to American tradition. It had seen 
the railroads manhandled and bedevilled to the limit of 
endurance, and was ready to demand their return to their 
owners and with new demands for improvements. 

And it began to appear to the great public that the per- 
sistent demand of the railroad employes for an increase of 
wages out of all proportion to the demands of others who 
were receiving much smaller pay had some ulterior motive. 
The facts seemed to warrant the suspicion. The brother- 
hoods were insisting that they must be paid more to meet 
the increased cost of living. But such demands had been 
met under private management. In 1907 the average wage 
of the rail worker was $641 per year, while In 19 17 It was 
$1,003, an increase of 56 per cent. This kept pace with 
the Increased cost of living. But under government control, 



Government Railroading 95 

the workers insisted that the pay was not keeping pace with 
living costs. In 19 16 the payrolls of rail employes totalled 
$1,470,000,000, which grew to $1,739,000,000 in 1917, 
to $2,500,000,000 in 1918 and to substantially $3,000,- 
000,000 in 19 19, and, had the demands of the workers been 
yielded to, they would have received $3,800,000,000 in 
1920. At no time was the United States Railroad Admin- 
istration free from controversy and threat of a strike to en- 
force a higher scale of wages, though the amount had to 
be made up out of the pockets of the people receiving less 
than half the pay of these organized men who had never 
lost any time or spent any money, as had teachers of the 
country and many others, in learning their business; but 
on the contrary were being paid while learning railroading. 

When radicalism was asserting itself in mid-summer 
of 19 19 among these organized railroad men, Director- 
General Hines, who had succeeded Mr. McAdoo as head 
of the Railroad Administration, reporting to the President 
on July 30, declared that a deadlock existed over the de- 
mands of the shopmen, and that the granting of their de- 
mands and of the others to follow involved another increase 
of $800,000,000 a year, and at a time when the railroads 
were already piling up an enormous deficit every month. 

President Wilson was ready with the simple expedient 
of loading the burden onto the already overburdened pub- 
lic; and the very next day asked Congress to create a body 
to determine all railroad wage questions. Congress as 
promptly rejected his suggestion upon the ground that he 
was already invested with full power to deal with the 
matter. 

In all this controversy it is well to note that the Presi- 
dent was now confronted with the growing fire which not 
only he lacked the courage to stamp into and extinguish in 
1 9 1 6, but which he at that time actually fanned into a blaze ; 
that these demands were not the demands of the great pub- 
lic who had for months been beseeching the President 



96 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

unavailingly for relief or recognition; and that the organ- 
ized labor of the railroads declared its purpose to enforce 
these demands upon the government and the public by a 
nation-wide strike that would compel the American people 
on their knees to beseech organized classism to spare them 
the agony of freezing and starvation. 

For it was the Winnipeg experience to be repeated. Mr. 
Hines' report to President Wilson and the latter's appeal 
to Congress to be rid of a threatening matter at the very 
moment that he was preparing to give his undivided atten- 
tion to laying his League-of-Nations scheme before the peo- 
ple, were followed immediately by the threatened railroad 
strike in August, 19 19, jeopardizing transportation and the 
lives of the people in southern California, Nevada, and 
Arizona. And now Director-General Hines took a firm 
stand, such as Director-General McAdoo had taken in a 
similar crisis during the war, making it plain that no further 
mutiny against the United States would be tolerated. He 
gave warning that in those states he would undertake to 
restore complete railroad service at a specified hour and that 
all who did not return to work by that time would be out of 
a job; and that any one undertaking to interfere with or 
to impede the use of railroad property would be dealt with 
as having committed an offense against the United States. 
His firm stand was backed by the American public. The 
days of the "rubber-stamp" Congress had already been 
written into history. Organized classism was losing ground, 
though the railroad men felt that they had chosen a most 
propitious time — when the country was in the grip of an 
unsettled state following the war and at the moment when 
the President's chief concern was to obtain support for the 
Covenant. It was on this occasion that a member of the 
President's own party in Congress declared: "The broth- 
erhoods got a taste of power when the Adamson law was 
passed under whip and spur, and they have been intoxicated 
by it ever since." 



Government Railroading 97 

And in referring to the Plumb Plan, to which the rail- 
road brotherhoods were now turning, one public journal 
stated the situation in brief when it said: 

Most of us feel that the interests of a hundred million people are 
of greater importance than the interests of either railroad owners or 
workers. For either of these two groups to endeavor to secure some 
permanent advantage at the cost of permanent advantage to the 
body of the nation would be wrong and unfair.^ 

But all through the war and during the reconstruction days, 
the leaders of organized labor and a few select groups, 
as the railroad brotherhoods, manifested as thoroughly a 
selfish spirit as did the capitalistic groups, and with more 
classism attaching to its conduct. 

Whatever other cause may be assigned, it is probable 
that, in large measure, the Administration's failure in rail- 
roading must be laid at the door of this class spirit which 
puts the selfishness of its group above the public good and 
above the government itself. But did the Administration 
fail? 

Before government operation was adopted, advocates 
of the policy held that under it the railways would be oper- 
ated much more economically than when operated pri- 
ately. Do the facts bear out or support this theory? 

Government operation reduced the quantity of freight 
handled per car daily and failed to increase the amount of 
freight per train in any degree approaching the proportion 
of increase under private operation — a fact which accounts, 
in large measure, for the increase in expenses. In fact, there 
was practically no increase in the freight moved; yet there 

' Times-Union, Rochester, N. Y. 

Plumb was the general counsel of the railroad brotherhoods. On Au- 
gust 2, the president of the four brotherhoods and the head of the Feder- 
ation employes' department stated that their unions "were in no mood to 
brook the return of the railway lines to their former control"; and that 
economic disaster would follow unless the Plumb Plan was adopted. And on 
August 3 the president of the brotherhood of locomotive engineers said 
the Plan would be made an issue in the next congressional campaign. 
The public accepted this as a threat 



98 The JVilson Administration and the Great IV ar 

was an increase of 1 1 per cent, almost 200,000, in the 
number of men employed. It was chiefly because of de- 
creased efficiency in operation that there was so great an 
increase in operating expenses. Under private operation 
the railways had increased wages during the ten-year period 
of 1907-19 17 by over $600,000,000, in face of the fact 
that freight and passenger rates were lower in 19 17 than 
In 1907. But the companies did not accumulate a deficit. 
It became a passing remark, in referring to a railroad man 
under government operation, that "he was wearing out the 
seat of his overalls in looking for something to do." Yet 
at the time the roads were returned to private operation, 
the employes were claiming advances in wages aggregating 
another $1,000,000,000. 

In his statement to the Senate committee, in January, 
19 19, Mr. McAdoo expressed the hope that there would 
be no considerable deficiency in government operation. The 
event did not justify the hope. With all the advantages 
of pooling, which privilege was forbidden the companies 
by law, the first year of government operation cost the sum 
of $4,007,000,000, an increase of 40 per cent over that 
of 19 1 7. True, war was a disturbing factor. But the next 
year, when the war was past, it had increased to $4,420,- 
000,000. And while a large part of this was in wages alone, 
$1,200,000,000 from 19 17 to 19 19, yet wages had been 
keeping pace with living costs under private operation. 

When Congress, in the Control Act, gave the Adminis- 
tration the power to increase rates to cover operating ex- 
penses and the returns guaranteed the companies, it ob- 
viously meant that the rates should be made sufficiently 
high to cover all by rates to be paid by those who used the 
transportation, without laying any portion of the burden 
upon the taxpayers of the country. And in June, 19 18, 
the Railroad Administration increased passenger rates to 
three cents a mile, an increase of 50 per cent; and freight 
rates by 25 per cent, in addition to the increase granted 



Government Railroading 99 

the February previous, making a total in freight to that 
time of 32^ per cent higher than had been allowed under 
private operation. Thereupon, Mr. McAdoo issued a state- 
ment that it was expected that the increased earnings would 
cover all increases in expenses, basing his estimates upon 
the returns actually made by the roads during the three 
years ending June 30, 19 17. 

Yet, the first year of government operation fell short of 
this estimate by almost $240,000,000, the deficit officially 
admitted by the Railroad Administration. And upon his 
surrender of his office at the end of that year, he estimated 
that the roads should earn a surplus over the guarantees of 
$100,000,000. But after paying expenses, including taxes, 
there was a deficit of about $360,000,000 for the year 1919 ; 
and for the last two months of government operation, Janu- 
ary and February, 1920, the deficit was $103,000,000. 

When government operation ceased on March i, 1920, 
Director-General Hines estimated the total losses to the 
government during the twenty-six months of its operation 
at $904,000,000, in his statement submitted to the House 
committee on appropriations. But the committee found 
other items which he had omitted, and stated that before 
the accounts were closed "the total loss to the government 
chargeable to federal control and operation of railroads 
would amount to $1,375,000,000." This was loaded upon 
the taxpayers of the country. And Mr. Hines asked for an 
appropriation of the people's money to see the roads 
through the year 19 19 in the sum of $1,200,000,000; on 
June 10 Congress gave him $750,000,000. 

Much of the beginning of government failure in rail- 
roading was attributed to the extreme weather in its second 
month of operation and to the scarcity of coal. But the 
corresponding month of 1919, when freight rates had been 
materially increased, coal was plentiful, and the weather 
was extraordinarily mild and pleasant, was a worse month 
for the railroads financially than the direful February, 



100 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

19 1 8. For in the later month the net operating income of 
the roads was $2,225,000 less than for the disastrous Febru- 
ary of 19 1 8. While rates were increased fully 25 per cent, 
the income decreased 14 per cent and with slower service. 
And there was a progression of deficits. During the year 
19 1 8 the monthly average of deficits was $17,000,000; 
the first quarter of 19 19, they averaged $37,000,000. And 
Mr. Hines' request of Congress for $1,200,000,000 to 
the end of that year, suggests a very great increase. 

Were these great deficits due to better service under 
government operation? Scarcely had the Railroad Ad- 
ministration given to the public the statement that traflic of 
all kinds was being handled with expedition and with cars 
in abundance to spare, when it became known that there 
was an acute car shortage in the central northwest. On 
September 4, 19 18, the grain elevators were closing be- 
cause they were full, with no cars available to carry the 
wheat to the great markets of the east. In 19 17 the rail- 
roads of the country handled 10 per cent more freight 
than in 19 16, in which latter year it was of much greater 
volume than in any previous year. In freight traffic the in- 
crease alone of 1917 over that of 1916 was 135,000,000,- 
000 ton-miles — substantially equal to the combined total 
of all the railroads of Canada, Great Britain, France, Rus- 
sia, Germany and Austria for an entire year. 

Nor was the tremendous deficit under government opera- 
tion the whole of the story. The Administration ineffi- 
ciency was demonstrated further by the condition in which 
the equipment and traffic were found when the companies 
received the roads back from the government. On March 
I, 1920, there were over 90,000 loaded cars accumulated 
in the various terminals awaiting movement. The follow- 
ing months came the railroad strikes and the number soon 
ran up to 300,000. In July of that year the Railroad Labor 
Board rendered an award granting employes advances in 
wages aggregating $625,000,000. During the last month 



Government Railroading loi 

of government operation, though there was a great deficit 
and the business was greater than ever before handled in 
any February, the Administration had not adequately main- 
tained the properties, laying upon the companies the im- 
mediate necessity of largely increasing their maintenance 
expenditures in tracks and equipment. After seven months 
of returned private control, the number of loaded cars 
awaiting movement was normal, or about 50,000. 

And the railroad executives had already taken steps to 
improve the service^ in spite of the "outlaw" strike in April, 
agreeing that the matter of first importance was an increased 
daily average in the movement of freight cars, an increase 
in the average loading, and a reduction in the number of 
cars in bad order. 

To this end they turned every energy. The greatest 
average freight mileage per car per day ever attained was 
in 19 1 6, when it was 26,9 miles. Under government opera- 
tion, this mileage had decreased to less than 25 in 19 18, 
to 23 in 1 9 19, and at the time the roads were returned on 
March i, 1920, it was only 22 mHes. Every increase of 
one mile per car per day is equivalent to the addition of 
100,000 cars to the available supply. In July, 1920, the 
average for all railroads had increased to 25 miles and the 
executives agreed to attempt to reach 30 miles. Increase 
in loading, urged strongly by the United States Railroad 
Administration, was also urged by the companies when the 
roads came back into their hands ; since an increase of one ton 
in the average car-load is equivalent to increasing the avail- 
able car supply by about 75,000.° 

With the roads the government took over 129,000 
freight cars in bad order, or 5.7 per cent of the total. When 
it returned the properties it reported I53'727 bad-order 
cars, an increase of nearly 25,000, or approximately 20 
per cent. Moreover, the cars were scattered all over the 

'"The Railroad Situation to Date": an address by Samuel M. Felton, 
president of the C. G. W. R. R., before the Central Manufacturing Dis- 
trict Club, Chicago, September 29, 1920, p. 3. 



102 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

country;'^ and when returned home, the number in bad 
order was found to be much larger than the Railroad Ad- 
ministration reported. It was estimated that to meet the 
demand of the freight traffic of the next two years 800,000 
new cars were needed; and so greatly was the greatest rail- 
way system in the world neglected under government control 
that these cars had not been ordered when it was turned 
back to private control. 

But there was a more appalling deficit than the financial 
deficit or that in maintaining equipment. One of the most 
disastrous effects of government control was the undermin- 
ing of the railway organizations and of the discipline of 
the employes. One leading newspaper of the Atlantic sea- 
board, after showing how government operation had de- 
pleted the railroad equipment and after citing the decreased 
production per man with greatly increased wages, said : 

But the most damaging result was that it destroyed the morale 
of the workers and sowed discord between them and the manage- 
ments. By urging all the workers to organize under the union 
rules, the government helped to transform the railroad brother- 
hoods from the most conservative, contented and loyal labor organi-* 
zation in the country into an aggressively radical machine, which is 
now in open competition with the managements for future control 
of this great industry.^ 

The Administration's method of government, which found 
ready expression in its railroading as in other directions, 
produced a greater deficit in the morale of the people than 
the financial deficit, whether in airplanes, shipbuilding, mu- 
nitions of war, or railroading. It taught the spendthrift 
habit by the most open and notorious concrete examples, 
In utter disregard of the first principles of business man- 
agement. Staggering as the figures are in dealing with 

^It was not unlike the situation in which the shipping men of the 
country found themselves at the close of hostilities. They could find neither 
their ships nor any one at Washington who could tell them where they 
were, or when or how they could get them back. See chapter on "Ship- 
building." 

"Philadelphia North American, March 5, 1920. 



Government Railroading 103 

railroad operation, it is scarcely a matter of wonder that 
the American people are charged with spending annually 
$22,000,000,000 on non-essentials. 

The Act of Congress restoring the railroads to private 
operation and control, insured the railroads against bank- 
ruptcy and collapse; assured labor of no reduction in wages 
for six months and the companies an income for the same 
period, and instead of penalizing pooling as in the past, 
it was encouraged. The Act forbade any increase of wages 
during the six months, a feature of the bill that brought a 
storm of protest from labor organizations. A prominent 
feature of the law related to the adjustment of wages and 
the conditions of labor, creating a board of appeals con- 
sisting of nine members: three representing the roads, em- 
ployes and the public each. This board was to reach a de- 
cision by a majority, including at least one representative 
of the public. It was made compulsory, under penalty, for 
both sides to submit their dispute to this board. But a re- 
markable fact is that neither party was required to accept 
the decision and the board was given no power to enforce 
its findings. 

Pleased to have the government take over the railroads, 
the public was more pleased to have them returned to pri- 
vate control. Inefficiency and the attempt to play politics 
with the thing created a violent reaction in public sentiment 
touching government operation. Said one newspaper that 
has always stood firmly for working people's rights: 

Never did the pendulum of popular judgment on any economic 
question swing so far in so short a time — from virtually unanimous 
approval when the lines were taken over by the Government twenty- 
six months ago, to virtually unanimous relief when they were given 
back.'* 

Indeed, there was practically nothing to be said in favor 
of government operation after the Administration had tried 

"Philadelphia Nort/i American. 



I04 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

it for over two years. The public was not at first permitted 
to know the facts concerning the monumental deficits that 
were loaded upon the people. And when the light was per- 
mitted to shine out from the dark corners, the Administra- 
tion, in answer to the outcry, felt obliged to explain. This 
Director-General Hines undertook to do before the mem- 
bers and guests of the Chamber of Commerce and Traffic 
Club of Philadelphia in June, 19 19. But the figures later 
given out indicated that the situation was far worse than 
he at that time permitted the public to know. The gross 
figures later showed that the last year before the govern- 
ment took over the roads, operating expenses aggregated 
$2,957,000,000. And though there was notable failure to 
maintain the properties at the standard at which taken over, 
the operating expenses the year the government ended con- 
trol totalled about $5,350,000,000, an annual increase of 
about $2,400,000,000, of which some $2,000,000,000 is 
chargeable to labor. And with the total operating expenses 
and taxes aggregating $5,600,000,000 per annum, while 
the total earnings for the year 1919 were $5,200,000,000, 
there was a shortage of $400,000,000 merely to meet ex- 
penses, with nothing on investment. The employes in Sep- 
tember, 1920, were receiving more than twice as much in 
wages as in 19 16. 

The people were gradually learning the truth. On the 
floor of the Senate on December 5, 19 19, Senator Kellogg 
stated that federal operation of the previous two years had 
demoralized the railroad service and impoverished the rail- 
road properties. He cited the fact that in the last nine 
months of 19 17 the roads, under private operation, handled 
virtually as much business as during the same months in 
191 8, and more than for the corresponding months of 1919 ; 
and that they did it with 190,000 fewer men and at a cost 
less by $1,500,000,000. And that notwithstanding the in- 
crease in rates from 25 to 50 per cent, the Government was 
losing in operation at the rate per year of $350,000,000. 



Government Railroading 105 

Thus had the Administration written another chapter 
in the history of its operations during the Great War. But 
it did not end with that. When the roads were returned to 
private management in March, 1920, the law perpetuated 
the system of adjusting the relations of the workers through 
a board, now in the Railroad Labor Board, to fix the rates 
of wages the roads should pay, and the system was made 
nationally applicable. In July, 1920, an increase in freight 
rates from 25 to 40 per cent and in passenger rates of 20 
per cent was granted. This, it was estimated, would yield 
an additional revenue of $1,500,000,000. It did not ma- 
terialize. Wages remained the same, while revenues de- 
creased. At the beginning of 192 1 it was evident that the 
lines were facing financial straits, and in April the Railroad 
Labor Board abrogated the national rules effective July i. 
And early in June it granted the request of the roads that 
there be a cut in wages approximating an average of 12 per 
cent, effective July i. Thereafter the roads were on a safer 
basis. But in the late summer of 1921, the amounts due 
the roads from the government for the obligations incurred 
during the war were still unpaid and the lines were ham- 
pered for the want of this money. 

As a logical result of the Administration's policy in 
showing favoritism to a strongly organized class beginning 
in 19 1 6, this same class, "big four" brotherhoods of rail- 
road employes, to which was added a fifth, the switchmen, 
undertook to play the game that was played in Winnipeg 
two years previously — starving and freezing the people 
into submission to their demands by refusing to move 
trains. The strike which they called for October 30, 1921, 
ostensibly a strike against the railroads, was in fact a strike 
against the people and the people's government. With no 
popular support, the strike order was cancelled by the lead- 
ers three days before it was to become effective. 

The transportation system of the country, the best in 
the world, is the main artery of the nation's progress. And 



lo6 The PFilson Administration and the Great War 

the radical element of society must never be permitted to 
gam control thereof. The President or other official at- 
temptmg to sell the nation's birthright for a mess of politi- 
cal pottage deserves the execration of his countrymen. 






i 



CHAPTER VII 

SECRETARY BAKER AND MR. CREEL IN WAR 

As delightful a gentleman as any one could care to meet 
personally; as studiously scholarly as any in the land; as 
rich in experience as one could wish along certain but ill- 
defined lines; a pacifist of pacifists — such is the man whom 
President Wilson, of his own accord, selected for the all- 
important fighting branch of the government's service in the 
greatest war of recorded time, displacing Secretary of War 
Garrison, who was a real fighting man. 

It was when the Germans were making great headway 
in their terrific March drive against the Allies in 191 8 
that Mr. Baker made a notable address that was heralded 
throughout the country and the world; for the War De- 
partment had been excoriated in Congress and by the peo- 
ple for its failures at the crucial time, and the world hung 
breathlessly upon the words of the nation's war head. 

This address to the publishers in New York is an in- 
stance of what he was confidently seeking to lead the Ameri- 
can public to believe. He spoke well of our soldiers, "men 
prepared to make the supreme sacrifice in order that we 
who remained behind and those who come after us may be 
free from a philosophy too hateful to govern the world." 
As to our own country, he said: "Long live the United 
States — not a place on the map, not a system of political 
institutions hemmed in by the seas, but a living moral in- 
fluence in the world, liberating the spirits of men and pre- 
serving the freedom of opportunity for the children of 
men." 

Then Mr. Baker concluded his address with an impres- 
sive and characteristic reference to the magnitude of our 

107 



io8 The JVihon Administration and the Great War 

task as indicated by the alleged fact that the warehouses 
planned for American use, "now in France and projected to 
be there," would cover a tract of land fifty feet wide by 
two hundred and fifty miles long — his imagination un- 
equaled except probably by the actual production of one 
airplane whose arrival in France had not yet been heralded 
to the world, when 20,000 were promised. 
George Harvey put it thus : 

This is substantially all that Mr. Baker had to say, — the same 
old slush about things too beautiful to perish ; the lulling of our 
people to sleep upon the theory that the French and English can 
win without our aid; the virtual intimation that we should be most 
careful not to tread upon German toes; the plain declaration that 
we are in the war only to keep free from a hateful "philosophy"; 
the easy putting aside as of slight importance the breaking of the 
vital battle line, the inferential but no less certain loading of the 
whole burden upon our stricken Allies; the cautious avoidance of 
distinguishing between the causes for which the two forces were 
striving with might and main and the very hearts' blood of millions 
of men, women and children. . . . 

Not a word about the war itself; not a suggestion of warning; 
not a shadow of appeal for help from the people in hurrying forward, 
"for God's sake," the work of succor and relief ; not a syllable of 
denunciation of the barriance; not a sound above a whisper in praise 
and appreciation of our brothers in arms; not a hint of peril to the 
mother and sister countries and to our own; not one clear bugle 
note to rouse and thrill a mighty people into overpowering action; 
nothing, nothing under heaven but pifHe — piddling, pacifist piffle 
from an American Secretary of War, basking in the sunlight of his 
chief while hundreds of thousands of those left at home, no less surely 
than the best of our manhood who have gone and are going, sit in 
the shadow of death. 

Can one wonder that, after having seen and heard such a repre- 
sentative of our great and fearless Nation, our Allies began to look 
askance at America, and even to murmur their doubts and misgiv- 
ings? For more than a year they have held their breath in suspense, 
in hope, in unparalleled generosity and considerateness, and for policy's 
sake. How they have felt during the past few months, many of us. 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in JVar loo 

to our humiliation and shame, know only too well, but it took tlicir 
own death agonies, accentuated by the smiling smugness of our 
Secretary of JVar to fetch utterance of their disappointment and 
dispair.^ 

It is doubtful whether a better idea of the two views 
at that time prevailing in the country is obtainable than in 
this characteristic speech of Mr. Baker and the comment 
of George Harvey — the one the Administration view, the 
other the popular view. The one is given to glittering 
generalities; the other to pushing the war preparation to the 
limit, both in men and equipment. The one is intended 
to soothe the people; the other to arousing the people 
to the critical situation and to the fighting spirit. If 
each is extreme, each best represents the views then cur- 
rent. 

If it seems strange that two men as unlike as George 
Creel and Secretary Baker are linked together in recording 
events of the Great War, it must not be forgotten that 
three outstanding facts bring them into this connection : 
Both were members of the federal Committee on Publicity, 
of which Creel was made chairman; both were imbued with 
the so-called liberal spirit and of definite pacifist taint; 
each believed he was better able to endure difficult situations 
which their beliefs had engendered than were the great 
public, for which reason each believed it was right to mis- 
lead, even grossly to deceive, the public, and in his own way 
this each sought to do. 

The extent to which this was done will be revealed only 
when the records of all departments of the government shall 
be made accessible to the world, records which vvere then 
hidden away from the public for fear of the result had the 
people been permitted to know the exact facts concerning 
the failures of the Administration in its efforts to make it 
appear that it and its partisans had conducted a great war 
to a successful conclusion. 

* IVar IVeekly, May 4, 1918. 



no The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

The Great War brought into popular use some new 
words that are likely to become living parts of the language, 
as Bolshevist, camouflage, over the top, Hooverize. The 
last named is used fondly at every table. There is one, 
however, that is not used to conjure with, but which has 
gotten for itself a place rather of obloquy than of affection. 
It is the term Bakcrize, which came to symbolize official 
deception, official promises without fulfillment, shiftiness. 
And there is its near relative, Creelism. Though each has 
but a brief history, it is not known whether the verb or 
the noun came first into being. The latter means all that the 
former does; but though it has less of official flavor, it is 
a slightly stronger term, a senator from Missouri intimat- 
ing that it meant licensed lying. 

Nor is it strange that these two men should thus char- 
acterize the two words. To Secretary Baker the nation 
owes the creation and operation of an elaborate system of 
official deception designed to protect incompetence, conceal 
failure, and mislead the public. Close examination showed 
that the prepared statements which he made to the Senate 
Committee on Military Affairs were wholly untrustworthy, 
while his communications to the public were almost always 
descriptive, sometimes mere fabrication. Creelism was his 
conception — a system of propaganda using the war powers 
of the government to compel the local press to spread 
official misinformation.^ 

More discouraging to millions of Americans than all 
the rest of his failures was the fact that Secretary Baker 
continued his efforts to deceive the public after exposure. 
It seemed that he did not, and could not, learn; that re- 
peated exposure of mendacity and duplicity on his part 
taught him nothing; that his conception of the important 
duties of his office was camouflaging and deceiving the 
American public, rather than making the performance of his 

^See chapter on "The Press and Public Opinion." 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War ill 

department conform to the expectations of the people and 
the necessities of war. 

When Mr. Kahn, of California, was obliged to assume 
the duties of Chairman Dent, of Alabama, to carry for- 
ward the work of the chairman of the Military Affairs Com- 
mittee of the Plouse because Mr. Dent was not ready to 
turn in to help drive the crusher of civilization out of busi- 
ness — when Mr. Kahn artlessly asked whether the statement 
made by the War Department in 19 17 that we would have 
20,000 airplanes in France by July i, 19 18, was not re- 
sponsible for this tendency in all branches of the govern- 
ment service to exaggerate, he put his finger on the exact 
spot. The department's aircraft statement, and a dozen 
other incorrect statements, were distinctly responsible for 
the evil tendency toward exaggeration during the entire 
career of the Administration in the war. The War Depart- 
ment was the source of more and worse exaggerations than 
came from any other quarter. It became the father of 
exaggerations. 

It was along many lines and in regard to many situations 
that Secretary Baker sought to mislead the public and to 
cover up the facts. The people came to accept it as a fixed 
habit of his thought. And the partisan newspaper organs, 
to avoid embarrassment for the Administration, aided 
wherever possible. When Governor Allen of Kansas, who 
had been on the front lines, spoke from personal ex- 
perience and unquestioned knowledge as to the casualties, 
Mr. Baker replied by stating that it was not excessive at 
some other time than that to which Governor Allen referred. 
When the Associated Press dispatches were telling the coun- 
try that the fighters were coming home penniless and de- 
pendent upon charity while the government was owing them 
for months of service. Secretary Baker replied by referring 
to certain camps which w^ere free from the condition charged 
and stated the men were paid in full up to the time of leav- 



112 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

ing Europe. This statement led the Boston Transcript to 

say: 

The impression conveyed and, as we believe, intended to be 
conveyed, by this cunningly deceitful official declaration, is that there 
is no truth in the reported return to this country of soldiers whose 
penniless condition is due to their failure to receive the pay due 
them for periods ranging from one to ten months; no truth in the 
report that such soldiers have arrived at Camp Devens, Camp Sher- 
man, Camp Funston, and various Army hospitals; no truth in the 
report that General McCain, General Wood and one or two other 
courageous divisional commanders have, upon their own personal 
responsibility, without awaiting any authority from the War De- 
partment, ordered these returning heroes to be paid forthwith; no 
truth in the report that the Red Cross had been lending money to 
some of the more seriously wounded among these penniless defenders. 
But all these reports are true, and the condition is even more dis- 
graceful than the reports published describe. 

Likewise, when charged with dilatoriness in the work of 
the War Department in connection with the Archibald 
Stevenson affair, Mr. Baker promptly abolished the par- 
ticular branch of the Military Intelligence to which Mr. 
Stevenson belonged and then wrote to Senator Overman 
that no such man as Stevenson belonged to that branch of 
the service — which was technically true when he so wrote. 

He carried through the same principle when, in regard 
to the severe criticisms of his department, he wrote con- 
cerning the very efHcient Edward Stettinius : 

It is within his province to keep track of the capacity and pro- 
duction of contractors. Mr. Stettinius will also watch closely the 
transportation and shipping situation in order that the production and 
deliveries of war materials may properly proceed. In other words, 
Mr. Stettinius, a business man and purchasing agent of vast experi- 
ence, may figuratively be called "the surveying eye of the Director 
of Purchases and Supplies." 

Mr. Baker very well understood that the duties which 
were to devolve upon Mr. Stettinus were simply advisory, he 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in JVar 113 

having no authority to compel execution. But he hoped 
it would serve its purpose of quieting the disturbed public. 

When Mr. Gutzon Borglum undertook to uncover the 
facts in the airplane scandal, in the winter of 19 17-18, the 
War Department connived at an attempt to blackmail him 
into silence. The files of the department were searched, 
and an unsubstantiated series of allegations charging Mr. 
Borglum with attempting to sell his influence with the 
President were handed to one of the Administration's 
trusted press agents. They were printed far and wide. 
The evidence appeared to be damning. But Mr. Borglum 
scorned it all and insisted on telling the truth. Time has 
vindicated his character and proved his charges. 

Who were the men powerful enough to use the War 
Department in an attempt to blackmail Mr. Borglum into 
silence? Every man whom the Senate committee found re- 
sponsible for the failure was appointed by Mr. Baker. 

One of the most marked characteristics of the Admin- 
istration during the war was deliberate evasion of responsi- 
bility, failure to measure up to the demands of the occasion. 
This was particularly pronounced in the head of the War 
Department. It was on the fifth day of December, 19 17, 
that he said: 

From the moment the "Lusitania" was sent to a watery grave by 
the hand of the assassin, the United States had only two choices. 
The United States could have crawled on its knees to the Hohen- 
zollerns, crying out that their frightfulness and military efficiency 
were too great, that we submit and become their vassals, or as an 
alternative we could fight. We chose to fight. 

The "Lusitania" was sunk May 5, 19 15. Two months 
later the field secretary of the National Security League re- 
ported that Mr. Baker, then Mayor of Cleveland, "refused 
absolutely to co-operate with the League because he said 
he was a pacifist and opposed to the agitation for pre- 
paredness," and then declared that "of all the mayors 1 



114 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

interviewed Mr. Baker was the most pronounced opponent 
of preparedness." At that time, therefore, and with full 
understanding he preferred that his country should crawl 
on its knees to the Hohenzollerns rather than fight them. 
He also turned aside the idea that his nation should be 
equipped for acceptance of what he knew to be the only 
alternative open to a self-respecting people. He declared 
on December 28, 19 17, in his New York address that "this 
nation has shown that in time of war a peace-loving, prog- 
ress-making people, when the time came had but to watch 
the magnet of the spirit to defend itself." But the idle 
dream and more idle talk were immediately dispelled by 
the rude shock of the Senate's investigation. "A gentle 
egotist commissioned as the vice-regent of Mars. Pacifism 
twirling its thumbs while hellish Mars was wrecking the 
universe. Murder, rapine, and sudden death, horror piled 
upon horror, the world feverishly burnishing its armour 
while a lamb-like little gentleman, serene in his security 
in the triumph of morality sat like a monk in his cell, un- 
vexed by gross passions rubricating the golden rule!" ^ 

As if the fatuous policy of unpreparedness when the 
war burst upon the land had not been sufficiently impressed 
upon the nation, Secretary Baker appeared to be always 
looking for a way of escape from the consequences of his 
policy of delay and evasion. He always found a story to ac- 
count for the responsibility of delay and shifting. When his 
department was receiving a gruelling in the beginning of 
19 1 8 for the results of its delay, evasion, and incompetence, 
he told the country it was idle to draw men from industrial 
pursuits for training in France when there were no ships to 
carry them, and urged the absurdly inadequate restriction 
of ages from 21 to 26 years for army service. Six months 
later, on July 4, he stated, when the country insisted upon 
the most ample army possible to crush civilization's enemy, 
that he desired "to learn the effect upon vital industries." 

^ North American Review, March, 1918, 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 1 1 5 

Eight days later he appeared at the capitol and stated that 
he was opposed to any change in the draft ages, without re- 
vealing to the astonished Senate the cause for this complete 
change of front. And then he regaled the country with a 
statement that shows the turnings and twistings of a mind 
that seemed to warrant the conclusion that it was incapable 
of straight-forward utterance, declaring that the War De- 
partment was "constantly anxious to expand its military 
program" and was "now very actively considering an in- 
crease, if that increase is possible"; and that after the sen- 
ators would return from their recess in September he might 
recommend further appropriations for men and measures. 
At the very time he was making the lack-of-ships argument, 
Chairman Hurley was promising ships to the limit, what- 
ever might be the number of men to be transported. 
Mr. Baker continued: 

The War Department has from the beginning been expanding 
its military program. We are many months ahead of what was our 
original hope in regard to the transportation of men. We are con- 
stantly seeking ways to expand that, and we are in the midst of a 
plan now to expand it again. Should we so expand the program it 
may turn out that we will need an increased number of men and 
it may turn out that the best we can do won't require It. When we 
have determined what Is best we will then ask congress to provide 
additional money and men. For the present there Is no such 
necessity. 

As put by George Harvey in his JVar Weekly : 

This was the same old song! The war may be over! Schwab 
may not produce the ships! We may all be dead! Anything, any- 
thing for an excuse for doing nothing. 

Senator Wadsworth depicted the situation succinctly in 
these words: 

Can we not get out of that habit of mind which leads us to en- 
deavor to meet emergencies after tliey overtake us, in this country and 
in the management of this war at large, not only by ourselves but by 



ii6 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

our Allies? Can we not anticipate emergencies before they over- 
take us? ... It passes my understanding how those responsible for 
the conduct of the military preparations of this great republic can 
solemnly advise us at this day that for the time being nothing more 
is desired. 

One of the glaring outrages of Secretary Baker was his 
attempt to throttle the press that was not willing to do his 
bidding. This was exemplified in his treatment of the 
newspapers which, without any notice from him or his de- 
partment not to do so, printed the official report of the com- 
mittee of the United States Senate on the airplane failure, 
the first summary of which was given out by the committee 
for the evening papers of August 22, 19 18. After the re- 
port had been given to the news agencies of the country, had 
been printed in the Congressional Record, and was given 
full liberty of the press anywhere in the world, Mr. Baker 
forbade copies of the American newspapers carrying the 
report to leave the country. But the papers were already 
in the mails, and on the way to the soldiers in Europe, hun- 
dreds of thousands of whom had paid their subscriptions 
thereto, with postage prepaid. 

When the second installment of the committee's report 
was ready two days later, Mr. Baker sent a confidential 
warning against using it for overseas circulation; and im- 
mediately thereafter a second confidential communication 
to the effect that it did not make so much difference whether 
the part of the report dealing with the aircraft failure went 
abroad, provided the newspapers would see to it that the 
overseas editions contain no hint of the disclosures made 
in the report of the committee of the program which Mr. 
Baker was preparing for the following year. In fact, this 
time it was practically the "official denial" in advance.^ 

*The three great agencies carried as their introduction to this portion 
of the report on the appalling failure, this paragraph: "America's aircraft 
program for the great army that is counted on to win the war next year 
allows for 350 complete squadrons of planes, and the main part of the 
program already is ahead of the schedule, with 3,000 trained pilots." 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in IFar 117 

There could be no pretense that It was necessary to 
the military success of the United States to keep the Sen- 
ate report out of the American newspapers. It was an 
official document and was already sent abroad and in the 
hands of the Allies, neutrals and enemy alike, a fact which 
Mr. Baker's censorship already knew. He appeared to 
believe that by harassing the newspapers of the United 
States he could intimidate the press into suppressing vital 
facts and make of it a reptile press. But it was regrettable 
that the same censorship did not see its way clear to pre- 
vent Mr. Creel's pure fabrications, to which the Senate's re- 
port was giving the lie. Said the eminent writer, George 
Harvey: "Surely truth should not be handicapped and ham- 
strung in her effort to overtake falsehood." 

Each time an investigation to determine the progress 
of the war program was proposed, Secretary Baker blocked 
it. And as the startling truths leaked out he, in keeping 
with his habitual practice of misleading the public, made use 
of the official denial, knowing that the public would prefer 
the denial that anything was wrong to believing the almost 
unbelievable facts concerning War Department shortcom- 
ings. The investigators went off the stage branded by his 
Department officials as friends of Germany bent upon giv- 
ing "information of value to the enemy." President Wil- 
son sustained this attitude when he undertook to brand Sen- 
ator Chamberlain, who first fully opened to the public the 
deplorable situation in January, 19 18. 

One of the phases of Secretary Baker's war activities 
was his effort to save the slacker who became known as the 
"conscientious objector." Treated more fully elsewhere,^^ 
this matter cannot properly be wholly passed over in con- 
nection with its chief exponent in high circles of the Ad- 
ministration. 

That there were organized efforts to encourage draft- 
dodgers in refusal to obey military orders when inducted 

"Chapter on "Disloyalty." 



Ii8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

into camps was but common knowledge to Secretary Baker. 
Conspicuous among these efforts was the National Civil 
Liberties Bureau of New York, which issued, two months 
prior to Secretary Baker's "Confidential" Order, a confi- 
dential pamphlet which stated: 

We see no reason to change our policy of handling this matter 
quietly, without any publicity. Secretary Baker has been and is 
giving the whole subject personal attention, and nothing would be 
gained by our going into the press where hostile news notices and 
damning editorials are certain. We have far more to gain, both 
for the men themselves and for the cause itself, through Secretary 
Baker than through the newspapers. 

While there are those who are conscientiously opposed to 
war, such as the Quakers, they have been conscientious 
through the centuries, and did not become so over night 
as a war threatening the nation's integrity approached. 

But these "conscientious objectors" who feared public 
opinion and counted on Secretary Baker's support, were far 
from the Quaker type. And if they did not know of his 
"confidential order" two months before it was issued, they 
could not have better written their own confidential pam- 
phlet if they had known it. The records are crowded with 
instances of Secretary Baker's expressions of warm sym- 
pathy with the scoundrels ready to stab the nation in its 
day of distress.*^ 

At the end of his first year's work, Mr. Creel asked 
Congress for $2,000,000 with which to carry forward his 
scheme for the ensuing year. He was granted $125,000 
by the House measure, only because the President had de- 
clared the work of the Committee on Public Information as 
a means of winning the war. Said one keenly analytical 
editorial comment, solid to the core in its Americanism : 

'A valuable contribution to the literature of this subject is found in 
Basil M. Stevens' "With Kindly Consideration" in The North American 
Revienv for January, 1920, p. 57. 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War no 

The real purpose of the propaganda in which Creel is the most 
active figure Is to overlay the facts of history with studied inventions, 
in order to build up the reputation and influence of President Wilson 
and his Administration. The ofl^cial utterances that are being sent 
throughout the world are calculated to make it appear that from the 
beginning Mr. Wilson was for war, but could not act because the 
American people had not reached his heights of discernment and 
moral inspiration. 

False in substance and implication, this propaganda under the 
present circumstances Is an especially atrocious thing. For Wash- 
ington authority behind it causes it to find reflection in the press of 
the Allied countries, which pays glowing tribute to President Wilson 
for having overcome the reluctance and stimulated the patriotism of 
his countrymen, so that they were at last aroused to defend them- 
selves and civilization. 

It is discreditable enough that public funds should be employed to 
serve partisan political interests. But it is shameful that this means 
should be employed to pervert history for the benefit of a blundering 
statesmanship by traducing a loyal people; and it is Indecent that 
because of this campaign American troops on the way to the battle- 
field should meet the suggestion abroad that they represent a nation 
of slackers regenerated by President Wilson's leadership.'^ 

The cost to the country, it developed when the official report 
came before Congress almost a year after the armistice was 
signed, of the operation of the Committee on Public Infor- 
mation was about $6,600,000. 

Like so many other matters touching the relations of the 
Administration to the Great War, the appointment of 
George Creel as chairman of this committee of vast im- 
portance during war has always been a deep mystery 
to the American people, unless they regard It as an ex- 
pression of Wilsonism; then it becomes plain. He was a 
"liberal," and with that class President Wilson seemed 
desirous of aligning himself, though it developed that they 
were the dangerous element of the country, and very far 

'Philadelphia North American, August 28, 1918. 



I20 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

from liberal. Mr. Creel's views on public questions, and 
particularly upon constitutional government, if known to the 
Administration when appointed to his responsible position, 
were damning to the Administration itself. 

His attitude to German propaganda was not less dan- 
gerous. He wrote the introduction to the book "Two 
Thousand Questions and Answers About the War," de- 
claring that in his view It "constitutes a vital part of the 
national defense," a book which the National Security 
League, a patriotic organization, pronounced "a master- 
piece of Hun propaganda," declaring that the German gov- 
ernment itself "could not have devised anything more in- 
siduous, more calculated to destroy our faith in our Allies 
and to insinuate into the American mind excuses for Ger- 
many." And an indorsement, such as Creel's, gave the 
work almost an official character, making It particularly 
dangerous. His known sympathies with syndicalism and 
various radical programs, even before the war, created such 
an Incongruity in his appointment to become the chief of 
American propaganda for democracy as to become ludi- 
crous, except for the seriousness of It. He used his official 
position to give wide publicity to writings whose tendency 
was to weaken the national cause. That politics was at the 
bottom of the whole of it is hardly questioned. His resort 
to distortion of the truth and the fabrication of official 
"news" brought from Senator Reed, after citing typical 
Creelisms, the title of "licensed liar," so named after his 
aircraft inventions.^ 

When, at Christmas time, 191 8, Mr. Creel announced 
at Paris that he had severed his relations with the United 
States government, as the news reached America It came 
as a refreshing breath of pure air after a night of dense- 
ness, with the prospect of his complete extinguishment as 

' A crushing editorial expose of his mendacity is contained in the 
Philadelphia North American for September 25, 191 8. 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in JFar 121 

a public character and official. There was a sense of relief 
from a heavy burden in the land. 

All the distortions of fact, the wrenching of truth to con- 
ceal blunders piled upon blunders mountain high, the cov- 
ering up of the need of a man with a plan at the head of 
the War Department — these were ample to warrant the 
contortions of Mr. Creel and Secretary Baker when they 
lacked the courage to permit the public to know the facts. 
The situation was appalling and almost beyond human 
conception. 

The nation richest in material resources and in genius 
for accomplishment, as well as having had amplest time for 
thorough preparation, when the great German drive began, 
on March 21, 191 8, had been at war almost a year, with a 
stubborn warning of a full year-and-half before that we were 
practically certain to enter the war before its conclusion; and 
when the Allies had been worn down by the continuous 
pounding the greatest war machine the world had ever seen 
could administer to them on Belgian and French soil, we 
had two regiments engaged somewhere in the line — two 
regiments of American soldiers and there were a million 
men on each side. It was just two regiments from a nation 
of 100,000,000 people, too, "making the world safe for 
Democracy," against the mightiest and most ruthless war 
machine of recorded history, — and they were railroad en- 
gineers. 

Secretary Baker's department produced the two out- 
standing scandals of the whole war, hardly exceeded in 
magnitude by those due to the corruption and incapacity of 
Russian bureaucracy under czarism. The one billion dol- 
lars devoted to aviation did not place the first squadron of 
American figliting machines at the front until sixteen months 
after the declaration of war, and the program as a whole 
was a disastrous failure. With billions appropriated for 
ordnance, the department did not place at the front, in 



122 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

time to be used, a single American gun of 6-inch caliber or 
over, nor a single high-explosive shell larger than the 3-inch. 

The ordnance collapse in the midst of the greatest ex- 
actions of the fiercest battling on the front in Europe was 
astounding. But those on the inner side were particularly 
careful to keep the facts from public view, some of which 
will be read with amazement by future generations: Total 
appropriations to September 24, 19 18, for facilities and 
munitions were $4,837,044,550, of which slightly over 
$600,000,000 went for facilities, leaving a good margin 
over $4,000,000,000 for artillery munitions alone. 

What the American army in France was urgently de- 
manding and not getting were 8-inch guns and 9.2-inch 
guns with which to blast the enemy out of his position. The 
appalling facts were that from the time the independent 
American army began its drive toward the strong German 
front up to the end of the war, there was not received in 
France from the United States one shell, either shrapnel 
or high explosive, for a 4.7-inch, a 5-inch, a 6-inch, an 
8-inch, a 9.2-inch, or a lo-inch gun. Not a finished gun, 
with a complete round of ammunition, of a caliber above 
6 inch, was ever shipped from the United States to the 
army in France up to the time of the signing of the armi- 
stice. 

Complete and utter failure to deliver American artillery 
and shells to the fighting front marked the floundering of 
the ordnance bureau; and as late as the month when the 
armistice was signed. General Pershing, after repeatedly 
calling for proper material, virtually demanded the reor- 
ganization of that bureau. 

When the cabled demands of the American comman- 
ders became insistent, the War Department replied that our 
rate of fire was too high — they were sending too many 
shells at the Germans. The fact is our ordnance bureau 
did not supply the American troops in France with ammu- 
nition adequate in size or in quantity; and that its troops 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 123 

had to win their battles by sheer courage, and the expendi- 
ture of blood and by means of supplies they obtained from 
the French. 

At a time when the First American Army was engaged 
in its greatest effort, ammunition was supplied only by the 
most strenuous efforts. It had no reserve supply, and it was 
officially reported that troops could not be sent forward be- 
cause of the shortage of guns and ammunition. The definite 
statement was given out in September that 155-mm. guns 
(6-inch) were shipped to France; and as late as October 16, 
19 1 8, word came from the supply bases in France that 
no such guns were received, nor the ammunition to fit 
them. 

Two months after we entered the war, Mr. Baker 
issued an official bulletin in which he admitted the "diffi- 
culty, disorder, and confusion in getting things started, 
but," he said, "it is a happy confusion. I delight in the 
fact that when we entered this war we were not, like our 
adversary, ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it, and 
inviting it. Accustomed to peace, we were not ready." 

In the following October he announced with undis- 
guised self-satisfaction: "We are well on the way to the 
battle-field." Tliis was too much for Roosevelt, who wrote: 
"For comparison with this kind of military activity we must 
go back to the days of TIglath-Pileser, Nebuchadnezzar 
and Pharaoh. The United States should adopt the stand- 
ard of speed in war which belongs to the twentieth century 
A.D. ; we should not be content with, and still less boast 
about, standards which were obsolete in the seventeenth 
century B.C." ^ 

On December 31, 1917, General Crozier, head of the 
Ordnance Department, testified before the Senate committee 
on military affairs that in the first seven months in the war 
contracts for $1,500,000,000 had been let. "All the huge 
machinery of the War Department has been going at top 

'North American Review, November, 1919. 



1 24 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

speed for months. The work accomplished is something of 
which the people may be proud," he declared. 

On January 10, 1918, Secretary Baker told the commit- 
tee of contracts totaling $1,677,000,000 out of an appro- 
priation of almost twice that amount. On the next day 
under cross-examination he stated; "Our initial needs have 
been met, every man in France has full equipment." On 
January 18, Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the commit- 
tee, declared in a public address: "The military establish- 
ment of America has fallen down." On January 21, Presi- 
dent Wilson characterized this as an astonishing and abso- 
lutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth," and declared: 
"The War Department has performed a task of unparal- 
leled magnitude and difficulty with extraordinary promptness 
and efficiency. . . . My association and constant confer- 
ence with the Secretary of War have taught me to regard 
him as one of the ablest public officers I have ever known." 

January 24. Senator Chamberlain, replying on the floor 
of the Senate, said: "America today is unprepared so far 
as ordnance is concerned. France is furnishing our troops 
with heavy ordnance and machine guns. If we relied upon 
the Ordnance Department to supply our troops with heavy 
ordnance, the war would be over before the guns got to 
the front." 

January 28. Secretary Baker testified before the com- 
mittee : "The American army in France, now and to be 
there is provided (by the Allies) with artillery of the types 
they want as rapidly as they could use it. Our own manu- 
facture is in process. Deliveries of some pieces are al- 
ready begun, with a rising and steadily increasing stream of 
American production." 

March 26. (Five days after the opening of the Ger- 
man offensive) Senator Lodge declared: "We have no 
guns in France except a few old coast guns for which the 
French are making cartridges." 

May 8. Following a minute investigation, the Senate 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 125 

committee declared: "The condition respecting ordnance is 
comparable only to the failure of the aircraft program." 
Members said that production of 6-inch, 8-inch, and 9.2- 
inch Howitzers, the three vital pieces of heavy artillery, was 
"pitifully small." Of the largest, they said, not one would 
be delivered in France this year and of the others the de- 
liveries would be "negligible." 

May II. Said an official statement from the Ordnance 
office : "The Ordnance Department has thus far met every 
demand imposed by the new program for over-seas ship- 
ment of American troops. Tonnage is a limiting factor in 
the shipment of ordnance. Sufficient supplies of artillery 
— French 75-mm. and 155-mm. and American heavy rail- 
way artillery — are already in France to meet the present 
demand." 

May 17. After visiting many ordnance plants, the 
Senate committee reported: "The first 8-Inch Howitzers 
were delivered this week, and the 9.2-inch Howitzers are 
in an advanced state of manufacture. But during the present 
year we shall be compelled to depend very largely, as here- 
tofore, on France for our small field guns and to some ex- 
tent on Great Britain for our large field guns." 

June 28. Secretary Baker wrote to the House Military 
Affairs Committee: "The artillery program is now ap- 
proaching a point where quantity production is beginning." 

July 2. A New York IVorld dispatch from Washing- 
ton states: "The American-built 155-mm. Howitzers are 
moving to France. One American firm is turning out How- 
itzers at the rate of ten a day. These are of an approxi- 
mately 6-inch bore, and are the heavy barrage guns which 
support infantry advances into intrenched positions." 

At various times, also, the committee on public informa- 
tion issued bulletins and photographs respecting the ship- 
ment of American guns. 

On November 20, 19 18, General Pershing, making an 
official report, said: 



126 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

Among our most important deficiencies in material were artillery, 
aviation and tanks. We accepted the offer of the French government 
to provide us with the necessary artillery equipment of 3-inch and 
6-inch guns for thirty divisions. There were no guns of the calibers 
mentioned manufactured in America, on our front at the date the 
armistice was signed. The only guns of these types produced at home 
thus far received in France are log 75-mm. (3-inch) guns. In avia- 
tion, we were in the same situation. We obtained from the French 
the necessary planes for training our personnel, and they have pro- 
vided' us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation and bombing 
planes. As to tanks we were also compelled to rely upon the French. 
Here, however, we were less fortunate, for the reason that the 
French production could barely meet the requirements of their own 
armies.^" 

After the severe drubbing given the War Department 
in the early part of 191 8, not only by the Senate Commit- 
tee on Military Affairs, but from all unbiased sources and 
from all sections of the country, there was a spirit of work 
and co-operation developed that produced marvelous re- 
sults in some directions though not in all. One of the bu- 
reaus most severely criticized was that of ordnance. It took 
a new stride, the entire Administration having felt bitterly 
the attack that was being made upon it from all sides — and 
knowing the criticisms were well based. It resulted in a 
marked showing of improvement soon after the year was 
half over. In mid-summer, 19 18, a report was authorized 
by the War Department showing that upwards of two bil- 
lion cartridges had been put out by that time, the average 
daily approximating fifteen million which, however, would 
be only fifteen for each man of an army of one million for 
all kinds of arms: rifles, pistols, machine-guns. And the 
total number of rifles made was then 1,886,769, about one 
for each man in the service, but none to replace the fearful 
destruction of modern battles, as compared with the almost 
nothing of five or six months earlier. This improvement, 

*" Confirming this deficiency is Andre Tardieu's "Truth about the Treaty," 
p. 35, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1921. 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 127 

however, but strongly brought into relief the fearful short- 
comings of the entire previous period of the year and a 
quarter that the nation had been in the war. 

Not only was the American soldier now armed with a 
weapon superior in range and adaptability, but capable of 
from 30 to 50 per cent greater quickness in action. That 
is to say, two men could fire approximately as many bullets 
in a given space of time as three men using inferior rifles. 

In the summer of 19 18 there was established an Ameri- 
can assembling plant for tanks in France, and contracts were 
let to English, French and Americans for about 500 tanks 
each. When, in a short time, the thousand tanks con- 
tracted for in France and Great Britain had been delivered 
and assembled, the parts of not one complete American 
tank had arrived. The War Department program provided 
for the contract for 4,400 tanks in this country. On Sep- 
tember I, just eight tanks had been completed. There was 
prospect, it was officially stated to members of the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee, that the total of 40 tanks 
would be delivered during that month. Months previously 
a tank training-camp was established in Gettysburg, Penn- 
sylvania. On September i, not one tank had been deliv- 
ered at the camp, and the men who had enlisted for and 
been assigned to tank service were being trained with blue 
prints, paper representations of the machines they were 
supposed to master. 

The United States was capable of turning out more 
tanks in a given time than England and France combined. 
When members of Congress asked Secretary Baker about 
the collapse of the tank program, his reply was that it was 
"military information not proper to disclose." 

At first an attempt was made by the War Department 
to deny that no American-made gas in an American shell 
was ever fired by the American forces overseas. A little 
later, however. General William L. Sibert admitted the fail- 
ure of the War Department in this respect. General 



128 Tlic fVilsoH Adminislration and the Great War 

Sibert, who took charge of the chemical warfare service in 
the summer of 191 8, when it was in a deplorable state, made 
it efficient by the time the war ended. 

Some of the ardent friends of the Administration, par- 
ticularly apologists for Secretary Baker, doubted that he 
ever made the statement that the war was 3,000 miles away, 
when seeking to excuse the dilatoriness of his department. 
On page 16 15, of Part III, of Senate public documents, in 
a hearing before the committee on military affairs, are these 
words : 

Secretary Baker: The War was not on us in the the sense 
that the enemy was at our doors. He was 3,000 miles away. 

And on the next page was this: 

Secretary Baker: I ask permission to call your attention to the 
fact that the battle front was 3,000 miles away. 

Senator Weeks: I want to say that, to my mind, it does not 
make any difference practically whether it was 10,000 miles away 
or one mile away. Our obligation was the same. 

When the criticism of the War Department was at its 
height, following the celebrated speech of Senator Cham- 
berlain in New York, in January, 19 18, Secretary Baker 
started in upon the theory that his patchwork reorganiza- 
tion of his department would placate public opinion. Per- 
haps the best single example of the way his plan was work- 
ing out is shown by his method of letting contracts, at that 
time five different branches of the War Department bidding 
against each other for leather, this sending the price rap- 
idly upwards and the government buying at the top price. 

In September, 19 18, there were millions of fully-loaded 
shells on this side of the water waiting to be shipped to the 
front. Most of them lacked some essential part. Others, 
which had been manufactured for Russia, were in perfect 
condition, but the ownership of them was In question. 
Orders for twenty million small caliber shells had been 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 129 

placed in Canada, and they were not delivered; for the Can- 
adian manufacturers seemed to be in doubt as to whether 
they were to manufacture the shells complete or simply 
build them in parts and ship them to the United States to 
be finished. Also a firm in Indiana had a contract for 
some ten million parts. It was expected that it would be 
producing about 20,000 of these parts each day beginning 
months before the armistice was signed. But after some 
thousand of them had been finished, it was discovered that 
they were made wrong, they were worthless. Delay fol- 
lowed delay, there must be correction of fault after fault, 
while precious days and weeks and months were lost in the 
crucial days of 19 18, and finally production was begun again 
just as the conflict closed. The entire trouble from begin- 
ning to end of the war, so far as the Administration was 
concerned, was an entire failure to co-ordinate. 

Said a member of the United States Chamber of Com- 
merce, a business man, as a witness before the investigating 
committee : 

There is no central control or planning. What is needed is 
someone who shall have power or responsibility for making decisions. 
The difficulty in getting decisions in Washington to-day is apparent 
to every one. It is an extraordinarily difficult thing to have any 
matter definitely and positively decided. The thing that we are trying 
to impress upon you is that the experience of business men has been 
universal, that without central control and responsibility no enterprise, 
large or small, could succeed. ^^ 

" President Ferguson, of one of the large ship-building plants that were 
relied upon to put out the ships necessary to carry forward the war, told 
how there was no head work in the preparation of places in which to carry 
forward the great plan. He told how in one little town where they could 
not get water in the shipyard, though he was ordered to hasten the ship- 
building work, the army had 15,000 horses all using water and 20,000 
soldiers all using water, and that in the same week he had instructions 
from either one of two government departments to give its work priority. 
And he stated: 

"We cannot get hard coal, for which our houses are built with latrobe 
stoves, yet the army has put a lot of hard-coal stoves in their camps which 
might as well have burned soft coal. I took this matter up with the Secretary 



130 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

And it was at this point that the very personality of the 
war secretary due to his mental attitude created the chief 
difficulty. 

The record is crowded with examples of failure to co- 
ordinate, to plan ahead. The Secretary of War appeared 
to have no appreciation of the size of his job. Up to Jan- 
uary I, 19 18, there had been ordered over 21,000,000 pairs 
of shoes. That was more shoes than had been ordered for 
the very much larger British army during the entire three 
and one-half years of war. At the same time, the army 
was short by several hundred thousand of the number of 
overcoats needed. Clothing in the navy was so worthless 
that the sailors had to pay out of their own slender pay 
about as much to replenish them as the whole was supposed 
to cost in the first place. Our shortage in several lines of 
arms and ammunition was serious, one alarming shortage 
being in powder, our shortage in production for our own 
use at that time being about a million pounds a day when 
we were supposed to be also supplying the Allies, and 
orders for the new buildings to increase our powder supply 
were not given until December, 19 17, though the great 
shortage was already alarming by the middle of 19 17. 

What Secretary Baker cost the country in money and 
lives will probably never be known. Some of his state- 
ments, however, may suggest it. When, early in 19 18, 
Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Committee on Mili- 
tary Affairs, declared that "the military establishment of 
America has fallen down;" and when, a few weeks later, 

of War, and wrote him a letter, and discussed it with everybody in Washing- 
ton I could discuss it with, and the Secretary is investigating, and, I under- 
stand, proposes to put up some temporary quarters for the soldiers and the 
regular officers." 
Then followed this colloquy: 

Senator Johnson: "That indicates lack of management and utter lack of 
co-operation. 

Mr. Ferguson: "It is due to the fact that the people have the power to 
arbitrarily give orders without knowing the consequence of the orders they 
give. 

Senator Johnson: "And without knowing who else gives orders?" 

Mr. Ferguson: "Yes, sir." 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 131 

Senator Hitchcock, one Democratic member of the commit- 
tee, arraigned the department for "confusion, red tape, and 
incapacity," and supported his charges with an extended 
summary of delay and neglect in equipping the soldiers, they 
were letting the country know something about the disasters 
which were certain to befall as a result of this utter con- 
fusion in the War Department, and that Mr. Baker's fail- 
ure to place men with a just sense of proportion, at the head 
of important bureaus, was the chief cause. 

To the soldiers across the sea, failure to receive their 
pay was a matter secondary to failure to hear from their 
loved ones at home. While many of these poor fellows 
were lying sick or wounded in hospitals, to their physical 
suffering was added the mental torture of not being able 
to get a line from the folks at home. They were kept in 
the dark as to whether fathers, mothers, wives were dead 
and buried. Tons of these precious letters which they were 
longing for were being dumped in great masses in France, 
until the pathetic missives were boxed up for reshipment 
to the distracted souls back in the old home who, on their 
return, were unable to learn from the War Department as 
to whether and how their sick and wounded ones were. 
It was one of the shameful things which attended the in- 
competence of the War Department in its direct dealing 
with American soldiers.^" 

"Representative Mann, on the floor of the House, read a batch of 
these letters both from soldiers and from soldiers' wives and mothers bear- 
ing on this imhappy state of affairs. Some of these missives from the sol- 
diers to the home folks were fairly heartrending in their pitiful appeal for 
tidings of any sort from those dear to them. On the other hand, he read 
letters from agonized mothers and wives here who knew their soldiers 
were wounded and ill somewhere, but who could get no information other 
than this maddening fact from the War Department. In one such case 
Adjutant General Parker told the applicant for information to write to the 
Red Cross in Washington. Commenting on this, Mr. Mann said: 

"Here is a man wounded severely in the service of the United States 
on the firing line in September last. His wife has been informed of the 
injury, and, as I shall show later, with other letters, is probably unable 
to get into communication directly with the soldier and writes to the Adju- 
tant General's office to inquire about him. Now it would be just as cheap 
for the Adjutant General's office to cable to France as it is for the Red 
Cross to do it. I can conceive no meaner disposition on the part of the 



132 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

Cruel was the infliction of suspense and anguish through 
deception and delay in publication of the casualty lists. Be- 
fore election Mr. Baker had assured the country that a 
total number of killed and wounded would not exceed 100,- 
000; after election the estimate was raised to "more than 
200,000," then to 262,000 and late January, 19 19, it was 
disclosed that the lists might not be completed until the 
following September. Final announcement was made on 
Armistice Day, 19 19, showing a total of casualties of 293,- 
089 to the American forces, the wounded in action number- 
ing 215,489. 

Great criticism was leveled at the War Department for 
its failure in reporting casualties as they occurred. The 
Red Cross, not a government service, had the confidence of 
the men in the service as well as of the people at home who 
knew their method. Why the Red Cross should be able to 
get information as to what had happened to a boy at the 
front more quickly than the regular Government channels 
of the War Department was never explained but the fact 
is that people learned to have confidence in the one and to 
distrust the other. The latter forbade the former to send 
home lists and this ban was not removed until September 
27, 1918. 

The negligence of the War Department service respon- 
sible for the announcement of casualties in the American 
forces was admitted December 9, 19 18, by Assistant Secre- 
tary of War Keppel to the Senate committee on military 
affairs. 

The very first day that Congress was in session in the 
year of 19 19 an attack was made upon Mr. Baker for his 
carelessness, if not deliberate method, in notifying parents 
as to what had happened to their sons on the European bat- 
tle front. Senator Weeks declared that the War Depart- 

Government than to tell a wondering and grieving wife, "Your husband 
Avas severely wounded nearly four months ago, and if you want to know 
how he is, communicate with a private party." 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 133 

ment information as to casualties had been wrong. He 
stated that during the week ending December 14, 19 18, the 
Red Cross had received an average of twenty letters a day 
from parents who had been advised by the War Depart- 
ment that their sons had been killed on a specific date, and 
that in every one of these cases the parents wrote that they 
had received communication from their boys subsequent to 
the date of death given by the War Department. Referring 
to the Red Cross methods, Senator Weeks said that agency 
in August located in French hospitals 200 American soldiers 
reported missing by the War Department. And he stated 
that they believed that through it their relatives would 
learn of their condition; but that information was never 
transmitted because of the order by the War Department 
prohibiting the mailing of such letters. 

When Senator Chamberlain made his attack upon the 
failure of the War Department in taking care of disabled 
men after the armistice was signed he stated: "Take the 
number of men on the battle front and the casualties — the 
dead, wounded and missing — there has been practically 17.6 
per cent of the boys on the front killed, wounded or miss- 
ing." Then he stated that what he criticised was the fact 
that we have not the hospital facilities. "If the War De- 
partment," he declared, "had paid half the attention to 
preparation for receiving these boys as they are to getting 
legislation through Congress in order to protect contractors 
who made contracts for war supplies over the telephone and 
in violation of law, this matter would soon be settled." 

No satisfactory reason was ever given for the gross 
misrepresentation of the nation's losses and the shocking 
delay in making known the names of the victims. But the 
matter of greatest moment was the high percentage of casu- 
alties, nearly three-eighths of the force being put out of 
action. It is true that American divisions were heavily en- 
gaged and severe losses were to be expected. But what 
makes the figures significant is the disclosure that to the 



134 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

very end of the conflict the American forces were imper- 
fectly armed; that they had to go against the German de- 
fensive, bristling with machine-guns, insufficiently supported 
by artillery and with supply of ammunition dangerously in- 
adequate. 

Although forced to abandon the Red Cross home-com- 
munication's service. Governor Allen pointed out that the 
system of personal letters was being used by the British 
without any interference with war office reports. Colonel 
Davis retorted: 

Because one army wears red pants is no reason why our army 
should wear red pants. 

Secretary Baker felt called upon to Issue a statement 
in reply to criticisms of the unpublished casualties after the 
armistice was signed, declaring none had been held back. 

The rapidity with which the American troops were 
transported to Europe in the summer of 19 17 and until the 
American army had reached the proportion of a million 
and more men was characteristic of America's method once 
she got down to real business. It was as much as the most 
optimistic could hope for. 

The greater part of these troops, however, was taken 
over in ships of the Allies. While the efforts of the navy 
were laudable In the extreme, we were simply short of the 
necessary means of transportation. In returning the troops 
there was a different situation. They were returned with 
all the speed that any one within reason could have asked, 
and far beyond the expectation of a great majority of the 
people. They were returned at about the same rate at 
which they were sent over. Of the 320,000 troops brought 
home from overseas during May, 19 19, vessels operated 
by the cruiser and transpg^rt force of the United States 
Navy carried more than 300,000. 

In the spring of 19 19, the country was stirred by the dis- 
pute between Secretary Baker and General Ansell over the 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 135. 

court-martial system of the country, resulting in the de- 
motion of the latter to his pre-war rank of lieutenant colonel. 
It brought Senator Chamberlain again to the front in de- 
fending those whom the position of Secretary Baker per- 
mitted him to castigate in what he denominated the inter- 
ests of discipline. It was well known that Mr. Baker sanc- 
tioned the intolerable terms of the system upon some all but 
innocent youth, while he was making use of all the prestige 
of his position to favor worthless scoundrels known to the 
War Department as "conscientious objectors" to military 
service to their country in time of war. Under the system 
he accepted the sentence of a half-witted youth "to 99 years 
at hard labor for absence without leave, desertion, and es- 
cape," while Captain Samuel H. Hodgson, of the United 
States Army, tried on charges showing him favorable to 
the Germans at a time when his country was at war with 
Germany, and particularly to Germans in Mexico, sen- 
tenced to dismissal from the army and confinement to hard 
labor for two years, all finally commuted to a reprimand by 
the general commanding the camp in Porto Rico. 

The New York World described the system as "lynch 
law for the army," while the Washington Post declared 
that "there is sometimes justice in a court-martial, but it is 
purely accidental." Writing Secretary Baker concerning 
the injustice of the system and the Secretary's attitude 
toward those with whom he might differ. Senator Chamber- 
lain pointedly stated, on March 20, 19 19: 

On March 10 }ou were blind to any deficiencies in the existing 
system ; as indeed the evidence abundantly shows, you have been 
deaf throughout tlie war to complaints about the injustice of this 
system, complaints which should at least have challenged your earnest 
attention, rather than provoked your undisguised irritation. 

And then again : 

You elbowed aside the one officer who even then had the courage 
to condemn the system and the prevision to point out its terrible re- 



136 The JVilson Administration and the Great fFar 

suits — General Ansell — and took into the bosom of your confidence 
a trio of men who are pronounced reactionaries. 

And he pointed out to the Secretary of War circum- 
stances indicating that the Secretary's position was not 
taken in good faith but simply designed to allay public 
apprehension and inquiry by the appearance of doing some- 
thing, and added: 

The existing system does injustice — gross, terrible, spirit-crushing 
injustice. Evidence of it is on every hand. The records of the 
judge advocate general's department reek with it. . . . 

You have taken a terrible stand upon a subject which lies close 
to a thousand American hearthstones. The American people will not 
be deceived by self-serving, misleading reports and statistics. Too 
many American families have made a pentecostal sacrifice of their 
sons upon the altar of organized injustice. 

A group of lawyers who held commissions during the 
war and were assigned to the Judge Advocate General's 
Department joined in giving out a statement to the press 
which declared that: 

Our court-martial system has been inherited from English law 
as it existed prior to the American Revolution ; it had its inception in 
medieval days when soldiers were not free citizens of the flag under 
which they served, but were either paid mercenaries or armed retainers 
of petty lords. Those were times when armies were made up of men 
who constituted the dregs of society, or were no more than the chat- 
tels of military commanders. England, France, and other democratic 
countries have changed and liberalized their military codes so as to 
insure justice to their soldiers; but our armies are still governed by 
this brutal, medieval court-martial system which has survived outside 
of the United States only in Germany and in Russia. 

But these were the things, not only which the pacifist 
Secretary of War tolerated, but which he insisted upon 
when it came to punishing the peccadillos of real men wear- 
ing their country's uniform and ready to lay down their 
lives. But when it came to the contemptible cowards who 
saved their hides by sneaking under pleas that they were 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 137 

"conscientious objectors" then the pacifist secretary was all 
tenderness and consideration. "For a real soldier caught 
smoking a cigarette and refusing to obey a petty order, 40 
years at hard labor with no appeal to a reviewing court. 
For a cowardly cur openly refusing to wear a uniform, re- 
fusing to obey any military orders, openly defying the whole 
authority of military law — for such as these, considerate 
treatment and no punishment until the Secretary of War had 
passed upon the case!" ^^ 

Similarly, when the demand for a universal draft be- 
came so great that General Crowder was called before the 
Senate committee, and he there showed the compelling and 
immediate need for enlarged man power. Secretary Baker 
and General March took an opposite view. General Crow- 
der's advice was followed, and the great army which was 
sent across the seas came as a result. 

But General Crowder's patriotism was his undoing. 
Secretary Baker and General March could no more en- 
dure his activities than they could those of General Wood. 
Accordingly, General March ordered General Crowder to 
his office and reprimanded him for having encroached on 
the duties of the general staff; yet Crowder was wholly re- 
sponsible for the men until they were actually sworn Into 
the service. But the reprimand was stamped on General 
Crowder's record, and the Secretary of War did not lift a 
finger to stay the unjust act against this soldier, this officer 
who had never blundered when the whole war machine of 
the W^ar Department was blundering; who hewed to the 
line when the Secretary of War was wobbling; who had 
prepared, perfected, and executed the mechanism for a draft 
which had done more than any other single thing in our his- 
tory to make a great army possible. 

There is a large element in the consideration of Mr. 
Baker's elevation to his high place. Judge Garrison, from 
the day he took office, devoted himself zealously to strength- 

^ Harvey's If^eekly, February 22, 1919. 



138 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

ening the national defenses, and as the shadow of coming 
war darkened the country's path he redoubled his efforts 
to promote preparedness. Then came the inadequately ex- 
plained resignation of Secretary Garrison. When Presi- 
dent Wilson, in the first months of 19 16 made a series of 
addresses in New York and the middle west in behalf of 
the policy of preparation for the inevitable conflict, the 
President went so far as to urge that the United States 
should have "incomparably the greatest navy in the 
world." After the President's return, Secretary Garrison 
called at the White House to express his loyal enthusiasm 
and to say that preparedness was to be forwarded. To his 
amazement, the response was an expression of disapproval, 
the President declaring he would tolerate no agitation or 
activity in this direction until after election — the presiden- 
tial election of the coming fall, when the issue, as it later 
developed, was to be, "he kept us out of war." Hurt and 
bewildered. Secretary Garrison remarked that their ideas 
seemed to be at variance; he was told that they were. He 
suggested that his resignation might be acceptable. Presi- 
dent Wilson said promptly that it would; moreover, on his 
western tour he had selected Mr, Garrison's successor, a 
man who would not embarrass the Administration with 
schemes of preparedness. 

Such was the manner and inspiration of the appointment 
of Newton D. Baker, avowed pacifist placed in charge of 
the defense of a nation that was being driven irresistibly 
into war. His function was to strangle preparedness and 
cultivate the pacifist sentiment of the country until after the 
election in 19 16. Fie had, besides, other valued political 
qualifications — influence with the radiical element and a 
readiness, as was shown, to use even the laws against sedi- 
tion and espionage to promote the Administration's political 
interests. And he was retained, in the face of a record of 
incompetence written in the waste of colossal wealth and 
unnumbered lives, because he served those interests and re- 



Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in JVar 139 

fleeted secretly the spirit and purposes of the Wilson 
regime.^'* 

The editor of Harvey's Weekly, facetious at times, de- 
nunciatory almost beyond endurance at other times, freely 
told its readers how it had misplaced its trust in one mem- 
ber of the cabinet, and did it in this fashion: 

Oddly enough, the one member of the Cabinet in whose favor 
we were most strongly prepossessed was Mr. Baker; we valued his 
brains as a sort of oasis in a comparative desert. But he quickly 
proved himself to be utterly incapacitated by surpassing egotism for 
the performance of his great tasks and consequently was a positive 
menace. Anything more dangerous than his attempts to lull the 
American people into a sense of false security or more damnable than 
his perpetual evading, sidestepping, deceiving and, when cornered, 
actually lying, we simply cannot imagine. 

Never again should the American nation permit paci- 
fists to be in control of the government when the country's 
life is threatened. 

"Philadelphia North American, January 31, 1919. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT 

From some forms of distemper, President Wilson's 
administration made fairly good recovery; but never from 
the blight which fell upon the Post-Office Department. 

By some it was called incompetence in Washington, by 
some inefficiency throughout the country; some said it was 
failure, others that it was wreckage. All agreed that the 
Department was not functioning — this one Department 
that comes closest to the American hearth, this one service 
of the government that freely enters the home daily. 

For its letter-carrier walks the crowded street and as- 
cends the tower-like office building whose head is buried in 
the cloud; or hastens with his car into the thrifty forty-acre 
farmer settlements of Jersey or of the Keystone State, and 
back home for dinner; or glides along the western trail 
which, as a huge serpent, stretches itself from the Great 
River away to the snow-capped Rockies; or more slowly 
with horse and cart threads his way to the secluded home 
among the mountain passes — this carrier who bears the 
heat of summer and faces the blistering blasts of winter, 
who drags his weary way through sticky mud and flounders 
through unbroken drifts — he who brings the expected or 
the unlooked-for message of love or sadness, of joy or sor- 
row, of hope or disaster; this man whose step or cart or 
car is eagerly watched for, and whose coming sets the heart 
a-throb or brings depression to the spirit — this man is al- 
ways welcome. And he failed not. 

Under such circumstances it was very fitting that the 
first criticism directed against this great Department of the 

140 



The Post-Office Department 141 

people should be on the social side, rather than on the ma- 
terial. It squares best with America's idealism. 

This early criticism was aimed at a pronouncement made 
officially in the Administration's beginning days, declaring 
that its old employes, when they became aged and infirm 
from long service, were entitled to no further consideration 
from the government. The official statement further an- 
nounced that the people would never consent to civil pen- 
sions, and with a self-assurance suggestive of the final word 
on the matter. Yet it is the irony of history that before the 
ruthless incumbent left his place of power, civil employees in 
his Department were not pensioned, it is true, but were re- 
tired on part pay with the greatest favor shown to them of 
any in the government service. He poorly assessed the 
public temper when he assumed the position that as the eye 
became dim and the hand shaky these faithful servants who 
had given the best of their years to the government on a 
salary insufficient to lay aside anything for the uncertain 
day, were to be tossed to the scrap-heap, placing the gov- 
ernment in the class of the soulless employer who used men 
and women only as cogs in a machine. The Department's 
procedure of that day was described as "a mighty mean 
policy." 

This social side bore a close relation to the material 
side. It was induced by Postmaster-General Burleson's de- 
sire to make a shov/ing for economy. Its tendency was to 
weaken the morale of the entire force. Protest after pro- 
test was entered until it was piling Ossa on Pelion. Officials 
became hardened to the process and gave little or no heed. 
As complaint after complaint came in, their reply became a 
stock: "Oh, well, I guess a few complaints, more or less, 
will not make much difference." 

The criticism grew in strength and scope, involving every 
feature of the Department's activities. It would have been 
more severe but for the fact that war activities diverted the 



142 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

thoughts and energies of the people. A subservient Con- 
gress did nothing to uncover the blight. Secrecy was the 
final official word in this Department, as in many of them, 
throughout President Wilson's incumbency. It was impos- 
sible for the people to get the light. 

The treatment accorded drove the railway-mail men 
into the American Federation of Labor for protection 
against the ravages of the Department. Immediately 
thereafter came the unionizing of every department and 
bureau of the government service as a protection of the 
employe against the government itself. The Administra- 
tion sowed the wind; the nation will reap the whirlwind. 

Business men, as well as others, fully aware of the de- 
generation of the postal service, used what means they 
commanded for getting the facts to set before the people. 
The Department refusing all information, as though the 
public has no right to know about its own business, they 
set out to gather facts showing the truth of the matter. To 
this end the New York Merchants' Association conducted an 
investigation in 38 states, through 165 business agencies, 
representing 119 cities, giving substantial basis for a re- 
port upon the deficiencies of the service as found up to the 
middle of 19 18. The essential facts thus developed were 
these : 

That mails were not dispatched with former frequency. 

That they were not fully worked in transit. 

That in consequence much "stuck" letter-mail was turned into 
the terminal stations and there materially delayed. 

That inferior mails moved with extreme slowness. 

That train delays were not a principal cause of slowness in the 
mails; but that 

Insufficiency in the number of railway postal cars, their with- 
drawal from a great number of routes throughout the United States, 
and the reduction of the crews on the railway postal cars appeared 
as the main causes of the condition shown.^ 

* In eighteen months there was either total abolishment or heavy cur- 
tailment in the sorting of mails on 1612 trains. Railway-mail clerks well 



The Post-0 fficc Department 143 

That space rental on trains, instead of charge by weight, was a 
fertile cause of inefficient service. 

Of 9,612 letters sent out by business men as a fair test, to 
and from all parts of the country, 56 per cent were delayed 
from a day to weeks in delivery. Local-delivery letters 
bearing special delivery stamps were subject to the same 
delays. During the year 19 19, there were mailed from New 
York 119 letters at an hour when proper service would 
have delivered them the same day, and 81 of them were 
not delivered until the next day.- 

Curtailment in the sorting of mails on the trains was one 
of the economies upon which Mr. Burleson prided himself. 
In his 19 1 8 annual report he stated enthusiastically that 
during the preceding year postal revenues exceeded ex- 
penditures by something over $19,600,000. Was the gov- 
ernment in the postal business for the purpose of making 
money regardless of how it was made? The reduction of 
the human mechanism to the position of mere machinery, 
resulting in human wreckage and v/astage, and a loss of 
morale resulting in loss in efficiency and service, is a mat- 
ter of greater consequence to the nation than the saving of 
one cent every eighteen days of the year for each person. 
Through his effort to get credit for cutting expenses he 
earned the title of postal-service wrecker. 

In the same report he further stated that there were 
formerly "frequent and unnecessary dispatches of mail;" 
but those paying for the service did not think they were 

knew that, owing to the reduction in their forces in face of a largely in- 
creasing mail volume, between important terminal points, as Chicago to 
the Twin City or Chicago to Omaha, mail was worked to the extent possible 
and the rest was left to be worked on the trip back or left to its own devices, 
thus carrying it back and forth indefinitely before reaching its destination. 

^ When complaint was made by publishers of weekly newspapers in 
New 'i'ork that they were four-and-half days reaching the homes of sub- 
scribers in Washington, the Department stated that the cause was the 
unprecedened rail congestion. Questioning and testing this reason, a num- 
ber of the papers were taken to Washington and there deposited in the post- 
office just before midnight Thursday, and were delivered in that same 
city, within two miles of the post-office, the following Monday, some not 
before Tuesday. 



144 ^^^ JVilson Administration and the Great War 

unnecessary. The fact is, no date was permitted to be 
stamped on some of the inferior mail, and if it was delayed 
a month no one was the wiser. 

It was a theory of Mr. Burleson that the cost of de- 
livery of newspapers and magazines was too great for long 
distances. Accordingly, upon his recommendation the coun- 
try was divided into eight zones, effective July i, 191 8, 
with a higher rate of postage for each successive zone far- 
ther from the place of mailing. This created opposition 
among publishers of such papers. Others knew little of 
the matter, though it was really they who suffered, for in 
many instances the additional cost was placed upon the 
reader. 

In this proposed method of saving, the Postmaster- 
General sectionalized the nation, establishing a system ob- 
noxious to the whole plan of government under the Con- 
stitution. It was bringing back the system under which the 
government under the Articles of Confederation had failed, 
the plan so opposed to the American's sense of the fitness of 
things that no one ever objected to paying the same rate of 
postage for sending a letter from New York to Brooklyn 
as from New York to Seattle. 

The direct reply to this theory of the too great cost was 
that the method of the Department's bookkeeping was so 
defective that it was impossible to determine, with even 
approximate accuracy, the cost to the Department of the 
various branches of its service. 

It was further observed, and with more point, that the 
system worked a discrimination against the man or woman 
of the distant, outlying and sparsely-settled sections of the 
country; for while enduring the hardships of pioneers, they 
were thus penalized for seeking the best In the way of 
current magazine literature; when, as a matter of history, 
the government had always theretofore conceded to the 
pioneer the privilege of having the best obtainable as well 
as he whose abode was near the centers of wealth and popu- 



The Post-0 ffice Department 145 

lation and of publications.^ Said one weekly of the highest 
standing: "In this eight-zone system, what could the brain 
of man devise that is more unbusiness-like and more un- 
scientific?" ■* 

Another favorite plan of Mr. Burleson was to rest con- 
trol of the wires of the country in his Department, On so 
important a matter, the Senate did not like to yield hastily; 
it blustered for a week with the declaration that it would 
not be forced into hasty action. Its committee was making 
preparation for extensive hearings in the early hours of the 
day, July 10, 1918; but when the order was given from the 
White House, Senate leaders were convinced that it was 
time to take a vote, and on that day capitulated, not even 
members of the committee having opportunity to express 
their views. One senator in picturesquely describing the 
swiftly developing situation said: "The whip has been 
cracked and the Senate will jump through the hoop just as 
the House did last week." Accordingly, by order of Presi- 
dent Wilson the government took over control of all land 
wires on August i, 19 18, placing them in the hands of the 
Post-Office Department. 

In taking control, Mr. Burleson issued a public state- 
ment in which lie said : 

I earnestly request the loyal co-operation of all officers, operators 
and employes, and the public, in order that the service rendered shall 
be not only maintained at a high standard, but improved wherever 
possible. It is the purpose to co-ordinate and unify these services 
so that they may be operated as a national system with due regard 
to the interests of the public and the owners of the properties. 

With what loyalty of compliance on the part of any, will 
be seen presently. In his 19 18 annual report, prepared 

^ In the spring of 1918, the author personally witnessed on the great 
ranches of VVyoming and Montana, scores of miles from any railroad, 
magazines of the highest class in the homes of humble herders, the ranch- 
houses on wheels ready to be moved from place to place where pasturage 
could be found for the flocks, among them Harper's, Leslie's, and Scien- 
tific American. 

* Scientific American, New York, June 15, 1918, p. 542. 



146 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

but a few weeks later, he disclosed his desire for govern- 
ment ownership of these utilities when he stated: 

The experiences as a result of the present war have fully demon- 
strated that the principle of government ownership of the telegraphs 
and telephones is not only sound but practicable. 

Soon after he had taken over the wires, his procedure was 
described as having reduced all competitive systems to a 
state of chaos; as having changed the best telegraph and 
telephone systems the world had ever known to one of the 
worst; while running the latter at a loss of millions of dol- 
lars which he loaded upon the taxpayers, besides loading 
telephone users with heavily increased rates and a greatly 
depreciated service. 

On December 6, 19 19, Chairman Steenerson of the 
House Committee on Post-offices and Post-roads, having 
before him the annual report of the Postmaster-General, 
then but recently issued, criticised on the floor of the House, 
Mr. Burleson's mismanagement of the telegraph and tele- 
phone wires, declaring that he had gotten out of the tax- 
payers of the country $9,000,000 to make up deficits, in 
addition to $30,000,000 in increased rates; and he sharply 
questioned the figures by which the attempt wa,s made to 
show the savings in his Department, declaring that while 
the report showed a net surplus of $35,000,000 in the previ- 
ous seven years, it was not true in fact and was misleading 
to the public, and in all probability claims for losses and 
increases for carrying the mail would wipe out the entire 
alleged net savings or more. 

While Mr, Burleson undertook the next day to reply 
to this statement, he did not undertake to deny the enor- 
mously increased cost of Inferior service to the public. And 
on the 23rd of the same month, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission rendered a decision whereby on space-rental 
plan on trains, compensation for carrying the mail was in- 
creased 33 per cent from November i, 19 16, and 50 per 



The Post-Office Department 147 

cent from March i, 1920, which, as Assistant Postmaster- 
General Praeger stated in the Senate hearings, amounted 
to between $30,000,000 and $40,000,000 a year, at 50 per 
cent. And in discussing the necessary appropriation, Mr. 
Steenerson on the floor of the House declared on April 15, 
1920, that the space rental would cost about 8 per cent more 
than the old weight-rental method, amounting to between 
$4,000,000 and $5,000,000 a year on the slower space-rent 
plan. 

Chairman Steenerson knew whereof he spoke. So did 
Mr. Burleson. Announcement by the latter that there would 
be a reduction in telephone rates under government control 
was immediately followed by an increase ranging from 14 
to 36 per cent. So sharp was this increase from the various 
\ states that it brought vigorous protest from practically 
every section of the land. 

North Dakota found that her increase approximated 
30 to 33 per cent, and resented interference on any such 
basis. Ohio gave deliberate publicity to the fact that any 
attempt to increase rates in that state by the Post-Office De- 
partment would be resisted by the State. In Minnesota, 
Massachusetts, and other states, the public service com- 
missions served notice of rigid scrutiny at points of interfer- 
ence with local regulations, with promise of contest should 
the government attempt to override rates fixed by local 
authorities. Some one declared that Mr. Burleson's state 
was about the only one in the union whose rates would not 
be about doubled; and even in Houston the city council re- 
fused to put the new rates into operation, and at a largely 
attended meeting of business men the council's action was 
warmly endorsed. Surely Mr. Burleson was getting a taste 
of the State Rights doctrine. 

In Illinois there was actually started a conflict which as- 
sumed a serious aspect. Following the order of Postmaster- 
General Burleson fixing a schedule of rates in excess of 
those then in force, an action brought by the Attorney- 



148 The Wilson Administration and the Great IV ar 

General of Illinois resulted in a decision rendered by the 
Superior Court whereby the State refused to be bound by 
the action of the Postmaster-General, and whereby the 
telephone companies of the state were restrained from in- 
creasing the toll rates. 

As further illustrating the method during Mr. Burle- 
son's incumbency, a well-known weekly, referring to the 
delivery of night letters assuming to be sent by wire, when 
under government control, recites this episode : 

The Clerk: That will be all right; we are not telegraphing 
night letters to New York; we are sending them by mail. 35 cents 
please. 

Myself: You are going to send this telegram by mail and deliver 
it by mail? 

The Clerk: That's so. 

Myself: And can you tell me why I should pay you 35 cents 
to deliver a letter when I can put a 3-cent stamp on it and get the 
same result? 

The Clerk: Well, that's the way it's being done these days.° 

Nor was the increase in rates the sole objection to the 
Post-Office Department's wire management. Soon after 
it assumed control, strikes and threatened strikes became 
the daily news served to a patient public. Of them all, 
probably the most serious was that of Boston and vicinity, 
threatening the welfare of all New England. In this, the 
incapacity of the Department's head was acknowledged 
when, after a good deal of bitterness, he agreed to leave the 
matter to the managers of the properties and the operators; 
then a settlement was quickly reached. 

So far as the public knew of his order of December 2, 
191 8, as to courtesy on the part of wire employes, warning 
that indifference to the public would not be tolerated, it was 
but to smile. Users of telephones in those strenuous days 
of strikes and threatened strikes, became accustomed to 
waiting fifteen to forty-five minutes to get the operator and 

'^Harvey's Weekly, New York, February i, 1919. 



The Post-Office Department 149 

then meeting withering insolence from the operator or the 
unblushing statement that the line was busy. 

As if these things were not enough for the public tp 
endure at the hands of government operation of the wires, 
when hostilities were at an end and the silence of arms 
reigned supreme the President ordered that the cables be 
taken over as a war necessity — for which purpose alone the 
authority had been invested in the President — and placed 
them into the hands of the Postmaster-General. It is prob- 
able that there was no single act of the Administration for 
which both officials were so severely condemned. It was 
looked upon as a self-assumed authority, autocratic, arbi- 
trary, unwarranted. The discussion on the floor of the 
Senate brought out the fact that there was some strange and 
unwarranted manipulation in the matter of the signing of 
the order of the President taking over the wires, assuming 
to have been signed November 2, nine days before the sign- 
ing of the armistice, but incomplete because not counter- 
signed by the Secretary of State. After inviting attention 
to this unusual course, Senator Kellogg stated: 

The law authorized the President to take over the cables and tele- 
graph lines as a war necessity, and not a senator on this floor or any- 
where else dreamed that we were giving the Postmaster-General 
power to force on this country government ownership whether the 
people wanted it or not. 

And Senator Hitchcock, Senate leader of the President's 
party, declared that even if the order had been signed on 
November 2 and was regular in every other respect, it was 
yet a breach of faith with Congress; for by the terms of the 
resolution granting the power and by the reiterated assur- 
ances of its advocates when it was up for consideration it 
was explicitly set forth that only in case of danger from war 
to the country's security was the authority to be exercised. 
And it had not been found necessary to exercise it until 
after war had ceased. It was bitterly denounced in the 



150 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

Senate as an attempt to foist socialism upon the nation by 
executive order and the President was freely charged with 
playing to the radical element. 

In taking over the cables, the President said the neces- 
sity for the act lay in the need of keeping two cables open 
between France and the War and State departments in 
Washington. While Mr. Burleson declared: 

There never was a time in the history of this war, for which this 
joint resolution was passed giving the President the right to con- 
trol the wire and cable systems, which calls for such a close control 
of the cable system as to-day, and which will continue during the 
period of readjustment. The absolute necessity for uninterrupted, 
continuous communication should be apparent to all. 

He stated further that the cables had been insufficiently 
managed during hostilities. 

It was asked why, if this were true, no action to remedy 
the evil had been taken until hostilities ceased. And the 
public wondered why the necessity arose November 16, five 
days after the armistice was signed, when the President's 
order was published, and at the same time that the Presi- 
dent made known his intention of going to Europe as a mem- 
ber of the Peace Congress, and why they were placed in 
charge of the man known to be the politician of the Admin- 
istration. 

But caustic criticism met the President's statement, com- 
ing from every section of the country and from every com- 
plexion of political view, denouncing the President for du- 
plicity in his treatment of Congress and the people. If his 
reason were valid, they wanted to know why, after the war 
was ended, he seized fourteen or fifteen cables between 
America and Europe and all the cables from the Pacific 
coast to China, Japan, the Philippines and Plawaii, as well 
as those to South America, Central America, and the West 
Indies, including all of the Gulf-of-Mexico lines — all this 
that there might be two clear cables between Paris and 



The Post-0 ffice Department 151 

Washington. The people saw through it as the sole pur- 
pose of keeping from them knowledge of what was trans- 
piring at the World's Peace Congress at Paris — the center 
of the world's interest. 

With the postal and the wire services of the country in 
the hands of a politician and both deteriorating in useful- 
ness, with the President in a European capital Instead of at 
the American, with reconstruction problems pressing for 
settlement at home and no one to give them direction — with 
these matters and others of imposing stature forging to the 
front, the outburst of the people became so violent in the 
spring of 19 19 that the President, stung to action by the 
criticisms heaped upon himself and the Postmaster-General, 
directed that the wires be returned to private control. So 
virulent and insistent became the strictures upon the Ad- 
ministration that, though Mr. Burleson announced that the 
land wires would be returned as soon as Congress should 
make provision therefor, the country was surprised the very 
next day. May 2, by his turning them back on that date with- 
out awaiting further "provision;" and the cables were re- 
turned more than a week earlier than the announced date. 

The most vitriolic of these attacks upon the Administra- 
tion came from the President's own party, one group of 
whom cabled the President at Paris demanding that Mr. 
Burleson be Immediately relieved of his office. 

The two main reasons for the inveterate attacks upon 
the Administration's wire control were Inefficiency of service 
and attempted political manipulation, including government 
ownership. But the immediate cause was the refusal of 
telegraph officials, under government control, to transmit a 
message from the New York World offering other news- 
papers an article In which Mr. Burleson was criticised. 
Said Collier's Weekly: "The newspapers are making a 
fight for self-preservation." And the veteran journalist of 
the Southland, Henry Watterson, declared: 



152 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

That war involves autocraq^ I understand well enough, but in the 
field, not in the White House; over the international situation, not 
over our domestic afFairs. ... I reject, loathe and spit upon the plea 
that, because of war, the press should abdicate its duty to the people. 

Mr. Burleson undertook to answer the complaints at a 
meeting of representatives of business organizations and of 
postal service, held in Washington in April, 19 19. But it 
was only when the wires were taken out of his hands that 
the wrath of the people subsided. 

It is a matter of historic interest that postal air service 
was established in the most pressing of war activities, on 
May 15, 1918. The first route lay between New York and 
Washington. This route was later discontinued, because 
it was said mail between the two terminals was delayed 
rather than hastened by the service. 

The War Department at first operated the mail planes; 
but on August 12, 19 18, the transfer of the equipment and 
flying operations of the aerial mail service to the Post- 
Oflice Department was effected. The New York-Chicago 
route was inaugurated the following December, and in three 
legs: New York to Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, 215 miles; 
thence to Cleveland, 250 miles; the last, to Chicago, 323 
miles. Each had a midway emergency station. In Decem- 
ber the War Department turned over to the Post-Office 
Department one hundred other airplanes, it having been 
found feasible to carry mail by air. These included large 
bombing planes capable of carrying a ton or more. 

Though there had been doubt among aeronautic au- 
thorities as to the ability to maintain the service in all kinds 
of weather, the Post-Office department demonstrated its 
practicability. During the second year of its service, postal 
airplanes covered 498,664 miles, carrying 538,734 pounds 
of mail, with a reported average of 87 per cent perfect per- 
formance, including all conditions of weather. This is far 
higher than the train service, which is placed at 62 per cent 
on time. 



The Post-0 ffice Department 153 

America's best ideals must be saved to the world, and 
demagogic performances smothered. The nation has put 
too much into its Post-Office Department, and its operation 
comes too close to the daily life of the people to have it 
turned into a politician's paradise. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION 

One of the undlmmed glories of America is the liberty 
of the press and freedom of speech. This is an enduring 
heritage from her foundation, and it shall continue to the 
last roll-call of her free sons and daughters. 

If ever it shall be lost, then America of noble tradition 
is lost, replaced by an alien America. If ever it shall wane 
or grow dim, it will be because of sinister influences seek- 
ing, not America's honor, but personal aggrandizement. It 
can be brought about only by some stupendous cataclysm, 
when a seeming danger may close the eyes of her citizenship 
to the real danger. 

There was suggestion of this during the Great War. 
There was evident at the very fountain-head of the gov- 
ernment an autocratic assumption of responsibility for 
public opinion. The nation came to be governed by organ- 
ized opinion. It was a result of this system that the Ameri- 
can people were kept in ignorance as to the conduct of the 
war which they fought, for which so extravagant a price 
was paid. 

As a means of getting to the public such information as 
it was deemed proper for the public to have there was es- 
tablished a daily newspaper, under the control of the gov- 
ernment, edited and managed by the committee on publicity 
with George Creel at its head. This was the Official Bul- 
letin. While this assumed to give out orders and state- 
ments that were deemed proper from the various branches 
of the government service, it was turned largely into a pub- 
licity political bureau to bring the President into favorable 
light, by the shading and coloring that were given to much 

154 



The Press and Public Opinion 155 

that appeared in its columns. Hence, despite the fact that 
the committee's publicity matter was supported by the Gov- 
ernment, it soon fell into discredit. The New York World, 
an Administration organ, declared the President of the 
American Newspaper Publishers' Association demanded 
that the "incompetent and disloyal" head of the committee 
be let out. Stung by criticism, Mr. Creel himself admitted 
in a public meeting in Philadelphia, that the ostensible pur- 
pose of the committee was a failure. He stated: "The 
fundamentally important news of the war for the enlighten- 
ment of Americans has been available, but not one paper in 
a hundred has had the brains to publish it." He referred to 
the Official Bulletin. 

There were three classes of American public opinion 
at the outbreak of the war in Europe: A powerful minor- 
ity, clear-eyed on the fundamentals of the issue; a viciously 
pro-German, unscrupulous, determined, and abundantly 
financed class; and that composed of persons who knew 
nothing about the issues raised by the attack of the German 
people upon civilization, and who cared less, known as 
"neutrals" — the class who inspired timid statesmanship 
with a fear at the ballot-box. It was at this time, when the 
Administration should have been outspoken and should have 
aroused the American people to their danger in clarion 
notes, that the nation was deliberately permitted, if not 
actively encouraged, by the Administration to drift or to 
be carried away with pro-German propaganda put out by 
such men as Dernberg. The nation thus faced the home 
problem, as serious as that across the water. And while 
the newspapers felt it to be necessary to deal with it by 
drastic methods, they found themselves already shackled 
by the Administration forces. Learning of dangerous hap- 
penings beneath the surface, they dared not print them. It 
was practically impossible to use facts in a way to benefit 
the country by speeding up the war. The newspapers, by 
assisting in the lynching of public opinion, had created such 



156 The JFilson Administration and the Great War 

a disordered state of mind in the country that if they them- 
selves had raised their voices to full strength in protest 
against inefficiency they would have been denounced as "pro- 
German." That fear hung over the head of everybody. 
The very incompetents who should have been shown up and 
thrown out sought refuge behind this psychological bar- 
rier. Newspapers above all things dreaded that German- 
propaganda charge, and rightly. The country was so 
worked up that any newspaper might have been ruined by 
falling under that suspicion, however baseless. The trouble 
was that the public, that was getting its denatured news 
from the government news factories, had nothing upon 
which to base an intelligent and honest opinion. Congress 
Itself was all but terrorized.^ 

How far American newspapers would have sunk in this 
slough into which the Administration had driven them, had 
not they received encouragement from some strong man in 
a commanding position, it would be difficult to say. Roose- 
velt in stentorian tones was proclaiming Americanism at all 
times. Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Military Af- 
fairs Committee, in his New York speech charged that in 
some branches the War Department had almost ceased to 
function; and he gave courage to some of the more daring 
newspapers in the investigation of the War Department 
which he conducted and which did so much to speed up the 
war. His boldness brought forth a volley of denunciation 
from President Wilson. The titanic struggle brought to 
Washington Theodore Roosevelt who declared he cared 
less what they were saying about him personally than he 
did as to what the Administration was trying to do to Sen- 
ator Chamberlain. The issue was immediately formulated 
between the Administration forces seeking to cover up reck- 
less squandering and more reckless benumbing of the Ameri- 
can conscience on the one hand, and on the other the forces 
that were urging America's utmost in getting into the war, 

* George Rothwell Brown in North American Revie<w for June, 1919. 



The Press and Public Opinion 157 

represented by such men as Roosevelt and Chamberlain. 
It gave the thoroughgoing American newspapers a new 
courage and a new dignity. 

The arrogant methods which were actually applied to 
American newspapers by the Administration, and to which 
the American newspapers out of a sheer feeling of patriot- 
ism submitted, out-distanced anything that the American 
mind could conceive in advance. If anything appeared in 
some newspaper more fearless than the rest, that was dis- 
pleasing to the Administration press agent, the editor would 
receive a haughty communication, stating: "please make a 
correction and send us a copy of the paper containing it!" 
It is almost unthinkable that self-respecting newspapers 
would ever be compelled to submit to such autocratic im- 
perialism. But the few Washington correspondents during 
the war, who revolted at the surrender of a noble profes- 
sion, and who still undertook to write frankly the truth as 
they found it in occasional undefiled channels, were threat- 
ened and insulted. 

The situation became unbearable. In consequence of 
the Administration method there was a steady decline in 
the morak of newspaper men in Washington. Their con- 
ferences with responsible heads of departments or bu- 
reaus degenerated into farces, and correspondents who had 
been proud of their profession lost that pride and all but 
their self-respect. The situation became so bad in Wash- 
ington during the war period that practically every litde 
minor official had a press agent of his own for his own per- 
sonal glorification. 

It was this system that worked so well so long as the 
American people knew nothing better. Denatured news 
which turned the noble and highly responsible calling of 
news gathering to doing the will of incompetent or head- 
strong officials, was all that the American people were al- 
lowed to receive. It was this kind of news that told the 
people, and led them to accept as fact, the story of a mar- 



158 The JVihon Administration and the Great War 

velous sea battle on July 4, which was never fought, and 
made possible the Liberty Motor hoax; the kind of news 
that caused uselessly many lives to be lost because American 
soldiers had to fight hand to hand with the veterans of the 
German army in the Argonne Forest, looking anxiously into 
the skies for the fleets of Yankee airplanes which they had 
read about in every deceived American newspaper, but 
which never came to their aid because they did not exist. 

A form of control exercised over newspapers defied all 
but an official inquiry. To quote the editor of a daily in 
Portland, Maine: 

Two editors of my acquaintance have been called to the phone 
recently by local government officials who notified them that if fur- 
ther material of the nature mentioned was published their papers 
would be suppressed. 

This occurred just previous to the Maine election early 
in September. The matter referred to was solely Republi- 
can political matter, and its only bearing on the war lay in 
the fact that it aimed to prevent the election of Democrats 
in the place of Republicans of sound war record. 

When the President sought to obtain from Congress a 
drastic censorship law, there was one time that Congress re- 
fused to become a rubber stamp in his hands. The remorse- 
lessness with which the censorship could be used by the 
Administration was clearly manifested in the fictitious manu- 
factures that were sent out from Paris while the World 
Congress was in session. It was also shown how it could 
be abused when Washington was giving out that the total 
of American losses in the war would not exceed 100,000 
at the very time when it was well known that they would 
exceed 250,000. And this was after the armistice was 
signed when the Administration felt that the American peo- 
ple could not stand the truth about our battle casualties. 

Early in August, 19 18, Mr. Burleson announced that, 
in order to "provide for the press the most efficient wire 



The Press and Public Opinion 159 

facilities under government control," he purposed taking 
over the news wire. The intent of this was plain to all 
newspaper men, for the "news wire" had long been known 
as the best organized part of the entire telegraph service. 
It had been given preference over market and commercial 
wires, and was always the first wire up after disasters such 
as the Galveston flood, the San Francisco fire, or the loss 
of the "Titanic." It was always as nearly perfect as any- 
thing human could make it; and it was less in need of atten- 
tion than any other mechanical device in the country. 

The fact of the matter is that Mr. Burleson's bring- 
ing the news service under his control and the political in- 
terests he represented was to mean a censorship of all news 
— not by the usually frank method of the blue pencil, but by 
the winding method of ofHcial delay, holding It up until its 
news value was lost. It was easy for Burleson and his 
associates to say to correspondents handling material ob- 
noxious to him, that "the pressure of official business" re- 
quired the full capacity of the news wires. 

When the New York Nation was suppressed and op- 
pressed by the Post-Office Department, it threatened to 
establish its rights by carrying to the Supreme Court the 
case of its disbarment from the mails. In this manner it 
succeeded In having the Post-Office Department remove the 
ban against its circulation. 

Referring to its experience with Mr. Burleson it stated: 

Obviously, what happens to the Nation itself is, despite its fifty- 
three jears of honorable and patriotic service, of little importance 
compared to the principles at stake. . . . Freedom of dissent is a true 
national safety valve; more than that, it is a mark of true democracy 
without which in war time any pretension to democracy lays itself 
open to the charge of hypocrisy. 

It was apparent to all intelligent observers that Mr. 
Burleson was no longer merely seeking to prevent sedition 
and treason, but he aimed more to control public opinion. 



i6o The JFihon Administration and the Great War 

The one central will which dominated the powers of 
government in Washington was that one in the White 
House. Gathering into his own hands all the powers of 
press and legislature, he parceled them out according to his 
pleasure, to bureaus and extra-governmental boards and 
commissions. It was impossible for one man to keep track 
of and to disseminate all the news, though all was retained 
in his grasp. The news agent developed. He became an 
important figure in Washington — to nev/spapers of the coun- 
try be became a dominant figure. Two institutions sprang 
into existence fatal to the free press — the press agent, and 
its corollary, the official denial. These two were insepa- 
rable. The institution thus developed, the press agent 
became a pernicious factor in the formulating of public 
opinion. It developed, during the war, into the like of 
which this country had never before known. The "denial" 
by a government official was as essential to government- 
owned publicity as was the press agent himself. The pur- 
pose of the denial was to strike the venturesome newspaper 
that would seek to uncover official fiction by invading the 
forbidden fields of fact. Both publishers and news gath- 
erers, in many instances, felt it to be a patriotic duty to 
close their eyes to what was obviously going on, and accept 
the output of the official news factories and send it broad- 
cast, accepting the theory that in so doing they were per- 
forming a conscientious duty. 

It became evident, after a little close observation, that 
the activities of the Administration in suppressing news- 
papers were directed not solely against pro-German publi- 
cations. The Christian Science Monitor of Boston, a news- 
paper in no way radical in its editorial policy and very con- 
servative in its news policy, was denied circulation for 
three days as a punishment for its publication of the avia- 
tion report and comment thereon. The Detroit News was 
barred, for the same reason, from circulation in Canada, 



The Press and Public Opinion i6l 

where it circulates 30,000 copies. The absurdity of this 
action was seen in the fact that its direct competitor for 
the Canadian circulation, the Montreal Star, published the 
committee's report almost in full and, of course, without 
punishment. The New York Times, never accused of di- 
vulging military secrets, suffered the penalty of having Its 
foreign edition containing the report suppressed without 
notification. 

Commenting on these facts Senator Lodge, in an au- 
thorized interview, said: 

The purpose of the government is plain. If material appears 
which the government says cannot be sent abroad, that will tend to 
make every newspaper refuse to publish that matter. The effect of 
this governmental order would be to prevent the publication of any- 
thing relating to the aircraft situation in the newspapers by refusing 
the mails to them to go abroad. All important newspapers send more 
or less copies to Europe. If the publication of any matter will pre- 
vent their going abroad, cost them money, involve the loss of postage 
and all of that, of course, they will omit such matter altogether, and 
it will never reach the American people. . . . 

In addition to all this, reports have come to me that many small 
newspapers throughout the country fear to make any independent 
report of, or any independent comment on, the news of the day be- 
cause of coercion, and the attitude taken by most of them is the easy 
one of preferring existence on the government's terms rather than 
the surely hazardous one of attempting to perform a difficult duty 
toward their readers. . . . 

If it is possible to prevent the full text and meaning of such a 
report as that of the Senate Sub-Committee on Aviation from reach- 
ing all classes of American citizens, then how are our people, who 
deserve to know the truth about their war, for it is emphatically their 
war, to be sure that any of the information being served them is reli- 
able? If the corps of specially trained writers accustomed to serve 
the newspapers from Washington and other chief centers is to have 
its opportunity for expression choked off, then who henceforth will 
have confidence in the dry official reports, relieved only by the ques- 
tionable interpretation of an official press bureau? 



1 62 The IVihon Administration and the Great War 

The effect on the people was inevitable. Deprived of 
fact, they often ran into fancy, forming erroneous conclu- 
sions upon misinformation. Public opinion was lynched. 
Freedom of thought for the first time in American history 
was suppressed. Only a few brave voices were heard in 

tlie land. 

The evidence of the abject servitude of the Associated 
Press was made notable by a fulsome eulogy of the wonder- 
ful results of the diplomacy of Edward M. House abroad 
which was spread all over the country in an Associated 
Press dispatch from Paris under date of November 25, 
19 1 8. It undertook to establish the fact that upon his ar- 
rival there he "found little disposition among American and 
European friends to accept as a totality the framework of 
peace as expressed by President Wilson." And making it 
plain that through his efforts the desired object of the Ad- 
ministration was fully realized. 

With the Associated Press and other press agencies 
under its authority, the Administration not only distributed 
but manufactured the news of the day to suit its own exi- 
gencies. 

Shortly after the beginning of the war, the various news 
agencies, such as the Associated Press and the United Press, 
voluntarily announced that they would send to their clients 
only such material as would conform to government re- 
quirements. While the attempt was made to have this 
appear as a restriction to prevent the circulation of infor- 
mation of value to the enemy, in effect it became a political 
control denying circulation of all facts which it was proper 
that the American public should know, but which certain 
agents of the Administration might desire not to have 
known. Such an instance was that of the report of the 
Senate Committee on Military Affairs on aircraft condi- 
tions. This was a matter of momentous import to the 
American public. Yet only one newspaper, the New York 
Times, carried it in full. The Associated Press sent out a 



The Press and Public Opinion 163 

relatively small amount of it, and that made up largely 
of generalizations and evidently a dispatch previously sub- 
mitted for official approval. The reason given was that 
the papers feared to publish what the Administration de- 
sired to have kept under cover. The reason officials gave 
was they did not wish it to reach the enemy, as it would re- 
veal the military secrets of the United States Government. 

Senator Lodge very truthfully stated on the floor of 
the Senate : "Our enemies know the contents of the re- 
port, our Allies know the contents of it, and the only people 
who do not know about it are the people of the United 
States." It would hardly be denied that the people of the 
United States were the ones who had the most right to 
know what a committee of their senators had to say after ^ 
a full investigation of the aircraft situation. 

Had the newspapers submitted to the outraged sense of 
decency in the action of Mr. Baker in refusing newspaper 
distribution containing the Senate committee's report on the 
aircraft collapse, it would have meant the end of a free 
press. It would have marked the beginning of the decay 
of American manhood. It would have foreshadowed the 
killing at home of the American freedom for which the-^ 
nation made sacrifices so many and so great on the fields of 
France.^ 

Already the cry was raised by the more alert American 
newspapers, Are we to have a reptile press? And with 
abundant reason, in view of the methods pursued by the 
Administration in seeking to create a public opinion through 
the news columns that would exalt and magnify each official 
under Administration influence and who had his own press 
agent. 

Theodore Roosevelt's expose was the first complete view 
given the public of how the Administration favored power- 
ful papers that fawned upon its acts. Yet it was well 
known to Intelligent editors who publish throughout the 

'Philadelphia North American, September 9, 1918. 



164 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

country that the Administration sought control of the press 
through rewards of favor and threats of punishment. 

One of the first demands made by President Wilson, 
after the declaration of war, was the enactment of a law 
that would have empowered him to suppress arbitrarily any 
critical publication. To its credit Congress declined to 
accede to this. There was, however, a measure enacted 
sufficiently drastic to intimidate many papers that did not 
flatter the Administration. Often the position of the pub- 
lic press was humiliating and intolerable for loyal American 
papers. The Administration undertook to supply informa- 
tion deemed proper for the public to have, and issued daily 
great masses of official statements, not only reciting alleged 
facts, but urging Administration aims and policies. In 
large part, the statements were inaccurate, misleading, and 
conflicting. Newspapers disseminating this material knew 
that in so doing they were often helping to deceive their 
readers. But there was nothing else for them to do if 
they were to continue as newspapers. It was sent to all 
alike; and if any of the flagrant official misrepresentations 
were modified or omitted, the offending newspaper laid it- 
self open to the charge of not "supporting the govern- 
ment." Few newspapers had sufficient command of the 
facts to make it safe for them to risk a controversy by chal- 
lenging statements they knew to be untrue. The method 
was simple but deadly. 

As a whole, the system brought the American press 
under a reign of terrorism, few of the newspapers daring to 
challenge the displeasure of an Administration which had 
shown that it did not scruple to use the postal service and 
the Department of Justice to exact servility. Few of them 
had the strength or the courage to risk such an assault as 
President Wilson made upon Senator Chamberlain when 
he undertook to tell the nation the truth. 

One Philadelphia newspaper, a keen analyst of the Ad- 
ministration's acts and one that stood notably at all times 



The Press and Public Opinion 165 

for unadulterated Americanism and always firmly against 
the murderous tactics of Prussianism, whether in Europe or 
under the sea or on the sea or in the air or in the German 
propaganda in America, had an experience that is worthy 
of permanent record, though a shameful one for the Ad- 
ministration. 

The case is not isolated or singular. It is typical of 
the entire Administration method in dealing with that class 
of papers which was so independent that it would not fawn 
upon Administration officials, and was so thoroughly Ameri- 
can that it would not lower its standard for any false propa- 
ganda, German or other. Because of this the story is re- 
corded in substantially its own words: 

In discussing editorially, February 4, 191 8, the Liberty Motor, 
it remarked that soon the original model "was found to be obsolete" 
and "was scrapped and the name adopted for a new and radically 
different model." A few days later the newspaper received an 
insolent letter from one Robert C. Benchley, written on the letter 
paper of the chairman of the aircraft board, stating that the news- 
paper had "put itself in the position of American representative of the 
Berliner Togehlatt" by spreading such "rumors." There had been 
only the "normal" change, said the writer of the letter, from eight 
to twelve cylinders, and he bitterly denounced the suggestion that that 
meant the original model had been found "obsolete." A newspaper 
less sure of its facts might have been alarmed by this "official" re- 
buke, with its impudent charge of disloyalty. The newspaper simply 
kept on telling the truth until, on May 15 (more than three months 
later), the War Department, in a formal description of the Liberty 
Motor, itself employed the very word the newspaper had used, when 
the report said: "The first sample was an 8-cylinder model. This, 
however, was never put into production, as advices from France indi- 
cated that demands for increased power would make the 8-c\'linder 
model obsolete before it could be produced." Again, on March 25, 
the same newspaper printed over the day's account of the great Ger- 
man drive a 7-column headline in moie conservative form than the 
dispatches, reading: "British Line Bends, But Holds," and on the 
same page a 2-column head, strictly accurate, reading: "Germans 



1 66 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

Capture Peronne: Berlin Boasts of Victory." At midnight, news- 
boys selling the paper were threatened by a secret-service agent ; who 
later took into custody the office employe in charge of the boys and 
conducted him nearly to the federal building before he would state 
what charge he intended to make against him. When he said that the 
newsboys were giving "aid and comfort to the enemy" by calling out 
that the Germans had captured a town and added that this was a 
part of the North Americans pro-Germanism, the preposterous 
charge, once stated in words, appeared to frighten him, he lost his 
nerve, released the employe, with a warning that the newspaper would 
hear from the Department of Justice. When the newspaper under- 
took to ascertain who the agent was, the department declined to per- 
mit his name to be known. 

Einer Barfod, of the staff of the same paper, is of Danish birth. 
His passionate loyalty to America is equaled only by his detestation 
of Germany. Yet from government circles there emanated an insin- 
uation that he was a German spy employed by a German sheet. 
Reginald Wright KaufiFman, a former correspondent of the same 
newspaper at the front, a member of the vigilantes, a group of writers 
standing for Americanism above all else, and standing for it when 
the Administration was truckling to German frightfulness, and whose 
utter devotion to the cause of the United States and the Allies was 
so well known that he had confidential relations with Lloyd George, 
Mr. Bryce, high French statesmen and General Foch, — because he 
questioned the wisdom of some Administration policies the whisper 
was sent out against him that he was pro-German, and agents of the 
Department of Justice were instructed to examine his record. The 
system of intimidation was so villainous that even the name of the 
editor of the newspaper, Van Valkenburg, was seized upon with the 
false suggestion that he was a German, though it is no more German 
than Wilson and Baker, and his ancestors had been in America 250 
years before some of the Bolsheviki who fawn upon the Administra- 
tion had set feet on American soil. 

The revolting disclosures respecting the system is that seditious 
utterances against the United States might be safely made by news- 
papers which adulate the President, while truthful and helpful criti- 
cism of the Administration had become dangerous for publications 
which were wholly and devotedly loyal to the country, and it was 
shown that the price of immunity was undiluted servility. Just criti- 



The Press and Public Opinion 167 

cism of governmental blundering and Inefficiency mortally offended 
the authorities which tolerated downright disloyalty from journals 
which flattered the President.^ 

Perhaps In all the developments that the Great War 
produced there was none more sinister In character than the 
lowering of the American press to Idealize an Individual, 
cloud an Issue, confuse public opinion, as seen from the 
point of view of American institutions of liberty. It bred 
subserviency, disguised failure, clothed Incompetency with 
the plumage of efficiency. Back of the wall of secrecy and 
deceit, reared by the agile manipulators of public opinion 
throughout the war, blunders were made without exposure 
and repeated the frightful course because of that very lack. 
Gold was dissipated without detection, fictitious personages 
were created out of nothingness and pigmies magnified to 
the stature of giants.^ 

The plan of the Administration was merely aided by the 
surrender of Congress itself. Congress had no press agent, 
had no need for any under conditions that existed. As a 
consequence, congressmen were as ignorant of what was 
going on In Administration circles as any one else. The 
only real source of news was an Inaccessible figure who ter- 
minated his intercourse with newspaper men shortly after 
proclaiming the policy of "pitiless publicity," and who re- 
sumed those relations only after his return from Paris 
when he found the country In an uproar over the League 
of Nations. 

As illustrative of the method in vogue, Mr. Taft's ad- 
vocacy of the League of Nations through news channels was 
given the widest publicity. Although long a private citizen, 
as an advocate of the President's program he had a wider 
use of newspaper columns than he could have obtained when 

'Philadelphia North American, May 30, 1918. 

*A very enlightening contribution to the literature of the war upon 
the method adopted by the Administration for the purpose of formulating 
public opinion in covering up its own defects which it did not dare to per- 
mit to come to public notice, by George Rothwell Brown in the North 
American Review for June, 1919- 



1 68 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

he was President, except in interviews and signed statements. 

As a result of the thoroughness of the Administration 
in securing control of the news channels, by fair means or 
foul, there came to exist in the United States a control of 
the press and a suppression of vital news and public discus- 
sion which it would be difficult to parallel in English-speak- 
ing countries except to go back 300 years. 

On the great issues of the war with Germany the Ameri- 
can newspapers were almost universally right. Loyal to 
the government, they were far in advance of the Adminis- 
tration in upholding the views of liberty and proclaiming 
the duty of America. There were perhaps not to exceed a 
half-dozen that failed to exemplify the principles of democ- 
racy and international justice. 

Never shall a free press loyal to free institutions be 
stifled for political partisan purposes or personal aggran- 
dizement. 



CHAPTER X 

LIQUOR AND VICE 

An invariable accompaniment of war has been the social 
evil. And the social evil accepts and demands intoxicating 
liquor as its constant companion and partner. It were not 
just to President Wilson to charge that he in any manner or 
degree supported the former. But as indicated elsewhere/ 
it appeared to be a marked characteristic of his to be found 
on the wrong side of important matters affecting the great 
public; so he was found on the great matter of dealing with 
the latter. ^. 

But members of his cabinet who had to take care of the 
Interests of the fighting boys of the nation and to look after 
the morale, not only of these boys but of the nation at 
large, accepted the challenge and met the issue squarely 
for the nation's interests. It was a matter of large con- 
cern to the millions of homes whence these boys came; it 
was a matter of grave interest for the nation's future. 

For decades the liquor problem was becoming more 
acute as a political problem; for it had entered the political 
arena under the guise of the old political parties which, 
in large measure, it controlled, the liquor power seeking to 
keep itself hidden from public view. But the activities of 
this real power were being uncovered just before the Great 
War; and when the war forced to the front the necessity 
of conserving the nation's man-power and its fuel and food 
supplies, and of its utmost efficiency in workmanship in war 
preparations, the opposition to using any of these to accom- 
modate the politcal and commercialized liquor traffic be- 
came more emphatic. And when the Senate's investigation 

* Chapter on "Wilson and Wilsonism." 

169 



170 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

of the pro-German propaganda bared the fact that liquor's 
interests were inseparably intertwined with that propaganda, 
the opposition became an avalanche. 

As to the social vice, it is a matter of history that Con- 
gress had taken cognizance of it as an interstate affair some 
years previously in the Mann Act; in war time it took dras- 
tic action in dealing with its associate evil. For war imparts 
new life and new energy to both; and it was realized that at 
such a time both must be handled with energy, the training- 
camp being a particularly fruitful field for their nefarious 
trade at the time when the best that is in man is demanded 
for the increased burdens. Said the eminent Englishman, 
Lord Haldane : "If the country were free from tuberculosis 
and venereal disease, the nation would have strength and vi- 
tality to undertake almost any burden." And the British 
Royal Commission, seeking to overcome the recognized 
handicap, declared that venereal disease was responsible 
for more than fifty per cent of the incapacity of the race 
to have children. It aims straight at the power of the race 
to perpetuate itself. Likewise, Surgeon-General Gorgas 
of the United States, in urging measures that were later 
successfully adopted to control venereal disease within the 
American army during the war, stated that if it were pos- 
sible to get rid of either all of the wounds or all of venereal 
disease he would prefer to be rid of the latter. 

The first attack upon the social evil during the war 
was made by the Council of National Defense and the Com- 
mission on Training-Camp Activities. It was a hard fight 
against the forces of evil organized for selfish purposes 
even against the boys who were to do the fighting and 
against the very morale of the nation. The success of 
the crusade is shown by the fact that one hundred and ten 
cities abolished the "red-light" districts. Laws and regula- 
tions were adopted in the various states requiring physi- 
cians to report all such cases, as other communicable dis- 
eases were reported. 



Liquor and Vice i-yi 

The local draft boards had everywhere uncovered the 
ugly fact that about five times as much venereal disease ex- 
isted in civil life as was found proportionately in the army. 
This determined the army and navy to carry its fight into 
civil life. In doing so it might have met opposition, had 
not wide circles of civilian life, which otherwise would have 
remained ignorant and complacent, become as thoroughly 
aroused at the conditions thus uncovered as did the army. 
And what Great Britain and the United States undertook 
in the way of fighting this fearful thing came as a result of 
this unwelcome discovery. The fight carried on by the 
United States Public Health Service after the war became 
a matter of utmost importance. 

But this grievous state of affairs was a sad admission of 
inefficiency in American municipal government. The evil 
power had gained the upper hand largely because of co- 
operation or connivance on the part of the local authorities. 
Great cities, when called upon by the federal authorities 
to close these places of infamy, at the beginning of the war, 
declared that it could not be done, that the police forces 
were incapable of it. Secretary of the Navy Daniels in- 
formed, first the local, then the state authorities, that unless 
they were able to abate the evil, he would either withdraw 
the men from training at those places, or else would take 
possession by the strong arm of the navy. It had become a 
question whether these corrupt and corrupting forces were 
mightier than the municipal and state authorities, and had 
become so powerful as to dictate to the national govern- 
ment in time of war. 

It was this unyielding attitude toward these twin vices 
that brought down upon his head the malediction of power- 
ful interests and powerful newspapers. His efforts to save 
the men under him from these evils caused vituperations 
to be heaped upon him which one would think would have 
been heaped rather upon the evils he was seeking to be rid 
of. It was the very old story over: selfishness seeking its 



172 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

own, at no matter what cost in money, health, self-respect, 
and morale for the sake of the nation. 

But while war is the prime opportunity of these evils, it 
is also the opportunity to organize against and to combat 
them. In a public statement touching this phase of the 
matter, Secretary Daniels declared: 

One of the compensations of the tragedy of the war is the fact 
that an enlightened opinion is behind the organized campaign to pro- 
tect the youth against venereal disease. The campaign begun in war 
to insure the military fitness of men for fighting is quite as necessary 
to save men for civil efficiency. 

And future generations of those who had a peculiar interest 
in the sailor boys, many of whom came from Christian 
homes, will rise to bless the Secretary for his determined 
action In seeking to rid naval stations of these training 
dens of vice that sprang into existence as if by magic as 
soon as training stations were opened when the country 
entered the Great War. The nation was placed under a 
great debt for his faithfulness to the trust reposed in him. 
Secretary of War Baker likewise took advanced ground 
in this important matter. It had ever been declared that 
the evil was an inevitable accompaniment of war; that where 
armies were gathered, there it was sure to be found; that it 
could not be resisted. Secretary Baker declared not only 
that it could be prevented, but that it must be prevented. 
In a letter to mayors of cities he plainly stated: 

The only practical policy which presents itself in relation to this 
problem is the policy of absolute repression. This policy involves, of 
course, constant vigilance on the part of the police. 

Thus he was strongly backing up the Council of National 
Defense and the Commission on Training-Camp Activities, 
and Secretary Daniels was in hearty accord. 

Yet the forces of unrighteousness continued their efforts 
to thwart these measures; and just prior to the middle of 



Liquor and Vice 1-73 

August, 19 1 8, as a police regulation badly needed, and its 
enforcement no less required because of the incompetence 
or indifference of the police of the various cities where camps 
were located, there were issued by both Secretary Baker and 
Secretary Daniels, the result of conferences held by repre- 
sentatives of their departments with the Department of 
Justice and the Training-Camp Commission, orders against 
prostitution within a radius of ten miles of any army or navy 
camp, station, post or fort, and against the aiding or abet- 
ting of it in any way. 

In the same manner an effort was made in good faith 
to break up the sale of intoxicants in the vicinity of camps 
and to those in the camps; and stringent measures were 
taken to enforce the orders. Special care was taken to seek 
to instil into the minds of the men in army and camp the 
value of a clean life, not only while in the fighting forces 
of the country but for success after the war should have 
concluded. It was well expressed in a crude manner by 
a somewhat crude mind: "If the man in the army cannot 
mind what he learned there how to take care of himself 
after he gets out, it is all the worse for him; I'll say they 
learned me somethings I didn't know about." 

One of the important results attained by the unceasing 
efforts in behalf of the men made during the war was this 
looking to the future welfare. It set civilian agencies at 
work that had been dormant. Said Chairman Fosdick of 
the War Department Commission on Training-Camp Ac- 
tivities, in his report to the Secretary of War in 1918 : 

It has been our purpose to keep the man in uniform healthy and 
clean, physically and mentally, by safeguarding him against evil influ- 
ences and surrounding him with opportunity for sane, beneficial occu- 
pation for his spare time. 

And after stating that the army section and the navy section 
were so closely related In method and material as to be 
treated jointly, he adds: 



174 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

Their purpose is to give to every soldier and sailor in the service 
of the United States such essential facts regarding the nature and 
prevention of venereal disease as will contribute to the protection of 
his health and to the efficiency of his services as a fighting man. 

These activities began in August, 19 17, under the direction 
of the Council of National Defense, and were transferred, 
early in 19 18, to the Commission on Training-Camp Ac- 
tivities. And it was the more than 50,000 letters written 
to citizens in 700 communities requesting them to investigate 
local conditions and to urge new legislation in support of 
the government's program against vice and liquor, that 
brought the communities into full co-operation with the 
army and navy. 

The annual reports ^ of both the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Navy for 19 18, stress the conditions 
under which the men trained for the Great War, both in 
the army and the navy; and state how men that had for- 
merly been turned away because affected by the vile disease 
were now accepted into the service and cured. Secretary 
Daniels called attention to the establishment of the interde- 
partmental social hygiene board in the effort to abate and 
prevent vice conditions throughout the country. 

In furtherance of this general clean-up plan, fraternal 
organizations and commercial bodies wrote the Surgeon- 
General that they were ready to stand by him shoulder to 
shoulder in the work. And medical journals and physicians 
everywhere enlisted in the fight; as did employers in industry 
by awakening their employes to the gravity of the danger. 
And the United States Public Health Service entered upon 
a campaign of education for the public, immediately the war 
ended. In December, 19 18, among other things it stated: 

Whatever the cost of this campaign, whether that cost is counted 
in terms of money, scientific striving, self-sacrificing, educational 

^Both of these reports are full of food for reflection on this vital mat- 
ter. 



Liquor and Vice i^^ 

effort, or wise restraint in personal conduct, it will be immeasureably 
exceeded by the gains. 

The efforts of Secretary Baker and Secretary Daniels 
to keep the army and navy free from the damning influence 
of intoxicants were seconded by Director-General of Rail- 
roads McAdoo in an order of wide influence issued August 
12, 19 1 8, wherein he stated: 

The sale of liquors and intoxicants of every character in dining- 
cars, restaurants, and railroad stations under federal control shall be 
discontinued immediately. 

In the midst of all this effort to keep the fighting boys 
in the best possible trim and to return them to their home 
as free from the liquor taint as when they were taken thence 
to fight the nation's battles; and in the midst of all the 
effort to conserve man-power, fuel, food, and efficiency to 
carry the war to a successful conclusion, there is one instance 
in which President Wilson made an order that appears to 
be against the liquor business and in favor of the boys. It 
was issued June 27, 19 18, promulgating regulations pro- 
hibiting the furnishing of liquor to officers and men of the 
army anywhere In the United States, even in private homes; 
and establishing dry zones of a half-mile within any camp 
where as many as 250 men were stationed for more than 
thirty consecutive days where there was a city permitting 
the sale of liquors, and five miles in all other places. And 
this order was issued upon recommendations by representa- 
tives of the Attorney-General, the Judge Advocate General 
of the army, and the War Department Commission on 
Training-Camp Activities, and not upon the President's 
initiative. 

On the contrary. Secretary Baker continued to the end 
to plead for the fighting men, even on December 6, 19 18, 
appealing to friends of the returning soldiers for assistance 
in discontinuing the giving of intoxicating liquors to the 
men as a part of home-coming celebrations: 



176 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

A drunken soldier is a disgrace to his uniform, an insult to the 
flag, a shame to himself, and a danger to the community. . . . 

I appeal to the friends of our boys at the front to discourage this 
abuse of hospitality. Our army in service has made a record for 
cleanness and sobriety of which the country has the right to be proud. 
I appeal to that pride to help the men to live up to their record. 

This was the first effort on a large scale to reduce to 
the minimum the evils of drink and the social vice in time 
of war. Yet even in this effort, the voice of the head of 
the Administration in support of the liquor interests, when 
the acute stage was reached during the struggle at arms, 
found ready echo in all parts of the land. It gave encour- 
agement to the saloonists and the lawless elements they 
represented. This was true of the lamentable situation 
that arose at the great naval station at Newport, Rhode 
Island; of the worse situation that developed at Chicago; 
of that in Philadelphia, where the governor of the state 
had to inform the mayor that unless the local authorities 
could cope with the situation the state troops would be 
used. Even little country towns in the inland Middle West 
felt this baneful influence.^ 

It was this consistent attitude on the part of President 
Wilson toward the liquor interests of the nation that en- 
couraged them in the hope and opportunity of waging a 
campaign against war-time prohibition long before it was 
authorized by Congress. After Congress had authorized 
him to declare war-time prohibition, he delayed as long 

^The small village of Blooming Prairie, Minn., is so typical an in- 
stance of this influence that the main facts are cited. In mid-summer, 1918, 
the saloonmen of this village, backed by some stronger but unseen hand, 
became the nucleus of lawless bands. The state commission of public 
safety found it necessary, owing to this condition in war time, to order 
the saloons closed. Open defiance of this order caused the governor of the 
state to station troops in the village to enforce the commission's orders. 
The saloonists going to a state judge, a man of the creation of their own 
element, undertook to hale the governor of the commonwealth, commander- 
in-chief of the state's military forces, into court, in time of war, to answer 
the charge of contempt of court on his part for not telling the court why 
it was necessary to enforce the orders of the commission touching the 
dangers of open connivance at law violation at such a time! 



Liquor and Vice i^Y 

as it seemed possible. Before action by Congress, he in- 
terfered with every move to discontinue the manufacture 
of liquor from the beginning of the war. Immediately after 
the country entered the war, both houses of Congress, re- 
gardless of party lines, went on record for the suppression 
of the liquor traffic as a necessary means of conserving 
the nation's resources and energies for the conflict. Senti- 
ment throughout the country backed this action. Hostile 
orders from the White House prevented. As early as June, 
19 1 7, the sentiment was so strong that the House passed, 
by a vote of 2>^s to 5, an amendment to a food bill, for- 
bidding the use of foodstuffs in the manufacture of intoxi- 
cants during the war. President Wilson intervened and 
had the Senate adopt a compromise which stopped the mak- 
ing of distilled spirits and empowered the President to limit 
the alcoholic content of beer. From the time this bill be- 
came a law in August, 19 17, the President had the power 
of life and death over the liquor industry. It was from this 
time on that the campaign of the liquor forces became more 
vigorous than ever. They now knew that the President was 
with them. It was not difficult to account for the outbreaks 
of disorder and the resistance to the orders of the state 
commissions of public safety in war time. 

The intelligence of the nation could not understand the 
President's conduct in this matter. The pound of coal re- 
quired to make a pint of beer he was unwilling to have saved 
to warm shivering children, to heat school-houses and 
churches so that they might be kept open, to save three 
million tons a year for legitimate purposes. Moreover, 
reports indicated that the twenty-five per cent increased out- 
put of fuel requested by the national fuel administration 
was promptly forthcoming in the states in which prohibition 
of the liquor traffic was already enforced, while the other 
states had to report that it was impossible to get out the 
desired increase. The President's action was understood 
only from one possible angle — he was angling for the liquor 



178 The IVilson Administration and the Great War 

vote, with the hope that he might win thereby the labor vote. 
At all events, it was not till September 16, 19 18, that he 
issued his proclamation under Act of Congress of August 
10, 19 17, forbidding the use of foods to produce malt 
liquors after November 30, 19 18, a few months before war- 
time prohibition became effective. And he let it be known 
that his action was taken after a conference with the Food, 
Fuel, and Railroad Administrations and the War Indus- 
tries Board. Had it not been for his determined opposition, 
suspension of the liquor traffic would have ceased nearly 
two years earlier than it did. It was June, 19 18, that an 
irrepressible movement for war prohibition began. White 
House Intervention postponed action until the end of Au- 
gust, and it was November 21 (after the armistice was 
signed) that the President signed the emergency food bill 
with an amendment making the whole country dry for the 
period of the war and demobilization. 

Here again the President used his Influence and the 
power of his official position to defer suspension of the 
traffic. An overwhelming majority in Congress wanted the 
act to become effective at the end of 1918 ; President Wilson, 
without stating any sufficient reason, urged postponement 
to the end of 19 19. This would have given the liquor busi- 
ness another extension of twelve months. It was finally 
agreed that the time limit be fixed at June 30, 19 19. This 
constant favor shown the business by the President led 
Homer W. Tope, superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League 
of Pennsylvania, to criticize President Wilson's stand as "a 
discrimination in favor of the liquor interests for which 
the Hearst papers and the German-American Alliance have 
been fighting for years." 

While the important measure known as the war-time 
prohibition bill was but a rider to the emergency agricul- 
tural appropriation bill, it became the chief measure, the 
agricultural feature being wholly forgotten. In the con- 
troversy, the two forces, those representing the liquor in- 



Liquor and Vice 179 

terests and those against them, showed the old "line-up of 
booze or bread; between special privilege and war efficiency; 
between waste and conservation; between instinctive whole- 
hearted patriotism and alcoholic patriotism," as put by one 
leading newspaper. The fact is, the President maneuvered 
until he succeeded in having lodged in his hands all power 
to commandeer all stocks of distilled liquors and to control 
or stop the production of beer. From that time on the 
traffic continued only by his permission. And a large propa- 
ganda was put forth to blindfold the people — a customary 
practice of the Administration when it had something to 
bring forth that would not bear investigation. It was on 
this occasion that Mr. Hoover gave out his statement that 
the diversion of a mere 40,000,000 bushels of grain an- 
nually to the brewers was negligible, though he had been 
sedulously instructing the housewives of the land to save 
every ounce of flour and that the winning of the war de- 
pended upon it. These wives of the country sat up and 
took notice. Mr. Hoover also gave out the opinion that 
the troops might be debauched with whiskey and gin, if not 
allowed beer, though that matter was fully in the hands of 
the President. 

So insistent was the Administration head to have liquor 
continued that it was declared that efficiency in shipbuilding 
required it. Bainbridge Colby, formerly a Progressive 
and who had held to saner views, declared for liquid effi- 
ciency In shipbuilding; he had only opinion to offer, but 
that opinion was that efficiency might be expected to drop 
25 per cent without the stimulant. But this was good ma- 
terial for extensive liquor advertising and It was used to 
the utmost. Postmaster-General Burleson, the politician 
of the Administration and seemingly the direct representa- 
tive thereof, an ardent pro-liquor advocate, was against 
prohibition on the ground that It would "cause a fight In 
every congressional district." Samuel Gompers, president 
of the American Federation of Labor, found In the union 



i8o The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

sixty thousand bartenders, and he was also against it. And 
as President Wilson had declared that he liked "to lay his 
mind along side" of that of Mr. Gompers, it was not diffi- 
cult for the two Presidents to think alike on this matter. 
Mr. Hurley, of the Shipping Board, also was of opinion 
that efficiency demanded liquor. But these were chiefly 
opinions. 

On the other hand, Fuel Administrator Garfield in- 
formed the brewers that they need not expect to be allowed 
more fuel than actually required to "utilize the materials 
in the process of manufacture, including malt already manu- 
factured." This was taken to mean the end of the brewing 
business whether Congress acted or not. And while the 
President approved it, it was believed he did so in order 
to snatch the credit from Congress; it was in great contrast 
with the Administration's opposition to the House rider on 
the ground that it would put the country on a "whiskey 
basis." In his order of July 3, 19 18, Fuel Administrator 
Garfield prohibited the use of fuel by brewers in excess of 
fifty per cent of the average they had used 1915-1917. 

To make matters hard for the efficiency plea of the pro- 
liquor members of the Administration, there came, on July 
12, 1918, the declaration of the National Coal Association 
to the fuel administrator that "immediate nation-wide pro- 
hibition is absolutely necessary if the extra hundred-million 
tons of coal a year needed by the country in its war on Ger- 
many is to be mined." This association represented the 
bituminous operators, producing 400,000,000 tons of coal 
yearly. 

The same month that the shipbuilders were seeking to 
retain the liquor traffic for efficiency's sake, an inspector 
from the quartermaster's department of the federal gov- 
ernment was sent to Kenosha, Wisconsin, to ascertain the 
cause of failure to keep up with the war contracts with the 
government. He reported that the delay was due to the 
wide-open and law-breaking saloons; that after spending 



Liquor and Vice i8i 

Sunday in carousing, many of the men did not report for 
duty Monday. Immediately the manufacturers, local au- 
thorities, and saloonists entered into an agreement whereby 
saloons were to close Saturday evenings and not open 
until the men had gone to work Monday morning, rather 
than lose the hundreds of thousands of dollars in con- 
tracts. 

It was an open secret that the President's action upon 
matters touching the liquor traffic reflected the fact that 
his three trusted advisers in political affairs were three men 
who stood well with the liquor forces of the nation: Post 
master-General Burleson, Samuel Gompcrs, and Privat; 
Secretary Tumulty. However, his attitude had little influ 
ence with Congress, which body was hearing from the "folk:: 
back home." It is probable that there was never a presi- 
dential veto handled with so little respect for the vote power 
as was President Wilson's veto of the bill to enforce con- 
stitutional prohibition."* In spite of the efforts of the liquor 
people, it required the Plouse a scant two hours to pass 
it over his veto by a vote of 176 to 55 ; and in still less time 
for the Senate, on the following day, to pass it by a vote 
of d^ to 20. 

The extraordinary vacillation of the Attorney-General 
in the execution of the prohibition, whether the war-time 
prohibition act or the constitutional amendment, was in 
conformity with the whole procedure of the Administra- 
tion in dealing with the liquor problem. One day the policy 
announced was that there was no governmental machinery 
for enforcement; directly after, the country was served with 
notice that stern prosecutions would follow violation of the 
law. And to the end of the Wilson Administration there 

*In his veto message, the President stated that the measure "has to do 
with the enforccrnent of an act which was passed by reason of the emer- 
gency of the war and whose olijccts have been satisfied by the demobilization 
of the army and navy." Yet in his message to the coal strikers he had de- 
clared just two days before: "The country is confronted with this project 
at a time when the war is still a fact, when the world is still in suspense 
as to negotiations for peace." (Message of October 25, 1919) 



1 82 The JVilson Admin: .tralion and the Great War 

was constant, open, and notorious violations of law, so com- 
mon, even in prohibition : tates, as to become a national 
scandal. '"^^ And it is a remarkable fact that at the time when 
President Wilson was taking his last strong stands for the 
traffic and his Attorney-General was wobbling on the mat- 
ter of execution, the Senate's investigations had already dis- 
closed the intimate relations between the brewery interests 
which the President was seeking to save and the thoroughly 
disloyal German-American Alliance." 

The outstanding facts of President Wilson's relations 
v/ith the liquor traffic during the war are summarized as 
i illows : 

1. His vigilant opposition prevented adoption by Con- 
<Tess, but a few months after America entered the war, 
of prohibition when the country was eager to eliminate the 
waste of fuel and grain at a time when the nation was gath- 
ering its energies for the final struggle. 

2. Regardless of party, Congress promptly responded 
to this sentiment. When the House caucus of the Presi- 
dent's party voted to promote war-time prohibition, the 
White House Immediately declared that no legislation was 

'When President Wilson declared his purpose to take the ending of 
war-time prohibition into liis own hands in 1919, his aclion led the head 
of the New York Anti-Saloon League to declare: "By throwing a monkey- 
wrench into the enforcement machinery, Picsident Wilson is running true 
to form on the liquor ((uestion. In 1917 it was the prohlbiiion forces 
and not the brewers that he asked to quit. In 1918 he suggested that 
the operation of war prohibition be postponed a year. Last month he tried 
to prevent its going into effect at all, even though he had signed it, and 
he now gives the liquor traffic to unders(and that he will come to its rescue 
if it can hold on in the meantime. His assurance that he will do away 
with the law entirely at the earliest possible moment will be taken by the 
brewers as an implied invitation to violate the law in the interim. His 
suggestion will tend to paralyze the enforcement machinery; no official can 
have any heart in enforcing a law which he knows may be wiped out at 
any minute. The responsibility for any disorder or confusion due to viola- 
tion of war prohibition is now located with the President." 

"As early as December 11, 1918, Major E. Lowry Humes, of the Judge 
Advocate's office, conducting the Senate inquiry, read into the record com- 
munications showing the relations of the Alliance and the Protective Bu- 
reau of the National Wholesale Liquor Dealers Association. His records 
disclosed that this Bureau had expended $1,168,071, which had been deposited 
to its credit in two Pittsburgh banks; and he charged that it was the politi- 
cal agency of the Association. 



Liquor and Vice i8-> 

to be considered that he did not initiate. The caucus action 
was rescinded. 

3. A little later the Senate added to the espionage bill 
a provision forbidding the use of grain in making liquor. 
The President objected and the amendment was stricken 
out. 

4. On July 23, 19 1 7, by a vote of 365 to 5, the House 
added to the food-control bill an amendment that no food- 
stuffs should be used in the manufacture of alcoholic bever- 
ages. Under strict orders from the President to the Senate 
leaders, this body receded from its clearly defined purpose 
to accept the House measure. 

5. From the day the food-control measure passed, in 
August, 19 1 7, the President had in his hands absolute power 
over the liquor traffic, and he permitted it to flourish undis- 
turbed. 

6. The growing insistence of the people for conservation 
of food, fuel, and man-power became so strong that it could 
no longer be ignored. Then the President served notice 
that there must be no prohibition riders to appropriation 
bills, though he well knew that this meant no action at all. 

7. It was at this time that he and Mr. Hoover were so 
in accord on this one great issue that Mr. Hoover inter- 
vened with the statement that 40,000,000 bushels of grain 
were a negligible item; and members of the Shipping Board 
declared that liquor was a necessary item in acquiring effi- 
ciency in building ships. 

8. But the answer of the country was so firm and pro- 
nounced that the measure would have become a law July i, 
I9i8» had not the President managed to delay consideration 
until the end of August. 

9. Then Congress and the country were so overwhelm- 
ingly in favor of the law taking effect January i, 19 19, that 
that would have been the result had not the President in- 
sisted upon a year later. A compromise then made it effec- 
tive July I, 19 19. 



184 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

10. He cabled an urgent request from Paris that the 
law be repealed. 

11. Failing in that, he sent a further message stating 
that when demobilization should be completed "my power 
to act without congressional action will be exercised." 

12. This was, in effect, notice by the President that en- 
forcement of the law would be lax. Liquor-selling contineud 
with virtual paralysis of enforcement. 

13. Every Administration influence was exerted to pre- 
vent legislation looking to the enforcement of the act. 

14. Congress, yielding to the overwhelming demands 
of the country, rather than to White House dictation, passed 
the enforcement measure on October 16 by a very large 
majority, becoming operative October 28, 1919, with a 
drastic provision defining intoxicating liquors as those con- 
taining more than one-half of one per cent alcohol. The 
liquor interests had already announced their readiness to 
obey the law, when the entire country was amazed to learn 
that the President had vetoed the bill on October 27. The 
bill had been withheld from him, on account of illness, from 
October 16 to October 27, though a pro-liquor organ, a 
leading newspaper supporter of the President, stated that 
"he inquired about it almost daily" and then requested that 
it be brought to him. 

15. This veto constitutes one of the remarkable state 
papers of the President, whether considered in its tone or its 
reasoning. He indicated a willingness to create a situation 
in which a law of the United States, with its violation in- 
vited, would become a mockery. 

16. With scant courtesy for the President's reasons, 
this enforcement measure became law over his veto, admin- 
istering what was, up to that time, probably the most de- 
cisive rebuke ever given to any chief executive of the nation. 

17. From that time on. President Wilson manifested 
no interest in the enforcement of that law up to the time 



Liquor and Vice 185 

the constitutional prohibition amendment became effective, 
January 16, 1920; and no more in the enforcement of this 
prohibition by the basic law of the land after that date. 

That the dealers were hoping that the business would 
be revived was indicated in the various signs posted, many 
written in a humorous vein. Everywhere there was evidence 
of the confident belief that prohibition would fail because of 
resentment. One complaint of the dealers was that the vote 
had been taken when the soldier boys were absent from the 
country and had no opportunity to express themselves. 
This, however, amounted to no more than a wrong idea 
of what these soldier boys wanted, as was shown in their 
ready acceptance of the new condition upon their return 
from abroad. When war-time prohibition went into effect, 
virtually all the hotels of the land discontinued the sale of 
liquors at their bars and in their restaurants. And while 
the saloons generally remained open, only a few sold 
strongly alcoholic beverages; the others relied on soft drinks 
or else "2.75 per cent" beer to keep their business going. 
And much to their chagrin, they soon discovered that the 
American public manifested no resentment at the closing 
of the liquor traffic. 

Many notices were given to the public by the liquor 
craft to stock up before July i, 19 19, some indicating that 
all hope was gone of ever opening again. Said one notice 
by one of the largest dealers in the country, in an expensive 
sign placed high on his building and in characters large 
enough to be readily read some blocks distant: 

•'BONE DRY FOREVER. STOCK 
UP NOW FORTHERESTOFYOUR 
LIFE. STOCK UP BEFORE JULY i." 

And on July i, could be read these notices posted on saloon 
doors as one walked up and down the street: "For rent, 
or "Closed"; while another advised the people, "Closed 



1 86 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

until further notice"; and yet another, "Closed; we have 
gone fishing." 

This was six months before constitutional prohibition 
went into effect, all of which time the war-time prohibition 
was operative, but the traffic went on in great volume, owing 
to lax enforcement of the law. While in most places the 
sale was surreptitious, in many cities It was open and un- 
hindered. Said the pro-liquor and pro-Administration 
World, of New York, on Saturday, January 17, 1920, the 
first day of constitutional prohibition : 

Many places were openly selling everything from wine to whisky 
at sky-high prices yesterday afternoon and up to midnight. The sub- 
ways were full of men and women heading for Broadway with suit- 
cases and parcels full of liquor. Some were taking the stuff home, 
some taking it from their homes to hotels and restaurants. In the 
afternoon many bars and cafes were crowded. . . . Liquor flowed 
freely in Broadway places . . . till midnight. It was a hard-drink- 
ing indoor spree, rather than an outdoor affair. . . . Besides the 
oceans of liquor sold and drunk yesterday, a tremendous amount was 
unloaded surreptitiously. During the last few days, hundreds of 
thousands of dollars' worth of wines and whiskies have been sold in 
New York. 

National prohibition, under an amendment to the United 
States Constitution, went Into effect at midnight at the end 
of Friday, January 16, 1920, barring manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of liquor In the United States. 

One of the last official acts of Attorney-General Palmer, 
just as the Wilson Administration was passing out of exist- 
ence, was a ruling that beer might be prescribed as a medi- 
cine — using his official position to nullify. In large measure, 
the clear intent of the fundamental law of the land. This 
climaxed the Administration's method of enforcing the law, 
In many Instances by men selected from lists prepared by 
Wilson politicians, men who had been engaged in the liquor 
traffic and who were Inveterate enemies of prohibition. In 
the summer of 102 1 Congress remedied this defect caused 



Liquor and Vice i8y 

by Mr. Palmer's ruling, by a more stringent measure than 
had ever previously been considered. 

The nation must be kept clean for future efficiency; and 
no liquor-pro-German alliance can be tolerated if the nation 
is to be kept safe. 



CHAPTER XI 

RUSSIA AND BOLSHEVISM 

Russia is the land Wonderful. With its vast area, its 
variety of climate, its boundless material resources, its rivers 
and lakes and seas, the appeal to the imagination is irre- 
sistible. But the splendid idealism and spiritual aspirations 
of its people make it most wonderful. 

Then why did not Russia stand true in its fight by the 
side of the Allies against Prussian autocracy? Russia, in 
her rulers, had an autocracy of her own. This autocracy 
was saturated with Prussianism in men and purposes. The 
men from the Russian masses fought with the courage of 
men imbued with a holy idealism and were slaughtered like 
cattle until their battle front became a shambles. But 
treachery lurked in the ruling powers above, and the fighting 
men could not longer endure the attacks of the enemy in 
front and a worse enemy in the rear. 

Then came the revolution of March, 19 17, overthrow- 
ing the autocratic government of the czar. This was the 
joint product of all political parties in Russia, whose ulti- 
mate aims differed greatly. On March 11 the revolution 
broke out spontaneously, the soldiers joining the citizens, 
army and people together turning on the government which 
had betrayed them and sweeping it out of existence in a five- 
days' battle. 

Now followed a race between the Parliamentary Party, 
warmly pro-Ally and representing the great middle class, 
and the Revolutionary Party, leading the ignorant and in- 
flamed masses, proclaiming all kinds of wild social theories 
and openly scorning any kind of international obligation. 
The popular government was organized with Kerensky at 

188 



Russia and Bolshevism 189 

its head. The Duma, the representative body in session, 
stood its ground in refusing to disperse upon the czar's 
order. 

The Anarchist party did not cease its efforts. Germany, 
seizing the opportune moment, thrust in a wedge in the 
astute Lenine. Throughout the summer of 19 17 the strug- 
gle between Kerensky and Lenine seesawed up and down, 
while Russia disintegrated ever more rapidly into a state 
of anarchy. In October the Anarchists successfully directed 
a counter-revolution in Petrograd, sending Kerensky into 
exile. This ended the brief period of the only representative 
free government Russia experienced. Directing with vigor 
the situation thus developed, Germany succeeded in bring- 
ing about at Brest-Litovsk, a treaty whereby Russia was 
betrayed into the hands of Germany, the champions of the 
social revolution in Russia agreeing with military autocracy 
in signing away their country's birthright of freedom. Len- 
ine stood for anarchy — the destruction of the existing social 
order, not only in Russia but throughont the world, as a 
preliminary to the construction of a new society. He was 
enthusiastically supported by all those elements ready to 
enter blindly into the reaction against the existing order. 

History can scarcely do less than ask the American 
Administration to show cause why it should not be charged 
with the defection of Russia from the cause of the Allies 
in March, 1 9 1 7, because too slow in entering the Great War, 
and the resulting treachery at Brest-Litovsk just a year 
later. 

While invariably declaring that the social revolution 
should not be interfered with, it is a fact that Lenine called 
Colonel Raymond Robins, then active in Red Cross work 
in Russia, into conference in the expressed hope that some 
assistance might be obtained from the United States that 
would assure Russia's standing with the Allies. For days, 
while Colonel Robins awaited reply to his cablegrams to 
Washington, Lenine held the diverse elements by his speech, 



190 The M^ilson Administration and the Great War 

meanwhile meeting Robins repeatedly. No word received, 
Leninc and the forces back of him were lost to the cause 
of the Allies, and the fatal treaty of March 3, 19 18, at 
Brest-Litovsk, resulted. And as a resulting disaster to the 
world, the destructive force known as Bolshevism was 
erected on the wreck of Incipient free government in Russia. 

When the Senate committee was conducting an investi- 
gation of this new phase of the social order, David R. 
Francis, United States ambassador to Russia, called as 
a witness, testified that he had told Raymond Robins to 
say to the Bolshevists that he would recommend a modus 
Vivendi if they would organize an opposition to Germany; 
and he stated it as his opinion that if Russia had remained 
in the war It would have ended a year earlier than it did 
and millions of lives would have been saved, then added: 
"Russia lost more men in the war than any other country 
although she quit the war a year before it ended." 

It was strange that President Wilson repeatedly called 
this counter-revolution the revolution, as if it were that 
which had overthrown czarism. Either he was confused 
in his Ideas or else in the use of terms. His confusion of 
purposes seems to indicate that It was the former. Had the 
democratic governments of the world maintained their first 
attitude in standing by the revolution which overthrew 
czarism and Germanism in Russia, Europe could have been 
saved the terrorism that reigned after the end of the Great 
War. The Allies, regarding the menacing rise of Bol- 
shevism as a temporary phenomenon, failed to see in It a 
danger to the peace of the world. They thought that at 
worst It could harm only Russia. Though the warning given 
by clear-vlsloned men was ample, the vision of the states- 
men occupying the world's stage was limited. 

Chief among these was President Wilson, who went 
before the world with a special message on this new thing. 
As early as May, 1917, it had been made so clear to keen 
observers from the evidence of events that the Bolshevik! 



Russia and Bolshevism 191 

were atrociously undemocratic that a warning was sounded. 
This warning went unheeded. The President, when, in 
November, 19 17, it usurped the powers of government in 
Russia, hailed this new autocracy as the manifestation of 
the new day. He had ample warning that it was no democ- 
racy in action but a movement of "zealots incapable of 
patriotism and whose conception of democracy is a travesty 
upon the name." Early in 191 8, when these rulers in Rus- 
sia were betraying their country to Germany at Brest-Li- 
tovsk, he declared that they were working "in the true spirit 
of modern democracy" and that theirs was the "voice of 
the Russian people," which was giving expression to their 
ideas of right "with a largeness of view, a generosity of 
spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must chal- 
lenge the admiration of every friend of mankind." ^ Just 
eight days after the Brest-Litovsk infamy, he gave to the 
world a special message on the occasion of the meeting 
of the Congress of the Soviets, in which he assumed that 
Lenine's militaristic government in Russia would "free 
themselves forever from autocratic government." 

With the evidence before the world at the time he was 
making these statements, it seems incomprehensible that 
President Wilson, with his opportunity to know the facts, 
could believe what he was then saying to civilization. 

In September, 1918, President Wilson declared that the 
rule of the Bolshevists was a "campaign of mass terrorism," 
and called upon all civilized nations to "register an abhor- 
rence of such barbarism." Their record was summarized by 
Herman Bernstein, an American investigator whose sym- 
pathies were with the supposed ideals of the Bolsheviki, 
when, after seeing the results of their course, he stated: 

They demoralized the Russian army; they unchained the mob 
spirit; they incited civil war; they signed the treaty which dismem- 
bered Russia; they paralyzed the industries; they encouraged looting, 
terror and murder ; they muzzled the press ; they abolished the courts 
^Address to Congress, January 8, 1918, 



192 The JVibon Administration and the Great IFar 

of justice; they dispersed the Constituent Assembly by force of arms, 
and set up a brutal dictatorship. 

This new power rising In the East was not Russia, nor 
was it the voice of the Russian people. The first principle 
of its creed was the repudiation of nationality. It declared 
that it represented a class, not a nation; and it spoke of a 
class in France, Britain, and the United States as well as 
Russia. Yet, in the early days of the world's Peace Con- 
gress there was the weakening of the assembled statesmen 
to the point of giving it representation in a conference called 
to meet on one of the Prince's Islands in the Sea of Mar- 
mora, which became known as the Prinkipo Conference. 
And to this conference President Wilson appointed a dele- 
gate who had written of him in these glowing words: 

Woodrow Wilson has dared to believe divinely; and his faith that 
a federate world is possible, and the challenge of that faith to the na- 
tions, is the most creative collective act since the French Revolution. 
By his faith he has set a goal from which mankind can never take 
its eyes; he has sent forth the word that can never return. 

This delegate, George D. Herron, a former Congre- 
gational minister of the gospel and teacher in an Iowa 
college, was dismissed from both positions for his discredit- 
able personal life. Of this appointment one eminent Ameri- 
can citizen said: 

We have become accustomed during these past six years to the 
President's fondness for surrounding himself with intellectual and 
political midgets; but we have heretofore been spared anything so 
shocking as this appointment." 

And in his official capacity, a noted American prelate 
gave utterance to these words : 

The case of George D. Herron, under appointment of the Presi- 
dent of the United States as representative of this Christian country 
to Prince's Islands for conference with the Bolsheviks, is the most 
disreputable appointment ever made in the United States. . . . The 

^Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University. 



Russia and Bolshevism 1^3 

attack in his appointment is on the Christian home, which is the core 
of the American life. Without it, America mij^ht be liolshevik. 
There is no republic possible where there is not God and where there 
is no Christian home.^ 

Of the many things done by President Wilson while in 
his high office, which demanded constant explanation by his 
friends and apologies by those who would like to be his 
friends, it is probable that his course with the Bolshevists 
was the strangest and the character of his appointments as 
representatives of Americanism was most strange of all. 
Accepting the fact that the appointment of Mr. Herron had 
not the least basis for even an excuse, his commissioners, 
Lincoln Steffens and William C. Bullitt, were markedly 
strange representatives of America to show Bolshevist 
Russia what America really is. They were probably made 
upon the principle that "it takes a thief to catch a thief" — 
in this instance, a Bolshevist to catch a Bolshevist. The 
public was never offered any other reason. It was apparent 
on the surface, however, that numerous of the President's 
like appointments were of men who had been fulsome in 
speaking the President's praises. Notably among them were 
William Bayard Hale and Norman Hapgood. And it is 
a remarkable fact that all of these men, to the list of whom 
should be added George Creel, were men whose large aim 
was to overturn American tradition, perhaps pushing to 
one side the Constitution itself. 

It was recognized that at the Prinkipo Conference there 
would come from Russia's 180,000,000 people representa- 
tives from none but the 40,000,000 under Bolshevik domi- 
nation, and that none but that "bloody and disorderly 
tyranny" would have representation; for in all that vast 
region of aspiring peoples democratic expression was stifled 
by violence. And this was the people In whom Wilson saw 
the rising hope of the world. The Philadelphia Public 
Ledger, in large measure warm toward Bolshevist doc- 

^ William A. Quayle, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church. 



194 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

trines both in Russia and the United States, published from 
its Paris correspondent, a recognized authority on European 
affairs at the time of the armistice and a particularly well- 
informed commentator on Russian affairs, these words re- 
ferring to the situation as it developed in late January, 19 19, 
at the Paris Conference of the world's statesmen: 

The decision has definitely extinguished all hope of settling Rus- 
sian affairs through the medium of the peace conference. The invita- 
tion was a fatal mistake, both in form and substance. The unkindest 
cut of all is to abandon the stanch friends of the Allies to their in- 
human butchers. 

And in the same public journal, Vladimir Bourtzeff, an ar- 
dent revolutionist, declared in unmistakable terms : 

Premier Lloyd George and President Wilson, in the name of 
England and America, are doing much, we believe unwittingly, for 
the development of the Bolshevist scourge throughout the world, and 
especially in Russia. Their responsibility before history is great. 

In the sinking of Hungary into the Bolshevist chaos 
was witnessed the fulfillment of warnings often repeated. 
One of the least excitable of experienced European observers 
of the time had warned the whole world but a little while 
before : 

The spectacle of European ruin is simply appalling. Nineteenth 
century civilization has broken down. I do not mean merely that 
famine and pestilence are creeping over Europe, but that there is a 
collapse of human moral energy, a revival of the primitive, barbaric 
instincts, and the fierce endeavor to have one's little private will by 
force. ... Up through the European chaos is surely creeping the 
menace of Bolshevism — that Bolshevism which is the revengeful 
shadow of reckless modern materialism. 

While loyal Americans will applaud the stern indictment 
which the Administration framed, in the early autumn of 
19 1 8 immediately after declaring that there would be no 
negotiation with undefeated Prussianism, calling upon civil- 
ized nations to "register their abhorrence of the organized 



Russia and Bolshevism 195 

official massacres In Russia," history will not forget that it 
was but a few months before that these creatures, the blood- 
stained persecutors of the Russian people, were reprcJ- 
sented in Washington "as high-minded champions of peace 
and justice, whose generous idealism was a reproach to 
the imperialism of the Allies and a summons to American 
recognition." And now, in the Peace Congress, President 
Wilson once mxore turns to dally with the foul thing, in send- 
ing representatives to meet it in the Prinkipo Conference. 
Fortunately there was a collapse of the planned meeting 
and America was spared the further humiliation of negoti- 
ating with this insensate brute of proletarian autocracy. It 
was Clemenceau who had the vision to see and the grit to 
declare the move to be a "contract with crime." It was 
President Wilson who was looked upon by the Bolshevists 
as their advocate. A few days before the matter came up 
in the Peace Congress, the former Bolshevist ambassador 
at London said: "It is not President Wilson's fault that 
our government was not represented at the Peace Confer- 
ence." And the President's declaration that the democratic 
governments "recognized the absolute right of the Russian 
people to direct their ov/n affairs without dictation or di- 
rection of any kind from outside" recalled his former fa- 
mous statement that "with the causes and issues of the war 
we have no concern." 

Outside of a few groups, as the Bolshevists in Russia, 
the socialist and pacifist sympathizers almost everywhere, 
and those who looked upon it as a well-meant device that 
might be worth trying in a perilous situation, the proposal 
was unsparingly denounced. In England characteristic com- 
ments were: "hopelessly weak," "politically hazardous," 
"ethically wrong." In France, except among organs of so- 
cialism, stronger terms of dissent designated it as "strange," 
"perilous," "insane," one paper charging it to "ideology', 
ignorance, and electioneering politics." 

In his determination to recognize the Lenine govern- 



196 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

ment, President Wilson, in this third position he assumed 
toward Bolshevism, leaned heavily upon men of pronounced 
Bolshevist tendencies. This is why it was declared, by men 
in responsible positions, that if it would be known where the 
strength of the Lenine despotism lay, the trail to the Hotel 
Crlllon was the right trail. Nor does any wonder when one 
of the President's commissioners, Mr. Herron, could write 
these ghastly words found in his previously published works: 

I have no expectation that the present kind of civilization can 
be amended — it can only be ended. . . . 

It is already too late to reform society in America. It is no 
longer a question whether you will have a socialistic revolution. It 
is only left to you to decide what kind of a revolution you will have. 

The teachings of this personal representative of the Presi- 
dent of the United States conform to the edicts, and his 
practices no less, of Lenine and Trotzky. Discarding one 
wife and seeking another, and compelled to flee the country 
because of his relations with the fairer sex, he v/as also a 
full-fledged internationalist and a budding Bolshevik, warm 
in his praises of President Wilson's internationalism, and 
ready to treat, in the name of America, with Russian Bol- 
shevism, the very negation of democracy. 

That history may be kept clear, it should be made mat- 
ter of record that it was January 22, 1919, that President 
Wilson wrote his Prinkipo memorandum. When presented 
to the fighting factions in Russia, one after another declined 
to accept, contrary to the President's expectations, his pro- 
posals. Then it was discovered that the French Foreign 
Office had been in communication with the Ukrainian and 
other anti-Bolshevist governments, assuring them that if 
they refused the proposals the French government would 
support them.'* It was thus that America was spared the 
deeper humiliation, and spared through the efforts of France 

* William C. Bullitt, in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee of the United States Senate, investigating Bolshevism. 



Russia and Bolshevism iq^ 

and in spite of the deadly efforts of President Wilson's pur- 
poses. 

The fourth position of the Administration toward t!ic 
Bolshevist regime in Russia was similar to the second. 
There is ample evidence that the note expressive of this 
attitude was the production of Secretary of State Colhy, 
and not of the President. But it expressed the views of the 
latter. It was written in the period of Poland's gravest 
danger from Bolshevism's fiercest drive of armed forces 
in August, 1920. It emphatically reversed the former atti- 
tude of the Administration and gave expression to America's 
judgment. It came at a time when most needed. For 
England, forced by the radical labor element, was committed 
to peace at any price with the Bolshevists; and it strength- 
ened the hand of France, which, in spite of Great Britain's 
position, had announced her intention of supporting Gen- 
eral Wrangel in his South Russia scheme of fighting Bol- 
shevism at home — France, again the pioneer in democracy, 
to which the American Administration was a good second. 

In this new and fourth position, the American Admin- 
istration said: 

That the present rulers of Russia do not rule by the will or con- 
sent of any considerable proportion of the Russian people is an incon- 
testable fact. . . . The Bolsheviki, although in number an incon- 
siderable proportion of the people, by force and cunninp; seized the 
powers and machinery of government and have continued to use them 
with savage oppression to maintain themselves in power. 

And then the note stated further: 

In the view of this government there cannot be any common 
ground upon which it can stand with a Power whose conceptions of 
international relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly 
repugnant to its moral sense. . . . Wc cannot recognize, hold official 
relations with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a govern- 
ment which is determined and bound to conspire against our institu- 
tions. 



198 The JVUson Administration and the Great War 

This looked like irrevocably committing the Administra- 
tion, as some keen American journals declared, against Bol- 
shevism. But in his personal appointment of George D. 
Herron, to the American people "so utterly repugnant to 
its moral sense," the President was not deterred. And the 
language is so like that used by the Administration toward 
Germany in the Metropolitan Opera House less than two 
years previously, and then almost immediately forgot his 
own words, when he declared that Germany and the United 
States "do not speak the same language of agreement." 

At all events, in this fourth position the Administra- 
tion was, in a measure, wiping out the great stain of the 
diplomatic absurdity and the moral atrocity of its attempt, 
in the early days of the World's Peace Congress, to admit 
to the Prinkipo Conference on equal terms the Moscow 
terrorists and their victims; and which abortive attempt 
of the President did so much to bring about the Red con- 
quest of all of Russia. And it was of the utmost importance 
for the influence it had upon the sweep of events at the 
moment. England and Italy were ready to recognize the 
Russian Soviet Government. France, as ever, was steel- 
faced against Bolshevism. As in the face of the great Ger- 
man drive in the spring of 19 18, so now, in the face of the 
great Bolshevist drive at Poland, there was division of 
counsel among the Allies. The note from the American 
government had a steadying effect. That in the Bolshevist 
plan of subjugation Poland is but a way station is evident. 
Germany and all of central Europe were the real goal. In 
the fall of 19 1 7 Lenine had boldly declared: "Germany 
forms the most important link in the revolutionary chain; 
and the success of our world revolution depends to the 
;.^reatest degree upon Germany." This was the plan for 
conquering France and reaching England. Already, for 
nearly a year before this American note of August, 1920, 
Bolshevist propaganda was active in Asia, reaching eagerly 
toward India to stab EnMand in the back Next to be 



Russia and Bolshevism 199 

attacked was America. For Italy had already succumbed 
In mid-September, 1920, later partially recovering. 

Indeed, it was In Milan, the hotbed of Socialism In Italy, 
where President Wilson reached the pinnacle of his popu- 
larity. His friends declare that it was there that he was 
worshipped as a god by those who set his picture by the side 
of the crucifix. There he declared: 

Here in Milan, where I know so much of the pulse of interna- 
tional sympathy beats, I am glad to stand up and say that that pulse 
beats also in my own veins. 

He had just stated that the working classes, "by their con- 
sciousness of community of interest and spirit, have done 
more, perhaps, than an other influence to establish a world 
which Is not of nations, but is the opinion, one might say, 
of mankind." This was his announced internationalism as 
against nationalism. It is a foundation doctrine of Bol- 
shevism that there must be no nationalism, no nation. It 
caught In Italy while the President was there. But as soon 
as he touched Italian pride in the matter of nationality over 
Flume, his popularity toppled to the dust, and Orlando, 
their premier, fell because he failed to measure up to their 
demands of nationality, not because of his disagreement with 
President Wilson, as writers in support of the President like 
to say.^'"' 

To charge that President Wilson brought Bolshevism to 
America, as some do openly, does not accord with the facts. 
But history will lay a severe charge to his account in this one 
count. Before sitting In the great World's Peace Congress, 
he went up and down Europe, with an imposing retinue, 
turning loose the anarchistic elements against orderly organ- 
ized governments at the very time when stabilized society 
was the first demand. Statesmen should have sought to 
show uncertain, restless elements a better way. It was these 
same radicals, whether in Europe or America, who later set 

'Particularly Ray Stannard Baker in "What Wilson Did at Paris" and 
George Creel in "The War, the World, and Wilson." 



200 The JVilson Admtnistratwn and the Great War 

the pace which President Wilson was compelled to meet. 
Pie unchained the tiger which he was never able afterward 
to restrain. He released the monster which later showed 
its ugly head in America. He was as helpless to meet the 
menacing situation in America as he was to meet the appall- 
ing disaster which he had invited in Europe. Originating 
in the perversion of the developing revolution in Russia 
which he had failed to recognize in its real character, it 
swept eastward and southward into farther Russia and 
Asia, sank Hungary in the slough, grasped Italy in its tenta- 
cles, struck at Poland, sought Germany, aimed at France 
and England, and reached out toward America. The at- 
tempt to starve and freeze Winnipeg to its knees; the at- 
tempt to overthrow civil government in Seattle ; the plan 
to starve the people of the United States in the "outlaw" 
railroad strike and to freeze them into submission in the 
coal strike; the steel strike directed by a horse-shoer who 
had never worked at a steel plant; the planned dynamiting 
of the home of the attorney-general of the United States 
and many others in nine eastern cities at one time ; the con- 
stant demand for higher wages among highly-paid employes 
regardless of the burden it placed upon the shoulders of 
those outside of their particular class; the fostering of class 
spirit, particularly of the obstructionist or destructionist 
class — these were symptoms manifested during President 
Wilson's incumbency that had never been seen before in like 
manner in the history of America. Its blow was aimed at 
so-called capitalism and at the very foundations of civil 
government Itself. 

Nor were these solely outgrowths of the Great War. 
Indeed, in the splendid economic condition in which the 
country found itself at the conclusion of the war, there was 
no reason or excuse for this destructive tendency. People 
were never better fed, clothed, or cared for after a great 
war; wages were exceptionally good, money was plentiful, 



Russia and Bolshevism 20 1 

there was no unemployment. America was unscathed by 
the Great War. Yet the President, after the shiftinjr of 
responsibility and the delays characteristic of tlic man, be- 
came aroused to the dangerous situation at a late day, and 
in his annual message to Congress in December, 191 9, 
stated in regard to Bolshevism : 

Let us be frank about this solemn matter. The evidences of the 
world-wide unrest which manifest themselves in violence throughout 
the world bid us pause and consider the means to be found to stop 
the spread of this contagious thing before it saps the very vitality of 
the nation itself. 

It was the poisonous serpent stretching its ugly self to 
America out of the noisomeness of the European pestilence 
created by the delays incident to a wilful persistence in seek- 
ing to arrange a super-government for the world in the 
Peace Congress. 

"Let us be frank about this solemn matter." The sin- 
ister symptoms in the United States already mentioned 
were preceded by the celebrated Mooney trial in Cali- 
fornia. Thomas J. Mooney, a Russian, was convicted in 
the California courts on the charge of a most atrocious 
crime — setting a bomb on July 22, 19 16, so placed and 
timed as to inflict the greatest degree of suffering upon the 
innocent. The occasion was the preparedness parade in 
San Francisco when the streets and sidewalks were crowded 
with people and other thousands were in the parade. Ten 
persons were killed by the terrific explosion and about fifty 
others were mutilated or maimed. Mooney was deeply in- 
terested in The Blast, a newspaper started to oppose pre- 
paredness. 

The trial began January 3, 19 17, and he was convicted 
by unanimous vote of the jury on the first ballot on Febru- 
ary 9, and on February 24 was sentenced to death. Said the 
attorney for Billings, charged with the same crime: 



202 The fVihon Administration and the Great War 

We have had a fair trial. . . . This jury was impanelled by a 
member of the district attorney's staff with absolute fairness and im- 
partiality. 

Mooney himself at his trial was represented by the choice 
legal talent of the country, including W. Bourke Cochran, 
the silver-tongued orator of New York and former con- 
gressman. There was an enormous fund of money at his 
disposal. On the other hand, the prosecution had scarcely 
sufficient to pay the expenses of getting essential witnesses 
to the place of trial, a teacher In Hawaii having to lose 
his own time without pay. 

After every recourse known to civilized legal procedure 
was exhausted, Including appeal to the Supreme Court of 
his state, to the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
to the Governor of the State, an appeal was made to Presi- 
dent Wilson outside the course of legal procedure. Grave 
charges were set up against the courts of California, par- 
ticularly against the county attorney of San Francisco who 
conducted the trial, perjured evidence was submitted against 
him; and by means of the most persistent and widespread 
propaganda of falsehood carried on by the International 
Workers' Defense League, than which there Is no more 
radical organization In the world, with money at their dis- 
posal running to upwards of $1,000,000, the people were 
made to believe that the courts of California were corrupt 
and that, perhaps, Mooney had not had a square deal. 
This propaganda was carried on, chiefly In the Important 
industrial centers of the East, by Alexander Berkman, since 
deported as an anti-American and whose very name Is a 
stench In the nostrils of decency In his relations with Emma 
Goldman, deported with him. In conducting his propa- 
ganda, he always applied this rule: "No Importance is to 
be attached to the guilt or Innocence of the accused." The 
country was plastered from center to circumference with 
the little stickers printed in red: "Remember Mooney." 
The vigor of the propaganda, backed by such men as W. 



Russia and Bolshevism 203 

Bourke Cochran and Felix Frankfurter, gave it momentum 
and standing; and some sections of organized labor were 
led to believe that an attack was being made upon labor 
by the California courts. That was the purpose of this 
million-dollar propaganda put out by American Bolshevism. 

President Wilson had appointed a Mediation Commis- 
sion to settle labor disputes during the war. Directed by its 
chairman, Secretary of Labor Wilson, to inquire into the 
Mooney case, it took quarters at a prominent San Fran- 
cisco hotel, where it heard the Mooney side of the case. 
But no one was called to give the people's side, and its re- 
port was made up wholly from material offered by the de- 
fense, was written by Stanley Arnold, a San Francisco at- 
torney, and with date of January 16, was published in full 
in the Official Bulletin, a government publication, in its issue 
of January 28, 19 18. This report, giving only the side of 
the man convicted as indicated above of the most atrocious 
of crimes, stated that "from Russia and the Western States 
protest spread to all the country until It has gathered 
momentum from many sources"; that "the liberal (Bol- 
shevik) sentiment of Russia was aroused"; that "the liberal 
sentiment of the United States was aroused because the 
circumstances of Mooney's prosecution, in the light of his 
history, led to the belief that the terrible and sacred instru- 
ments of criminal justice were consciously or unconsciously 
made use of against labor by its enemies in an industrial 
conflict." About the same time that this report was put 
out, another member of the Commission and its attorney, 
Felix Frankfurter, issued statements that were widely cir- 
culated through the public press "that a desire to appease 
the liberal element in Russia was paramount in the minds 
of the Commission," 

This action on the part of United States officials, who 
appeared to be anxious to save the neck of a vile criminal 
who was willing to kill many and mutilate and maim ior 
life many more innocent people who were interested in a 



204 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

patriotic parade, led the attorney who tried the case to 
comment upon the Commission's report in these withering 
words : 

The Commission in their conclusion moralize upon the duties we 
all owe to the cause of democracy. We venture to suggest in this 
regard, however, that democracy has no worse enemy than the man 
or set of men who, upon the unsworn statements of interested persons 
and without considering both sides of the case, undertake to set aside 
the verdict of two juries, which said verdicts have been sustained by 
the trial and appellate tribunals, in order to satisfy the demands of 
anarchists on a diliferent continent whose views are entirely out of 
harmony with democracy as well as with any other kind of organized 
government. Anarchy and murder will never assist the cause of 
democracy, nor will an effort to overturn the Constitution and laws 
of our country to save murderers and anarchists increase the regard 
for democracy entertained by honest and patriotic citizens. . . . 
Making the world safe for Mooney and his ilk will not make it safer 
for democracy ; neither will it stimulate patriotism nor inspire respect 
for our institutions.^ 

Prior, however, to the report of this Commission and 
prior to Mooney's trial, while anarchist Berkman was con- 
ducting his propaganda in the East, deceiving the labor 
unions and the uninformed public, he hired George P. West, 
who had deceived the public by his propaganda in the Mc- 
Namara cases, to prepare a report in behalf of Mooney, 
the purpose being to set out to the public that the Mooney 
case was a labor case pure and simple. West was employed 
as an investigator by the Industrial Relations Committee, of 
which Frank P. Walsh was chairman, later joint chairman 
of the federal War Labor Board. And West's report was 
put out in the name of the federal committee, though its 
author received $300 for it from Mooney's most intimate 
associate in his anarchistic activities, including publication of 

""Review of the Mooney Case," page 65, by John M. Olin, Madison, 
Wis., 1919— a most thorough study and faithful digest of this whole matter 
by a trained mind. 



Russia and Bolshevism 205 

the destructlonist paper, The Blast.'' It was because of the 
fact that the public kept the Industrial Relations Committee 
in mind as a federal body that its name was used by the prop- 
agandists to influence public sentiment. 

Theodore Roosevelt, writing to Felix Frankfurter rela- 
tive to the matter, as brought out in the Commission's re- 
port, said: 

I answer it (his letter) at length because you have taken, and arc 
taking, on behalf of the Administration an attitude which seems to 
me to be fundamentally that of Trotzky and the other Bolshevik! 
leaders in Russia — an attitude which may be fraught with mischief 
to this country. . . . 

The reactionaries have in the past been a great menace to this 
republic ; but at this moment it is the I. W. W., the Germanized So- 
cialists, the anarchists, the foolish creatures who always protest 
against the suppression of crime, the pacifists and the like under the 
lead ... of the Bergers, and Hillquits, the Fremont Olders, and 
Amos Pinchots and Rudolph Spreckels who are the really grave 
danger. These are the Bolsheviki of America, and the Bolsheviki are 
just as bad as the Romanoffs, and are at the moment a greater menace 
to orderly freedom. . . . When you, as representing President 
Wilson, find yourself obliged to champion men of this stamp, you 
ought, by unequivocal affirmative action, to make it evident that you 
are sternly against their general and habitual line of conduct. 

After the report of the Mediation Commission, John B. 
Dcnsmore, nephew of Secretai7 of Labor Wilson, was ap- 
pointed by this cabinet official to make further investiga- 
tion. After six months, during which he received instruc- 
tions from time to time, he submitted a report in which he 
stated that he had "continued a secret and altogether in- 
formal inquiry into the Mooney case," a report submitted 
as Director General of Employment under the Department 
of Labor. And prior to his connection therewith, he was 
an agitator in behalf of the noted McNamara case, in which 
the accused admitted their guilt of the atrocious crime 
' Id., p. 69. 



2o6 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

charged against them, when real labor awoke to the fact 
that it had been hoodwinked by men of the stamp of Dens- 
more, West, and Arnold. Thus, there was submitted a 
second secret report by Administration officials in which the 
people were not permitted to be heard, though it cannot be 
conceived how anarchists, criminals, traitors in time of war 
or any other time, such as Berkman, Mooney, and their 
kind could have any more right to be heard than the people 
who were innocent. Only those who were enemies of the 
people and whom the people had convicted in the regular 
process of court procedure were permitted to know what 
was being done. The methods of Catiline were not ex- 
hausted in the days of Rome's beginning dechne. The 
notorious International Workers' Defense League knew the 
contents of the report and had made arrangements with 
the editor of the San Francisco Call, edited by Fremont 
Older, to print 25,000 extra copies containing this report, 
for which $750 was paid, before the report had reached the 
Department in Washington. But the reviewer of the 
Mooney case was never able to obtain an official copy of this 
report, even for the purpose of setting out before the peo- 
ple the true state of facts; and to-day this report remains 
an unconfirmed, unsubstantiated government document 
based upon the utmost perversion of fact. A writer who 
has gone thoroughly into the substance of the Densmore 
report and what was back of It, sums up his views thus : 

Densmore was in former years a supporter of the McNamara 
murderers and agitator in their behalf. His relations with various 
reds was close. He went out at the expense of the United States 
and is said to have had in his employ some thirty detectives, including 
some of the men employed by the friends of anarchist Mooney. . . . 
He and his gang tapped the wires between the district attorney's 
office and the United States Naval Intelligence office, the Army In- 
telligence office and United States Marshal's office and stole various 
documents and gave the information so obtained to reds and disloyal- 
ists who were subjects of investigation and prosecution by United 



Russia and Bolshevism ion 

States and state authorities. Then choosing a . . . paper, . . . ed- 
ited by . . . Fremont Older, who is a friend of the reds and had 
publicly entertained Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, he 
published a scurrilous attack upon District Attorney Fickert. 
Then after Densmore was subpoenaed as a witness in the United 
States Court and was wanted by the grand jury, he fled the state and 
in spite of all efforts on the part of the Governor and the district 
attorney to get him back, he is still a fugitive from justice.^ 

But It remained for the grand jury, which went into the 
matter with conspicuous thoroughness under the personal 
direction of the attorney general of the state to make the 
most complete and overwhelming reply to the padded Dens- 
more report: 

It was expected that as these charges had been made in a pub- 
lished report by an ofRcial of the United States Government, the 
grand jury would be assisted in its investigation by such official and 
those of his subordinates who might have been employed in procuring 
the evidence upon which the report was based. ... Mr. Densmore 
departed and refused to answer the subpoena of the grand jury. 

And all appeals to William B. Wilson, head of the Depart- 
ment, by the Governor of California, by the mayor of San 
Francisco, by the presiding judge of the superior court, and 
by the foreman of the special grand jury were equally un- 
availing, although Secretary of Labor Wilson, under date 
of November 27, 19 18, wired the Governor: "I am in- 
structing Mr. Densmore to put into your hands a complete 
copy of his report to me and I am also Instructing him to 
place himself entirely at your disposal." A few days later 
the Governor replied that it was desired that Mr. Densmore 
report to the attorney general of the state. He did not re- 
port. Secretary Wilson then appointed William Denman, 
the man who came in conflict with General Goethals over 
ships, and he declined to represent him. And after then 
appointing G. Stanley Arnold for the same purpose, Mr. 

'Id., p. 92, quoting "America's Greatest Peril— The Bolsheviki and 
the Mooney Case," by Francis R. Welsh, Philadelphia. 



2o8 The Wilson Administration and the Great IVar 

Arnold informed Governor Stephens, on December 23, that 
he was directed by the Secretary of Labor "to state that he 
will not at this time direct either Mr. Densmore or his 
assistants, Messrs. McCarthy and Parsons, to return to San 
Francisco." And William Armstrong, another of Dens- 
more's assistants, declined to testify before the grand jury 
on the ground that he might incriminate himself. For over 
a month this grand jury had been led to believe that the 
author of the unfounded official government report or some 
one else representing the Department of Labor would ap- 
pear before it to get at the facts in the case; but no one 
appeared. It was evident that Densmore did not dare to 
face a grand jury under oath. 

The International Workers' Defense League, within two 
weeks after Mooney's arrest and even before the defense 
had decided upon its counsel, began its propaganda work. 
Men, like West and Densmore, who had poisoned the pub- 
lic mind in the case of the McNamaras, brutal murderers 
who afterward admitted their guilt in blowing up the Los 
Angeles Times Building, resulting in the death of twenty 
three persons, were engaged to carry through the same 
methods in the Mooney case, in utter disregard of courts 
and the methods of procedure of orderly society. 

Also came the President of the United States disre- 
garding the efficacy of courts, even courts of the last resort 
and the power of executive review. In January, 191 8, the 
Governor of California received from President Wilson 
"the urgent appeal," asking whether it would not be possible 
"to postpone the execution of Mooney until he could be 
tried upon one of the other indictments against him." The 
very suggestion seems almost too preposterous to be credi- 
ble. On March 27, the President wired the Governor, "if 
you could see your way to commute the sentence of Mooney, 
it would have a most heartfelt effect upon certain interna- 
tional affairs which his execution would greatly complicate." 
Again on June 4 he wired the State executive : "I would not 



Russia and Bolshevism 209 

venture again to call your attention to the case did I not 
know the international significance which attaches to it." 
Very properly Governor Stephens refused to take action 
while the case was pending in the State Supreme Court, 
which disposed of it August 23, And an appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court was disposed of November 
18, 19 1 8. For the Governor of the State to take the case 
out of the court would have been an unwarranted inter- 
ference with the course of justice in any case and would have 
shown him fitted to be a tyrant. If he made a mistake, it 
was in yielding to the importunities of President Wilson, 
to whom Samuel Gompers, president of the American Fed- 
eration of Labor, had been urged by many resolutions en- 
gineered through labor organizations by radicals in sympa- 
thy with Mooney and his fellow anarchists, to make an 
appeal. 

Said a careful and fair reviewer of the Mooney case : 

This is the first time in the history of this country that an organ- 
ized movement has been made to prevent the enforcement of deci- 
sions of our courts. If this movement should be successful, then the 
days of this Republic are numbered. So long as laws regularly 
enacted by the people are fairly and honestly enforced through the 
decisions of the courts honestly rendered, this country will be safe 
from any attack within our borders.^ 

The national Administration, as a result of the efforts 
of radicals working through Samuel Gompers and the De- 
partment of Labor, was constantly interfering with the 
operations of the courts in the Mooney case, many radicals 
being then employes of the Government. Just why Presi- 
dent Wilson was so bent upon saving the life of this desper- 
ado, destructionist, traitor, was never revealed. But it was 
not the only instance. He besought Governor Spry of Utah 
to spare the life of another duly convicted anarchist, Joe 
Hillstrom, who, in cold blood, had murdered a seventeen- 
Md., p. 4. 



2IO The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

year-old boy and his father. In that case Mooney, as secre- 
tary and treasurer of the International Workers' Defense 
League, wrote Governor Spry a threatening letter. Reply- 
ing to President Wilson's second appeal, in the Hillstrom 
case, Governor Spry made this manly, straightforward 
reply : 

I feel that a further postponement at this time would be an un- 
warranted interference with the course of justice. Mindful of the 
obligations of my oath of office to see to it that the laws are enforced, 
I cannot, and will not lend myself, nor my office, to such interference. 
Tangible facts must be presented before I will further interfere in 
this case. 

Hillstrom was executed in accordance with the law. The 
attempt to blow up the home of Governor Spry was dis- 
covered in time to avert the disaster. 

Mooney was interested in other cases, notably those of 
Suhr and of Ford, anarchistic murderers, to the extent of 
threatening the life of Hiram Johnson, then Governor of 
California, unless he interfered to spare them. 

These cases are cited to illustrate the general scheme 
resorted to by the International Workers' Defense League, 
which is made up entirely of the extreme radicals from the 
Socialist Labor party, the anarchists, the I. W. W.'s, the 
International Radical Club, the Free Discussion League, 
and some extreme radical members of labor unions. They 
are cited for the further purpose of indicating still further 
how the Administration was as intimately interwoven with 
radical internationalists and anti-nationalists as it believed 
the Covenant of the League of Nations to be with the 
Paris Peace Treaty. 

And this would not be complete without referring to the 
relations of the Administration to Robert A. Minor. If 
the Department of Labor, with William B. Wilson at its 
head, was responsible for Johannsen, a well-known anar- 
chist and I. W. W., friend of anarchists and dynamiters 



Russia and Bolshevism 211 

Caplan and Schmidt who stopped at his home when makinjr 
their purchases of dynamite with which to commit their 
dastardly deeds for which they were convicted with the 
McNamaras — if he received his appointment as federal 
Mediator of Munitions Strikes by the Department of 
Labor over the protest of federal officials, while un- 
der indictment in the United States courts for com- 
plicity with the McNamaras in blowing up the Times 
Building, Los Angeles, and while attending the Hay- 
wood trial as an L W. W. delegate, yet some one 
else or some other Department was responsible for Robert 
A. Minor, son of a Texas federal judge. Minor was editor 
of two anarchist papers. The Blast and The Masses, con- 
tributed to others, was an associate of Berkman, Emma 
Goldman, Johannsen, and other notorious Reds; testified 
that he wished to overthrow the American government and 
institutions, and in his public addresses and his writings 
advocated violence to that end; was the author of much 
inflammatory and infamously untruthful literature that did 
much to incite the Bolsheviki in Russia against the United 
States; was denied passport by the State Department upon 
the recommendation of the Department of Justice; and yet, 
through some mysterious processes of the powers at work 
at Washington, was sent to Russia as a representative of 
George Creel, though all of these facts had been called to 
the attention of the appointing power. There he served 
well in the cause of Lenlne and Trotzky, head of the Bol- 
shevist autocracy. He was the successor of Mooney as 
secretary and treasurer of the International Workers' De- 
fense League, when Mooney was arrested for the San 
Francisco bomb explosion. It was under his leadership that 
the nation-wide propaganda campaign was begun that mis- 
led the public^ immediately Mooney was arrested. And it 
was while the Reds were marching in New York In the 
interest of this campaign of falsehood, on November 12, 
carrying red flags above the United States flag, that some 



2 12 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

of the loyal boys who had returned from overseas handled 
one of these anarchists, J. Edward Morgan, roughly, — the 
same Morgan who, when arrested in California, was found 
in possession of a letter from President Wilson's private 
secretary, Tumulty, authorizing him to travel over the coun- 
try as a Mooney propagandist.^*^ As the loyal soldiers and 
sailors did not see it from Secretary Tumulty's viewpoint, 
carrying red flags on New York's streets was forbidden 
thereafter. 

There is a yet more serious connection between this anar- 
chist Minor and the Administration. It was on June 8, 
19 1 9, in a Paris cafe, while chatting with Lincoln Steffens, 
friend, confidant, and Russian adviser of President Wilson, 
that Minor was asked by a French secret service agent to 
accompany him to police headquarters. There he was 
promptly placed under arrest by waiting members of the 
American Military Intelligence and taken to Coblenz to the 
commanding officer of the Third American Army. Steffens 
went to the Hotel Crillon, which was President Wilson's 
headquarters, and informed friends that this time Minor 
would certainly face the firing squad. 

Ten days after the arrest, the Military Intelligence of 
the Third Army presented to the Judge Advocate at Cob- 
lenz evidence to establish against Minor charges that he 
had been employed at Petrograd by Lenine and Trotzky to 
publish an English-language paper to be circulated in the 
American and British armies for the purpose of creating 
mutiny through the dissemination of Bolshevistic doctrines; 
that this plan failing because of the armistice, he moved to 
Berlin where he was associated with the Sparticides, the 
German Bolshevists; that yet later, he moved to Coblenz, 
shortly after the American army crossed the Rhine, where 
he was caught publishing and seeking to circulate a Bol- 
shevist pamphlet designed to foment mutiny in the Ameri- 

" "America's Greatest Peril," pp. 11-12. 



Russia and Bolshevism ir^ 

can ranks. But he could not be arrested within the German 
lines. 

Two days later a commission was set to try him on these 
grave charges, which he made no attempt to deny. The 
officers in charge of the case were confident of a speedy 
verdict, when, on the eve of the trial, a peremptory order 
was received from General Pershing's Chief of Staff that no 
further action be taken pending a report upon an investi- 
gation by the Judge Advocate General of the Expedition- 
ary Forces. It is readily understood that General Persh- 
ing's only interest in a notorious military criminal would be 
to administer certain and severe punishment. After an in- 
vestigation, however, the Judge Advocate reported that 
Minor was "charged with as serious an offense as a man 
can commit" and that he "thoroughly believed him to be 
guilty" but that because of the great desirability of secur- 
ing a conviction, the trial should await the arrival of wit- 
nesses in the hands of the French and British. The Ameri- 
can, British, and French were working together on the case, 
and witnesses were en route to Coblenz, when Minor was re- 
leased on General Pershing's order. 

Minor was hurried to Paris when permitted to go, and 
he proceeded to America where he next appears at the head 
of a mob of Reds seeking to make a demonstration on Fifth 
Avenue, New York, until dispersed by the police. And next 
he is found back in his old haunts with the radical agitators 
on the Pacific Coast, 

When Minor was arrested, his father hurried to Wash- 
ington. Whom he saw there the records fail to disclose. 
But anarchist Minor was a friend of Secretary of War 
Baker and of George Creel, both members of the federal 
Committee on Publicity during the war, the latter editor 
of the Official Bulletin. Evidently Lincoln Steffens saw 
some one high in authority at the Hotel Crillon; and 
Minor's father saw some one high in authority in Washing- 



214 The JFilson Administration and the Great War 

ton. And when Secretary Baker was asked to reopen the 
case, he refused on the ground that it was a matter of the 
Department of Justice — a statement which he knew was not 
true, since the country was still at war with Germany, and 
Minor could have been sent back for trial,^^ 

It is doubtful whether any investigation could ever re- 
veal the devious ways of the Wilson Administration in deal- 
ing with slackers, disloyalists, and destructionists. 

Nor did it appear to be necessary. For Ludwig C. A. 
K. Martens issued a statement on March 19, 19 19, in New 
York, to the effect that he was the official representative in 
the United States of the Lenine-Trotzky government, his 
credentials being signed by George Tchicherin, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and bearing the seal of the Russian Com- 
missariat of Foreign Affairs. He was not recognized by 
the State Department, when he demanded recognition; but 
he opened offices in New York as the official envoy of the 
Soviet Government, with various departments and an official 
staff, including a Bolshevist disseminator of Soviet infor- 
mation, and prepared to open trade relations with the 
United States on behalf of his Government, with a guar- 
anteed deposit of $200,000,000 in gold. On April 2, he 
preached Bolshevism at Hunt's Point Palace to an audi- 
ence of 3,000 people. This brought a protest from the cur- 
ator of the New York Zoological Park addressed to the 
Attorney General of the United States. Six days later the 
Union League Club of New York City unanimously adopted 
a resolution calling upon the Government to take immedi- 
ate action to put an end to the activities of Martens as 
Soviet representative. But these activities continued unin- 
terruptedly. Large quantities of Bolshevist literature were 
distributed, a great mass of which came through the office 
of Martens in New York. His declared purpose to open 
trade relations between this country and his had a two-fold 
object: To appeal to the assumed cupidity of America and 

"^ Harvey's tVcehly, New York, May i, 1920. 



Russia and Bolshevism 215 

blind the people to the deeper design of propagandizing 
America. Whether the I. W. W. boast is true or not that 
the Russian counter-revolution, which sent the real revolu- 
tion under Kerensky to its death when the Constituent 
Assembly was dispersed by armed forces, was planned in 
Seattle at the time that Lenine and Trotzky were in that 
city on their way to Russia, it is yet true that tons of Bol- 
shevist literature were distributed containing the most in- 
cendiary appeals. And in October, 19 19, the Attorney- 
General of the State of New York, after a careful survey 
of radical publications in New York City, made a report in 
which he stated that these reports were, in large measure, 
subsidized by the New York parlor radicals, and declared 
that they 

are, in general, the same people who subsidized the pro-German 
propaganda and furnished the money for the pacifist, peace-at-any- 
price campaigns, and contributed to the cause of the conscientious 
objectors; 

the central idea advocated being "the overthrow of the 
present system of Government, the abolition of the wage 
system, and dictatorship of the proletariat." 

And this system of propaganda was in operation on 
American soil from the time Lenine and Trotzky took over 
the Soviet Government in Russia. Even while this nation 
was engaging all of its energies in preparing for and pros- 
ecuting the Great War, Bolshevism had a far-reaching or- 
ganization at work directed by the trained agents of Lenine 
and Trotzky. Even as early as the middle of 1918 the 
national headquarters of the propaganda were made known 
to the United States Secret Service, which then obtained 
the names and addresses of 1,200 members of the Phila- 
delphia branch, these latter embracing 15 Soviets operating 
under the direction of the All-Russia Soviets of America in 
New York. The movement and its propaganda were not 
haphazard, but were conducted by experienced revolution- 



2l6 The irilso7i Administration and the Great War 

arles to whom democracy is as hateful as czarism or Prus- 
sian autocracy. Destruction in America is as much a part 
of their plan as it is elsewhere. Said the noted Socialist 
writer, William English Walling: 

Nothing could be more untrue than to exonerate the Bolsheviki 
of the anarchistic taint. Their doctrine is rather a socialistic anar- 
chism than an anarchistic socialism. 

When this propaganda had been operating for some 
time, it was recognized that the leaders must strike, lest 
the psychological hour pass. The Winnipeg strike, the 
Seatde attempt upon the life of that city's government, the 
great steel strike, the coal strike, the attempt to force the 
Plumb plan upon the country by the organized railroad 
men, the "outlaw" railroad strike, the dynamiting outrages 
in nine large eastern cities and upon the lives of prominent 
men and government officials — these are some of the re- 
sults of the previous propaganda. And an eastern news- 
paper of wide influence declared: 

The Fitzpatricks and Fosters, the Plumbs and the Lewises — sup- 
ported to some extent even by the Gompers group — are really en- 
gaged in a movement whose aim is to establish in this country the 
philosophy of Lenine and Trotzky instead of the principles of Lincoln 
and Roosevelt, to substitute classism for democracy and American- 
ism.^^ 

How this was worked out, at least in part, by writers 
who received their inspiration from the Bolshevism of Rus- 
sia was told by G. A. Simonds in his testimony before the 
Senate committee on February 12, 19 19, as it was investi- 
gating Bolshevism. For many years and until compelled to 
leave in October, 19 18, he was head of the Methodist 
church in Russia. He informed the committee that Bol- 
shevism was being proclaimed in the United States by means 
of speakers, pamphlets, and articles in newspapers and 
magazines; and he named writers who had been closely 

"The Philadelphia North American, October, 30, 1919. 



Russia and Bolshevism 217 

affiliated with the Bolshevik government in Russia, and 
pointed out publishers of Bolshevik literature in the United 
States. 

Indeed, in the very month that he was giving his testi- 
mony to the Senate committee, there was held in the na- 
tional capital, and almost within the shadows of the place 
where Congress meets and of the White House, a largely 
attended meeting at which the soviet government in Russia 
was enthusiastically defended. 

Trotzky knew whereof he spoke when he said to Colonel 
Raymond Robins: 

Listen to me carefully. Follow me step by step. We have started 
our peace negotiations with the Germans. We have asked the Allies 
to join us in starting peace negotiations for the whole world on a 
democratic basis — no forcible annexations, no punitive indemnities, 
and a full acceptance of the principle of the self-determination of all 
peoples. The Allies have refused to accept our invitation. We still 
hope, of course, to compel them. 

Surprised, Colonel Robins was desirous of knowing more 
and asked, in simple monosyllable. How? Trotzky re- 
plied: 

By stirring up the comrades in France and in England and in 
America to upset the policy of their governments by asserting their 
own revolutionary socialist will. 

An official order of Lenine dated December 13, 1917, 
showed an appropriation of 2,000,000 rubles, shghtly over 
$1,000,000, for the spread of Bolshevik propaganda. And 
Roger Simmons, representing the United States Depart- 
ment of Commerce in Russia, in his testimony before the 
Senate committee, which began its investigations of the at- 
tempts of Russian Bolshevism upon the United States in 
February, 19 19, stated that Lenine had declared that "the 
power that had crushed Germany is also the power that, m 
the end, will crush England and the United States." 

And this was the power at first insidiously, then more 



2i8 Tlic tVihon Administration and the Great War 

openly, that was threatening just as surely, if in less tangi- 
ble form, the integrity of the United States as was Germany. 
It did it through Berkman and Johannsen and West and 
Arnold and Densmore and Mooney and Minor and thou- 
sands of others, many of them in official positions, and 
others, to the end under the protecting care of men very 
high in authority under the Wilson Administration. And 
whenever President Wilson lifted his voice or used the 
influence of his high office to shield anarchists, Bolshevists, 
traitors to the country of the stamp of Mooney, Hillstrom, 
and Minor, he was unworthy any more favorable considera- 
tion than any other man who did the same. And some 
departments of the government under his Administration 
were abundantly loaded with men of Bolshevist taint. To 
quote him again, "Let us be frank about this solemn mat- 
ter." It was not President Wilson who saw the danger 
and warned the country. As usual, he trailed. 

Said Lieutenant D. C. Van Buren, of the Army Intelli- 
gence Service, in October, 19 19, in his testimony before the 
Senate committee investigating the steel strike, that during 
the summer of that year the Russians in Gary, Indiana, 
started a movement to organize a Red Guard in prepara- 
tion for the revolution which they then saw for this country. 
They sought to get all of the former soldiers in Gary 
together and drill and equip them; at the same time agi- 
tators were telling the people to prepare to manage and 
operate their industries — just the thing that happened a 
year later in Italy. The witness stated further that the 
situation had become such that it was necessary to find a 
man with a bomb in his hands before the immigration 
officers would act. 

By this disclosure the Administration officials were 
stirred to unwonted activity; and on the morning of No- 
vember 8, newspaper readers were met with large headlines 
telling that there had been a general round-up of destruc- 
tionists in various industrial centers of the country : 200 in 



Russia and Bolshevism 219 

New York, 175 in Chicago, and smaller numbers in other 
cities, and that 50 would be deported. The oilicials has- 
tened to say that this action had been in contemplation for 
several weeks. 

A man who was American to the core and who had been 
through the thick of the fight with Bolshevism in its most 
glaring form stated the Administration's policy very aptly 
in these words: 

Many of the I. W. W.'s were arrested during the war and some 
were punished. The Government started, stopped, started again, 
conciliated, pandered, and generally pursued a skimmed-milk policy. 
Argument was tried, kindness, public statements appealing to patrio- 
tism, and this to a class of men who know but one argument, force; 
who think kindness is weakness, and who have no patriotism." ^^ 

This was but a manifestation of a pronounced character- 
istic of the Wilson Administration: "Watchful waiting" 
— shirking a responsibility until the urgency became so great 
that it could not longer be ignored and in some instances un- 
til great damage had resulted. In this instance, forced by the 
situation which developed as a result of the Administration's 
coddling this monster within the nation's fold, aroused at 
last by a public sentiment which it felt no longer able to 
resist and by open manifestations of hostility to the Gov- 
ernment, Secretary Baker, in a public address at Cleveland 
a year after the end of the Great War took a position that 
heartened real Americans and that dampened the ardor of 
the destructionists at whose machinations the Administra- 
tion had been conniving. He said: 

Our newspapers are daily filled with accounts of violent agita- 
tion by so-called Bolsheviki and radicals, counseling violence and 
urging action in behalf of what they call "social revolution." The 
American people will not exchange the solid foundations of their so- 
cial order for any of these fantastic programs. 

""Americanism versus Bolshevism," by Ole Hanson, published 1919-1920,- 
by Doubleday, Page & Co., New York. 



2 20 The JVihon Administration and the Great War 

This time it was more than words. When Ole Hanson, 
mayor of Seattle, asked for United States troops to save 
the overthrow of that city's government, they were 
promptly sent. Secretary Baker notified the Governors of 
all states in which disorder threatened to get beyond local 
control to call upon the armed forces of the United States 
for assistance; at the same time telegraphing each army 
department commander to respond instantly to any call 
from any Governor who found himself unable to cope with 
disorders and to enforce the laws. 

In marked contrast with the faltering and paltering 
course of President Wilson and those directly under his 
authority were the inspiring words of Vice President Mar- 
shall : 

I believe that America belongs to American citizens, native and 
naturalized, who are willing to seek redress for their grievances in 
orderly and constitutional ways; and I believe that all others should 
be taught, peacefully if we can and forcefully if we must, that our 
country is not an international boarding house nor an anarchistic cafe. 

Note. — The treaty between Germany and Soviet Russia, signed at 
Rapallo, April i6, 1923, substantially abrogated the treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
of March 3, 1918. Coming at the end of the first week of the Genoa Con- 
ference, to which Germany and Soviet Russia were admitted, called to re- 
establish Europe economically, this agreement, with the apparent intent of 
combating, in large measure, the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty and of 
challenging Western Europe, caused deep resentment among the leading 
nations, which felt themselves tricked, and severely strained the integrity 
of the Conference. 



Looking Toward Peace 235 

While the United States was yet a neutral, President 
Wilson had suggested to the belligerent powers that a state- 
ment of acceptable terms of peace was considered desirable 
by this government. The following day, Lloyd George,, 
speaking for Great Britain, referred to "restitution, liber- 
ation, and guarantees against repetition." This was made 
the basis of the Allies' formal and detailed reply to Wilson's 
request the following month, on January 10, 19 17 — a year 
before the promulgation of the Fourteen Points. In this 
reply, the essential terms of peace were named. But Mr. 
Wilson had also before him the statements of the Special 
National Labor Conference in London published less than 
two weeks before announcing his Fourteen Points, as well 
as the speech of Lloyd George delivered at the Trade 
Union Conference on man-power three days before the 
President stated his Points. As Mr. Wilson declared at 
the time, these were both fresh in his mind on January 8, 
19 1 8. And Lloyd George, in an address to Parliament, 
stated: "Before the war was over we stated our peace 
terms. ... A few days later President Wilson proposed 
his famous Fourteen Points which practically embodied 
my statement." 

In his address before Congress, January 8, 19 18, Presi- 
dent Wilson declared his distrust of the German rulers 
and demanded to know for whom the negotiators at Brest- 
Litovsk spoke. It was on that occasion that he enunciated 
the Fourteen Points which are substantially these: 

I. Open diplomacy. 2. Freedom of navigation in 
peace and in war. 3. Removal of international economic 
barriers. 4. Reduction of armaments. 5. Impartial ad- 
justment of colonial claims, the interests of the populations 
concerned having equal weight with governmental claims. 

6. Evacuation of all Russian territory, and such settlement 
of questions affecting Russia as to give her opportunity for 
determining her political development and national policy. 

7. Belgium to be evacuated and restored. 8. Alsace-Lor- 



236 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

raine restored to PVance. 9. Adjustment of Italian fron- 
tiers. 10. Peoples of Austria-Hungary accorded freest op- 
portunity for own development. 11. Roumania, Serbia, 
and Montenegro evacuated and restored, Serbia to have 
access to the sea, and the political and economic independ- 
ence of the Balkan states to be guaranteed internationally. 

12. Turkey to be assured sovereignty of Turkish portion 
of Ottoman Empire, but those of other nationalities under 
Turkish rule to have autonomous development, Dardanelles 
to be free for all nations under international guarantees. 

13. Independent Polish state. 14. A league of nations. 
One writer upon the League of Nations pointed out that 

a day or two after President Wilson had stated his Four- 
teen Points, Lloyd George, in answering the same call as 
to the terms of peace, "made a statement which was prac- 
tically an Anglo-French declaration. It was, in substance, 
identical with President Wilson's." - The inference might 
well be that Lloyd George was following President Wil- 
son's lead; when, as a matter of fact, the reverse was true. 
And, as pointed out by George Harvey in an analysis of 
the genesis of Mr. Wilson's fourteen principles, not more 
than one originated with him.^ 

But they were thrown into his phraseology and the peo- 
ple generally came to regard them as the product of his 
intellect. All forgotten by a busy world, they then sprang 
suddenly into prominence when the President himself re- 
vived them in his conversations during the German peace 
drive in the autumn of 19 18. 

An unfortunate feature about them was that they were 
no sure guide to peace. After declaring them to be "the 

^Kallen, "The League of Nations Today and Tomorrow," pp. XIV-XV. 

^The North American Reviciv, February, 1919. 

And for a marked similarity between the Russian Soviet's peace terms 
and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, the former announced nearly 
three months earlier than the latter, see pages 260-263 of Edward A. Ross' 
"The Russian Bolshevik Revolution," The Century Company, New York, 
1921. 



Looking Toward Peace 237 

only possible program of peace," he dismissed them as 
"only a provisional sketch." And the next month after 
formulating them for the nations, he offered to negotiate 
upon four abstract principles."* And though given very 
great publicity, as a set of principles they scarcely survived 
the armistice, and in the peace treaty were practically ig- 
nored; while the thirteen principles submitted by Lord 
Northcliffe, eminent English journalist and shapcr of pub- 
lic opinion, as indispensable to peace, received little publicity 
and were accepted by the peace congress, substantially in 
full. 

When President Wilson proposed his terms of peace, 
including the Fourteen Points as the condition of an armis- 
tice, there was an outburst of protest in the United States 
and there arose a loud cry for unconditional surrender as 
the only acceptable preliminary of peace. Americans and 
Allies alike were startled when the President insisted that 
it must be accepted by the democratic nations without 
amendment. The first complete acceptance of his peace 
program came from Germany. On January 24, 19 18, 
Count Hertling, speaking before the Reichstag for Ger- 
many, and Count Czernin, speaking before the Reichsrath 
for Austria, replied to the addresses of Lloyd George and 
President Wilson. 

Between the time of these early statements of peace 
terms and the autumn enemy peace drive, there was issued 
a statement that is worthy of being writ in gold. It is that 
of the committee of British workingmen in charge of the 
Labor and Socialist demonstration held in London, July 
14, 19 1 8, containing these notable words: 

Let it be known to the democracy of America that, come what 
may, even if Paris should fall and the channel ports be taken, the 
people of Great. Britain are resolved to support the Allied Nations 
to the fullest extent of their energy and power. 
* Address to Congress, February 11, 1918. 



238 The IVilson Administration and the Great War 

This meant that the British workingmcn purposed to 
fight the war to a victorious finish and to crush Prussian- 
ism before there could be so much even as consideration 
of peace. And the resolutions add: "What would follow 
peace negotiations with the Central Powers victorious can 
be judged by the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest." 
It gave a bracing to America's workingmen; and, perhaps 
chiefly, served as a warning to her statesman who had de- 
clared for making the world safe for democracy. It was 
a strange irony that should bring this warning from a 
European monarchy to the America which had always been 
the outstanding democracy of the world. 

There is of record, however, at an earlier date, an 
American contrast with the President's uncertain course 
during these crucial months, that is refreshing. It was 
the certain and wholesome notes, in May, 19 18, that came 
from the Philadelphia convention of the League to Enforce 
Peace. It was determined upon winning the war for per- 
manent peace. In this convention were two dominant notes : 
One, that in the struggle then on we were in opposition 
to a nation conclusively proved to be a criminal at the 
bar of history and humanity; the other, that in the contest 
with this guilty and vicious enemy the war must be fought to 
an overwhelming finish. At that time President Lowell 
of Harvard University said we must be on our guard against 
an inconclusive peace to which we were likely to be tempted 
any day; and Senator Williams of Mississippi declared that 
we could not even talk peace with Germany; and former 
President Taft told the audience, in words that expressed 
the sentiment of the gathering, that since Germany's char- 
acter was at that time fully revealed, the slogan must be 
stern, implacable war, and exclaimed: "Shall we not be 
open to the shame of history if we do not carry this thing 
through to the limit?" 

The developments of the next few months showed that 
the basis of President Lowell's warning was substantial. 



Looking Toward Peace 239 

When President Wilson, without consulting the nations 
with which America was allied in the Great War, urulcr- 
took his conversations with the enemies of the country 
for peace proposals within two months after the warning 
from the British workingmen and in less than four months 
after the warnings from the Philadelphia convention, the 
better thought of the nation was led by such men as James 
M. Beck, who declared that the President's peace proposals, 
at the very time when he was using all the prestige of his higli 
office to control, for partisan purposes, die state election 
in Wisconsin on the ground of loyalty, were paralyzing the 
will of the American people. And his wavering raised a 
question as to what kind of Americanism he represented. 

The President's idea of peace appeared to be different 
from that of the nations with which we were allied in 
carrying on the Great War. They had been through the 
death struggle from the beginning; and their idea of peace 
was a cessation of hostilities after complete defeat of the 
enemy. President W^ilson's idea appeared to be to take the 
Germans in to aid in fixing the terms of peace — a negotiated 
peace instead of a dictated peace. He entered the danger 
zone of diplomacy when he opened the doors of conversa- 
tion with the enemy in the great peace drive directed by 
Germany. 

His minister to The Netherlands had a distinctly differ- 
ent view when he stated : 

The duty of the present is to fight on beside France, Great Brit- 
ain, Italy, Belgium, Servia, Roumania, and, w^e hope, Russia, "to 
bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the 
war." 

To talk of any other course is treason, not only to our country 
but to the cause of true peace.^ 

The President's supporters declared that he stood for 
unconditional surrender. But there was the avowed peace 

"Henry Van Dyke in "Fighting for Peace," p. 212, Charles Scribners 
Sons, New York, 1917. 



240 The Wilson* Administration and the Great War 

program of the first serious effort at the peace drive, begun 
by Baron Burian, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister. 
It was what became known as the September "peace of- 
fensive." Beginning early in the month with vague and un- 
official statements to newspaper men, it continued until the 
fourteenth, when an official invitation was extended to the 
Allies to send delegates to a secret conference for an ex- 
change of terms to be binding on none. That refused, the 
effort culminated on October 5 in a note proposing, through 
President Wilson, to conclude with him and his Allies a gen- 
eral armistice on land, on sea, and in air; and to begin, with- 
out delay, negotiations for peace, these negotiations to be 
based upon the President's address of January 8, including 
the Fourteen Points, and his subsequent addresses of Febru- 
ary 12 and September 27. This was generally understood to 
be merely a "feeler" put forward by Germany. The next 
day brought to the newspapers the text of a note from Ger- 
many, asking President Wilson to take in hand the restora- 
tion of peace, inviting the Allies to send plenipotentiaries 
"for the purpose of opening negotiations." Thus the issue 
of peace or continued war was presented to the nations. 

Whatever the real reason for this action of the enemy, 
it is not flattering to the greatest world democracy that its 
President was so much more in sympathy with the brutal- 
izing forces of autocracy and with the game to slaughter 
civilization than were statesmen of other nations, as to be 
selected by Germany in carrying forward her peace cam- 
paign. It created unpleasant, something of uncanny, feel- 
ings in the American bosom to have this country made the 
mark by the arch enemy of civilization for this distinction. 
Nor was this feeling mollified by what became known 
as the general German plan and attitude, whether before 
or after the armistice was declared, an attitude Indicated 
by a series of resolutions adopted, after the signing of the 
armistice, by the chamber of commerce of Cologne, one of 
the Rhine cities held at the time by the Allied armies of 



Looking Toward Peace 241 

occupation; resolutions embodying the hope that "the de- 
struction of French and Belgian industries would allow a 
rapid recovery of German commercial power." These 
brutal calculations sought a peace, using the United States 
as a medium, that would give the unsubdued enemy the ad- 
vantage of a long start over the victims of her crimes. They 
were seeking to bring their diabolical plan of wholesale de- 
struction of these industries and the equally wholesale mur- 
ders of the civilian population of invaded territories to 
bear upon the United States in order to have its President 
intervene in their behalf, that their own country might be 
spared Invasion and destruction of its industries. 

The persistent assumption that the President of the 
United States, a member of the court writing the judg- 
ment upon Germany's crimes, should descend from his place 
and appear before that tribunal as her counsel probably 
seemed to the German a subtle form of flattery; and the 
President's course, it was generally admitted, invited the 
doubtful compliment. 

In all, it was very promptly recognized that the main- 
spring of the German peace policy was to separate the 
United States from its Allies in the settlement. Autocracy 
had lost the war; its only hope was to save itself and some 
of its power by skilful negotiation. The most obvious de- 
vice was to make all possible out of the fact that President 
Wilson's policy was ostentatiously independent; that he had 
criticized and rebuked the Allies for their alleged failure 
to serve the ends of justice; and that he had declared a 
peace program to which he demanded allegiance from all 
belligerents. Prussianism accepted his terms, thereby bind- 
ing him to seek a like acceptance from the Allies. 

The Austro-Hungarian note of September 14 was de- 
livered to the State Department in Washington at 6:20 in 
the evening of the 1 6th. President Wilson had prepared his 
reply upon the newspaper text that had been available all 
day. As soon as the official note arrived and was com- 



242 The IVilson Administration and the Great War 

pared with the newspaper account, his reply was made pub- 
lic — within a half-hour after the invitation was formally 
received. The reply stated : 

The government of the United States feels that there is only one 
reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro- 
Hungarian government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor 
stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace, 
and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter 
concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain. 

This was perhaps the shortest and least rhetorical of 
all of the state papers of President Wilson during the 
war period, as well as one of the most momentous. It 
thrilled the nation. It struck a very responsive chord 
throughout the civilized world outside of the enemy coun- 
tries. If the fine and lofty idealism of some of his other 
declarations were inspiring to the world, this terse repudi- 
ation of the German plan was electrifying. And in this 
famous reply there was no delay, no hushed speculation as 
to what policy was to be imposed upon the nation. It looked 
as though, at last, the President had taken his stand with 
the people. 

It was what the people had desired. It seemed at last 
the long-looked-for leader had appeared and was fully 
equipped to lead them from the morass of doubt into which 
he had permitted them to wander. The devastating swift- 
ness of it all almost took the people's breath, while it 
crushed with astounding force the elaborately-built struc- 
ture of the Prussian peace plan, its stern brevity leaving no 
chance for misunderstanding or rejoinder. It cut the ground 
completely from under autocracy's feet, threatening its utter 
confusion and destruction. The swiftness and bluntness of 
the reply are said to be without precedent in the annals 
of diplomacy. Never was government given more con- 
vincing proof of its strength and decision, and never did 
President Wilson display higher qualities of leadership than 



Looking Toward Peace 243 

in thus expressing the unalterable judgment of the nation 
fighting in a righteous cause. 

On the same day Mr. Balfour, British Foreign Secre- 
tary, said: "I cannot see the slightest hope in these pro- 
posals that the goal we all desire, a peace which is some- 
thing more than a truce, can be obtained." And Premier 
Clemenceau of France said: "We shall fight until the en- 
emy comes to understand that bargaining between crime 
and right is no longer possible." 

Eleven days after his swift and certain reply to the 
Austrian note of September 16, President Wilson continued 
the enthusiasm which it created by making in the New York 
Metropolitan Opera House an address that expressed ideas 
wholly in harmony with his reply, irrevocably confirming 
the outlawry of autocracy. This address contains a pas- 
sage worthy of a place with the finest of American tradi- 
tion. Speaking of the perfidy of the Central Powers he 
said : 

They have convinced us that they are without honor and do not 
intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but 
force and their own interest. We cannot come to terms with them. 
They have made it impossible. The German people must by this 
time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who 
forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or 
speak the same language of agreement. 

The address was somewhat confusing in its effort to 
harmonize its author's previous stand with his new position. 
As to the supreme issues of the day he stated: "They per- 
haps were not clear at the outset but they are clear now." 
Possibly this is as near to confession as one may expect; 
yet the one incontrovertible fact respecting the war is that 
the basic issues stood clearly defined in its first month. He 
also stated concerning the war: "We came into it when 
its character had become fully defined and it was plain that 
no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its out- 
come." Upon this statement it was April, 19 17, that the 



244 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

meaning of the war became so plain that America's partici- 
pation was necessary; yet only a few weeks before, Mr. 
Wilson was insisting upon a compromise between right and 
wrong in his declaration for a "peace without victory." 

No higher tribute could be paid to the utterance of the 
President in that notable address than the universal recog- 
nition that it was worthy of the occasion. No statesman 
ever had a greater audience or a more inspiring subject 
than he in addressing the nation upon the essential terms 
of peace. It was now the voice of American democracy 
that spoke the soul of the nation; not the weak and craven 
voice which said America was "too proud to fight," when 
might was trampling upon right. It was not now the voice 
that viewed the war against law and liberty as "none of our 
concern." Speaking with the serene sureness which came 
from conviction established in demonstrated facts, he spoke 
also with the authority derived from the will of the great 
nation which he represented. 

No one should have known better than he why, in his 
phrase, "the air every now and again gets darkened by 
mists and groundless doubts and mischievous perversions of 
counsel"; and it was through his own vague quest that the 
country was brought to the point of dividing on the issue 
which he himself raised in response to Germany's peace 
drive. 

In this connection, it is worthy of note that on the 
same day that President Wilson obscurely hinted that the 
issues of the war were not clear to him at first, another 
member of the Administration was uttering a robust avowal 
of error. This was Vice-President Marshall, who, in a 
public address in the same city, boldly declared: 

I come here partly to make an apology, an apology for my attitude 
during almost two years and a half of that fateful conflict ; an apology 
that a God-fearing man in the twentieth-century civilization could 
have dreamed that any nation, any people, or any man could be 
neutral when right was fighting with wrong. 



Looking Toward Peace 245 

When Germany saw that her overwhelming mihtary 
defeat was certain and sought a way to avoid the inevitable 
consequences, she directed her peace offensives toward 
Washington. This course was logical: First, President 
Wilson had undertaken to dominate the peace sctdcmcnt; 
second. This government was the only one of her opponents 
not pledged against making a separate peace; third. Presi- 
dent Wilson had proposed a set of terms, every item of 
which was open to various interpretations and to contro- 
versy, and Germany's acceptance of them would bring her 
into closer association with him and might impel him to 
demand like acceptance from the Allies. The correspond- 
ence into which they drew the President went far toward 
accomplishing these ends. In every note issued from Berlin 
and Washington, the Fourteen Points were emphasized, 
and were linked inseparably with the suggestion for an 
armistice. 

It was just eleven days after his notable New York 
address of September 27 that President Wilson made his 
faltering reply to Germany's request for peace terms, con- 
sisting of a statement and two questions. In this note of 
October 8, he stated that, owing to the "momentous in- 
terests involved," he deemed it proper to make some in- 
quiries as to the intent of Germany in seeking his assistance. 
This is the famous note: 

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straight- 
forward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of 
the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact 
meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial 
Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the 
terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of 
the United States on the 8th of January last and in subsequent ad- 
dresses, and that its object in entering into discussions would be only 
to agree upon the practical details of their application? 

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of 



246 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of 
arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United 
States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies 
of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discus- 
sion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers 
immediately to withdraw their forces ever3rwhere from invaded ter- 
ritory. 

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the 
Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities 
of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the 
answer to these questions vital from every point of view. 

It was with mingled astonishment, rage, and dismay 
that the souls of men were possessed when the news of his 
reply was published after what he had led the nation to 
expect as results of his address of September 27. This 
was evidenced by unvarying murmurs of "It Is what we have 
feared all along." The German Government, knowing that 
a war was never won by talking peace, engaged the Ameri- 
can Government in talking peace. The division of senti- 
ment was instant, whereas it had been solidly back of the 
President the day before. It led to James M. Beck's dec- 
laration that the President's wavering course was "paralyz- 
ing the will of the American people." The day before the 
President's reply, Senator Lodge had pledged his unequivo- 
cal support to the President's declared policy of refusing 
to have anything to do with German peace except through 
victory. The country was united. The leaders of the two 
great political parties were in hearty accord on Monday, 
while on Wednesday they were as far apart as the antipo- 
des. The President had changed and the people were 
disappointed. 

This division in public sentiment was shown in the 
two resolutions offered in the senate. That by Senator 
Lodge : 

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that there should be 
no further communication with the German Government upon the 



Looking Toward Peace 247 

subject of an armistice or conditions of peace, except a demand for 
unconditional surrender. 

That by Senator Lewis of Illinois was in these words : 
Resolved, That the United States Senate approves whatever 
course may be taken by the President of the United States in the 
matter of his replies and in his dealings with the German Imperial 
Government and the Austrian Imperial Government and the allies 
of either or both, in response to the demand of either for peace or 
armistice. 

Smarting under the criticisms of his first temporizing 
note to Germany, he essayed to issue, through Senator 
Pittman of Nevada, a direct challenge to his opponents, 
in this language : "The test in the coming election is inevita- 
ble between the policies of Woodrow Wilson and the 
policies of Henry Cabot Lodge." He uttered a great truth. 

Notwithstanding Mr. Wilson's capacity for fine phras- 
ing, some of his state papers, which should have left no 
possible scope for difference of opinion, were obscure in 
the extreme. And this first reply to Germany, containing 
fewer than 250 words, was so susceptible of differing con- 
structions that the various interpretations given to It filled 
many columns, some of them wholly in conflict with others. 
A thoroughgoing American newspaper stated: "Once 
more the American nation, eager for leadership, found 
itself confronting, instead, a question-mark." And when 
the outcry against the President's reply became too loud. 
Secretary of State Lansing explained to the public that the 
President's note was only a preliminary inquiry. That this 
was mere pretense was shown by the Inspired Interpretations 
issued from Washington describing It as the most powerful 
and decisive document of the war, and which declared It 
to exhibit "subtle dialectic skill," "majestic simplicity," and 
" the force of an ultimatum." But when the President, yield- 
ing to the enraged protest, changed his position and re- 
ferred the entire matter to the Allies, where it belonged. 



248 The Wilson Admimstration and the Great War 

in his next note to Germany, the nation was delivered from 
a grave menace. 

In his reply of October 8, he was led into what the 
Germans desired — conversations by an individual nation in 
the hope of winning that nation from its Allies. And had 
it not been for the sound American sentiments which 
sounded the alarm with an outcry that was exceeded by 
none during the war except that in the airplane scandal and 
the failure of the war department to function after the 
years of the do-nothing spirit, there was a fine prospect 
of its success. 

The German government seizing the opportunity, with 
swift and deadly precision on October 12 answered fully 
the President's two questions and in almost his exact words. 
Forced by the articulate rage on the part of America, to say 
nothing of the courteous protest of the European Allied 
statesmen, he then, on October 14, informed Germany that, 
"The unqualified acceptance by the present German Gov- 
ernment and by a large majority of the German Reichstag 
of the terms laid down by the President of the United States 
of America . . . justifies the President in making a frank, 
and direct statement of his decision with regard to the com- 
munications of the German Government of the 8th and 12th 
of October, 19 18." And he further stated that "it must be 
understood that the process of evacuation and the condi- 
tions of an armistice are matters which must be left to 
the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the 
Government of the United States and the Allied Govern- 
ments." 

Germany acceding to these conditions and asking for 
an armistice in its reply of October 20, the President re- 
plied by stating that he had referred all to the Allied na- 
tions. 

The peace conversations between President Wilson and 
the enemy powers are well summed up by a leading eastern 
newspaper as follows: 



Looking Tozvard Peace 249 

1. Germany to President Wilson — We request you to brinj^ 
about an immediate armistice, and a peace conference with your terms 
as a basis of negotiations. 

2. President Wilson to Germany — I will not propose an armis- 
tice so long as your armies are on invaded soil. Do you mean that 
you accept my terms, and wish to discuss merely the details of their 
application? Is your government still an autocracy? 

3. Germany to President Wilson — We have accepted your 
terms and principles and wish merely to discuss their application. We 
are ready to evacuate invaded territory, under an armistice arranged 
by a mixed commission. We speak in the name of the German gov- 
ernment and the German people. 

4. President Wilson to Germany — Conditions of an armistice 
must be decided by the military advisers of your opponents jointly, and 
must safeguard the military supremacy attained over you. Cessation 
of illegal and inhumane practices is first required. Your government 
is still arbitrary and autocratic, and it is within the choice of the 
German people to alter it. We must know with whom we are 
speaking. 

5. Germany to President Wilson — We again request an armis- 
tice, the terms based upon the actual standard of power on both sides 
in the field. We trust you will resist any demand injurious to the 
honor of the German people. Charges of illegal war practices are 
denied, but those guilty of such acts are being punished. You are 
dealing with a government free from any arbitrary and irresponsible 
influence and supported by the German people. 

6. President Wilson to Germany — Upon your assurances, I 
have transmitted to the Allies your request for an armistice, the 
understanding being that the terms would prevent your renewing 
hostilities and enable your opponents to enforce the details of the 
peace to which you have agreed. Extraordinary guarantees are re- 
quired because your government is not yet satisfactorily made re- 
sponsible to the German people. With veritable representatives of 
the people a negotiated peace is possible; if we must deal with mili- 
tarists and monarchical autocrats, our demand must be for surrender. 

7. Germany to President Wilson— This is a government of the 
people, and it controls the military authorities. It awaits proposals 
for an armistice, as a step toward peace on the Wilson terms.^ 

*The Philadelphia North American. 



250 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

That is the documentary record, including an ultimatum 
to the Allies in number 6. 

In the Allied countries, the President's note of October 
8 to Germany was praised; but the indorsements were cau- 
tious and they soon gave way to frank dissent. An official 
representative of Great Britain in Washington declared: 
"We cannot win this war by talking peace." The London 
Chronicle said : "It is expected here that President Wilson 
will stipulate, instead of asking rhetorical questions." For 
four years Lord Northcliffe's positive instructions to his 
English newspapers were that there was to be no criticism 
whatever of President Wilson in his newspapers. But under 
the stress of the President's reply to Germany his patience 
yielded and his London Times, chief of the papers, said: 

We all have the greatest confidence in President Wilson, but we 
think it would have been better if, instead of attempting any negotia- 
tions, he had stated straight out that any peace offer from the Central 
Powers must be presented to the Allies as a whole. 

And another dispatch said: "It was hoped in Britain 
that he would not be actuated by any desire to appropri- 
ate an undue share of responsibility in answering Ger- 
many." There was no word of approval from the great 
English journals. 

The only prominent man of the Allies in approval was 
the English pacifist Lansdowne. It was all deep silence 
from every European statesman from the democratic na- 
tions. Propaganda given out from Washington undertook 
to show Sir Eric Geddes, of the British admiralty, as 
giving "unqualified approval" of the President's course. 
13ut what he said was this: "We cannot win by talking 
peace. To get us talking of peace is just what Germany 
wants. Let the Kaiser talk while Foch shoots." And 
Premier Lloyd George would speak only of the brilliant 
success of the Allied arms against the common enemy. 

Immediately after President Wilson's alarming reply 



Looking Toward Peace 251 

to the German note requesting an armistice, Mr. Bonar 
Law, government spokesman in the British House of Com- 
mons, made an announcement in Parliament sounding the 
alarm and giving warning to the civilized world that it 
would be very unwise for any of the Allied governments to 
make any statement as to the terms likely to be imposed 
upon Germany, before an armistice should be granted. 

In France the sentiment concerning President Wilson's 
move was that there was developed among statesmen an 
influential body of opinion which would be more practica- 
ble if Mr. Wilson had said less. Le Temps, a semi-official 
newspaper and the most powerful in France, said: "Ger- 
many appears to believe that President Wilson intervenes 
as an arbiter to put everybody right." On the same day 
that the New York IForld was presenting on its first page 
the evidence of the enthusiasm of the Allies over Mr. Wil- 
son's move, there came from Paris this news: 

Paris, October 9. — While Paris waited for President Wilson's 
reply to Germany, the French press contented itself with printing 
long accounts of anti-armistice speeches in the United States Senate 
and a full symposium of American newspaper opinion, which, as it 
appears here, was unanimous against an interruption in the fighting. 
In fact, the reports of the debates in the American Senate share first 
pages with the news of the great military victories on the west front. 
Senators McCumber, Nelson, and Lodge are as highly thought of in 
France today as are the American generals. No news of the outcome 
of any battle was ever awaited with more eagerness than was the 
reply of the American President to the German Chancellor. 

While there was among the Allied nations, as among 
Americans, a disposition to accord to President Wilson the 
fullest measure of recognition in his effort to bring about 
a just peace, they were resolved that the fate of autocracy 
should not be committed exclusively to the judgment of one 
arbitrary wavering will. 

German newspapers, on the other hand, were rather par- 
tial toward President Wilson's attitude. The first impres- 



252 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

sion was a feeling of dismay, due to a misapprehension of 
the President's position. The Tagehlatt stated that a 
rumor spread Hke hghtning through Berlin that he had 
rejected the German offer. It said: "The emotion which 
followed was indescribable. It seemed as if a terrible 
catastrophe had descended on the city. Gloom and sulkiness 
prevailed"; and that when a correction of the erroneous 
report lifted the pall, unconfined joy supplanted it. In Stras- 
burg the first report was that "the President had replied 
favorably" and "at once glaring posters were put up an- 
nouncing the glad news, and thousands gathered in the 
streets to give wild expression to their joy." While the Post 
of that city asked the people to "await the reply of the Presi- 
dent of the United States with dignity and calmness. The 
only hope lies in the fact that our Note was not entirely re- 
jected." 

There were those who believed that President Wilson's 
question addressed to the German Chancellor, asking 
whether it was the German Government or the German peo- 
ple who spoke, was a master stroke. But sight was not 
lost of the fact that his inquiry was directed to a source 
which everybody knew and which he had then but recently 
declared was an autocracy, "without the capacity for coven- 
anted peace." Yet he invited it to write its own certificate 
of character, enabling it to write into the record a declara- 
tion that the German Imperial Government was a demo- 
cratic and responsible institution — a declaration completely 
responsive to Mr. Wilson's challenge. It extracted all 
efficacy from his repeated declarations that "we cannot take 
the word of the present German government" and "we do 
not think the same thoughts or speak the same language 
of agreement." 

Amidst all the fluctuations of public opinion during the 
Great War, one thought remained permanent with the peo- 
ple : That President Wilson's pre-war pacifism would gain 
the upper hand and lead him into an inconclusive peace, into 



Looking Toward Peace 253 

peace at an inopportune moment. It was a deadly fear. 
There was no fear on the part of our soldiers and sailors 
of the most destructive guns or the pirate submarine or the 
sharp bayonet or the poisonous gas; no fear in the heart 
of the red-blooded American father that his son would come 
home to him a helpless cripple for the rest of his life or 
that a grave in France might claim him. Clearly and with- 
out hesitation the newly-married wife declared that she did 
not fear the worst that German bullets could do; she de- 
manded that the war be fought to a conclusion, that future 
generations be safe. His program was declared acceptable 
to Germany, and it was not wholly acceptable to the Allies. 
"Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit" 
were the words of our President in April, when he was re- 
flecting American advanced thought; they should never 
have been forgotten, never repudiated, never discounted or 
modified in October. 

Had the President been a man whose mind was open 
to suggestion, he would have been glad to consider the 
warning of his minister to The Netherlands as quoted above. 
But warnings of the impending danger could not affect 
Mr. Wilson's mind. They were, therefore, directed more 
to the enlightening and shaping of public opinion to be 
applied when the supreme test should come, and they came 
from the most diverse sources. 

When, as early as August, 19 18, Senator Lodge declared 
unequivocally on the floor of the Senate that this nation 
would never agree to a negotiated peace, he voiced the senti- 
ment of the American people. The same warning came to 
the nation from other sources. In the early part of the 
September drive, a prominent American prelate stated the 
American point of view in this fashion: 

Germany has ravished the women of Belgium, Servia, Roumania, 
Poland, Armenia; Germany murdered the passengers of the "Lusi- 
tania" and struck a medal to celebrate that German triumph, dating 
it t\vo days before the horrible occurrence; Germany has ruined 



254 The fVilson Administration and the Great JVar 

cathedrals and cities in sheer wanton fury in such fashion as has not 
been done in all the wars waged in Europe since the days of the 
building of cathedrals; Germany has poisoned wells, crucified in- 
habitants and soldiers, burned people in their houses, and this by sys- 
tem; Germany has denatured men and boys, has wantonly defaced 
the living and the dying and the dead. An eye-witness tells of seeing 
women dead at a table with tongues nailed to the table and left to die. 
Germany has stolen things little and big; playthings from children, 
finery from women, pictures of incalculable worth, bank deposits, rail- 
roads, factories; Germany has sunk hospital-ships, has bombed hos- 
pitals and Red Cross camps; Germany has disclosed neither decency 
nor honor from the day they started war, nor has a single voice in 
Germany to date been lifted against the orgies of ruthlessness which 
turn the soul sick and which constitute the chiefest barbarity of his- 
tory ; Germany remains unblushing and unconscious of its indecency ; 
Germany's egotist still struts like a kaiser; and to climax its horrid 
crimes, Germany has inflicted compulsory polygamy on the virgins of 
its own land. What must decency say to this? That is not war; that 
is murder. Germany has slain and debauched more people in this 
war than all the heathen hordes have since Nero. 

Stern justice is what should be meted out; and unless it is, there 
will be shameful injustice meted out to a world of ruined bodies and 
befouled souls and bodies.^ 

The peace leadership, loyally recognized and gladly 
confirmed to the President by reason of his office, was can- 
celled from the day he opened alone his peace conversations 
with the common enemy. The nation's instant and stern 
repudiation of Germany's attempt to make its chief execu- 
tive her attorney to plead her cause with the other nations 
and of his apparent acceptance of this new function, signal- 
izing the nation's reply to his device of making what he 
called an inquiry, was swift, clear, and determined; and the 
outcry was so loud and spontaneous that it stood condemned 
from the first publication. 

While he excelled in stating the fundamental issues of 

' Bishop William A. Quayle in N orthvjestern Christian Advocate, Chi- 
cago, September i8, 191 8. 



Looking Toward Peace 255 

the conflict, he so egregiously and so often misrepresented 
the American spirit that he was repudiated at home. 'I'lic 
Associated Press was asked to say from Washington on 
Sunday, the day after the receipt of the German note, that 
"the Government asks the American people to withhoUl 
their judgment of Germany's note until President Wilson 
has had opportunity to consider it." It was similar to a 
later request, when he was returning from Europe, that 
the Senate withhold discussion of the League of Nations 
Covenant until he should present it to that body in his own 
way. Refraining from the discussion of the German note 
was not what the American people would do at that time. 
They discussed. 

It seemed that his peace efforts would prove disastrous 
to the loan then being asked of the nation. He felt im- 
pelled to go to the people to help save the new loan. On 
that occasion he said: 

Recent events have enhanced, not lessened the importance of this 
loan, and I hope that my fellow-countrymen will let me say this to 
them very frankly. . . . Nothing has happened which makes it safe 
or possible to do anything but push our effort to the utmost. The 
time is critical and the response must be complete. 

Other inspired statements were given out to ease the 
desperate situation into which the Administration had 
plunged itself and the country in its peace move. Secretary 
Baker stated that the war department was pushing forward 
as rapidly as possible. The President's Private Secretary 
Tumulty gave out this statement at the White House: 
"The Government will continue to send over 250,000 men, 
with their supplies, every month and there will be no re- 
laxation." 

Said one paper in the central northwest, the Duluth 

News-Tribune : 

It might seem too much even to hope that the President would 
ever decline to debate with Germany; that he would ever discover 



256 The JVilson Administration and the Great JVar 

that the Great War was not merelv with the German Government, 
but was with the German people. 

With characteristic ingenuity, Berlin sent by wireless, 
in advance of its official transmission to the President, its 
reply. Thus blazoned from unnumbered millions of news- 
paper pages the whole world read : 

"GERMANY ACCEPTS PRESIDENT WILSON'S TERMS"; 
"GERMANY MAKES UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER"; 
"GERMANY BEGS FOR ARMISTICE." 

But the suppression of Germany's reply by the Admin- 
istration in Washington, with the explanation that it was 
in the nature of propaganda which might have an ill effect 
upon the people, was so like the suppression of the Senate's 
report on the aircraft investigation, when all the world 
knew it, that it was placed in the same category — that the 
Administration thought itself more nearly proof against the 
wiles of the enemy than the American people had proved 
themselves to be. 

Dr. Henry van Dyke, who rendered such excellent serv- 
ice to the cause of freedom, writing upon peace more than 
a year before the armed conflict closed, gave further advice 
which might profitably have been heeded by the President. 
Referring to the German Government, he stated: 

Until that government is disabused of the delusion that it has 
won, is winning, or will win a substantial victory in this war, it is not 
likely to say anything sane or reasonable about peace. A pax Ger- 
manica is what it is willing to discuss. 

But that is just what we do not want. To enter into such a 
discussion now would be both futile and perilous.^ 

When President Wilson was furthering Germany's in- 
terests by writing notes, in the summer of 19 18, the wag's 
toast, proposed in a cloak-room in the capitol in Washing- 
ton carrying a savage significance, was not illy expressive 

* Henry van Dyke, "Fighting for Peace," p. 235. 



Looking Toward Peace 257 

of the American view of the President's leadership : "Here's 
to the Czar, last in war, first in peace, long may he waver !" 

Mr. Wilson had been seeking to drive a wedge between 
Austria and Germany. Whether he succeeeded will depend 
upon the point of view from which the matter is examined. 
That Austria, acting upon the initiative of Germany, opened 
the September peace offensive is hardly open to question. 
Germany immediately followed. From that time, the two 
nations apparently operated in full harmony. 

Thus, when, on October 28, 19 18, Austria asked an 
immediate armistice it is probable that she did so with 
Germany's full knowledge and consent. On that date, 
the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister instructed that a 
note be sent to Washington, of which a part is in these 
words : 

Austria-Hungary accepting all the conditions the President has 
laid down, for the entry into negotiations for an armistice and peace, 
no obstacle exists, according to judgment of the Austro-Hungarian 
government, to the beginning of these negotiations. 

The Austro-Hungarian government declares itself ready, in con- 
sequence, without awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter 
into negotiations upon peace between Austria-Hungary and the states 
in the opposing group and for an immediate armistice upon all Aus- 
tro-Hungarian fronts. 

It asks President Wilson to be so kind as to begin overtures cm 
this subject. 

This was the beginning of the end of the great struggle. 
From this on Germany's only effort was to be directed to 
securing the best possible terms with her superior enemies. 

November 5 the German Government was advised 
through the Swiss minister in charge of German affairs m 
this country that the President had the Allied reply, namely : 

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the 
correspondence which has passed between the President of the United 
States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications 



258 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the 
Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the 
President's address to Congress of January, 191 8, and the principles 
of settlement enunciated in his subsequent address. 

The Allied governments then made exception to the 
condition relative to freedom of the seas, until it was clearly 
defined. And then this other exception, which was of far- 
reaching importance, as later developments showed: 

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to 
Congress of January 8, 191 8, the President declared that invaded ter- 
ritories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, the Allied 
Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to 
v\hat this provision implies. By it they understand that compensa- 
tion will be made by Germany for all damages done to the civilian 
population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Ger- 
many by land, by sea, and from the air. 

The President then stated that he was "in agreement 
with the interpretations set forth in the last paragraph in 
the memorandum above quoted." And then the formal 
closing that the President requests the Swiss minister to 
notify the German Government that Marshal Foch had 
been authorized by the government of the United States 
and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited 
representatives of the German Government and to communi- 
cate to them the terms of the armistice. 

Sometimes the question was asked, who surrendered? 
Who was the German party to the armistice? We entered 
into no terms and no compact with the Imperial Govern- 
ment of Germany. The President himself had so declared. 
It was true. The armistice was In fact not a treaty or a 
compact, but a surrender. The word of no German au- 
thority was taken in anything, nor was faith placed In any- 
thing of German authority. We simply gave Germany a 
certain number of days in which to deliver over her military 
power and to make a partial restoration of stolen goods to 



Looking Toward Peace 2^9 

her victims. The correspondence was carried on with "the 
German Government," and was so conckjdcd in the armis- 
tice of November 11, 1918. 

The greatness of the event probably warranted two 
seasons of rejoicing over the conclusion of the armistice. 
These the country enjoyed. 

On the afternoon of November 7, 19 18, news dispatches 
from France were received in New York erroneously re- 
porting that the armistice had been signed. All over the 
United States the people received the news with spontaneous 
outbursts of joy, and the supposed end of the war was de- 
liriously celebrated for several hours before official denials 
from Washington checked the popular enthusiasm. 

After the country had been notified and convinced that 
the armistice had not actually been signed when the first 
false reports spread throughout the land, it settled down 
to await the news that signing had actually taken place. 
When the news did reach this country and was telegraphed 
to every village and city, it reached every cross-roads in 
mountain and valley, on prairie and in the deep forests; 
it penetrated every nook and corner of the land. But it 
was in the ciVies and larger towns that the wild delirium 
of joy broke forth in such an uproar of enthusiasm mingled 
with confusion that would have set in wild-eyed wonder an 
individual who might have dropped into its midst without 
previous notice. 

Trucks carrying young men and maidens beating upon 
drums improvised from large tin cans, old tin stoves, water 
tanks, or what not, yelling and shouting themselves hoarse 
over the general expressions of joy; offices deserted without 
any order or communication from heads of the concern; 
factories evacuated by their employes without any formality 
or notice ; streets crowded and jammed with men and women 
who seemed to vie with each other and with the younger 
portion of the population in keeping up the interminable 
racket; automobiles of dignified business and official men 



26o The JVilson Administration and the Great JVar 

with parts of stoves and tin cans chained to them rushed 
up and down the streets hither and thither to add to the 
clangor and uproar — these were but some of the features 
indicating the noisy demonstrations of the celebration in 
America of the signing of the armistice. On many street 
corners the Kaiser was hanged in effigy to the lamp-posts; 
this same effigy was noticed in some business places or was 
hanging out over balcony, and was given a place of promi- 
nence wherever prominence would attract public attention. 
In fact, in this form the Kaiser was honored by joy-rides 
on automobile trucks, in fashionable automobiles, on drays 
drawn by old horses or mules or oxen. It is probable that 
never in the nation's history was there so spontaneous and 
so complete an abandon on the part of the populace in gen- 
eral to an exhibition of unqualified outbursts of delirium 
as was witnessed in the United States November ii, 191 8. 

When President Wilson announced his intention of 
going to the Peace Congress, the announcement was met 
with a storm of protest throughout the country, in which his 
most ardent supporters joined. 

The wisdom of one man never equalled the combined 
counsels of many; and "in the multitude of counselors there 
is safety." America must be kept free from the power of 
one willful President to misguide and bind. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE WORLD'S PEACE CONGRESS 

Up to the time of the President's personal appeal, on 
October 24, 191 8, for the country's support of his party, 
the sole issue was support of the Government in the prosecu- 
tion of the war. At that point the President changed it. 
He made the issue : The American people to declare 
whether they would leave wholly in his hands the policy 
of peace, would give him authority to demand acceptance 
by the democratic nations of his official program, until then 
never passed upon by the country. If that judgment should 
be adverse, he said he would abide by it. The judgment, as 
expressed at the election, was decisively against him. He 
then overrode an expression of public opinion which he had 
himself requested and which he pledged himself to obey, 
in going to Europe. Upon this, the New York Tribune re- 
marked : "He goes abroad a rebuked and discredited leader 
in his own nation." 

It was immediately after the signing of the armistice 
that reports from Washington were creeping into the news- 
papers that President Wilson was planning to attend the 
Peace Conference as one of the American delegates. When 
the first studied hints went out from the White House, the 
general attitude was an amused incredulity. 

On November 18, however, formal announcement was 
made that the President would sail for France immediately 
after addressing Congress at the opening of its regular 
session on December 2. It was said that he did not intend 
to remain long at the conference but "his presence at the 
outset is necessary in order to obviate the manifest disad- 
vantages of discussion by cable in determining the greater 

261 



262 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

outlines of the treaty about which he must necessarily be 
consulted." This announcement produced a ferment of dis- 
cussion throughout the United States, and much opposition 
developed. Some details of the subsidiary organization of 
the peace delegation were made public, and on November 
29, it was announced that the delegation would consist of 
the President himself, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 
Colonel Edward M. House, a Texas politician, former Am- 
bassador to France, Henry White, and General Tasker H. 
Bliss, formerly chief of staff of the army, who had been in 
Paris as a representative of the United States since he re- 
tired as chief of staff. 

He had been very reticent as to his trip to Europe, and 
there was notorious propaganda from Washington to pre- 
pare the people for what he had in view for a full year 
previous. 

A political writer, in a series of criticisms in the New 
York Siin, referred to the propaganda as issued from the 
White House as "resolving themselves into a polite imputa- 
tion of growing megalomania and selfishness of motive." 

After the news was let out in a definite way that the 
President had determined upon going as a member of the 
peace commission, the distrust of the plan throughout the 
country was shown in the protest of public opinion. As an 
answer to this criticism the President went before Congress 
and the country with a statement of his purpose in going 
to Europe. This was a direct concession to the storm of 
public opinion which voiced itself against the movement, in 
the greatest diplomatic action of the country's history, by 
one man with silence on his lips and his plans under his hat. 

Upon the all-important subject of the coming Peace 
Conference, there was no word of information in his an- 
nual address to Congress. He merely declared that he 
considered that his personal attendance in the Conference 
was a transcendent duty, that he went to interpret, and to 
press the adoption of, the terms and principles stated by 



The World's Peace Congress iG-^ 

him in public addresses, to see that "no false or mistaken 
interpretation" was placed upon his ideals as announced, 
and "no possible effort omitted to realize them." The status 
of his program was admittedly obscure. When he sought 
authority to interpret and enforce it according to his own 
judgment, the people rejected his plea with an overwhelming 
answer. 

He said to Congress: "I shall be in close touch with 
you, and you will know all that I do. ... I am servant of 
the nation. I can have no private thought or purpose of 
my own. ... I shall count upon your friendly counsel and 
encouragement. I shall not be inaccessible, but available 
for any counsel or service you may desire of me." 

In every account of what occurred while he was deliv- 
ering that message to Congress one could read such words 
as "sternly set faces," the "coldly disapproving looks," the 
"unconcealed resentment," the "ominous silence" in which 
these statement were heard. 

Apologists for the President's enterprise attempted to 
dismiss the antagonism, which he had created, as a discredit- 
able exhibition of partisanship. The explanation did not 
stand scrutiny. Said an Administration organ: "The 
whole atmosphere of the capital was redolent of estrange- 
ment between Congress and the President." Another 
friendly paper reported that "nearly every Democratic sen- 
ator kept his seat during the brief period that the demon- 
stration of approval was in progress." Said a third account : 
"President Wilson met the strongest rebuff it is in power 
of Congress to give." 

The statement, "You will know all that I do," was an 
assurance which he studiously and completely ignored, not 
only throughout all the negotiations at Paris, but after his 
return to America with the Treaty in his hands. 

The most imposing corps of experts ever gathered to- 
gether for such a purpose as the President had in view 
in going to Europe had been quietly at work at Washington 



264 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

for more than year in advance charting every village, every 
mile of ground in the belligerent countries of Europe and 
western Asia, digesting every phase of history and tracing 
the nationality of every affected community since the begin- 
ning of recorded time. The material thus gathered was so 
indexed as to be available at a moment's notice. One 
hundred and fifty experts were at work quietly digging on 
the task from November, 19 17, all unknown to the world. 
Tons of maps and documents were to tell the truth about 
every hamlet and hillside from Havre to Teheran. Be- 
sides, the American delegation at the Peace Conference had 
a retinue of three hundred specialists and assistants. They 
made an impressive array of college professors, technical 
experts, ethnological experts and the like. Their particular 
subjects related especially to European matters. 

But the Senate of the United States, whose duty under 
the Constitution requires it to pass upon the treaty, was 
not represented. In all former peace conferences in which 
the United States was a party, the most eminent men of 
the nation were chosen for the performance of that solemn 
duty, if we omit reference to the treaty concluding the 
Mexican war. They represented both political parties, 
were regularly confirmed and commissioned by Congress or 
by the Senate, and in each instance care was taken that each 
branch of the treaty-making power was represented. In the 
case of the Spanish treaty. President McKinley took par- 
ticular care to give representation not only to both political 
parties, but selected the ablest man he could find in the 
United States Senate of the opposite party for that re- 
sponsible trust, George Grey, an international lawyer of 
wide reputation. In the making of that treaty two mem- 
bers, a cabinet secretary and an ambassador, represented the 
the executive branch of the government, while the three 
others were from the Senate, that body being a part of the 
treaty-making power. President Wilson, characteristic of 
the man, ignored not only precedent, but he appointed men 



The World* s Peace Congress 265 

with apparently no fitness for the great task before them. 
Aside from Secretary Lansing, it is doubtful whether in all 
the country's history so weak a body of commissioners was 
ever appointed for even a much smaller task. None, even 
of the President's most ardent partisans, undertook to 
defend him in thus ignoring the nation's entire history. 

Immediately these details were attended to, friendly 
warnings from the Allied nations to one another began, 
probably prompted by President Wilson's single-handed 
undertaking in the peace proposals. Later they ran danger- 
ously close to the hostile, beginning with the first prelimi- 
nary meeting. This first meeting of delegates preliminary 
to the Peace Conference took place in London on Decem- 
ber 3, 19 1 8. All of the Allied principal nations were repre- 
sented by their premiers and foremost statesmen. The 
United States was not represented. 

The State Department at Washington promptly in- 
formed the Associated Press "that any action looking to a 
demand upon Holland for the extradition of William Ho- 
henzollern will be held in abeyance until President Wilson 
reaches Europe." Mr. Churchhlll's declaration immedi- 
ately followed the conference, to the effect that "we do not 
intend, no matter what arguments and appeals are ad- 
dressed to us, to lend ourselves in any way to any fettering 
restrictions that will prevent the British Navy maintaining 
her well-tried and well-deserved supremacy." This state- 
ment the New York World correspondent regarded as be- 
ing "addressed especially to Woodrow Wilson." The pur- 
pose of it was probably to save Mr. Wilson for the humilia- 
tion of asking for something which under no circumstance 
would be granted. 

A singular preparation for his diplomatic mission was 
his repeated assertion that he alone held the keys to a 
peace of justice, and that the Allied statesmen were in- 
triguing for a peace of loot. Before he sailed, and while he 
was on the ocean, and after landing in Europe, he let no 



266 The PFilson Administration and the Great War 

occasion pass to declaim against the alleged imperialism 
of the democratic governments of Europe and their hos- 
tility to "the common thought" and the aspirations of the 
"plain people." It was this attitude of the President of the 
Republic that caused, soon after it was announced that Mr. 
Wilson was to attend the Conference, Lord Northcliffe to re- 
joice "that Mr. Wilson is to be brought personally into con- 
tact with men who can convince him that the spirit which he 
denominates unselfishness necessarily resolves itself into 
'give and take.' " And Mr. Balfour highly regarded a 
League of Nations because the United States would have to 
"bear a large share in the work it involves." It thus became 
apparent that the prospective negotiations between Presi- 
dent Wilson and the Allied Governments were coming so 
early in the proceedings to be regarded by the British as 
trading propositions. 

Before the President sailed, a Washington dispatch de- 
clared that this nation's naval program "will be a factor 
in the discussion concerning the freedom of the seas"; and 
"the size of the American navy, actually and potentially, 
is to be used in support of the argument the President is 
to make." And from the President's vessel carrying him 
to the Peace Congress was wirelessed the message to the 
whole world : "Should the present world policy of competi- 
tive armaments continue, the United States could do more 
than hold its own." ^ 

The substance of the President's demand was that 
Great Britain should surrender her position as the leading 
naval power of the world, while it was a recognized fact 
that it was Great Britain's naval power that saved civiliza- 
tion against the onslaughts of Prussian autocracy. 

Whether the disposition of the American people would 
authorize such an unknown factor appears not to have been 

*A happy contrast was President Harding's call for a conference of 
the leading nations to be held in Washington, November 12, 1921, and 
the prodigious program outlined by Secretary Hughes, head of the American 
delegation, on that date, surprising the world, on disarmament. 



The JVorld's Peace Congress 267 

taken into consideration. The British view appeared to he 
that the United States had the undoubted right to huikl 
as many dreadnaughts as her people were wiUing to pay for; 
and that such an enterprise would increase, rather than 
diminish, the safety of the world. Both the English and the 
American people smiled at the President's open threat. 

While the President was on his way to Europe, it was 
casually announced by the secretary of the preliminary con- 
ference that it had been there decided that Premier Clcmcn- 
ceau should preside at the sessions of the Peace Congress 
at Paris. 

On January 18, 19 19, the Peace Conference of the 
world held its first formal and plenipotentiary session — an 
occasion to become memorable in humanity's interest. 
Apart from the merits of the matter, the President's diplo- 
macy up to this point was singularly unfortunate. For 
while making one purpose of his journey the proposal to 
deprive the Allies of the chief weapon which enabled them 
to destroy the German menace, persistent secrecy regarding 
his purposes raised doubts and fears, while employing threat- 
ening intimations hardened suspicion into bitter judgment. 

Moreover, before going to the Peace Congress, he made 
a tour of Italy, France and England, addressing vast 
throngs, appealing to the masses as against their rulers. 
For this he was temporarily paid homage by the masses 
such as had never been accorded any human being. For 
this he was severely criticized, not only in his own country, 
but throughout the democratic nations of Europe. Later, 
he was anathematized by the very masses who had rendered 
the greatest applause, and upon the question of nationality. 

But at length the Peace Conference had begun and that 
was the paramount fact in the world at that day. There 
had been unwarranted and mischievous delay. There had 
been what was described as jockeying for position. 

Five important resolutions were adopted by the Peace 
Congress at its second open session. Two that were perti- 



268 The IFilson Administration and the Great War 

nent and practical were the appointment of a commission to 
determine the responsibility of the authors of the war, and 
the punishment to be imposed for the crimes which were 
committed. Another was the appointment of a commission 
on reparation. 

In his touring of Europe, even while urging his interest 
in "men everywhere," the President was sowing the seeds 
for dissensions in the Peace Congress. Without making his 
own purpose and intent plain to the understanding, he com- 
mitted himself and assumed to commit the nation to a 
vague scheme of a league comprising all of the nations of 
the world to be formed concurrently with the making of 
peace and not after it. It was said even then that there 
was no probability that so amazing a proposal would meet 
the approval of the United States Senate. As a matter of 
fact, and as was very fitting, the challenge came first from 
that nation which had chiefly borne the brunt of the war 
and which by long and bitter experience had learned the 
character of the Prussian autocracy. Georges Clemenceau, 
before the French Chamber of Deputies, s-aid: 

There is an old system which appears condemned today, and to 
which I do not fear to say that I remain faithful at this moment. 
Countries have organiMd the defense of their frontiers with the neces- 
sary elements and the balance of power. This system appears to be 
condemned by some very high authorities. Yet if such a balance had 
preceded the war, if England, the United States, Italy, and France 
had agreed that whoever attacked one of them attacked the whole, 
the world war would not have occurred. There is in this system of 
alliances, which I do not renounce, "I say it most distinctly, my guid- 
ing thought at the Conference, if your body permits me to go there. 

He stated to them that if they desired a change of pilots 
that was the time to change. "Are you with me or against 
me? Speak now or forever hold your peace." The cham- 
ber spoke with a voice of nearly three to one in approval 
of the policy. 



The fVorld's Peace Congress 269 

President Wilson was prompt with retort. Spcakinj>; 
the very next day at Manchester, England, undoubtcilly with 
the French Prime Minister's words in mind, he said : 

If the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep tlie 
world at a right poise by a balance of power, the United States would 
take no interest, because she will join no combination which is not a 
combination of all of us. 

Thus the issue was joined. Clemenceau had referred 
his policy to the popular chamber of the French Congress 
for its judgment and received approval by a tremendous ma- 
jority. President Wilson never even ventured to submit 
his scheme to either house of Congress; but when he asked 
the nation to approve his undefined course, he was turned 
down by a majority of more than a million votes. 

While the masses in Europe did not understand the Wil- 
sonian world-confederacy, they did fully appreciate the 
blessings he seemed to bring of release from the burden 
of conscription, and thus the poor took the gospel home. 
As stated by a leading French paper, the Petit Parisien: 

Our sons are no longer to be taken off to barracks and our daugh- 
ters shall not henceforth weep over slain sweethearts. Parents will 
not live in daily terror of impending military crisis. Taxes will not 
crush. These things are in the thoughts of the masses as they hail 
Wilson in great cities and put his portrait above the fireplace. 

No peace congress had ever faced so many intricate 
problems, problems on whose wise and equitable solution 
the whole future of the world depended — making perma- 
nent peace, creation of a League of Nations, reconciling con- 
flicting boundary claims of many nations, setting up new 
states within the truncated areas of the vanquished powers, 
the insuring of their liberty and unimpaired integrity, the 
assigning of mandates over millions of humanity in Asia and 
Africa, the creating of legislative machinery to improve 
conditions of labor In all civilized nations of the world. 

And in the midst of it all, never did it seem that this na- 



270 TIic IFilson Administration and the Great War 

tion had so great need of the stimulating voice and steadying 
counsel of the leader who left, in Theodore Roosevelt, in 
January, 19 19. Never were the sanity, the far-seeing states- 
manship; the splendid Americanism and sturdy common 
sense of Theodore Roosevelt more to be desired than in 
the hour when he was called hence, when the American 
people were facing the most critical decision in their history, 
and when their judgment was bewildered by conflicting 
appeals inviting partisanship, patriotism, idealism and in- 
ternationalism. 

The supreme need of the world was the earliest pos- 
sible settlement of the issues of war. That Mr. Wilson 
prevented. His program, such as it was, demanded as the 
first requisite the support of informed American public opin- 
ion; that he spurned. The next requirement was that the 
people of Europe should have confidence in the democratic 
governments forming the foundation of the League; that 
he very largely destroyed. It was above all things desirable 
that there should be unity of sentiment among the Allies, 
including the United States; that he undermined. And it 
was absolutely necessary for success that he should have 
a concrete program behind his idealistic generalizations; 
that he never possessed. 

As a result of the delays upon which the President in- 
sisted, when he found the treaty draft complete upon his 
return to Europe from America in mid-March, 19 19, 
France, the frontier of civilization, was suffering fiscal pros- 
tration and was restrained from the supreme work of res- 
toration; Great Britain was suffering an economic and in- 
dustrial crisis of indescribable gravity; Germany was in 
throes of civil war and danger of general anarchy; and 
Bolshevism had taken charge in Hungary, and was inso- 
lently challenging the western governments. It was truth- 
fully charged that "he kept us out of peace." 

Berlin and Vienna greatly rejoiced over the schism in 



The World's Peace Congress 271 

the Peace Congress. It was regarded as cause for regret 
and shame that an American President should have heen 
foremost in providing them with this reason for exultation. 

The Inner Council of the Peace Congress — President 
Wilson and Premiers Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and C)r- 
lando — were meeting daily in a small room, after the Presi- 
dent's return to Europe, from which even stenographers 
were excluded, in an endeavor to speed up the peace terms 
to avert the peril which the delay had invited. 

The question of peace-making is a question between the 
victorious and the vanquished belligerents and between them 
alone, and should have been accepted and acted upon as 
such. But about every other day in the Peace Congress 
a task that threw its shadow over the deliberations, and for 
the moment made everything else less important, was the 
task of coping with Bolshevism. So severe had become 
the charges of unnecessary delay, as due to the President's 
insistence upon the League of Nations scheme being intei- 
woven with the Peace Treaty, that Premier Lloyd George 
came to his rescue with the statement as to how much more 
rapidly the Peace Congress was moving than did the Vienna 
Conference of over a hundred years previous. President 
Wilson feeling th^ blows that were aimed at him, gave 
out a statement, after his return to Paris in March, that 
he believed the time was opportune for a statement which 
would allay apprehension over the delay, and show that the 
revision of the Covenant of the League of Nations had pro- 
ceeded at night sessions without any interruption to the dis- 
position of the other main questions. As early as February, 
Harvey's Weekly put it in this fashion: 

The gravest menace of the world today is in the futile fiddling 
of the Peace Congress. Red herrings are being dragged across the 
trail of justice, the essentials of peace-making are being delayed, the 
agonizingly urgent work of reconstruction in France and other coun- 
tries is being blocked, discontent and Bolshevism are being fostered 



272 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

even in our own land, and the Blond Beast beyond the Rhine is being 
encouraged to lick his bloody chops and snarl at the world with re- 
newed threats of war.^ 

The perils due to the delaying of peace for the sake 
of a headstrong policy became more manifest and more men- 
acing, with a result that the President's arbitrary mission 
diminished in importance. The vital parts of the peace to 
be imposed upon Germany were framed in his absence, and 
he returned to the Conference to find that the settlement 
was carried further toward completion than during all the 
weeks of his personal activity. 

On March 12, 19 19, Secretary Lansing stated: 

Two words tell the story — food and peace. If the present state 
of chaos continues and political power continues to grow weaker, 
there will be no responsible German government with which to make 
peace; there will be no government strong enough to carry out the 
conditions of the treaty. There is no time to be lost if we are to 
save the world from the despotism of anarchy, even as we saved it 
from the despotism of autocracy. We ought to make, we must make, 
peace without delay. 

On the next day Frank A. Vanderlip, described as "un- 
emotional a banker as ever reduced human problems to fig- 
ures," gave this startling picture and warning: 

I doubt if America has begun to 'comprehend the appalling situa- 
tion which confronts Europe and the wreck which the whole fabric 
of civilization may be facing. America was once told there should 
be peace without victory. What we have is victory without peace. 
Production has ceased, and unless production can be speedily resumed 
chaos may ensue. The great productive machine of Europe must be 
started, or the world will be confronted with disaster such as no 
experience has recorded. 

The Germans made a great outcry against the terms 
of the Treaty of Peace as presented to them for their sig- 
nature. It would have been well for them to compare the 

^February 15, 1919. 



The World's Peace Congress 27^ 

document thus presented to them with that which tiicy j^rc- 
pared at Brest-Litovsk which deprived Russia of a region 
covering one-third of her railway mileage, three-fourths 
of her Iron, nine-tenths of her coal, and nearly her entire 
industrial territory, together with a population of fifty- 
six millions, and required an enormous indemnity besides. 
That treaty was enthusiastically endorsed by the nation 
which came to Paris crying out against far less drastic 
terms. 

Said Herr Ebert, speaking for the Germans, to the 
Associated Press correspondent: "If the American de- 
mocracy actually accepts the present terms of peace as its 
own, it becomes an accomplice and abettor of political black- 
mailers; it surrenders the traditional American principle of 
fair play and sportsmanship," which leads a keen New York 
weekly to observe : 

This perjured violator of the most solemn pledges; this ravishcr 
of girls and kindergarten children; this wholesale murderer of aged 
men, of priests at the altar and of women with babies in their arms; 
this creature who at the point of the bayonet drove off tens of thou- 
sands of men to slavery and of women to enforced debasement; this 
common thief and incendiary ; this dynamiter of hospitals wherein lay 
the sick, the maimed and the dying; this skulking assassin of the high 
seao; this international brigand who in cold blood and of calculated 
purpose made a shambles of the world to gratify his beastly greed for 
plunder and power — this unspeakable Caliban of nations, now ren- 
dered impotent, has the unspeakable effrontery to whine about Ameri- 
can "fair play" and American sportsmanship.^ 

The French, to whom the treaty as drawn represented 
the minimum of justice, stood for absolute rejection of the 
enemy counter-proposal; but President Wilson favored 
modification of the terms. The long delay in making peace 
enabled the forces of pacifism and internationalism to organ- 
ize in all the Allied countries. This gave ground for the 
declaration that President Wilson was standing for terms, 

'Harvey's Weekly, May 24, 1919. 



274 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

not that would satisfy justice but that would satisfy Ger- 
many. 

The President's arbitrary methods, with the acute con- 
troversies and long delays occasioned thereby, gave the 
Germans renewed hope; and as they saw the Allies divided, 
their confidence grew to arrogance. They planned to chal- 
lenge every item in the treaty that did not satisfy their own 
interpretation of President Wilson's various statements; 
to widen every breach that had been created among their 
opponents; to incite, by appeals and propaganda, the paci- 
fist, Bolshevist, and radical Socialist element which existed 
in all countries. 

When there was severe criticism of the Peace Congress, 
and particularly of President Wilson, in the spring of 19 19, 
for his delays in getting the Peace Treaty completed, the 
propaganda put out was that the League of Nations was 
not causing the delay. It was put out that other things 
were causing this delay. At the outset, however, before 
the Congress opened. President Wilson had stated that 
there should be no peace until the League of Nations could 
simultaneously be formed. The President gave almost his 
entire attention to the matter of the League, yet he was 
unable to get the Constitution in shape to present to the 
Peace Congress until just a few hours before he started 
on his return trip to America. And nearly, if not quite, 
all of the other issues which were alleged to be responsible 
for the delay never arose until after the League Constitu- 
tion had been pushed to the fore; and some of them could 
never have arisen at all if the Peace Treaty had been made 
promptly; they arose because of the delay. And to those 
who were not bound by the President's view, it became clear 
that if it had not been for his insistence upon putting the 
League of Nations before everything else, the Treaty of 
Peace would have been made, signed, and ratified months 
before it was even presented to the United States Senate, 
and the nations would have been far on the way in their 



The World's Peace Congress 275 

work of restoration — a work of the very greatest civic, so- 
cial and economic importance. Moreover, these other issues 
which were falsely alleged to be the causes of the delay 
would have been disposed of long previously, if indeed (hey 
had arisen at all. 

President Wilson's famous demand for freedom of llic 
seas was cited as sufficient reason to justify his trip to 
Europe. Yet when his attention was called to the fact, in 
the notable White House Conference after his return from 
Europe, that under the League of Nations there would be 
no neutrals, and therefore no question as to freedom of 
the seas, he admitted that his insistence upon the point 
was something of a joke upon himself. By and by all the 
Fourteen Points, which the President had declared as the 
only possible basis of peace, had gone into the discard 
except the last — which was the League of Nations. He was 
willing to yield everything to save this one. 

When the Senate found itself wholly ignored by the 
President in making up his peace commission, it knew it 
would be called upon to consider in detail the terms of 
the Treaty. When senators found themselves shut out, 
they took the only course that was open by placing them- 
selves on record. Speeches were made on the floor of tlie 
Senate attacking the engagements to which the President 
was committing the country in the League Covenant. It 
served notice on the Peace Congress that the Senate, under 
the Constitution, was a part of the treaty-making power 
of this nation. 

And all the world was crying out for peace, for a prompt 
settlement that would close at the earhest date the dread- 
ful chapter of war and permit the exhausted, famine- 
haunted nations to resume the productive, restorative proc- 
esses of peace. But this idea President Wilson spurneil. 
His decree was that the rebuilding of Europe should be 
postponed until the future of the whole world had been 
arranged. During all his activities he contributed nothing 



276 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

to the actual making of peace; on the contrary he ob- 
structed it by his demand that it should be deferred until 
the League-of-Nations question had been settled. 

A desperate effort was being made by the end of March, 
1 9 19, to spread the belief that the delay in dealing with 
Germany was due to British indecision, to Italian imperial- 
ism, to French vindictiveness. Large propaganda was put 
out from the American press bureau to support this view. 
It was stated repeatedly by writers who were friendly to the 
President and who were ready at all points to give the Presi- 
dent a clean bill. It was pressed by Mr. Ray Stannard 
Baker.* But the record was too clear for this propaganda 
to prevail at the time it was issued. 

In his speeches in Europe President Wilson took the 
view that the most important thing was not peace but the 
permanence of peace, and he spoke with something of im- 
patience, almost with scorn, about those who were intent 
on the details of the peace that was to be made during the 
ensuing months at Paris. As he stated in his public ad- 
dresses, prior to sitting in the Conference, it was not merely 
with America, not merely with one nation, not even a group 
of nations, but with humanity as a whole that he was con- 
cerned. Yet there is always the problem of determining 
the precise boundary where a statesman's concern for hu- 
manity and the world at large should end, and his concern 
for his own people and his own country should begin. 

The President's attitude toward France drove her Into 
virtual isolation, since his exclusive concern was to create 
a League of Nations. Great Britain's dominant aim was 
to form some sort of alliance with the United States. Thus 
the American and British delegation worked In harmony 
to minimize the claims of France and to defer their satis- 
faction. For weeks all the energies of the conference were 
devoted to the League project and discussions of remote 

*"What Wilson Did at Paris," copyright, 1919, by Doubleday Page & Co., 
PP- S^j 57) 58 and 65. 



The IVorld's Peace Congress 277 

territorial issues, while the supreme problem of France's 
restoration and Germany's penalties were neglected. 

On March 30, 19 19, it was announced from I'aris that 
the commission on responsibility for the war had decided, — 

First, solemnly to condemn the violation of neutrality 
and all the crimes committed by the Central Powers. 

Second, to urge the appointment of an international 
tribunal to charge all those responsible, including the for- 
mer German Emperor. 

But Secretary Lansing submitted a separate memoran- 
dum in which Wilhelm's culpability was to be considered 
from a legal point of view. While the overwhelming ma- 
jority of the commission contended that the Kaiser was 
responsible largely for the acts and violation of the rules 
of war committed by land and naval forces, Mr. Lansing 
took the ground that what was done in his name was sus- 
tained by his own people, and that for that reason he could 
not be held legally culpable. 

The British Premier Lloyd George was merely echoing 
the demands of his nation when he declared: 

The Kaiser must be prosecuted. The war was a crime in the way 
it was planned ; in the wantonness with which it was provoked ; in 
the manner in which it was prosecuted. The men responsible must not 
be let off because their heads were crowned when they perpetrated the 
deeds. The government will use its whole influence at the Peace Con- 
ference to see that justice is executed. 

Misleading propaganda was put out upon almost every 
conceivable topic from the world's Peace Conference of 
Paris. This was no less true in regard to the damages suf- 
fered by the various nations than in other matters. It was 
made to appear that the United States stood third in suf- 
fering the costs of the war. In actual money that was true, 
as a real fact it was false. But it was put out for the pur- 
pose of showing the commanding position that the United 
States should take in the great Conference. But when it 



278 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

came to the relative wealth of the various nations, it was 
found that the war had cost Serbia more than 53 per cent 
of her total wealth, Great Britain more than 50 per cent, 
Italy about 50 per cent, France 45 per cent, Russia 30 per 
cent, and the United States less than 10 per cent, — the 
United States standing, instead of third, at the very bot- 
tom of the list, getting off by far the most cheaply of any. 
And if there was to be anything of justice in the peace 
settlement, the nations which were so greatly Impoverished 
by Germany's ruthless attack should have been reimbursed 
to the limit, and those nations should have had most to say 
in the settlement of damages. 

Germany was required to accept responsibility for all 
the losses and damages inflicted upon her adversaries by the 
war, although not to guarantee full payment. The inter- 
Allied Reparation Commission, appointed by the Peace Con- 
gress in its second open session, was to determine the 
total obligation to be met by Germany; this it was to do 
within two years. Then It would present a schedule of pay- 
ments to be made covering 30 years, reparation payments 
to be a prior charge upon her revenues. This commission 
was to consist of delegates representing the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Japan, and Serbia. 
While those of America, Great Britain, France and Italy 
were participants In all proceedings the members for Japan 
and Serbia would'vote only on questions affecting those coun- 
tries; and the Belgian delegates would take part except when 
Japanese or Serbian issues were under consideration. 

In response to President Wilson's request that the Sen- 
ate approve provisional appointment of an American repre- 
sentative on the reparations commission to be created under 
the Peace Treaty, the foreign relations committee of the 
Senate adopted a resolution declaring that until the Treaty 
was ratified, "no power exists" to carry out its provisions, 
an objection well taken, in view of subsequent developments. 

The British view was that all damages must be paid by 



The World's Peace Congress 279 

the aggressor, meaning that Germany should be compelled 
to pay the whole cost of the war, Including the expense 
to the Allies of raising, equiping, transporting and main- 
taining their armies, as well as reparation for wanton dam- 
age. The French view was that reparation should include 
all that England would demand, requiring Germany first 
to settle bills for destruction In violation of international 
law, and pay the other bills later as she could. The Ameri- 
can position was that reparation from Germany should 
cover only such damages as could be included In wanton 
destruction and violation of the laws of war and of nations. 
The conference committee on reparation estimated 
$120,000,000,000 as the amount which the enemy countries 
ought to pay the Allied nations. For many days the ques- 
tion of indemnities continued to be one of the most trouble- 
some before the conference, the chief Issue becoming not 
what Germany should pay but what she could pay. Both 
Lloyd George and Clemenceau had promised their constitu- 
ents that Germany would be made to pay the full amount 
of what the war had cost the Allies. This was estimated 
by the British at one hundred and twenty billion dollars 
and by the French as high as two hundred billions. The 
financial experts of the conference, however, concluded that 
the payment of any such sum by Germany was Impossible. 
In May, 1920, the amount was fixed at $30,000,000,000'^ 

'In late April, 1921, the Reparations Commission fixed upon the sum 
of approximately $33,000,000,000 for Germany to pay, it having until 
May I, 1921, to conclude its work. The amount determined in January 
was a great reduction from the $67,000,000,000 agreed upon in the previous 
July. Yet in March, Germany submitted counter proposals offering about 
one-third of the sum the Reparations Commission had fixed upon, and sought 
the intervention of the United States in their behalf. But the new Ad- 
ministration had come into power, and it very promptly declined to act 
upon the suggestion. Thereupon the German ministry resigned. The 
amount finally agreed upon was of the present sum of $21,000,000,000, which, 
spread over the forty-two years allowed for payment, totalled $56,000,000,000, 
including interest. 

As the fateful May i approached, both sides mobilized their military 
forces, France having declared that no more trifling would be permitted 
on the part of Germany in fulfilling her obligations under the Treaty, by 
the terms of whicb Germany accepted "responsibility for causing all the 
loss and damage' inflicted upon the Allies, and undertook "compensation 



2 8o The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

— about what the war had cost the United States. None 
of this, however, was to be paid to this country. 

The treaty of peace contains an article whereby the 
Powers "publicly arraign William II. of Hohenzollern for 
a supreme offense ajgainst international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties." And "a special tribunal to try the 
accused," with five judges from the United States, Great 
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, is provided. While the 
American commissioners at the Peace Congress gave partial 
assent to the position of the majority standing for criminal 
prosecution on the charge violating the usages of war, led 
by Mr. Lansing they protested against including violations 
of "the laws of humanity." This position of the American 
commissioners has found support among international law 
experts. An Italian parliamentary commission found : 

Crimes attributed to the former kaiser were not contemplated in 
any penal code. Nobody can be called to answer, and be punished, 
for acts which, when committed, did not constitute a crime contem- 
plated by law. It is impossible to ask Holland to extradite her guest 
for political crimes not within the purview of present treaties. 

On January 15, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allies 
made a demand upon the government of Plolland for the 
surrender of William of Hohenzollern, former emperor 
of Germany, that he might be tried for the crimes of the 
Great War. 

To this demand, Holland's reply, on January 23, was a 
peremptory denial. The reason given was that Holland 
could not admit, "in the present case, any other duty than 
that imposed on it by the laws of the kingdom and national 
tradition." And that the former emperor was entitled 
to the benefit of the country's laws and of the traditional 
right of refuge for the vanquished in international conflicts; 

for all damages done to the civilian population and their property" in Allied 
countries. England was ready to back up the stand of France, and with 
the United States refusing to take a hand in aiding Germany, there was but 
one thing for Germany to do — meet her legal international obligations in 
the matter of reparations. 



The H^orld's Peace Congress 2R1 

and that the sacred duty of justice and national honor de- 
manded of the government of Holland that It do not with- 
draw from this refugee the benefit of its laws and tiiis 
tradition. 

And it stated that "It rejects with energy, all suspicion 
of wishing to cover with Its sovereign right and its moral 
authority, violations of the essential principles of the solid- 
arity of nations; but It cannot recognize an international 
duty to associate Itself with this act of high international 
policy of the Powers." 

The original One Hundred, selected to give guidance 
to the Peace Congress, gave way to the Council of Ten; and 
that in turn. In April, 19 19 to the Council of Five, Including 
Japan; then Japan was dropped from the inner circle, and 
Premiers Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, and Presi- 
dent Wilson, known as the Council of Four, carried on the 
discussions on the most Important Issues of the conference 
among themselves. Later Premier Clemenceau and Lloyd 
George with President Wilson, constituted the inner circle. 
These came to be known as the "Big Five" the "Big Four" 
and the "Big Three." 

Instant approval followed the suggestion that the Peace 
Congress hold open sessions. Such a proposition was In 
harmony with the open-air diplomacy urged by President 
Wilson. It was a part of the new and accepted order of 
things. It was, therefore, with a shock that created a 
shudder when the suggestion came to the people that not 
only were the Americans to be deprived of direct and im- 
mediate knowledge of the peace proceedings but that they 
were to be furnished with such garbled Information as the 
plan of President Wilson demanded and the unworthy in- 
genuity of Creel could supply 

Increasing secrecy characterized the actions of the inner 
circle as It became smaller. Very few decisions were given 
out officially, and this led to speculations on the part of 
correspondents, while discontent ^prevailed generally at 



2 82 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

Paris over the news embargo. Articles attacking the Con- 
ference for its secret diplomacy; charges that the proceed- 
ings were unduly protracted; rumors of "dissensions," 
"crises," "ultimatums" were numerous. It was during this 
period that President Wilson's action, ordering his ship, the 
"George Washington," to France was interpreted as a 
threat to coerce his fellow delegates. There were other 
wild rumors afloat as to Clemenceau's resignation and Italy's 
premier breaking away ready to make a separate peace with 
Austria. 

With Mr. Wilson's first of his Fourteen Points for 
"open Covenants of peace openly arrived at," attacked in 
the Conference it seemed to be the first to be definitely and 
completely nullified. He and others sought to blame the 
Allies but the Paris correspondent of the New York Trib- 
une gave a different explanation: 

Judging from the New York newspapers arriving in Paris, the 
impression prevails in America that President Wilson had made a 
fight for his first point against the Allied delegates. This is hardly 
correct. He has been throughout one of the most determined oppo- 
nents of full publicity. He promptly agreed to closed sessions of the 
conference. He has repeatedly protested to the other delegates be- 
cause of the information they had given to the press. 

Before President Wilson left America to enter the 
Peace Congress at Paris he gave out the statement to the 
effect that there would be no censorship of news passing 
from the Peace Conference to America. Suddenly the news- 
paper men in Paris became aware that every word they 
v/rote was being read by both French and American censors 
and that on occasions some of it was held up, deleted, or en- 
tirely censored. One of the ablest of American correspond- 
ents found it necessary to adopt the formula which he had 
used during the war when the only censorship was in the 
hands of the French — the device of always putting into 
the first ten lines of his dispatches some allusion to "the 



The World's Peace Congress 283 

glorious French." Another correspondent arranged an 
understanding with his people In America to the effect that 
his editors should "always look for the real story In the 
fourth paragraph." 

Strange as such devices may seem to Americans at home 
they were practiced by two of the ablest American corre- 
spondents in Paris. It was necessitated by the resolution 
adopted In one of the preliminary conferences of the five 
powers forbidding any delegate to the Peace Conference to 
talk to newspaper men. And this secrecy was the precursor 
of all kinds of garbled and manufactured news going out 
from Paris. The irritation at the secrecy which enveloped 
Mr. Wilson's negotiations abroad grew rapidly after his 
arrival there. It broke out In the Senate In something like 
open revolt. The last days of January and the first of 
February, 19 19, were noted days for assault upon the 
secrecy In both the Senate and the House, In which both 
political parties, the majority then being the Democratic, 
engaged. 

In the Senate the attack was upon the president himself 
so far as he was responsible for the utter darkness In which 
he saw fit to keep the country with reference to engagements 
to which he was said to be committing the nation In the 
Paris negotiations. Mr. Wilson's obsession for secrctlve- 
ness, for cloistered seclusion, apparendy took the form of 
a fixed delusion that the affairs of the American people were 
things with which the American people had no right to 
meddle. 

On April 7, 19 19, the Chicago Daily News Peace 
Conference Bureau at Paris gave out Information that 
there was great popular resentment against President 
Wilson because he failed to tell the people what he was 
doing. 

A prominent writer In one of the leading American 
weeklies, after declaring that Paris had become a whisper- 
ing gallery, stated: 



284 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

Secrecy has given Germany the handle with which to spread the 
news that serious breaches are being made between the nations allied 
in war. Secrecy has cloaked the vacillating policy which first sug- 
gests that the Lenine government in Russia is unspeakable, next pro- 
poses conferences with its representatives at Prinkipo, considers in- 
vasion of Russia, counts its endless costs and rejects it, and finally 
allows an American emissary to go to Russia, for a talk with Lenine 
— and hopes that the public won't find out that he has been sent. 
Secrecy has made the peace a long way from a people's peace. 

This secrecy on the part of the President had a tendency 
to grow, causing him to lose favor with the large American 
pubhc. It manifested itself in a pronounced degree in his 
dealing with the United States Senate after his return from 
Paris. On August 11, 19 19, he declined to comply with a 
request of the Senate foreign relations committee that he 
furnish it with desired information as to the proceedings 
of the Peace Conference. 

Harvey's Weekly for May 3, 19 19, stated, what was 
probably a well substantiated truth when it said: "We 
must doubt if ever there was a great international confer- 
ence conducted with less frankness and openness, or with 
more of furtive secrecy and subterranean intrigue, than 
this has been under the President's domination." 

What the American people desired above all else dur- 
ing the days of the Paris Peace Conference was the truth as 
to what was going on in Paris. Nothing damaged their 
faith in the President more than the suspicion, however ill- 
founded, that the news that was let out from Paris was not 
the truth, but only something that was permitted to pass 
the censors. This suspicion was increased by the knowledge 
that the cables were controlled by a violent partisan, Post- 
master-General Burleson. It should have been made plain, 
and carried out to the letter, that the strangling of news at 
its source was not to be permitted by willful subordinates. 
The unfortunate thing about it was that the adopted method 
fell in with the President's purpose. 



The World's Peace Congress 285 

On April 14, 1919, President Wilson announced that in 
view of the nearness of the completion of the whole woik 
of the conference, it had been decided to invite the Ger- 
man peace plenipotentiaries to come to France on April 25. 

After three months had elapsed from the signing of the 
armistice the overshadowing urgent issues of the war re- 
mained virtually untouched, while the energies of the con- 
ference had been devoted to experimental innovations. Bel- 
gium and France awaited the righting of wrongs they hud 
suffered, the terms to be imposed upon Germany had not 
yet been framed, and the threatening Russian situation had 
been put aside with an evasion, and the whole economic 
recovery of the world had been retarded by continued un- 
certainty, while expecting really vital settlements. 

Owing to this acute situation there was an outcry against 
unnecessary delays from every part of the Allied regions. 
In the United States it took the form largely of placing the 
blame upon President Wilson for delaying the treaty by 
insisting upon his drafting of the League of Nations. It 
was known that during his temporary absence in the United 
States during the latter part ot February and early March 
great progress had been made on the treaty. Delay fol- 
lowed immediately after his return. Lloyd George assumed 
to speak for the conference, knowing that President Wil- 
son's explanation would avail nothing, and declared that 
matters were moving rapidly as compared with the great 
Vienna Conference during which eleven months were con- 
sumed in drafting the treaty. Lloyd George, however, 
omitted to state that the world was moving much more 
slowly in the time of the Vienna Conference than at the 
time of the Paris Conference of 19 19. Then there were 
no telegraphs, telephones, automobiles, railroads and the 
numerous other contrivances that the world has come to 
regard as common acquisitions since that far-away time. 

No. 14 in the President's Fourteen Points providing for 
*'a general association of nations," represented the single 



286 The fVihon Administration and the Great War 

definite accomplishment of President Wilson's peace mis- 
sion to Paris. 

His demand of the "impartial adjustment of colonial 
claims" resulted In annexation of the territories in question 
by the powers which wanted them, under a nebulous sys- 
tem of mandates. While invoking "self-determination" to 
keep Danzig from the Poles, he was suspending it to award 
Shantung to Japan and repudiating it In forbidding Italy 
to possess Italian Flume. 

From the time the President departed on his mission 
to Europe in December, 191 8, the chief theme of wonder- 
ing writers was his commanding Influence over the nations 
and their leaders. Pictured as a benevolent dictator whose 
wisdom and vision had captivated Europe, whose words 
made peoples forget their traditions and desires, whose 
lifted finger could be the signal for the overturning of 
thrones and«governments, he was represented as the inspired 
champion of justice and Idealism against the forces of Allied 
intrigue, ambition, and rapacity; but for his Intrepid Ideal- 
ism, the world was dally informed in moving accents, the 
lofty purposes of the war would be swept away in the cur- 
rents of national passion and greed; and unless a "Wilson 
peace" were made, militarism would triumph and all the 
sacrifices of the struggle would have been In vain. 

Yet when the treaty's terms were revealed, they were 
found to bear scarcely a trace of his handiwork. The news- 
papers, which for five months had been celebrating the 
Intervention of Mr. Wilson as the one safeguard of mankind 
against a "peace of imperialism and loot," discussed the 
Treaty with solemn approval and without mention of his 
name. They found the terms "moderate," "even lenient," 
marked by "cold, passionless justice," leaving "no rankling 
wounds." The terms of the Treaty, however, are in vir- 
tually every detail those which were laid down by the Allies 
two years previously In answer to President Wilson's de- 
mand for "peace without victory"; they are the identical 



The IForld's Peace Congress 287 

terms which the Administration organs constantly de- 
nounced as grossly imperialistic and hostile to the spirit of 
the age, terms which the President had to go to Europe 
to combat, as the spokesman of higher ideals of interna- 
tional right and human liberty. 

That Germany should acknowledge responsibility for 
her crimes and pay for them to the limit of her capacity, — 
this most important feature in the Treaty was put there 
by the Allies against the President's opposition. He op- 
posed the provision for trial of the former kaiser, and tliat 
went in. He wanted the German fleet sunk, and that failed. 
He declared that the League-of-Nations Covenant should 
not be amended, and it was changed in the particulars most 
vital to this country. His theory was that Germany should 
be admitted at once to the League of Nations, but severe 
probation was imposed upon her. Perhaps his most empha- 
tic declaration was that America would enter "no combina- 
tion which is not a combination of all of us." "There can 
be no leagues or alliances within the common family of the 
League of Nations," was his decree. Yet he came back to 
America and asked the Senate to ratify an alliance with 
Great Britain and France requiring the United States to 
give Instant aid to France if she was attacked by Germany. 

In fact the list of casualties among the principles put 
forth by Mr. Wilson make a formidable list and explains 
the silence of those who had predicted a peace dictated by 
him. He did win some substantial victories: he compelled 
the Peace Conference to of^er virtual recognition to the 
Bolshevist terrorists, and so he is described by a recent 
writer, a confidant of the President and head of the Press 
Bureau, as the "real liberal"; he forced a delaying of the 
Peace Treaty by adoption of the League Covenant; he pre- 
vented the naming of Brussels as capital of the League, be- 
cause, as he explained, the Belgian city "incarnates the 
enmity between races." 

Mr. William C. Bullitt testified before the Senate For- 



288 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

eign Relations Committee that the English statesmen, 
Lloyd George and Balfour, had as their confidential repre- 
sentative constantly with Colonel House and President Wil- 
son, Sir William Wiseman, through whom was arranged 
the plan, later made a part of the Treaty, whereby the 
United States agreed to recognize the British protectorate 
over Egypt, which "took only a few minutes." On this 
point The Nation asks, "How is it that the British. Prime 
Minister and his Foreign Secretary were able to keep this 
insidious janizary, this 'extra-confidential Foreign Office' 
constantly with Colonel House and the President? . . . 
what an ending of the Fourteen Points, after setting the best 
instincts of America aflame, after getting the response they 
had from every democratic element the world over! The 
poor, disowned, tattered . . . unmentionable in the polite 
society of the Peace Conference, . . . brandished at last in 
the unscrupulous hand of the British Foreign Office as a 
mere scarecrow to frighten its maker into a docile and un- 
questioning obedience to the will of economic imperialism! 
Really, except for the poor Egyptians, was there ever an 
incident as comical as this in the whole history of inter- 
national affairs?" ® 

It is difficult to understand why Belgium of all nations 
concerned should have had to suffer the pangs of neglect 
and suspense, and should have been compelled to threaten 
rejection of the Treaty in order to get approximate justice 
from her friends. Challenged suddenly by an overwhelm- 
ing power, forced to choose between surrender with safety 
and resistance that meant a living martyrdom, Belgium did 
not for one instant hesitate; she met with her own flesh and 
blood and her dauntless soul the onrush of the enemy, and 
sank, overcome but unconquered, into four years of slav- 
ery. The whole world rang with the glories of her fidelity 
and heroism, and all mankind was stirred to new concep- 
tions of faith and courage by the spectacle of her supreme 

^ The Nation, New York, September 27, 1919. 



The World's Peace Congress 289 

devotion to duty. The name of Belgium enlisted urinics, 
brought brave men hastening from the ends of the earth 
to avenge her wrongs and made secure the civiHzation she 
had saved by her sacrifice; the suffering of Belgium wrung 
the hearts of humanity and turned to her such an outpour- 
ing of sympathy as history had never seen; the honor and 
valor of Belgium were the themes of statesmen and poets, 
and her deliverance an inspiration of a mighty crusade. 

In every statement of war aims by the adversaries of 
Germany, the rescue and restoration of Belgium held first 
place. Great Britain proclaimed that until her wrongs were 
righted the empire's sword should never be sheathed; and 
after the war had raged eighteen months Great Britain and 
France and Russia united in the solemn pledge: "The 
Allied Powers declare that when the moment comes the 
Belgian Government will be called upon to take part in 
the peace negotiations, and they will not end hostilities 
without Belgium having re-established her political and 
economic independence." Even President Wilson, who had 
previously argued that with such things as Belgium's fate 
America had "no concern," finally declared for her restora- 
tion thus: "Without this healing act the structure and 
validity of international law is forever impaired." 

Yet, with the Conference of the nations assembled to 
frame the decrees of justice and reorganization, Belgium was 
slighted. There were allotted to her only two seats in the 
Council of the peace delegates, while Brazil had three, and 
this flagrant discrimination was corrected only after urgent 
protest had been made. 

The whole world had expected that her needs would be 
the first considered. But weeks of secret deliberation pro- 
duced no help for the prostrate nation, no assurance that 
justice would ultimately be done. The cloistered statesmen 
in Paris preoccupied themselves with problems of the Bal- 
kans, of Central Europe, of the enemy powers, of turbulent 
Russia. Contention rose and fell over the disposition of 



290 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

African colonies and Asiatic concessions and islands of the 
remote Pacific. Above all there was debate over the 
League of Nations, that would have to administer the affairs 
of the world after peace; but for plundered, impoverished 
Belgium there was nothing but vague intimations that event- 
ually her rights would be established according to the ideas 
of the controlling groups from which she was excluded. 

Her condition was desperate; yet it was nearly six 
months after the ending of hostilities before her pleas 
found adequate response. She had counted most, perhaps, 
upon the championship of President Wilson, whose solici- 
tude for the smaller nations had been so eloquently ex- 
pressed. 

Yet the Belgians were to learn that precisely because 
they sacrificed themselves for international law and justice, 
they must be dissociated from the institution created to 
make them secure. In the situation the needs for financial 
and economic support were so urgent that the Peace Con- 
ference appointed a special commission on February 15, 
to report on the matter. Delay followed delay. The situ- 
ation became so desperate that at the end of March, King 
Albert went to Paris to make a personal appeal, in which he 
stated: "The time for promises has passed. If Belgium is 
to live the Council must act." So flagrant had become the 
neglect of Belgium that the London Chronicle made this 
bitter comment: "While other subjects are passionately 
debated, this one, on which no debate ought to exist, is al- 
lowed to go by default." At the end of April, the issue 
still unsettled, the premier and other members of the cabi- 
net made another appeal to the Council for an assurance of 
justice and for an immediate advance of five hundred mil- 
lion dollars from the indemnity. On May 3, the delegation 
from Belgium was instructed not to sign the treaty, and 
this in response to a nation-wide petition which declared: 
"It would be better to risk having nothing rather than to 
abdicate our right to the reparations and guarantees prom- 



The fForld's Peace Congress 291 

ised by most solemn assurances." And it was not until May 
5 that the Peace Conference awarded to Belgium full rcj)- 
aration and priority of claim, which the whole worKl im- 
mediately recognized as an act of utmost justice. Yet it was 
President Wilson who declared in one of his peace prin- 
ciples: "The impartial justice meted out must involve no 
discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just 
and those to whom we do not wish to be just." And "the 
treatment accorded to Belgium seems to have been dictated 
by this singular rule of conduct, an expression of idealism so 
lofty that it forbids any distinction between aggressor and 
victim." "^ 

If the President's course puzzled Americans, it puzzled 
European statesmen more. Americans knew perfectly well 
that he had gone to Europe in the first instance without any 
authorization — indeed had gone in defiance of the American 
verdict given at the election in November, 191 8. But the 
fact that he was there led European statesmen to accept 
him as the representative of America In fact. And the posi- 
tion in which they found themselves In relation to the only 
head of a nation in the Congress was not only puzzling but 
exasperating with his lost prestige. 

One of the rocks upon which President Wilson settled 
as a firm foundation for the structure that he intended 
building for the world was that of self-determination for 
the smaller nations. When Venlzelos, the statesman from 
Greece, asked for an application of his principle of self- 
determination, even after Greece had stood true to the 
cause of democracy and at the cost of civil war, he still 
had to face the stubborn hostility of President Wilson who 
had arbitrarily prevented an American declaration of war 
against Bulgaria, Greece's bitter enemy and a vassal of 
Germany. For when the Greek statesman undertook at the 
peace council to reward that country with territory popu- 
lated by Greeks, President Wilson, disregarding his alleged 

'Philadelphia North American, May 8, 1919. 



292 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

principle of self-determination, in every way possible under- 
took to thwart the purpose, going so far even as to insist 
upon delivering part of Grecian Thrace to the Bulgarians 
and demanding that they have a strip of land leading to a 
port on the ^"gean — this queer strip to be called Wilsonia. 
But the San Remo conference in April heard Venizelos and 
acted without regard to President Wilson's utter disregard 
of his own principle of self-determination and ruled other- 
wise. 

The gravamen of the astounding revelation made by the 
publishing of the Treaty was that Great Britain, to secure 
Japanese support for her claims to the German islands in 
the south Pacific, and France, to draw China into the war to 
obtain the German vessels interned in her ports, entered 
into an agreement with Japan to despoil China when the 
time came to adjust conditions and territorial lines at the 
close of the war. If this was a guilty and unspeakable act, 
America was a party to it, as developed in the Peace Con- 
ference. In what position we are left by the signing of the 
peace pact by President Wilson, and his enthusiastic en- 
dorsement of the Treaty which he described "as nearly 
perfect as humanly possible" is shown by the fact that Mr. 
Wilson traded off all he had in order to secure a League of 
Nations which he afterward killed by his obduracy. For 
he had nothing to compromise, no "common counsel" to 
enter into with the Senate or his countrymen. 

When President Wilson told the American Congress 
that it was necessary for him to be at the World's Peace 
Congress at Paris to see that proper interpretation was 
given his self-enunciated principles, for which, he assured 
the world, America had fought for the first time in Europe, 
the country did not understand him. But what became 
clear as the months of discussion of the League of Nations 
lengthened, was discerned at once by the shrewd statesmen 
of Europe — his dominant purpose of returning to the 
United States with a League-of-Nations Covenant. With 



The World's Peace Congress 293 

this knowledge, they had in tlieir hands the key to the sit- 
uation, and they used it to the full throughout the Confer- 
ence. To get the Covenant, President Wilson paid the 
price demanded by sacrificing his principles one by one, as 
he traded off what he had. Mr. Lansing, in his testimony 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that 
the Fourteen Points were never discussed by the Confer- 
ence — a statement for which President Wilson never for- 
gave him. 

As the debate progressed, the determination of America 
not to become entangled in the affairs of Europe strength- 
ened and the League Covenant proportionately declined in 
favor. 

One of the President's definite statements made in the 
early stages of the Peace Congress was that the United 
States "will join no combination of power which is not a 
combination of us all." It stands against the equally frank 
declaration of Premier Clemenceau for the principle of 
the "balance of power." Thus upon this vital point there 
was a clear conflict of purpose. 

Premier Clemenceau stated it very pointedly, toward 
the end of the Peace Congress, as the President was about 
to return to his own country in these words : 

Now when peace is signed you are going home across the sea. 
The English are going home, too. But France stays where she is. 

Marshal Foch has told you that France is the barrier protecting 
civilization, and so France and civilization must be protected. 

You gentlemen have seen the character of the Germans along the 
Rhine. You know there is no democracy in their hearts. You know 
that their fawning attitude is as false as it can be. And so I say to 
you, France wants no such people in her republic. 

We don't want to annex Germany up to the Rhine, but we do 
intend to see that the German military machine stays behind the 
river. That is what Marshal Foch meant, I beheve. If we don't 
have that protection, France must maintain always an enormous army 
to guard civilization. 



294 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

With our great loss of life in the war that would be a terrible 
burden for France. We must have a natural barrier or else it would 
be madness to demobilize our army. 

I hope that Americans will see it in the same way. I hope that 
the soft words of the Germans will not convince the Americans that 
the leopard has changed his spots. So far I am unconvinced that the 
Germans of today are not the Germans of yesterday, the foes of the 
ideals of America, the ideals of France, the ideals of civilization, the 
foes of all that is desired in the hearts of mankind. 

A Paris dispatch of April 23, 19 19, stated: "In a 
statement issued by President Wilson today he declares 
that Fiume cannot become a part of Italy." And he 
"points out that every condition concerning the Adriatic 
settlement has been changed since Italy entered the war 
upon the promises of the pact of London, the Austro-Hun- 
garian empire having disappeared. He notes that new 
states have been created for which Fiume is the natural 
outlet to the sea. . . . 

"When Premier Orlando received President Wilson's 
statement, he immediately called a full meeting of the 
Italian delegation, which prepared a statement on the sit- 
uation addressed to the Italian people." 

As the conflict was developing between President Wil- 
son and Premier Clemenceau when it was felt that Clemen- 
ceau was right and his position unshakable, not only in the 
eyes of France but in the eyes of enlightened thought every- 
where among civilized nations, and it was apparent that 
President Wilson was attempting to meddle in foreign af- 
fairs, particularly in France which had suffered so greatly, 
while Americans had suffered so little, the efforts at propa- 
ganda sent out from Paris by the American delegation and 
its press bureau, was stifling in the fact that it attempted to 
belittle the ideals in France, urging her grasping disposition 
and the greed of her statesmen in seeking a conclusion of 
peace after America had won the Great War. And this 
propaganda, the American people having no better guide 



The JVorld's Peace Congress 295 

at that moment, went far toward poisoning the miiuls of 
Americans against France. The Paris Malin puhlishcd an 
open letter to President Wilson from Harry dc Jouvcnt, 
spring of 19 19, in which he maintained that if there was to 
be a League of Nations, it should guarantee reparation from 
Germany. He declared that France did not exact repara- 
tion for herself alone, and continued : "Today as yester- 
day France interprets the hopes of the nations. She is 
their voice." And he asks the President to sheer away 
from those who would say that reparation was impossible 
and then states: "If it were impossible that Germany, 
which is as safe as before the war, can repair the crimes 
which she has committed, it would be even more impossible 
for her victims to do so. In that case there would be noth- 
ing left but to despair of humanity." 

And on this matter the Philadelphia Ledger stated: 

False to the terms upon which the armistice was signed ; and false 
therefore to her own plighted word and that of her Allies and her 
enemy, is the demand of France that the peace treaty shall authorize 
her expansion into the Saar basin. The principle upon which France, 
with the nations that helped to save her, agreed to make peace is 
antagonistic to such trickery as that by which France now seeks to 
grab the Saar basin. 

This latter is a mere suggestion of what the propa- 
ganda put out from Paris by the American press bureau 
was accomplishing in seeking to develop American thought 
against even suffering FVance. 

Perhaps one of the hardest things for her to bear was 
the admonition, coming from America through its Presi- 
dent, that she must not irritate the sensitive Germans. 

The injustice of it all was intolerable, but the folly of it 
was worse. The pleas of France were counting less with 
President Wilson than the threats of Germany. It is doubt- 
ful whether statesmanship ever produced a more fatuous 
theory than that Germany, stripped of her fleet and her 
colonies, would plot against a strengthened France or would 



296 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

regard weakened France with sentiment of fraternity and 
gratitude. This was not a matter of territorial aggrandize- 
ment, but of strict economic justice, which the President of 
the United States sought to deny war-torn France. 

As though it were not enough that France should be 
compelled to contribute most to the peace, after contribut- 
ing incomparably most to the war, sustained efforts were 
being made to create the impression that she was obstruct- 
ing a just peace by her "greed" and "selfish demands." This 
campaign of detraction seriously affected public opinion in 
the United States; and it was supported by influential 
American newspapers upon inspiration coming direct from 
the American peace mission in Paris. This propaganda was 
becoming a powerful factor in American public opinion in 
early April, 19 19. An Associated Press dispatch carried 
the semi-official statement charging that "French claims are 
open to construction as meaning something more than mili- 
tary security and as verging upon territorial control." 

Dispatches from Europe told, after he had been in 
the Congress for some time, that "the President's position 
is immensely stronger than when he arrived" and "it may 
be authoritatively stated that he is feeling more optimistic 
today regarding the general situation than at any time since 
his arrival in Europe," and yet it was as early as the Satur- 
day on which the Peace Council began sitting that the report 
reached America of "future confirmation that Mr. Wilson 
is greatly disillusioned" and "already sees the impossibility 
of realizing all his ideals." 

The afternoon papers of April 23, 1919, gave the first 
intimation of a pending rupture in the delegations at the 
Peace Congress. This was brought about by the President's 
position on the matter of Fiume which the Italians claimed 
under the London convention of 19 17 and by President 
Wilson's own announced principle of self-determination for 
the smaller states. News began to reach America in a more 
exacerbated form when it became evident that the Italian 



The fV or Id's Peace Congress 297 

Premier Orlando, after President Wilson's appeal over the 
Italian Government, was determined to withdraw from the 
Conference, to return to his nation, and there determine 
what steps should next be taken. The situation developed 
into what leading American journals had predicted would 
happen months before under President Wilson's policy of 
dictation. The Italians charged that in issuing his appeal 
to the Italian people, Mr. Wilson made one of the gravest 
errors of diplomatic etiquette in the history of diplomacy. 
They charged directly that at 3 130 on the afternoon of 
April 23 they received from Premier Clemenceau and Lloyd 
George and Mr. Wilson a proposal which gave them satis- 
faction on the Dalmatian coast and proposed to make P'iume 
a free city under neither the Italians nor Jugo-Slavs. And 
that the next they knew was Mr. Wilson's appeal direct to 
the Italian people over the heads of their duly accredited 
representatives in the Peace Congress, instead of making 
it to the Italian Government. 

It would not have required great vision to see what 
would have happened, had the delegates of some other na- 
tion taken that action with reference to American duly ac- 
credited representatives at the Peace Congress. American 
newspapers, not under the influence of the Administration, 
deplored the lack of judgment and finesse with which Presi- 
dent Wilson gave out a decision as he did in the Itahan 
case. The Italian press backed Orlando in his position, 
while flaying Mr. Wilson for a bad diplomatic break. The 
French press, more reserved in its expressions, at every turn 
flayed Mr. Wilson for his inconsistency. A poll of the 
newspaper comment taken by the New York Tribune 
showed that the press in the United States was divided on 
the Italian crisis. 

The situation that developed in the Conference m the 
latter part of April, 19 19, over the Fiume question, when 
Premier Orlando withdrew from the Conference, returned 
to his home and received an overwhelming vote of confi- 



298 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

dence and then returned to the Congress stronger than 
before, became the most serious crisis for the Peace Con- 
ference up to that time. Not only was Italy involved against 
President Wilson's dictatorial manner, but the Poles, 
Czecho-Slovaks and Greeks were indignant that Americans 
resisted their territorial claims. Indeed, every nation rep- 
resented had grievances against the United States. Eng- 
land alone remained discreetly silent. 

It was President Wilson who undermined the moral 
authority and the actual power of the democratic govern- 
ments by traveling over Europe preaching a crusade against 
them, inciting the peoples to distrust their leaders as men 
without vision or humane instincts or international honor. 
But the revolt came later, not against the duly constituted 
governments, but against President Wilson. 

Frank H. Simonds, who had perhaps as firm a grasp 
upon the situation in the Peace Congress as any newspaper 
correspondent in the world, gives this view of the great 
crisis in the conference: 

The French Government, regretting that the break seems immi- 
nent, is resolved to make no more surrender of the essential security of 
France to Mr. Wilson, and is determined, if necessary, to endure the 
evil consequences of his withdrawal rather than yield further. 

Lloyd George has abandoned Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Wilson 
knows it. 

Mr. Wilson has a sketch of a separate treaty with Germany, 
which is his final threat if his leadership does not prevail. 

If he insists on going home there will be great disappointment, 
but, I think, no further concessions. The possibility that he will go 
home and attempt to make a separate peace with Germany has been 
threatened here privately for weeks, and has at last been discounted. 

Under the circumstances those at a distance could but 
wonder and speculate. 

The Congress of Vienna, though it attained a bad repu- 
tation for its intrigues and secrecy, the Congress of Berlin, 
and the conferences at The Hague, as well as all other 



The World's Peace Conyrcss 299 

known conferences drew protocols in which could he louiid 
the substance of the opinions, the suggestions, propositions 
and counter-propositions of the various states, "i'ct in the 
most notable Peace Conference the world ever saw, that of 
Paris, 19 19, which was supposed to be the most open of 
any the world ever knew, there was no record kept of any 
such matters. The Ten, then the Five, and after that the 
Four preferred not only to discuss in secret, but to leave 
no trace of their deliberations. They did not have any 
secretaries to record them. They broached and agitated all 
questions without putting anything on paper. They re- 
sumed on one day what they had settled the day before. 
They protested against language attributed to them on the 
outside. As nothing was written they could deny every- 
thing and begin all over again. In the state of things as 
they then existed, neither congresses nor parliaments nor 
peoples are left with any authentic documents at their dis- 
position, and they had to content themselves with the verbal 
declarations of their government ministers, and on many 
important matters no two of them seemed to agree as to 
their meaning. Some day there will be some kind of a his- 
tory written from the patching together of the various 
memoranda and denials of the various members. It will 
not, however, be an authentic record of the Congress. 

America's honor must never be traded off for an indi- 
vidual mess of pottage. America must never be made an 
appendage to a super-government of the world. 



CHAPTER XV 

THE TREATY OF PARIS 

If the United States is still to be regarded as a nation, 
then the most notable treaty in all the history of the making 
of treaties is a matter of prime concern to all Americans, 
from its very inception to the last syllable of the process 
of its final acceptance. And who is it, in this day of "the 
new order," that dares to rise and say. This is no longer 
the day of nations, but the new day of internationalism 
which has superseded the other? Only the man who lacks 
in his system the spark of vital Americanism. The United 
States is yet a nation, under a republican form of govern- 
ment, with a written constitution limiting the powers of 
every branch of its vast energy. And this limiting constitu- 
tion is the basic law of the land. 

The basis, then, of this supreme interest of all Ameri- 
cans is the preservation of the fundamental law of the land, 
that freedom in its highest sense to the individual may be 
kept safe. And that, after all, is the basis of the freedom 
granted to human society. The Constitution of the United 
States is but a means to this end. 

It was in obedience to this Constitution that America 
took upon itself the fateful task of engaging in armed con- 
flict with a dread war machine. It was in obedience to the 
same instrument that her delegates met with other assem- 
bled statesmen of the world to close the direful struggle. 
At this Peace Congress of the world at Paris these states- 
men met to determine upon what terms the conflict should 
be ended. Some held the view that this was the sole purpose 
for which they met or could meet. Others declared that 
they were at liberty to initiate any movement and to formu- 

300 



The Treaty of Paris 301 

late any program for the government of the world tliat tlicy 
might feel an IncHnation to take up. 

It was upon these two simple views that the action ol 
the Congress depended. Accepting the latter view, it la- 
bored and brought forth the document which is the Treaty 
of Paris. It undertook the accomplishment of two purposes 
in one instrument: Closing the armed conilict of the world 
and defining for the nations a form of government for the 
future. 

The former, and that only, is properly the Treaty of 
Peace. The other is known as the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, and was made a constituent part of the former 
at the insistence of one of the American members of the 
peace commission, President Wilson. Thus, when the 
Treaty was completed and came to the United States the 
two were combined in one, and the whole instrument was 
known as the Treaty of Peace. 

This document reached the United States outside the 
usual and regular channels. It leaked to America and into 
the United States Senate, much to the chagrin of Presi- 
dent Wilson; and its discussion there began May 23, 19 19, 
though the President did not present his copy of it In that 
body until July 10. He had been called upon to submit the 
Treaty through regular channels when the document was 
known to be in the country. He refused, though It was on 
sale in the leading capitals of Europe. Then Senator Borah 
informed the country that if the paper was to be withheld, 
he would read the entire document of some 85,000 words 
into the Senate record. A cablegram from the President 
was read by Senator Hitchcock, Administration leader In 
that body, asking a thorough investigation to determine how 
the Treaty had reached the Senate. This Immediately 
brought Senator Borah to his feet, with the statement that 
he had the Treaty in his hands, and that he was authorized 
by those from whom he received It to state how it came 
into his possession, namely, through Frazer Hunt, a corre- 



302 Tlie IVilson Administration and the Great War 

spondent of the Chicago Tribune. He read it into the 
record June 9 after points of order had been made against 
it for an hour with a view to its suppression. 

The Treaty itself is a remarkable document. The long- 
est ever written, it represents the combined product of over 
two thousand experts working continually through a series 
of commissions for three and a half months from January 
18, 19 19. It was printed in parallel pages of English and 
French, recognized as of equal validity, though prior thereto 
the French was understood to be the diplomatic language 
of the world. It did not deal with questions affecting 
Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, except in so far as to bind 
Germany to accept any agreement reached with these for- 
mer allies of hers. It covered a vast range of matters to 
which Senator Moses called attention when, on the floor of 
the Senate, he expressed himself humorously on this wise : 

In this Treaty are considerations of many things — of shoes and 
ships and sealing wax, of cabbages and kings. It roams the plains, 
sails the seas, delves into the earth and soars into the sky; Huns, 
horses and huntsmen alike come within their purview ; books, boun- 
daries and bullets; guns, goats, guarantees and governments; war- 
ships, water-ways, woman suffrage and Wilhelm II — in short, the al- 
phabet and alliteration alike are agonized in an attempt to deal ade- 
quately with merely a topical index to this instrument which we are 
asked to ratify in haste lest we break the heart of the world. 

Thomas Jefferson, eminent in the early history of 
the country, informed President Washington that it was 
advisable, whenever possible, to consult the Senate concern- 
ing a proposed treaty before beginning the negotiations. 
Ignoring this advice prudent, since no treaty is valid with- 
out approval of the Senate, President Wilson created un- 
necessary opposition in the Senate, as he did in the country, 
by his secret methods in the Peace Congress as well as when 
preparing for his attendance thereon. His course there- 
after only widened the breach between the executive and 
the ratifying power, in particular when he refused informa- 



The Treaty of Paris 303 

tion requested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
while it had the Treaty under consideration. 

When President Wilson submitted to the Senate what he 
said was the only authentic Treaty, he was described as 
reading his address slowly and in a clear, quiet voice. His 
manuscript, typewritten on small pages, he held in his left 
hand and with his right he punctuated his utterance with an 
occasional gesture, while before him on the Vice-President's 
desk lay the Treaty brought by him in person from Paris. 

In this message to the Senate the President stated that 
to reject the Covenant of the League of Nations now would 
"break the heart of the world"; that many issues intervened 
to make the Treaty of Peace "not exactly what we would 
have written"; that the compromises, which were accepted 
as inevitable, "nowhere cut to the heart of any principle"; 
that the Peace Treaty as a whole "squares" with the prin- 
ciples that were agreed upon as the basis of peace. He 
urged prompt ratification and with no substantial change. 

When it was declared through the public press that in 
submitting the Treaty to the Senate President Wilson had 
fired the opening gun in his fight to force immediate ratifica- 
tion of the League-of-Nations Covenant without reserva- 
tion, it was also stated that the shell landed short of its 
mark; that Mr. Wilson's address was disappointing to his 
friends and encouraging to his opponents; that for the most 
part it was a repetition of what he had said on former 
occasions; and that it furnished none of the information 
that was expected by both sides in the League controversy. 
It was recognized at the moment, however, that full and 
complete information was promised later. 

It was the first time that the Senate had ever received 
a treaty from the executive in open session and began its 
consideration with full publicity. For the first time a Presi- 
dent of the United States reported as his own ambassador. 
In the matter of actions and policies proposed there were 
innovations of the most far-reaching nature. The situation 



304 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

was described as unique in that it has no parallel elsewhere. 
While the Peace Treaty and Covenant were subject to criti- 
cism in Great Britain, France, and Italy, there were no such 
conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of 
the government — the reason being that in those countries 
the leaders had made the peace project a coalition agree- 
ment and co-operation instead of arbitrary personal direc- 
tion and partisan management. 

The deliberations on the Treaty provoked one of the 
most bitter and prolonged contests between the Senate and 
the President in American history, with the controversy cen- 
tering almost wholly about the League-of-Nations Cove- 
nant. At the sam^ time the newspapers of the nation took 
up the discussion with vigor and the rostrum furnished 
some of the ablest debaters the country possessed on both 
sides of the great question. 

There are three distinct stages of progression by which 
the President encouraged the bitterness of this controversy : 
First, when he passed over the Senate and thus Ignored all 
precedent and history and the advice of the early publicists 
of the nation, as Thomas Jefferson, who advised President 
Washington to confer with the Senate before undertaking 
negotiation of a treaty, since that body must pass upon a 
treaty before it can become operative; second, in refusing to 
furnish the Senate information in his possession, and only 
in his possession, so that it might reach a just and intelligent 
conclusion In its consideration of the Treaty; third, his at- 
tempt to create against the Senate a public sentiment, based 
upon false foundations, and thus force the Senate to action 
against its own better judgment. 

The Senate's effort to get information from the Presi- 
dent when seeking light so as to pass intelligently upon this 
document of supreme importance to the nation and to the 
world, resulted in a showing of efforts on the part of the 
President at concealment from the public that were un- 
worthy of a man in his high position. But in every instance, 



The Treaty of Paris 305 

it indicated the President's conception of government under 
the Constitution as revealed in his written works of years 
previous: That the Senate must approve what the execu- 
tive should choose to devise and that without question; that 
the words of the Constitution, "advice and consent" of tiic 
Senate were words with some meaning outside the ordinary 
use of language that could be read into them by the execu- 
tive. 

This is shown in the President's refusal of August 28, 
not given to the public until September i, to submit to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee other treades to which 
the United States was to be a party, upon the ground that 
compliance would set a precedent for encouragement of 
senatorial encroachment upon the presidential prerogative; 
and upon the further ground that it might create an embar- 
rassment to give out the contents of a treaty before it was 
ready for final action. Replying to this statement of the 
President's reasons, Senator Lodge, chairman of the com- 
mittee, said: 

The declaration of the i6th of June was printed some time ai^o 
in the Record, from the English White Book, the declaration having 
been submitted to the House of Commons on the 4th of July, I be- 
lieve. The committee asked for it merely because they thought it 
would be better that it should be officially before them. 

In reply to another request of the committee for infor- 
mation upon an important point, so essential, in fact, that 
the Senate would have stultified itself in passing upon the 
point without seeking the information at its source, and 
derelict in its duty as well, the President replied that as he 
recollected the busi«ncss, to use his phrase, no agreement 
had been reached concerning it when he left France and he 
had heard of none since. This was concerning the division 
and apportionment of the war indemnity exacted from Ger- 
many. He also stated that he was "not able to bring from 
Paris a complete file of papers" relating to the Treaty, but 



3o6 77/6' JVilson Administration and the Great War 

"only those which happen to be in my hands" — a remarkable 
admission of incompetence and neglect of duty. If the 
President could treat his Secretary of State as harshly as he 
treated Mr. Lansing for what he termed his offenses, what 
terms would he have used to condemn such indifference to 
the public for an offense such as the President admits he 
himself committed, in leaving essential records in a foreign 
land, or what punishment would he have meted out to him? 
Nor was the Secretary of State able to answer vital ques- 
tions, his constant reply being that only the President or 
Edward M, House had the information sought by the com- 
mittee. The refusal of the President to furnish the com- 
mittee essential documents ^ and every other avenue of In- 
formation being closed by the Administration to the commit- 
tee, the chairman was compelled to announce it would 
report the Treaty with Germany to the Senate. 

And all this occurred after the President had promised 
explicitly that he would furnish the Senate with all informa- 
tion in his possession. Instead, he suggested the White 
Ilouse meeting of August i8. It was the President's action 
which kept the Treaty In the committee as long as it was, 
the period of sixty days, and under consideration forty-five 
days. No just opinion by the Senate was possible with the 
information withheld by the President. In violation of his 
written stipulation with France that he would submit to the 
Senate for its consideration the special treaty with that 
nation at the same time he would submit the Treaty with 
Germany, he withheld It until the Senate refused to proceed 
further with the latter until the other was submitted. 

It was during the stage of proceedings when the com- 
mittee was seeking information from the President that the 

* A refreshing contrast to this attitude is that of President Harding in 
submitting to the Senate, February lo, 1922, the treaties of Disarmament 
Conference when he said: "It is a privilege as well as a duty to ask that 
advice and consent which the Constitution requires to make these covenants 
effective. Accompanying the treaties I bring to you the complete minutes 
of both plenary sessions and committee meetings, and a copy of the official 
report made to me by the American delegation to the Conference." 



The Treaty of Paris 30-7 

White House Conference of the President with the Senate- 
Foreign Relations Committee took place. It was disillusion- 
ing to the committee as well as to the American public and 
to the world, when he solemnly declared to the committee 
that he had no knowledge of the secret treaty entered int*) 
by the AUies, by virtue of which Italy entered the conllict. 
There were other treaties to which Senator Johnson in- 
vited his attention — the agreement with Rumania, in Au- 
gust, 1916; the several agreements touching Asia Minor; 
the agreements entered into in the winter of 19 17-19 18, be- 
tween France and Russia relative to the frontiers of Ger- 
many, and particularly concerning the Saar Valley and the 
left bank of the Rhine — and the President of the United 
States declared that he had no knowledge of any of them 
until he reached the Paris Conference. 

Yet, on March 4, 19 18, Mr. Balfour, in the House of 
Commons, stated that "President Wilson is kept informed" 
as to the treaties entered into by the Allies. It was the 
Russian government that published to the world in Novem- 
ber, 1917, the secret treaties. Late In 1917 and early in 
19 1 8, the English paper, the Manchester Guardian, pub- 
lished almost all of them; and early in 19 18 the New York 
Evening Post published many of them. One cause of the 
downfall of the Kerensky government in Russia was the 
refusal of the Allies to revise certain of the secret treaties. 
The secret treaty with Italy, known as the London Pact, 
was made April 27, 1915; and May 10, 1915, it was out- 
lined to the world by Sir Arthur Evans in a letter to the 
Manchester Guardian. It was given to the American pub- 
lic in various forms and in various publications, long prior 
to the meeting of the Paris Conference. 

And President Wilson was the statesman to represent 
America among the statesmen of the world In the Peace 
Congress, where he first knew anything of these secret 
treaties! Yet, in the armistice agreements the boundary 
lines were fixed almost as copied from the secret treaties. 



3o8 Tlie JVilson Admimstrat'wn and the Great War 

He was able to write and sign his statement upon the dis- 
position of Fiume without having seen the secret treaty, as 
he admitted under the questioning of Senator Moses of 
New Plampshire. 

But if it disillusioned Europeans, Americans even more. 
Confidence, which crumbled when the President in seeking 
personal advantage through a Democratic Congress which 
he asked the people to elect in fall of 191 8, was so shat- 
tered after the August, 19 19, White House Conference 
that the President found it necessary to tour the country in 
support of the Treaty he brought home and especially the 
League of Nations. His advocacy of the matter was fatal, 
for, as often, he attempted to make things appear what 
they were not, and his temper did not draw the American 
people to his cause. 

And to all of this was added the adverse features of 
Secretary Lansing's testimony before the Senate commit- 
tee; then the statement of William C. Bullitt, and other cir- 
cumstances that led the people to believe that the Presi- 
dent was not giving them a square deal. It strengthened the 
Senate's opposition to the President's arbitrary and wilful 
manner of seeking to make treaties and of binding the coun- 
try to unprecedented undertakings without consulting the 
co-ordinate treaty-making power of the government. 

In all the queer logic used by the President in his con- 
ference at the White House with the Foreign Relations 
Committee of the Senate, on August 18, 1919, none per- 
haps was stranger than his seeking to answer Senator Bran- 
degee as to the scope of Article X in regard to the express 
"external aggression" when he stated: 

I understand that Article to mean no nation is at liberty to invade 
the territorial inteffrity of another. That does not mean to invade for 
the purposes of warfare, but to impair the territorial Integrity of an- 
other nation. Its territorial integrity is not destroyed by armed inter- 
vention. It is destroyed by retention, by taking territory away from 
it that impairs its territorial integrity. 



The Treaty of Paris 309 

The logic of the President appeared to be that "exter- 
nal aggression" or "invasion" of the territory does n(.t 
mean that the League could be effective in restraining it 
until it came to the council table to arrange the terms, 
which would mean that it might be invaded by a powerful 
army, torn asunder, the property destroyed, the inhabitants 
carried or driven away, or slaughtered; and yet the League 
of Nations was not to become effective as touching that 
invasion or "external aggression" until the terms of peace 
were to be settled, with the aggressor in possession. 

A weakness in the committee's report was that it failed 
to recognize any good features in the Treaty. It did justly 
demand, however, that this nation "declines to assume, ex- 
cept by action of the Congress," any obligation "to preserve 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
other country, or to interfere in controversies between other 
nations." It had been declared by the President that this 
would "cut the heart out" of the League-of-Nations Cov- 
enant. The committee report further declared that "the 
United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to 
determine what questions are within its domestic juris- 
diction," and that "the Monroe Doctrine is to be interpreted 
by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be 
wholly outside the jurisdiction of the League of Nations," 
clarifying the most vague and most important of the pro- 
visions. 

It was thus made clear that the Covenant of the League 
of Nations was the danger from the outset to the Treaty's 
ratification. And the President's rude and arbitrary treat- 
ment of the Senate from the beginning, created a chasm that 
was never bridged and which he appeared to desire to per- 
petuate. 

In this it is probable that history will conclude that the 
President erred. In assuming his dictatorial attitude 
toward the Senate, a body of co-equal constitutional author- 
ity in treaty-making, he ignored history, tradition, and the 



3IO The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

written Constitution of the nation, to say nothing of the 
respect and confidence which the people repose in this con- 
stitutional body. It all appears to have come about as a 
result of the President's misconception of executive functions 
under the Constitution. Either that or an inborn desire to 
assume autocratic powers for purposes of self-aggrandize- 
ment. As a sequel, the Senate's position steadily grew 
stronger, while that of the President as steadily waned. 

As a result of his peculiar conception of executive func- 
tions under the federal Constitution, or for some other rea- 
son of equal validity, President Wilson appeared to think 
it a duty that he should, or at all events believe that he could, 
create a public sentiment that would carry him through, such 
sentiment based uppn false statement of fact; in other 
words, that he could make people believe what was not true, 
and simply because he said it. Examples are but too nu- 
merous. One will suffice to illustrate his method. 

On September 25, 1919, in his tour across the country 
in support of the League of Nations, President Wilson used 
this remarkable argument at Pueblo, Colorado: 

I had gone over there with, so to say, explicit instructions. Don't 
you remember that we laid down fourteen points which should contain 
the principles of settlement? They were not my points. In every 
one of them I was conscientiously trying to read the thought of the 
people of the United States, and after I uttered those points I had 
every assurance given me that could be given me that they did speak 
the moral judgment of the United States and not my single judg- 
ment. 

It was on this kind of argument that the President 
sought to make the American people believe that they had 
given him a mandate to insist upon his terms of peace as 
promulgated in his Fourteen Points. He never disclosed, 
however, who it was that had jointly with him worked out 
the Fourteen Points to his entire satisfaction. But it was 
with that kind of logic that the people were made suspicious 
of President Wilson's right intentions and that discredited 



The Treaty of Paris 3 i i 

him from the time of his tour across the country as they 
had never discredited him before. 

Upon leaving the country to attend the Peace Con^rrcss, 
President Wilson had assured the Congress of his own 
country that it should know all that he did. It soon became 
evident that he did not mean to keep that part of his agree- 
ment. Immediately after he had submitted the Treaty to 
the Senate for its consideration, it became evident that if 
the people of the country were ever furnished "full and com- 
plete" information about the League of Nations and the 
Peace Treaty, together with a history of the negotiations 
leading up to them, it would be in opposition to the Presi- 
dent instead of with his aid as he had promised. To this 
end. Administration leaders in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee set out to oppose every move to obtain from the 
President the reasons back of the Treaty and the Covenant. 

When the situation became so grave that he no longer 
dared face the country with further refusal, the President 
stated that he would receive the committee at the White 
House to talk over the great instrument. The Senate, 
mindful of what had occurred in a similar meeting at the 
White House in February, declined to accept this invitation 
of the President, unless it was distinctly understood that 
it was to be an open meeting and for the use of the public 
and to become a matter of record, instead of a White House 
secret conclave, as had been the former meeting. P>om this 
mid-summer meeting the President emerged with a good 
reputation as a casuist, but he lost tremendously as a de- 
bater possessed of the rugged horse sense of the average 
American. 

The first decisive vote upon the reservations which the 
Senate had determined to make to the Peace Treaty was 
that upon the nation's right to leave the League of Na- 
tions. This occurred on November 8, 19 19, and the na- 
tion's right was sustained by a vote of 50 to 35. This was 
a severe blow to what had been the hopes of the Admmis- 



312 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

tration forces that the Treaty might be adopted precisely 
as President Wilson brought it back with him from Europe 
during the discussion. 

The rejection of the Treaty, with the reservations 
adopted by the Senate, took place November 19, 19 19. 
There were two distinct propositions before the Senate and 
on these various propositions from three to ten Democrats 
voted with the Republicans. When President Wilson was 
disillusioned as to Senate procedure, he having been prev- 
iously of opinion that it required two-thirds of the Senate 
to adopt a reservation, the United States Supreme Court to 
the contrary notwithstanding, and was made to face the 
fact that reservations could be adopted by a majority vote 
of that body, and that they had been so adopted, he sent 
a written communication to his supporters demanding that 
they vote for rejection of the Treaty; and two-thirds vote 
being required to ratify, it was accordingly rejected with 
the reservations. 

After the rejection of the Treaty by the United States 
Senate in a decisive vote in which the Republicans were 
joined by prominent Democrats, the interest in the League 
of Nations was not lessened. It continued to be discussed 
in assemblies everywhere; votes were taken upon it by re- 
ligious bodies particularly in urging ratification promptly, 
many of them without knowing that in so doing they were 
bartering away American sovereignty and independence; in 
mid-January, 1920, the colleges and universities of che coun- 
try took a vote upon the matter, the result of which indi- 
cated a considerable majority In favor of reservations. The 
paramount question then became whether there should be a 
compromise between the position assumed by the President 
of ratification of the Treaty as he presented it to the Sen- 
ate and the reservations which had been adopted by the 
Senate previous to rejection of the Treaty on November 
19. At the Jackson Day dinner in Washington, the Presi- 
dent showed the same obduracy that had characterized him 



The Treaty of Paris 3 i 3 

throughout, while his former Secretary of State, William 
J. Bryan, took the position that the majority in the United 
States Senate had tl\e right to its own views without heing 
dictated to by the executive and a compromise should he 
the order of the day. So prominent became this issue be- 
tween the President and the former Secretary of State, 
that all the other noted speakers on that occasion were lost 
in the fog of discussion which followed. 

The second rejection of the Treaty occurred just four 
months from the time of its first failure of ratification. 
Partisans of the President declared that it was due to 
the partisanship of Senator Lodge and his following. The 
fact is the President gave written instructions to his fol- 
lowers to vote against ratification if any change was made 
in the League-of-Nations Covenant. 

During the long discussion in the Senate and over the 
country of the Treaty, there was no time that it would 
not have been ratified promptly but for the Covenant, a 
wholly foreign matter, having been woven into it. There 
would have been no serious objection on the part of cither 
the President or the Senate. It was the matter of the 
League of Nations alone that occasioned controversy and 
created violent opposition, that strained the relations be- 
tween the United States and the nations associated with 
her in the war, that greatly endangered the real association 
for the purpose it was thought the League would fulfill, 
and which delayed peace and threatened continued disaster 
to the world. 

History will ask, as thousands of Americans had already 
asked. Who is responsible for the refusal to make peace? 
Mr. Wilson sought to place the responsibility on the Sen- 
ate; yet the Senate was eager to make peace and to ratify 
a treaty of peace that would leave American institutions 
and freedom of action unimpaired. If the President refused 
to accept the advice and consent of the Senate as the 
Constitution requires on a matter of making a treaty, the 



314 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

question arose whether he would not be responsible for 
failure. 

But he sought to carry the matter away from the Senate 
and to take it before the country, for which there is no 
provision in the Constitution. In other words he was 
wholly willing to ignore the constitutional requirement that 
he make treaties of peace with the advice and consent of 
the Senate and to adopt a method outside of the Constitu- 
tion by an appeal to a vote of the mass of the people. 

And yet if there was to be a plebiscite, the President 
had provided no means by which to force a vote on the 
simple question, as he would have it passed upon : the 
Treaty as he presented it or no treaty at all; or the par- 
ticular Covenant of a League which he brought from Europe 
or no international organization at all. He sought to 
convince the people that he was with the people, as the 
Senate was against the people; just as in an earlier day and 
in another land Louis Bonaparte held himself put to be 
the most acivanced advocate of democratic ideas In France, 
won a vote by the people and overturned the Republic. 
And even should President Wilson be defeated In such an 
appeal he could easily escape the obloquy of defeat by say- 
ing, "I did the best I could, I bow to the will of the peo- 
ple." 

But the President showed plainly that his devotion to 
the Treaty of Peace and to the Covenant of the League of 
Nations was variable. He clearly told the Supreme Coun- 
cil at Paris that unless his authority was recognized and 
his decisions complied with he would withdraw the Treaty 
from the Senate, and that he would relieve himself of all 
responsibility if his will did not prevail In the dispute be- 
tween Serbia and Italy. He did not hestltate to say this, 
even though he would have to "face the unthinkable task 
of making another and separate peace with Germany" and 
though, to quote his words, he would have to "break the 
heart of the world." 



The Treaty of Paris 3 i 5 

When the President's proposal for a "great and solemn 
referendum" was made, as stated in his Jackson Day let- 
ter, it really meant this question: "Shall the President of 
the United States conclude treaties without advice and con- 
sent of the Senate?" And once that question is answered, 
another President with the same characteristics as Wood- 
row Wilson might easily take the next step and ask, Shall 
the President make laws without the sanction of Congress? 
One is as constitutional as the other. And the President 
who would undertake to overthrow the Constitution on 
one point could as readily assume to overthrow it on tiie 
other. 

Not only Republicans but millions of Democrats agreed 
with William J. Bryan that the president's rejection of the 
Treaty was "a colossal crime." 

Said Senator Owen, one of the president's staunchest 
adherents, in making his final speech before the roll was 
called, on March 19, 1920: 

I do not believe there is a single Democratic senator who would 
not vote for this resolution of ratification if it were not for the belief 
of such senator that the President of the United States desires them 
to defeat the resolution of ratification now pending and would regard 
their failure to do so as a refusal to follow his view as party leader. 

And there was no senator in a better position than he 
to gauge the sentiments of his colleagues; nor did any other 
senator challenge his statement. The vote was 49 to 35, 
and its return to the President was ordered by the Senate, 
and there it remained to his term's close. 

There was never any show for ratification in the dan- 
gerous form in which President Wilson submitted it to 
the Senate, July 10, 19 19. His refusal to permit any 
change, even to safeguard the interests of the United States, 
made ratification impossible. His written instructions that 
it be rejected if changes were to be made, sealed its fate. 

And the event makes sardonic comment on his state- 



3i6 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

craft. At Paris he repeatedly sacrificed principle to save 
the Covenant. At Washington he resisted any concession 
to the demands for the nation's safety. The Kansas City 
Star, in commenting upon the second failure of the Senate 
to ratify the Treaty, said: 

The Peace Treaty, with the League of Nations, is dead. It has 
been killed by the President. In the Senate yesterday, including the 
pairs, there was a majority of eighteen for the Americanized Treaty, 
but the President refused to release the seven senators whose votes 
would have ratified the document. 

Both houses of Congress then took up the matter of 
repealing the action whereby war was declared to exist be- 
tween Germany and United States. On April 9, this meas- 
ure passed the House by a vote of 242 to 150. In a 
modified form, it passed the Senate. But the President 
vetoed the measure, thus continuing technical war of his 
own will, which he so much deprecated that he urged Con- 
gress to take speedy action looking toward peace. It was 
not peace he sought, but a subterfuge. 

It was while the President was withholding from the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee the important treaty 
with France, in direct violation of his solemn agreement, 
that he was urging early ratification by the Senate of the 
document he brought back with him from Europe, declar- 
ing among other things these : 

The channels of trade are barred by war when there is no war. 

Our full normal profitable production waits on peace. Our mili- 
tary plans wait upon it. 

The nations that ratify the Treaty, such as Great Britain, Bel- 
gium and France, will be in a position to lay their plans for con- 
trolling the markets of the world without competition from us, if 
we do not presently act. 

Every element of normal life among us depends upon and awaits 
the ratification of peace. 



The Treaty of Paris 31-7 

The Monroe Doctrine is expressly mentioned as an understand- 
ing which is in no way to be impaired or interfered with by anjthinK 
contained in the Covenant. 

Immigration, tariffs and naturab'zation arc incontestibly domestic 
questions with which no international body could deal without ex- 
press authority to do so. 

The right of any sovereign state to withdraw had been taken for 
granted. 

The United States will undertake under Article X to "respect 
and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and 
existing political independence of all members of tlie league." And 
that engagement constitutes a very grave and solemn moral obliga- 
tion. 

There can be no reasonable objection to . . . interpretations ac- 
companying the act of ratification, providing they do not form a part 
of the ratification itself. 

In the famous reply of the Allies to President Wilson, 
on January 11, 1917, declaring the objects for which they 
were engaged in the war, they stated the principles that 
became basic in the terms of the Treaty of Peace. It was 
a solemn declaration from which they never swerved, 
whether battles were lost or won, until the final victory. To 
those terms they held when President Wilson was urging a 
"peace without victory"; they did not change their purposes 
when Russia withdrew from the war, nor yet when the 
United States entered It; they put those identical prin- 
ciples Into the armistice, and embedded them In the Peace 
Treaty. The result was a settlement which the organs of 
the Administration afterward hailed as a product of wis- 
dom and justice. 

In speaking of the American colonies, Edmund Burke, 
the great Englishman, declared: "I do not know the 
method of drawing up an indictment against a whole peo- 
ple." If he were living to-day he might learn from the 
indictment which delivers the German nation to a moral 



3i8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

judgment from which there will be no appeal now or here- 
after. The measured sentences fall upon Germany's self- 
slain repute like clods into an open grave. 

And in this connection it may be observed that it is 
with strange irony that the words of President Wilson, 
"a peace of justice," frequently upon his lips, were used 
invariably as a demand, not upon Germany, but on Ger- 
many's adversaries; a phrase which he never employed 
except as a means of questioning the motives and decrying 
the policies of the nations battling against the common 
enemy ; the habitual form of his warning and protest against 
"imperialism" and "vindictiveness" and "greed" which he 
attributed to the Allies; — strange that these words should 
enter so vividly into the indictment against Germany, 
namely: 

Justice is what the German delegation asks for and says that 
Germany has been promised. But it must be justice for all. There 
must be justice for the dead and wounded and for those who have 
been orphaned and bereaved that Europe might be freed from Prus- 
sian despotism. There must be justice for the peoples that now stag- 
ger for those millions whose homes and lands and property German 
savagery has spoliated and destroyed. 

What, then, are the terms? Only a few may be here 
suggested as pointing to the character of others. The terms 
of the Treaty were plainly stated and none too severe for 
the crimes committed against civilization. Germany was 
to concede the reduction of her territory in Europe from 
208,825 square miles to 172,000 square miles. Her popu- 
lation was to shrink from sixty-six millions to fifty-four 
millions through the liberation of peoples held in unwilling 
subjection. She was to renounce three million square miles 
of colonial possessions with their populations of thirteen 
millions. Her army, which in peace time numbered two 
million men, was not to exceed 200,000, and after March, 
1920, was to be cut to 100,000. She was to dismantle all 



The Treaty of Paris 31Q 

fortifications on Helgoland and within the /.one of 30 
miles of the Rhine. The fleet which she treacherously scut- 
tled after its surrender was not to he replaced, nor would 
she be permitted to possess military or naval aircraft. Ac- 
cepting responsibility for the war, she was to assume the 
obligation of repairing all damages inflicted, and pay there- 
for to her uttermost capacity under the supervision of an 
international reparation tribunal. She was to devote her 
resources for a generation to the work of restitution to 
the nations she had wronged. 

The main points in the Peace Treaty arc as follows: 

Alsace and Lorraine go to France. 

All the bridges over the Rhine, on their borders, are to be in 
French control. 

The port of Danzig is permanently internationalized and most 
of upper Silesia is ceded to Poland, whose independence Germany 
recognizes. Poland also receives the province of Posen and that por- 
tion of the province of West Prussia west of Vistula, 

The Saar coal basin is temporarily internationalized. The coal 
mines go to France. 

Germany recognizes the independence of German-Austria and 
Czecho-Slovakia. 

Germany's colonies are taken from her by clauses in which she 
renounces all her territorial and political rights outside of Europe. 
The League of Nations will work out the mandatory system for gov- 
erning these colonies. 

Belgium is conditionally given the Malmedy and Eupcn districts 
of Prussia bordering on Belgium, with the opportunity to be given 
the inhabitants to protest. The League of Nations has the final 
decision. 

Luxembourg is set free from the German customs union. 

All concessions and territory in China must be renounced. Shan- 
tung is ceded to Japan. 

Germany recognizes the French in Morocco and the British pro- 
tectorate over Egypt, 

German troops and authorities must evacuate Schleswig-Holstcin 
north of the Kiel canal within ten days after peace. A commission 



320 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

will be appointed to supervise a vote of self-determination in the ter- 
ritory, and the districts wishing to join Denmark will be ceded by 
Germany. 

Helgoland must be demolished, and by German labor. The Kiel 
canal must be opened to all nations. 

The German cables in dispute are surrendered. 
Germany may not have an army of more than 100,000 men and 
cannot resort to conscription. 

She must raze all her forts for fifty kilometers east of the Rhine 
and is almost entirely prohibited from producing war material. Vio- 
lation of the 50-kilometer zone restriction will be considered an act 
of war. 

Only six capital ships of not more than 10,000 tons each are al- 
lowed Germany for her navy. She is permitted six light cruisers, 
twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats in addition to six battle- 
ships, but no submarines. 

All civilian damages are to be reimbursed by Germany, her initial 
payment to be 20,000,000,000 marks, with subsequent payments to 
be secured by bonds. She must replace shipping ton for ton, handing 
over a great part of her economic resources to rebuilding the devas- 
tated regions. 

Parts of Germany will be occupied on a diminishing scale until 
reparation is made. 

Germany must agree to the trial of former Emperor William by 
an international court for a supreme offense against international 
morality and to the trial of others of her subjects for violations of 
the laws and customs of war. 

The Allies and Germany accept the League of Nations, Germany, 
however, only in principle and not as a member. 

All treaties and agreements with Bolshevik Russia must be abro- 
gated, as well as the treaty of Bucharest with Rumania. 

German prisoners of war are to be repatriated, but the Allies 
will hold German officers as hostages for Germans accused of crimes. 

After months of uncertainty and disunion, this most mo- 
mentous and far-reaching compact ever drawn was signed 
by the envoys of virtually all the civilized and stable gov- 
ernments of the earth; and after nearly five years of 
Strife, unparalleled in extent and destructiveness, peace was 



The Treaty of Paris 321 

re-established by the signing of the Treaty. As IVcsidcni 
Wilson declared, there was framed for better or worse, 
"the charter for a new order of affairs in the world." 

To the superficial view the Treaty looked like a fiiialily 
— the nations had counselled together and established i)cacc, 
and the world, it seemed, was freed from war or the im- 
minent threat of it. Yet upon sober examination it was 
perceived that this was the least conclusive document of 
the kind in history. Instead of solving the world's dangers 
and difficulties, the Treaty merely declares the manner in 
which civilization would endeavor to solve them. It was 
really not a settlement. It was merely a program for a 
settlement, and the test of its value lay in the application of 
its provisions. 

And herein it quickly exhibited its weakness. By mid- 
October, 19 19, it had been ratified by Great Britain, France, 
Italy, and Germany. Under its terms, this was sufficient to 
make it effective upon exchange. There was no immediate 
exchange of ratification, as it was hoped that the United 
States would become a party by ratification. Exchange by 
the ratifying nations took place January 10, 1920, and the 
Treaty became fully operative among these nations. When 
news dispatches from Paris, on January 5, 1920, told the 
country that the United States ambassador to France had 
requested the Supreme Council to precede future decisions 
of that body with the formula, "Allied Powers," instead 
of "Allied and Associated Powers," as formerly used, the 
French newspaper Echo de Paris declared: "This marks 
the determination of the United States not to participate 
officially in the decisions to be reached in Paris." 

And now came the danger from the weakness of this 
momentous document. When the Allies, in the spring of 
1920, and even before that, were unwiUing to exert them- 
selves as a unit to save the Treaty from violation and be- 
coming a mere scrap of paper in the hands of Germany, 
France stepped in, as she did in the beginning of the world 



322 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

conflagration, and declared that Germany must observe 
the terms of the Treaty, at least so far as movement toward 
the French border was concerned. And Belgium, as she did 
at the beginning of the world conflagration, boldly stepped 
to her side, and shoulder to shoulder they served emphatic 
notice upon Germany that at least that portion of the Treaty 
was in force. Then President Wilson interposed an objec- 
tion, and declared France had militaristic aims.- While 
the fact is, Germany was plainly and openly violating the 
most essential parts of the Treaty as affecting France, in- 
cluding the requirement to furnish coal to replace that 
wantonly destroyed, and the reduction of her army. When 
the statesmen of Europe came together at San Remo, in 
April, 1920, to take up these matters which affected Europe 
primarily and almost solely, the matters were quickly ad- 
justed. France's complete reply to President Wilson was, 
See that Germany disarms, and then we shall disarm. And 
in this conference, on April 21, Lloyd George stated rather 
pointedly that the League Covenant was inserted in the 
Peace Treaty out of deference to President Wilson; and 
now that President Wilson was to all intents and purposes 
out of European politics, the time had come to clear the 
decks of impracticabilities. 

In his statement the President is perfectly clear and 
says that the purpose of the League of Nations is to protect 
the world against the French government, and not against 
a revival of kaiserism or the overwhelming terror of Bol- 
shevism. That is to say, to curb the imperialistic ambitions 
of the French democracy which, for the protection of its 
own existence and the freedom of the world had lost over 
a million men killed — 57 per cent of the country's manhood 
between the ages of 19 and 34 years — 300,000 more mem- 
bers missing and never recovered; her wounded numbering 
above 3,000,000, of whom 700,000 were rendered per- 

^The most cordial reception given Marshal Foch when he visited the 
United States in October and November, 1921, went far toward wiping 
out this unwarranted blot upon the page of Franco-American friendship. 



The Treaty of Paris 323 

manently helpless. With France's 40,000,000 of a popula- 
tion it meant what would be the equivalent of 3,000,000 
of Americans killed with over 800,000 more missing and 
never recovered, 9,500,000 wounded of whom 2,000,000 
would be so maimed as to be permanently helpless, 'i'his 
should be sufficient answer to Mr. Wilson's accusation 
against F>ance which he singles out particularly to compare 
with Germany under kaiserism as an unbridled aggressor. 

It was proclaimed, however, in a joint statement by the 
three Allied powers on April 26 that they stood unequivo- 
cally for full execution of the Treaty. President Wilson 
was not present and the Europeans found themselves cap- 
able of settling European matters without his hand. Their 
statement said: 

The Allies are unanimous in declaring that they cannot tolerate 
a continuance of these infractions of the Treaty; that the Treaty 
must be executed, and remain as the basis of relations between Ger- 
many and the Allies; and that they are resolved to take all measures 
— even, if necessary, the occupation of additional German territory, in 
order to insure execution of the Treaty. Germany must understand 
that the unity of the Allies for the execution of the treaty is as solid 
as it was for war. 

Germany, still seeking a way of escape from the penalty 
for her crimes against civilization, did not promptly comply 
with these requirements. And when, July 8, 1920, another 
critical point was reached in the conference of the Allies 
with the Germans at Spa, in Belgium, Germany was plainly 
told that the time limit for accepting the Franco-British 
terms of disarmament was set for noon of the following day, 
and that the German army was to be reduced to 150,000 
by October i. It was France that had caused the Treaty to 
be executed, and that in the face of President Wilson's 
unfounded accusations. 

In this connection history must note the fact that from 
the time President Wilson returned from Europe with the 
Treaty, embodying the undertakings to which he sought to 



324 The JFilson Administration and the Great War 

bind the country without authority from the people, the 
Administration was making large plans for a United States 
army that seemed beyond all proportion to any demands, 
except for such obligations. While Secretary Baker saw 
no need of preparation when actual war was confronting 
the nation and thanked God for lack of it, now when the 
war was ended and the world was exhausted he was plan- 
ning for an army of 576,000. It set the country to asking 
why. 

While President Wilson had declared in his New York 
address, upon his second departure to attend the Peace 
Congress, that the League-of-Nations Covenant should be 
so inextricably interwoven with the Treaty that it could 
not be untangled without destroying the whole document, 
Secretary Hughes deftly performed the feat and the sepa- 
rate treaty which he prepared was accepted by Germany, 
and October, 192 1, it was ratified by the Senate. 

"In the multitude of counsellors there is safety"; but 
one headstrong man's wisdom may be fatal. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 

As a policy of the Administration, the League of Na- 
tions was given a place overshadowing any other. Upon 
its success President Wilson declared that his place in his- 
tory must be based. By it his reputation must be made; 
without it, it must fall. 

Whether it gave any individual or any administration a 
standing in history is of little consequence. Whether a 
great policy such as that proposed would advantage the 
nation or the world is a matter of supreme importance. If 
it could but put into practice in the world the great prin- 
ciple of social justice, it would be worth all the efforts and' 
all the heart-burnings the throes of its bringing forth re- 
quired. 

And President Wilson was consistent, persistent, in- 
sistent upon this one thing, however much he wavered in 
the other great affairs of state. He held that The League, 
The Covenant, and not some other, must prevail. He hckl 
that the American people had given him a mandate which 
he must obey, and which he did obey, in bringing from the 
Paris Peace Congress the instrument at first called the 
Constitution of the League, which later became the Cove- 
nant of The League of Nations. And sight must never be 
lost of the fact that there is a distinction with a difference 
between a league and The League. The former is the 
policy of the nation and the world; the latter, that of Presi- 
dent Wilson. 

From history's earliest dawn there have been associa- 
tions of nations. These, in the earliest days, were almost 
wholly for defensive or offensive purposes in war. In mod- 

325 



326 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

ern times they have been placed upon a firmer basis, as 
they have been upon a higher plane. The more advanced 
thought in the United States provoked and built up the idea 
of a league of the more progressive nations of the world 
to enforce peace upon all the nations of earth. Much had 
already been accomplished in the way of education along 
that line when the coming of the Great War gave added 
impetus. Individuals and societies in all sections of the 
country were giving of their energy to forward the move- 
ment. Former President William H. Taft was chosen 
president of the national organization. Once the new idea 
of the League of Nations, as announced by President Wil- 
son, was brought forward, Mr. Taft became its enthusiastic 
supporter; so enthusiastic, in fact, that it was thought his 
enthusiasm ran away with his better judgment. On the 
Pacific coast speaking in behalf of the Covenant he went 
so far as to declare that those who did not support it he 
would not trust over night. Later he materially modified 
his attitude, when the dangers lurking in the instrument 
were pointed out to him concretely. 

Very early in the days of the European conflict, Theo- 
dore Roosevelt said : 

The one effective move for obtaining peace is by an agreement 
among the great Powers, in which each should pledge itself not only 
to abide by the decisions of a common tribunal, but to back its deci- 
sions with force. The great civilized nations should combine by 
solemn agreement in a great world league for the peace of righteous- 
ness.^ 

And this idea grew with him with the years of the Euro- 
pean tragedy. He felt that in the group of democracies 
whose representatives met in Paris to settle the issues of 
the Great War there was the foundation of the structure, 
ready built and cemented by the common ideals of govern- 
ment and of law; and that this structure should be strength- 
ened by creating confidence in it. In his last dictated article, 

'Philadelphia North American, October i8, 1914. 



The League of Nations 327 

but which he had not the opportunity to correct when dcatli 
Intervened, he gave to the world his idea of a real league 
of nations in the beginning days of the World Peace Con- 
gress. 

Would it not be well to begin with the league which we actually 
have in existence, the league of the Allies who have fought through 
this Great War? . . . The American people do not wish to go into 
an overseas war unless for a very great cause and where the issue is 
absolutely plain.^ 

At the same time he criticized the nebulousness of President 
Wilson's expressions, so far as they were permitted to 
reach this country, stating that it was "a serious misfortune 
that our people are not getting a clear idea of what is hap- 
pening on the other side," touching a league of nations, 
while "we all earnestly desire such a league, only we wish 
to be sure that it will help and not hinder the cause of 
world peace and justice." 

It was not until President Wilson began to grip, as he 
believed, some international relationships, that he was cap- 
able of assuming so advanced a position as the great former 
President. Before American entered the war, and only 
four years before he was in his mortal combat with the 
Senate, he voiced his conviction in these words: "Every 
man who stands in this presence should examine himself 
and see whether he has a full conception of what it means 
that America should live her own life." And referring to 
the nation's relations with the rest of the world he de- 
clared : 

We cannot form alliances with those who are not going our way; 
and in our might and majesty and in the confidence and definiteness 
of our own purpose we need not and we should not form alliances 
with any nation in the world. 

But during the Great War he came to believe, according 
to his public statements, that internationalism was greater 

"Kansas City Star, January 13, 1919- 



328 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

than nationalism; that the Covenant, as he brought it 
back from Europe, was greater than the American govern- 
ment. It was by degrees that he reached this stage, and 
only after association with European statesmen, as witness 
his various statements; for in his original position his utter- 
ances were merely in the negative form. 

In his address to the League to Enforce Peace, on May 
27, 19 1 6, he declared that "the United States is willing 
to become a partner in any feasible association of nations 
... to maintain inviolate the security of the highways 
of the sea for the common and unhindered use of all the 
nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either 
contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full 
submission of the cause to the opinion of the world." 

Accepting, September 2, 19 16, renomination for the 
presidency, he declared that "the nations of the world must 
unite in joint guarantee that whatever is done to disturb the 
whole world's hfe must first be tested in the court of the 
whole world's opinion before it is attempted." 

On January 22, 19 17, in an address to the Senate he 
stated that "the peace must be followed by some definite 
concert of power which will make it virtually impossible 
that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again." 

In his address to Congress asking a declaration of war, 
on April 2, 19 17, he declared that "our object is to set 
up among the self-governed peoples of the world such a 
concert of purpose and of action as will insure the observ- 
ance of its principles." 

To the Russian Provisional Government he stated in 
his message of May 26, 1917: "The free peoples of the 
world must draw together in some common covenant . . . 
the brotherhood of mankind must be given a structure of 
force and reality." 

Stating his Fourteen Points in the address to Congress 
on January 8, 19 18, he announced as the last: 



The League of Nations 329 

A general association of nations must be formed imdcr spccifK 
covenants having the purpose of affording mutual guar.mtccs of po- 
litical independence and territorial integrity to great and small na- 
tions alike. 

In his address to the Mexican editors at the White 
House on June 7, 19 18, he said: "The whole family of 
nations will have to guarantee to each nation that no nation 
shall violate its political independence or its territorial in- 
tegrity." 

While touring Europe, in response to the address of the 
French socialists on December 14, 191 8, he declared it to 
be necessary that security against absolutism and militarism 
"should be supported by a co-operation of the nations which 
shall be based upon fixed and definite covenants and which 
shall be made certain of effective action through the instru- 
mentality of a league of nations." And while in Europe 
he gave his definition of the league thus: 

My conception of the league of nations is just this — that it shall 
operate as the organized moral force of man throughout the world, 
and that whenever or wherever wrong and aggression are planned or 
contemplated this searching light of conscience will be turned upon 
them and men everywhere will ask, "What are the purposes that you 
hold in your heart against the fortunes of the world ?" 

A keen analyst in collating these views of President 
Wilson, declaring that his ideas as given out after reach- 
ing Europe were more nebulous than before, commented: 
"If an enduring league of nations Is to be created, the 
structure must be erected by statesmen who are builders. 
It will never rise at the waving of an oratorical wand and 
the utterance of vague formulas of aspirations." ^ It was 
an uncontradicted fact that up to the end of 19 18 the man 
who had made the idea his own and then undertook to 
establish it as an accomplished reality, was still promoting 

'Philadelphia North American for December 30, 1918. 



330 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

abstract theory and unformulated plan. After urging it 
for two and a half years, when called upon to present a 
definite program he was able only to outline vague aspira- 
tions. It was this that led Senator Knox to state: "I am 
entirely ignorant of what the President means by a league 
of nations"; and a Democratic Senator to say that what he 
could gather from the President's idea was a world federa- 
tion to which a large part of the sovereignty of the United 
States would be surrendered; while a third gave it as his 
idea that Mr. Wilson sought to have Great Britain and the 
United States give law to the nations; and yet others took 
the view that he aimed at nothing but a general entente of 
governments, based upon precepts of morality and justice. 

It was in this frame of mind that President Wilson 
began sitting with the world's statesmen at Paris to settle 
peace upon the world. How he delayed the business that 
was of first importance has been related elsewhere.'* The 
cables having been taken over, the public was kept in the 
dark as to what was taking place by way of binding the 
nation in a league. Nor was the nation aware that an 
American plan for a league of nations was proposed, until 
the fact was disclosed upon close questioning of the Presi- 
dent by senators at a White House conference with the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee after the Treaty was 
concluded. Even then the President did not permit this 
plan to come to the light. The form adopted was drawn 
by the British General Smuts and patterned upon the form 
of government of the British Empire. 

Just before President Wilson returned to the United 
States in February, for the closing days of Congress, he 
read to the peace conference the League-of-Nations Con- 
stitution. This he permitted to reach this side of the 
Atlantic. So violent and sweeping was the criticism of the 
program that flared up in the Senate that some eager edi- 
tors were asking whether, after all, the entire project was 

" See chapter on The Peace Congress. 



The League of Nations 331 

to be wrecked by the nation that hatl been rcsanlcd as its 
special sponsor. President Wilson hat! sent in atlvaiuc of 
his coming a message requesting that thcr^- be no discussion 
of the League until he could present it to the people. This 
request was wholly disregarded on all sides. The most 
violent discussion ensued. Some of the staunchest of rock- 
ribbed Democrats, as the veteran Henry Watterson of Ken- 
tucky, took decisive stand against the constitution; while 
some of the most prominent men of the opposite party, as 
former President Taft, took a firm stand for the instrument. 
Promptly thirty-nine senators signed a statement that they 
would not vote for ratification of the Treaty with this Con- 
stitution as a part thereof. This doomed It to defeat. 
President Lowell of Harvard University, favoring the Con- 
stitution as a whole, thought It faulty in construction, some- 
what loosely drawn, and requiring some amendments. 
Senator Lodge, declaring In favor of the principle of a 
league of nations to Insure the peace of the world, strongly 
opposed the form In which presented, one of about forty 
plans suggested. It was felt that the one which President 
Wilson accepted and brought to America had not safe- 
guarded vital interests of the United States, but he an- 
nounced that "there is good and sufliclent reason for the 
phraseology and substance of each article." And when he 
failed to justify or even Intelligently explain the new doc- 
trine, there was immediate and fierce attack from all 
quarters, and the country was being stirred as it had not 
been since war days. 

At noon of March 4 the new Senate began its existence. 
When President Wilson, on the evening of that day, as he 
was taking his departure a second time for the Pans Peace 
Congress, appeared for a public address In New York, he 
and former President Taft went upon the platform arm in 
arm. The public interest was at high pitch. Of the 100,- 
000 applications for admission to the place of meeting, the 
Metropolitan Opera House, all had to be denied except the 



332 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

3,400 for whom there were seats and an additional 500 
whom the law permitted to stand. Mr. Taft spoke first. 
The President followed. He knew of the statement signed 
by the 39 senators, namely: 

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate of the United States 
in the discharge of its constitutional duty of advice in regard to 
treaties, that it is the sense of the Senate that, while it is the sincere 
desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace 
and general disarmament, the constitution of the League of Nations 
in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference should not be ac- 
cepted by the United States. 

It cut him to the quick. He looked upon it as an attack 
upon him and as an intrusion of the Senate upon executive 
privilege of making such treaties as seemed best to him 
without suggestion from that body. Braced by the inspira- 
tion of what he accepted as popular approval, he lashed the 
legislative body in a tone of jeering defiance, declaring that 
Senators displayed "comprehensive ignorance of the state 
of the world" and that he would hang them as high as 
Haman, but hang them the other way, and that he "loathed 
their pigmy minds." It was felt through the nation that 
such intemperate language was beneath the dignity of the 
high office occupied by Mr. Wilson; it was felt so all the 
more since the nation was looking to him to make clear the 
purposes and undertakings to which he was seeking to bind 
the Republic; and when they asked for bread he gave them 
a stone. For on that historic occasion he declared: 

When that treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will find 
the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads tied to the Cove- 
nant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without 
destro3 ing the whole vital structure. 

And partisans of the President assailed the protesting sen- 
ators as enemies of peace, pro-German marplots, and pet- 
tifogging obstructionists. 

Yet at the very time that these accusations were being 



The League of Nations 333 

made, the Senate statement was openinjr the eyes of states- 
men of other nations, and causing a change in the attitude 
of the French press and of the European delegates to tlie 
Peace Congress at Paris. And when President Wilson 
reached Paris he was obliged to face the fact that the Peace 
Congress had arranged, in his absence, a peace based on 
practical considerations, with the League separate, lie 
thereupon halted the proceedings until the Covenant was 
intertwined as a component part of the Treaty. It is a 
fine part of the irony of the situation that it was Switzer- 
land, and not Mr. Wilson or his associates, that urged an 
amendment to the Covenant confirming the Monroe Doc- 
trine, so far as that appears in the Covenant. So eager did 
Mr. Wilson become to secure approval of his position 
touching the Covenant that other nations, seeing his atti- 
tude, took advantage of it to gain their own points. Ruth- 
less he had been in the use of his great prestige in the Peace 
Congress, ruthless became others in return. He was com- 
pelled to engage in trading to gain his point. The Japanese 
were keen students of his methods, and they drove a ruth- 
less bargain, even with more poignancy than he. On April 
2, Baron Makino, head of the Japanese delegation, de- 
clared: "We are not too proud to fight, but we are too 
proud to accept a place of admitted inferiority in dealing 
with associate nations." As a result of their ruthlessness, 
the Japanese acquired possession of a province inhabited 
by 36,000,000 Chinese. And Immediately President Wilson 
returned to America, he was put on the defensive in this 
deal of Japan, and which an American delegate, Secretary 
of State Lansing, declared was not necessary to obtain 
Japan's approval of the League Covenant. 

President Wilson appeared conscienceless in his bold 
statements to the assembled statesmen of the world that he 
had from the American people a mandate to form a League 
of Nations. If there was any mandate given it was m the 
adverse verdict of the 19 18 election, and its fair interpreta- 



334 ^^^^' JVilson Administration and the Great War 

tion would seem to indicate a command that he remain at his 
constitutional post of duty in Washington rather than taking 
up an unauthorized post in Paris. He had sought to blind- 
fold European statesmen by taking over control of all the 
ways of communication between the United States and Paris 
under the subterfuge that it was a war necessity, and suc- 
ceeded until the ways of communication were again open 
and free to the world. It was on April 28, 19 19, in refer- 
ring to the League Covenant, that he made to the Peace 
Congress this astounding declaration: 

If we return to the United States without having made every 
effort in our power to realize this program, we should return to meet 
the merited scorn of our fellow-citizens. They expect their leaders 
to speak their thoughts. . . . We have no choice but to obey their 
mandate. But it is with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure that 
we accept that mandate. . . . We would not dare abate a single item 
of the program which constitutes our instructions. 

There was never a more audacious pretense than that the 
people had given President Wilson a mandate or instruc- 
tions to deliver the country unreservedly to international- 
ism. Like so many of the war powers, it was taken upon 
purely gratuitous assumption. But its chief evil lay in the 
fact that it misled European statesmen, who did not feel 
at liberty to set lightly aside the statements of the only 
head of a nation in the Congress, even if they knew his 
statements to be without foundation in fact. Yet, when 
these same statesmen did permit themselves to be led 
astray after the warning resolution signed by the thirty- 
nine senators, they should not have accused the American 
people, as some did, of dishonor. If they did not know the 
Constitution of the United States, they should have known 
it required action by the Senate In treaty making. 

After the President's return to Europe in March, the 
Constitution of the League of Nations became the Cove- 
nant. In this country its supporters were termed Cove- 



The League of Nations 335 

nanters. And while the instrument was given to the public 
in all the leading capitals of Europe, it was denied the 
American public. Even the Senate, which must pass upon 
it officially, the President declined to furnish a copy, and 
it was first given that body outside of official channels. 

But on July 10, 19 19, President Wilson appeared in 
person before the Senate and read the text of the Treaty, 
which contained the Covenant. Now the fight waxed more 
fierce than before. Mr. Wilson appeared to use more 
suave methods, evidently to gain senators to his side of the 
controversy and to win the people. But both distrusted 
him. Both sought enlightenment and found it not. The 
first opportunity that offered, in his Boston speech when he 
landed in his own country in February with the League 
Constitution, he ignored. In his later efforts he was but 
confusing. In his White House conference with the Senate, 
his logic fared badly under questioning of the senators. 

Meanwhile every means known to the propagandist was 
being used to forestall a correct judgment on the part of 
the public''' Mr. Taft's statements in support of the Cove- 
nant were given more space than he could command while 
President, except on special occasions. In August, 19 19, 
the joint committee on printing of the Senate and House 
discovered that propaganda favoring the League Cove- 
nant was printed and distributed at government expense.® 
In a speech In Boston, July 8, 19 19, Senator Hiram W. 

"It was announced from Washington that arrangements had been com- 
pleted whereby the Mount Clemens, Michigan, news bureau, the press 
agency supported by Henry Ford for publicity in his libel suit against the 
Chicago Tribune, would report President Wilson's tour across the country 
in behalf of the League of Nations free of charge, for it had its own cor- 
respondent on the President's train. An announcement sent to editors 
throughout the country stated that it would supply the President's speeches 
"in plate form of two or three columns free of charge, transportation pre- 
paid, to such papers as desired them." The estimated cost of this service 
was $500,cxx). The circular offering this free service did not state who 
would pay the bills. 

"Among the publications named were National School Service, with a 
half-million circulation; Sc/iool Life, with 40,000, a semi-monthly; the Great 
Lakes Bulletin, daily, put out by the Naval Training Station at Great Lakes, 
Illinois; and the Life Buoy, at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. 



336 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

Johnson charged that the propaganda covering the whole 
country was devoted, not to the dissemination of truth but 
to deceiving the people, paid for by millions of dollars 
wrung by taxation from an over-burdened people, and con- 
cluded: "We have been picking our pockets to poison 
our minds." 

To combat the powerful influence of the Administration 
with the people's money supporting it, there was organized 
the League for the Preservation of American Independence, 
in which prominent men of the country, regardless of politi- 
cal affiliation, became active with a view to setting the es- 
sential facts about the League-of-Nations Covenant before 
the people in their true light. 

And the people began gripping the situation. At first 
apathetic, the several steps, whether of planned deception 
or of purposed enlightenment, by which the people reached 
the height stand out clear. And each step gained was but 
gathering force to hurry the great mass of the people on 
to the next. In it all, it is a remarkable fact that many 
ministers, churches, and teachers were misled by the Presi- 
dent's sophistry. But the momentum became so great as 
to carry all before it. The first step was the President's 
declaration that he would be bound by the decision of the 
people at the polls in the 19 18 election, and then deliber- 
ately ignoring his pledge not only, but in violation of his 
own pronouncement of "open covenants openly arrived at," 
cutting off all communication with his own nation, sitting 
In secret conclave to bind his nation to dangerous under- 
takings. This was followed by his casting aside the first 
opportunity offered him. In his Boston speech, to explain 
to his countrymen to what he was pledging the nation. He 
not only had thus ignored the people, but still more offen- 
sively ignored the request of the Senate for information that 
would enable it to pass intelligently upon the great instru- 
ment as required by the Constitution. The next step of 



The League of Nations 3^-7 

enlightenment to the nation was his calling individual sen- 
ators to the White House, one at a time, to talk over in- 
formally the Covenant, and the views they gave out after 
they had interviewed the President. But greatly more 
enlightening was the White House conference ^ with the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he undertook to 
state his views of the document; for he had been telling 
the whole country, in season and out, that he could mal;e 
clear every point so that no one need hesitate in Its sup- 
port. Until then, many senators withheld judgment; so 
did many people. Though he had repeatedly deceived tlieni, 
and they knew it, they willingly heard him yet again. But 
they were thinking. He had not convinced the Senate. 
He would now awaken the people to force the Senate to 
action. When he submitted the Covenant to the Senate on 
July 10, he asked prompt action. When the Senate asked 
of him documents to aid In its consideration of the Instru- 
ment, he failed to furnish any. They called witnesses that 
seemed to possess knowledge, among them Secretary of 
State Lansing whose position antagonized the President. 
Much time was lost in seeking information at the best 
sources. 

The next and final step on the part of the President was 
to go before the country. He undertook a tour from the 

' At the President's suggestion, this conference was arranged and it was 
held in August, 1919. Asked as to Article X, of which he is said to be the 
framer, whether it did not bind the United States to undertakings inconsist- 
ent with the nation's fundamental law, he saidtit was not legally binding, 
but that it had a moral obligation that was more binding than would be a 
legal. He informed the committee that aside from the" Treaty itself there 
is no record of the proceedings of the Paris Peace Congress. He said: 
"Each day the matters discussed were summarized and the conclusions 
reached were recorded as a process verbal"; which means that these records 
will be kept secret and that the only copies are held by members of the 
Council. He further stated it as his "confident impression from the debates 
that accompanied the formulation of the Covenant" that the uiiconditional 
right of withdrawal from the League remained in the' United States. 
adding: "That is my interpretation" and "I am confident that that was 
the view." Yet he opposed putting that plainly in writing into the solemn 
instrument, willing to hinge America's most vital interests upon his "mter- 
pretatioc'' and a "view." 



338 The Wilson Administration and the Great JVar 

Atlantic to the Pacific and back again, speaking at the more 
important centers. In the earlier of these addresses, he 
again stepped a few paces beneath the dignity of his high 
office when, in referring to the Senate, he termed those 
opposing the Covenant as "contemptible quitters," and ad- 
vised them to "put up or shut up." Throngs met him 
everywhere. The people were eager to know what he had 
to say of this new thing. His answers but confused the 
people seeking information. In his Des Moines address 
he declared: "I have come out to fight for a cause. That 
cause is greater than the Senate. It is greater than the 
government. It is as great as the'cause of mankind." The 
sophistry of this did not deceive the people. It stirred them 
to a deeper study of the great issue between the President 
and the Senate. Many condemned the Senate. Many good 
people took issue with the Senate. Many church bodies 
passed resolutions supporting the President and condemning 
the Senate.^ This, however, did not affect the thoughtful 
leaders of the churches. It was the Senate that, in that 
crucial hour, saved the fundamental law of the land, and 
real leaders acknowledged the fact. In his commencement 
address on June 8, 19 19, Chancellor James R. Day, of 
Syracuse University, condemned the Covenant as an in- 
famous bargain, declaring: 

The fear that should seize the heart of every red-blooded citizen of 
this country to-day is that the position of the Constitution of the 
United States is threatened in settlement of world controversies at 
Paris. I would reject and overthrow everything before I would re- 
ject the Constitution of the United States. 

And referring to the safeguard of the vital instrument, 
he said : 

^ It became almost a fad for some one in such a body seeking a little 
local notoriety to offer a resolution to that effect; and then to call for 
a vote. As no one knew much about it, the vote was almost invariably 
nearly unanimous for the resolution. These were published in the news- 
papers and it operated as strong propaganda for the cause. 



The League of Nations 330 

If there is any body of men of whom the American people should 
be proud to-day it is their senators, standing firmly for the defense 
of the sacred institutions of our country. Thank God that there is a 
remnant of statesmanship left standing between America and the 
imperial quagmires of internationalism. 

This position was but typical of independent thinkers. 
The bodies of men and women who voted for a resolution 
because some one presented it, and for no better reason, 
were not t>'pical of the best traditions of the country. 

And as President Wilson proceeded on his trip across 
the continent, he constantly lost ground, while men of the 
type of Chancellor Day who gave reasons for their faith 
instead of sophistry for confusion of the inquiring mind 
were winning. When, as he did at Des Moines, the Presi- 
dent declared that "to alter that Treaty is to impair one 
of the first charters of mankind," he was giving utterance 
to statements, blasphemous to Americanism, that turned 
Senate and people, without regard to party, against him 
and his views. It was on September 14, while on his tour 
of the country, that the week of celebration of the adoption 
of the Constitution began, emphasizing the value of consti- 
tutional government. One might have expected the Presi- 
dent to pause long enough to give some expression upon 
the importance of such government as opposed to oligarchic, 
autocratic, or mob government, and of the value which the 
Constitution and the government founded upon It had been 
to mankind. But he did not do that; Instead, he was urging 
his countrymen to force their Senate to approve a Covenant 
which was a theory with him, but which he expounded to 
them as greater than the government. 

The further he proceeded in his discussion, the more 
the people obtained an insight Into the weakness of his 
position and the unworthlness of his demands. They raised 
questions as to the Instrument which he brought back with 
him from Paris. He demanded that the nation make the 
supreme sacrifice "without counting the cost." At Salt 



340 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

Lake City he was questioned outright, as he had been in 
less obvious form previously. He was hurt by these ques- 
tionings. He had not convinced the people, except that 
he was wrong. He had spent himself. Taken ill from 
the great strain and disappointment, he was hurried back 
to Washington, while the whole nation, forgetting for 
the time his ill-conceived mission, eagerly read about and 
discussed his critical condition. It is doubtful whether, in 
all American history, there was a campaign of equal magni- 
tude that was so sterile of result except as it stirred the na- 
tion to its danger. 

He was immediately followed by Senator Hiram W. 
Johnson who stirred the people everywhere he went, as 
far as the Twin City, when he returned to Washington. 
This was the first revealment of how deeply the people 
were interested in this rather abstruse and obscure subject. 
At Kansas City delegations came to hear Senator Johnson 
from four states, including Oklahoma and Texas. 

The great issue, as raised by President Wilson, was be- 
tween him and the Senate. As stated by an eminent publi- 
cist, his attitude was that "at no time shall the Senate be 
permitted freely to perform its constitutional duty, which 
is equivalent to saying that one man can absolutely deter- 
mine the future destiny of the United States." ^ The Sen- 
ate perforce accepted the challenge. The people became 
referee. He sought to make it appear that the Senate was 
against a league of nations, as he confused the people at 
first when he declared that eighty per cent of the people 
were in favor of a league of nations. He could as truth- 
fully have said ninety per cent; for very few are not in 
favor of a league. But to favor some league was one thing; 
to favor the Covenant which he submitted to the Senate was 
quite another matter. Therefore, the Senate wanted to 
change the Covenant so as to meet America's demands. He 
refused to permit any changes in the instrument itself, 

* David Jayne Hill in North American Revieiv for November, 1919. 



The League of Nations 341 

but was willing that clarifying statements might be made 
by the Senate outside of the Covenant. This would have 
been of no value, except to confuse, since it would be no 
part of the instrument. The conclusions reached by the 
Senate committee majority presented the issue that came 
before the country in acute form. It said: 

The League as it stands demands sacrifices of American inde- 
pendence and sovereignty which would in no way promote the world's 
peace, but which are fraught with the gravest dangers to the future 
safety and well-being of the United States. We exact nothing for 
ourselves, but we insist that we shall be the judges, and the only 
judges, as to the preservation of our rights, our sovereignty, our 
safety, and our independence. 

President Wilson declared that to change Article X of 
the Covenant would "cut the heart out of the League." 
This noted Article is this: 

The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve 
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing 
political independence of all members of the League. 

In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger 
of such aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which 
this obligation shall be fulfilled. 

The crucial test in the Senate's consideration of the 
Treaty came on November 13, 19 19, when, by a vote of 
46 to 33, it adopted a reservation to this Article.^" And 
though the President in his Cheyenne address had declared 
that a reservation substantially this he would regard as 
a rejection, it made no difference in the vote.^^ 

"This celebrated reservation is in these words: "The United States 
assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political in- 
dependence of any other country or to interfere with controversies between 
nations, whether members of the League or not, under the provisions of Ar- 
ticle X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States 
under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in a particular case 
the Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole power to declare 
war or authorize the employment of the military forces of the Unitea 
States, shall, by act or joint resolution, so provide." 

"Mr. Wilson entertained the delusion that a reservation could be 
adopted only by a two-thirds vote, instead of by a majority vote. 



342 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

Around this issue waged one of the most hardly con- 
tested struggles in all American history. It reached be- 
yond the seas and involved statesmen of other great na- 
tions. Because of this Covenant being made a component 
part of the Treaty, it was rejected by the Senate on No- 
vember 19, 19 19, seven Democrats joining the majority 
party in rejecting ratification of the unchanged Treaty. 
Four Democrats voted with the Republicans to ratify with 
the reservations that had been voted by a decisive majority 
of the Senate. 

Efforts at compromise were then made by such ardent 
advocates of the Covenant as former President Taft. But 
President Wilson was obdurate. The official statement of 
his position was that "he has no concession or compromise 
of any kind in mind." Prominent men of both political 
parties, leaders in the League to Enforce Peace, sought 
a compromise, all to no effect. Indeed, it was a fact no- 
where disputed that ratification would have taken place 
on November 19, had not the President intervened with 
a letter to his partisans in the Senate to vote down the 
resolution of ratification with reservations — an attempt to 
override the will of that body and to paralyze its constitu- 
tional powers. 

After this action there was a variety of statements as 
to the President's position. This discussion he ended on 
January 8, at the Jackson Day banquet in Washington, 
by a formal statement that rather than permit any modi- 
fication of the Covenant he would carry it into the presi- 
dential campaign by a "great and solemn referendum." 
On the same occasion William J. Bryan took issue with 
the President, declaring that it was the Senate's right to 
adopt reservations as it saw fit. Thus came the cleavage 
that ran through the fall campaign to the undoing of execu- 
tive arrogancy. 

Immediately following the President's Jackson Da.y 
statement, more than a score of Democratic senators framed 



The League of Nations 343 

a plan for a bi-partisan conference with Republicans :m.l 
began a series of daily meetings on January 15 for thresh- 
ing out their differences. Mr. Wilson still intervening, 
stated as late as January 26 that the Lodge reservations 
would "chill our relationship" with the associated luiropean 
powers. Unfortunately for this utterance of the Presitlent, 
Viscount Edward Grey, special ambassador from Great 
Britain to the United States, but whom President Wilson 
declined to see, made public in England the result of his 
observations on the situation in the United States. Febru- 
ary I, 1920, he stated that Great Britain should not except 
to the position of the United States in making reservations 
to the Covenant. It at once put the President on the de- 
fensive. It placed him and his supporters, as their oppo- 
nents put it, in the position of being even more British than 
the Britons, since Viscount Grey declared that there could 
be no objection even to an increase of the vote of the United 
States to more than one, should it so desire. Remarkable 
as was the fact that a statement of a foreign ambassador 
affecting American politics was made and published broad- 
cast without resentment, it was yet more remarkable that 
it was warmly received by Americans. This was due in 
great measure to its timeliness, speaking as he did, not 
only for Great Britain, but for the other Allied nations 
who had done everything short of official proclamation to 
indicate their willingness to have the United States make 
such reservations as it deemed proper. 

President Wilson had told the Senate that failure to 
ratify the Treaty with the Covenant would "break the heart 
of the world." Yet he prevented ratification on terms satis- 
factory to the Senate, to the people, and to the nations of 
Europe. He gave the impression not only to the American 
public but to the European nations as well, that he was 
willing that the heart of the world should break unless 
all would submit to his one arbitrary will. 

On the final vote by the Senate on ratification, March 



344 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

19, 1920, of the 49 voting in the affirmative 28 were Re- 
publicans and 21 Democrats — a gain of 14 of the Presi- 
dent's party to his opponents since the vote on November 
19, 19 19. Just before this vote was taken, Senator Owen, 
of the President's party, and one of his staunch supporters, 
stated it as his belief that there was not a Democratic sen- 
ator who would not vote for ratification if each did not 
believe that the President wanted him to vote its defeat. 
As a matter of history, every Democratic senator but six 
voted for pne or more of the reservations under the leader- 
ship of Senator Lodge. It was not a matter of partisanship 
with them; it was a matter of Americanism. But partisan 
newspapers attempted to accuse the leaders against the 
dangerous Covenant of seeking partisan advantage; and 
many good people were misled by the baselessness of the 
charge. ^2 

From its lofty inception until eliminated by the final 
vote of March 19, 1920, the League of Nations constantly 
lost ground. The reasons assigned were many. Perhaps 
the most potent was the method by which President Wilson 
undertook to force the Covenant upon the people in the 
first place without consideration or discussion; and, when 
discussion became inevitable, by misleading the people by 
false and illogical premises to believe the thing was right 
but which the general discussion disclosed as all wrong from 
the American point of view and in conflict with the United 
States Constitution. And it looked as if, when the "great 
and solemn referendum" was held on November 2, 1920, 
there was nothing more to be said; that the avalanche of 
ballots buried it beyond all possibility of resurrection. It 
will probably be discovered, however, that there is a place 
for an association of nations such as the American people 

"A fair example is an article by Samuel Plantz, president of Lawrence 
College, in the Northivestcrn Christian Advocate, Chicago, December 17, 
1919. Such men failed to perceive that it was President Wilson, and not 
the Senate, who was seeking to pull the wool over the eyes of the people. 
The Senate was living up to the best traditions of that notable body, as 
Chancellor Day recognized. 



The League of Nations 34r 

desire. But there is an end of the Covenant such as IVcsi- 
dent Wilson brought from Paris and submitted to the 
United States Senate on July lo, 19 19. It was Wilsonlsm, 
and not a league of nations, that brought disaster to the 
President's political party— a disaster which he himself in- 
vited and in the face of warnings from those of his own 
political faith who had at heart the best interests of the 
nation and of the world. 

The United States Constitution is the fundamental law 
of the land, and is greater than internationalism; and he 
who declares the latter the greater is of an unsafe type of 
American. 

The action of President Wilson's successor in July, 
192 1, caUing a conference of the great powers to consider 
disarmament seems a more direct and more efficient method 
of helping the world to the path of peace than setting up a 
kind of world government to which the fundamental law 
of the land must be subordinated. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS 

From Its beginning, the American nation has success- 
fully maintained popular government. This it has accom- 
plished through definite, well-organized political parties, by 
means of which all classes of people have been free to ex- 
press their convictions upon any great public matter. This 
is the antithesis of class domination as found, for example, 
in Russia under the czar and in more pronounced form in 
the present regime, where class rule is supreme, as it was 
in Prussia prior to the Great War. 

Two positions of President Wilson assumed during the 
two terms he served, while seeming fatally inconsistent with 
this view are really in accord. A partisan of the more nar- 
row type, he has been regarded as a liberal. As a liberal, 
however, he has not been found generous toward the most 
thorough Americanism. In the liberal has been found the 
man of great position favorable to a class that would 
strengthen his position as an individual. If this liberalism 
tended toward internationalism instead of nationalism, that 
v/as no concern of his. The chief aim was greater power 
^v'ithin the grasp of the President. If that could be at- 
tained through a strictly political organization, then that 
was the channel of operation. If working through a class 
seemed the more feasible, then that was the chosen channel. 
A careful study of the acts of President Wilson's Adminis- 
tration beneath the surface and out of view of the public, 
where he chiefly worked, discloses that every act of the 
first importance faithfully kept this one aim in view, sweep- 
ing from the great circumference straight and rigidly to the 
center, as the spokes of a great wheel from its rim to the 

346 



The Administration and Politics 347 

hub. Never was this purpose lost from sight. Ami ;my 
study of the i\dministnition's politics based upon any other 
theory will be fatally defective. 

Examples of this mode of operation are numerous and 
glaring. One will well illustrate this view. Others will 
be found in this chapter. When the President yielded to 
the demands of the railway trainmen just prior to the presi- 
dential election in 1916, he bowed to an imperious class 
demand. It is probably the most considerable bribe ever 
offered and paid for the presidency, though put into a form 
that, on the surface, partook of the nature of an act of 
virtue. Mr. Wilson was willing to operate through a 
political party so long as that accomplished his purpose; 
through any organized class, when that offered him more. 

It accords well with his theory enunciated during the 
years in his study prior to entering upon the presidency, 
when seeking to express something of his philosophy of 
American government. He declared that the chief execu- 
tive engaged much in politics. And when placed on the 
higher level, this is laudable; when dragged in the mire 
for any purpose, and chiefly when for personal ambition, it 
is most reprehensible to America's best thought. The 
slogan of Jackson's administration that "to the victor be- 
longs the spoils," was excepted to, even in that day. In 
a measure, it was the practice in the Civil War period and 
immediately after, when the spoils system again gained the 
ascendency. But all this occurred when there was no civil- 
service merit system in existence. Moreover, it was thought 
that the nation had advanced somewhat in its view of pub- 
lic office as a public trust between that day and President 
Wilson's incumbency. 

Indeed, prior to his occupying the office of chief execu- 
tive of the nation, Woodrow Wilson had declared himself 
repeatedly, and was looked to by civil-service reformers as, 
a friend and champion of the civil-service merit system. 
And when he became chief executive of the nation, it was 



34^ The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

stated broadly in the land that civil-service rules would be 
strictly adhered to and the scope of the merit system en- 
larged. It was announced with large publicity that the 
post-offices throughout the country would be served by men 
who had earned their position by their capacity for that 
kind of service to the public. 

Yet the Administration had scarcely ended these an- 
nouncements to the public when it began its system of fla- 
grant disregard of merit in the postal service. It was the 
method that obtained throughout the two terms of the Ad- 
ministration of announcing in advance its virtuous purposes 
and then working to accomplish its concealed designs. An 
early notable example was the displacing of Mr. Morgan, 
the capable postmaster of New York City, who had worked 
his way through the grades to the highest position of the 
kind in the country, than whom there was no abler or more 
dependable man for good service, to make way for a man 
Tammany wanted, .the chief organization of corruption in 
New York politics. This was in contrast with the method 
of Mr. Cleveland when he came to the presidency. He 
was large enough a President to continue in that office a 
capable official whom he found there. But it soon came to 
be understood that Mr. Burleson was appointed to the office 
of Postmaster-General for the purpose of building up a 
strong partisan political system throughout the country. 
It was discovered that he was using an appointee, covered 
into the civil service by presidential order, to write political 
letters to ascertain how a senatorial campaign was progres- 
sing in Nevada, through the postmasters of that state. 
The next day after this activity was divulged to the public, 
an activity in violation of law and of the civil-service rules, 
Mr. Burleson, evidently to divert public attention from his 
own impropriety, issued this statement to the public: "I 
sincerely regret that certain Republican leaders have thrust 
partisanship into the congressional contest, which, under 
our constitution, was unavoidable at this critical period 



The Administration and Politics 349 

of the World's War," and referred In a snccrinjj; manner to 
the suggestion of Will Hays, national chairman of tiic op- 
position political party, that "We are not Republicans or 
Democrats; we are Americans" and there shouUl be a unitcil 
effort to elect members of Congress for their Americanism 
and not for their political partisanship. 

It has been frequently asked why Woodrow Wilson, 
private citizen, professed so heartily his friendship for the 
merit system in the civil service, while throwing it so strenu- 
ously into the discard when he became President. The ques- 
tion is capable of intelligent answer only as President Wil- 
son's career is studied in the light of his personal ambitions. 
A study of his acts shows that with him the end justified tlie 
means of Its attainment. He sought a place of power and 
notoriety beyond that of any other of human kind. To this 
end he sought to build up first of all a powerful partisan 
machine which he sought later to convert Into a yet more 
powerful personal Wilson machine. If his public acts and 
public omissions be looked upon from this point of view, 
it will explain many things otherv/isc mystifying and in- 
explicable. This will explain Mr. Burleson, who became 
known as the most incompetent Postmaster-General the 
country ever had and perhaps the most abject slave to po- 
litical methods any President ever knew. It is true that 
he overworked the method until the people protested, but 
protests accomplished nothing either with Mr. Burleson or 
the President, either to correct the error of his appoint- 
ments or to rectify the wrong done to f^althful men and 
women by the execrable methods of the Postmaster-General. 

The numerous cards and posters used by the Democratic 
national committee to secure the re-election of President 
Wilson in 19 16 became familiar to the public at large. 
What was used In one section of the country was used prac- 
tically everywhere, except where It was feared their use 
would alienate votes. Just before the election, the St. 
Louis Republic contained this advertisement which was 



2S^ The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

similar to those appearing simultaneously in hundreds of 
newspapers: 

YOU ARE WORKING: 

— Not Fighting! 

ALIVE AND HAPPY: 

— Not Cannon Fodder! 

WILSON AND PEACE WITH HONOR? 

or 
HUGHES WITH ROOSEVELT AND WAR? 

Roosevelt says we should hang our heads in shame because we are 
not at war with Germany in behalf of Belgium! 

Roosevelt says that following the sinking of the "Lusitania" he 
would have foregone diplomacy and seized every ship in our ports 
flying the German flag. That would have meant war! 

Hughes Says He and Roosevelt Are in Complete Accord! 

The Lesson Is Plain: 

IF YOU WANT WAR 

VOTE FOR HUGHES! 

If You Want Peace with Honor and Continued Prosperity, 

VOTE FOR WILSON ! 

Mr. Wilson was re-elected by a tactical blunder on the 
part of the opposition in California. 

Mr. Wilson not only took a keen personal interest in 
the primaries and elections in the several states; he took 
a hand in directing them. Sometimes he wrote letters to 
the people seeking to govern their action, sometimes his 
trusted lieutenants went into the states to bring to fruition 
his plans. In cases in which he was not able to bring under 
his control the member of the House or of the Senate af- 
fected, he sought to displace him with one more tractable. 
His hand was noticeable in Alabama, in Georgia, and in 



Tlie Administration and Politics 351 

Mississippi, as unfailing Democratic states. In some sec- 
tions, and particularly In Mississippi, his accomplishments 
were for the betterment of the country. But tlie method is 
obnoxious to America's political sense and to a sense of 
justice. If carried to its logical conclusion, it would build 
up so mighty a personal autocracy In the presidency that 
no man, with any feeling of manhood or independence, 
would dare raise so much as a finger. If displeasing to the 
President. He sought to control states that were as un- 
questionably Republican. While denying that he took 
any direct part in the election In Maine, he did not deny 
that men close to him and active in Administration circles 
took an open and pronounced part in the canvass in that 
state. The President's chief spokesman in the Senate, J. 
H. Lewis, was active In the New Hampshire campaign. 
He sought to overturn In his own state of New Jersey the 
situation for his personal advantage. His senatorial spokes- 
man, Senator Lewis, seeing the handwriting, was desirous 
of withdrawing from the campaign in Illinois, until the 
President urged his candidacy. In Wisconsin the Presi- 
dent's activity was particularly obnoxious In that it was 
placed upon the ground of loyalty against disloyalty, the 
attack being upon Mr. Lenroot, the opposition-party candi- 
date, though the President's candidate, Joseph E. Davles, 
had never been in a position to vote upon any of the mat- 
ters pertaining to the war. Even the Vice-President went 
into that state to support the President's candidate. The 
loyalist Lenroot's most convincing reply to the President's 
interference in this state was contained in his speech de- 
livered at Dodgevllle, Wisconsin, March 27, 19 18, preced- 
ing a special election for filling a vacancy, when he said: 

If before the war I was disloyal, then President Wilson, too, was 
disloyal. 

Three months before we entered the war, I did not say that the 
European war must end by "peace without victory." President Wil- 
son said that. 



352 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

Three days after the sinking of the "Lusitania," I did not say 
"we were too proud to fight." It was President Wilson who said 
that. 

On the i8th day of January, 1916, I did not say that I was 
"inclined to think that Germany had a right to sink belligerent mer- 
chant ships without warning." It was President Wilson who said 
that. 

Five weeks before we entered the war I did not say that armed 
neutrality would, in my opinion, be sufficient to protect American 
rights upon the seas, nor did I then say that I was not then contem- 
plating war or any steps that might lead to it. It was President 
Wilson who said that. 

I did not, on May 27, 1916, say that "with the causes and objects 
of the European war we are not concerned." It was President 
Wilson who said that. 

If possible, the situation in Michigan threw a somewhat 
darker shadow on the President's purposes, where the at- 
tempt was made to win the election of a man, of the op- 
position political party, in the person of Henry Ford, the 
automobile manufacturer. Mr. Ford was known at all 
times as outrageously and distinctively a pacifist who would 
do President Wilson's bidding as a member of the Senate. 
On the witness stand, in his action against the Chicago 
Tribune for libel, he convicted himself of his anti-Ameri- 
canism and showed that the only possible fact that brought 
him prominendy before the people and to the President's 
attention was his millions made as a result of American in- 
stitutions. He had declared that the American flag was 
nothing but to arouse American sentiment by, and that 
after the war the flags would come down from his factories 
never to go up again, and that the American flag would be 
superseded by the international flag. This is the man who 
was President Wilson's choice for a seat in the United 
States Senate, and to secure the election of whom all the 
prestige of his high office was used. 



The Adminislral'w7i and Politics 353 

With the President using all of the power of his great 
office to gain the election of a man of the Ford type, and 
using all the influence of the same high ofiicc to secure the 
defeat of Lenroot who had been nominated on the K)yalty 
issue against the influence of the pacifist Senator La T'ollcttc 
of the same state, the question is raised at once as to the 
type of Americanism President Wilson represented and for 
what purpose he wanted to use his type of men in the Senate. 
As all these events occurred during the notable war year 
of 19 1 8, from early spring until the November election, 
there seems little doubt that he sought to focus every 
possible turn of public opinion in the November election 
with a view to gaining a subservient Congress in both of 
its branches. Once this was accomplished, the way was 
clear to carrying out the purposes of his personal ambition. 
The course of the President himself has permitted history 
to question his motive, whether his purpose was to seek an 
inconclusive peace with the backing of the nation, to gain 
a place of first position in the world's history among others, 
or to become the dominating figure in world politics. In 
any event, history will question his loyal Americanism, as 
well as his purpose. 

Early in 19 18, on the floor of the Senate, Senator Smoot 
arraigned the President's partisanship in these true words : 

We can only regret that our commander-in-chief in this stupen- 
dous war, around whom we rally to a man in his efforts to achieve 
victory, has not seen fit to abstain from partisan activities in contests 
for specific political offices and thereby reciprocate in spirit and deed 
the real non-partisanship so essential to success. 

He recalled that whenever criticism was levelled at 
those guilty of incompetence or worse, the retort was that 
they were aiding the kaiser, as was true in the airplane 
fiasco and in the munitions breakdown; and then added, 
what was also known to be true: 



354 The fVilson Administration and the Great IVar 

Practically all Republicans of the Senate and House have laid 
aside party lines since the declaration of war and have voted for leg- 
islation asked by the President, though much of it was revolutionary 
and socialistic in character, and in some cases unjustifiable and un- 
necessary. 

Sv< j Late in the summer of 191 8, after the President had 
I done everything it seemed possible for him to do to secure 
the election of men he desired in Congress, except the last 
eventful throw, he issued a statement declaring that politics 
was adjourned till the war should end. This seemed too 
good to be true, in view of what he had seen .It to do in 
the line of building up a personal political machine from 
the days the tremendous German drive began in France in 
March to the time he made the announcement. But once 
more he was taken at his word, as he hoped to be. For it 
was a pet scheme of the Administration that whenever it 
was about to do something that would outrage the Ameri- 
can sense of right, it would announce something virtuous. 
Taken at his word, that politics was really adjourned for 
the period of the war. Republican national chairman. Will 
H. Hays, proposed to the Democratic chairman a plan that 
would minimize party strife during those dark days of the 
war and promote the election of loyalists. The proffer was 
evaded. And there was regret among loyalists that the 
President himself declined to recommend such a course. 
It did not harmonize with his ulterior plans. He wanted 
men to do his personal bidding. Accordingly, after Henry 
Ford had lost the Republican primary by a vote of two to 
one, he sought election to the Senate as a Democrat. The 
President's plans demanded that he have control of that 
body in one form or another. 

How much the President meant of his "PoHtics-is- 
adjourned" statement, became apparent in October, ten 
days before the national elections were to take place, 
when he issued a statement to the country, beginning as 
follows : 



The Administration and Politics ^ijr 

My Fellow Countrymen: The congressional elections are at 
hand. They occur in the most critical period our country has cvrr 
faced or is likely to face in our time. Tf you have approved of my 
leadership and wish me to continue as your unembarrassed spokesman 
in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express 
yourselves unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic ma- 
jority to both the Senate and House of Representatives. I am your 
servant and will accept your judgment without cavil. , , . 

The leaders of the minority in the present Congress have unques- 
tionably been pro-war, but they have been anti-Administration. At 
almost every turn since we entered the war they have sought to take 
the choice of policy and the conduct of the war out of my hands and 
put it under the control of instrumentalities of their own choosing. 

At the time of this appeal, the campaign was prac- 
tically closed on account of the epidemic of influenza. This 
the President knew. And when he added: 

I need not tell you, my fellow countrymen, that I am asking your 
support, not for my own sake or for the sake of a political party, but 
for the sake of the nation itself — 

he raised a large question as to his sincerity by making 
the appeal under such circumstances. He knew that much 
he said was not true. He knew that it was his party that 
had elected as speaker of the House, Champ Clark, who 
left the speaker's chair to make a speech against the draft 
act of his own Administration, declaring that to him a 
conscript and a convict looked much alike, willing to stig- 
matize the millions of America's splendid manhood that 
left their colleges and places of business to go to Europe 
to fight the battles of humanity. He knew, also, that not 
Republicans but Democrats were blocking effective meas- 
ures for prosecution of the war; that Claude Kitchen, 
pacifist of the first order, chairman of the important ways 
and means committee of the House, failed to put through 
the necessary measures to carry forward the war to which 
he was opposed; that S. Hubert Dent, chairman of the 
House military affairs committee, was so much of a pacifist 



356 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

that the work of this most important wartime committee 
had to be turned over to a Republican, Mr. Kahn, of Cali- 
fornia, in order to get action on the Administration's pro- 
gram. 

For months the people were beginning to distrust the 
President. But it was war time and they stood by him. 
Now, however, the end of their patience with what they 
believed to be his camouflaging was reached. He did not 
state the truth and they knew it. It was impossible to 
reconcile his recent renunciation of politics with this abrupt 
substitution of partisanship at the nation's peril. It was 
all too apparent. It came as a blow in the face of the 
people that the President could, for personal advantage, 
descend so far from his high estate. It was for the unmis- 
takable purpose of furthering his own towering ambition 
and was instinctively felt as a reflection upon the Republic 
itself. The President recorded mental perversion when 
he issued his statement; the people recorded clarity of vis- 
ion at the ballot-box. 

Generally speaking, politics was interned at the nation's 
capital from April i, 19 17, except for the President's ac- 
tivities in a more or less clandestine manner, until he is- 
sued this partisan appeal of October. After that there was 
no end to the outcry and the battle-ground became fierce, 
chiefly by means of printed matter. He had thrown down 
the bars to all restraint upon the part of the opposition. 
On the same day that the President issued this appeal, 
there came statements from leaders of the minority in both 
the Senate and the House, Said one : 

The voters of Michigan, to take a single example, are called upon 
to support Henry Ford — notorious for his advocacy of peace at any 
price, for his contemptuous allusions to the flag, for the exemption 
of his son from military service^ — on the sole ground that he will 
blindly support the President. 

Referring to the support the President had received 



The Administration and Politics i,^l 

in war measures, the statement was most damniii}^ to t lie- 
President's appeal: 

Although the Republicans of the House are in the minority, they 
cast more actual votes on seven great war measures than the Ofnio- 
cratic majority. 

What is the record of the Senate? On fifty-one roll-calls on war 
measures between April 6, 191 7, and the 29th of May, 19 18, the 
votes cast by Republicans in favor of such measures were 72 per cent, 
while only 67 per cent of the votes cast on the Democratic side were 
in favor of such measures. Those were the President's own measures. 

The result of the election was most hcartcnin^r to the 
loyal American. It was not that he cared so much whether 
Republicans or Democrats were chosen as whether real 
Americans were chosen to the national legislature. While 
the most that was looked for by any one prior to the elec- 
tion was that the Republicans might win the House by a 
small majority, overturning the overwhelming majority of 
the Democrats, the nation laughed at the large majority 
received in the House by the Republicans, they also having 
a Senate majority. 

By the end of the first month after the election, there 
was scarcely any paper of consequence that did not con- 
tain a sharp criticism of the President and his advisers, 
when they found themselves free to speak. Papers which 
had faithfully supported the President in his policies se- 
verely censured his dictatorial interference in congressional 
contests. The New York IForld saw in it grave dangers, 
while the Times was "more than a little perplexed to find 
the clue and key to Mr. Wilson's selections, indorsements, 
and repudiations of candidates." 

Some of the local results were particularly enlightening. 
In Missouri, Champ Clark's state, which was regarded as 
wholly safe for the President's party, the Republicans 
elected their candidate to the Senate by a majority of 
30,000, and Champ Clark himself was barely saved from 
defeat. South Dakota, in which state George Creel had 



35 8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

played to the Non-partisan appeal at the public's expense, 
the Republicans elected the most one-sided legislature in its 
history. Indeed, one meaning of the election was the elimi- 
nation of Creelism, with its attemps to stifle honest criti- 
cism and to substitute official opinion for public opinion. 

It also meant cancelling the "advance veto," whereby 
the President, by intervention, dictated what bills should 
be passed by Congress, even what bills should be presented 
to Congress for consideration. It was a stinging rebuke 
for the President's attempt to maintain the political dic- 
tatorship which he had set up. 

Not less surprising, alike to friend and foe of the Presi- 
dent's attitude, were the figures which the election returned. 
No one thought that the President's appeal had stirred the 
soul of America so deeply until the count was completed. 
While two years previously the Democratic majority for 
the presidency was nearly 600,000, now the Republican 
majorities for representatives In Congress aggregated more 
than 1,200,000. In 1916 the President carried 30 states 
and his opponent 18; now the Democrats carried 19 and 
their opponents 29 states. In the White House absolute 
silence reigned, on results. 

The President, as the people came to believe, willingly 
played for the vote of a class, even the dangerous class. 
In his practical politics. The vote of the laboring man 
should always be prized as that of a man deserving high 
consideration. But the vote of a class calling itself the 
laboring people merely because they are organized, while 
a vastly larger number who are unorganized are just as 
truly laboring people, should not be sought more than that 
of any other class as a class. Indeed, in their destructionlst 
tendency they deserve greatly less consideration unless it 
be punitive consideration. 

And yet it was to the selfishness of this class organiza- 
tion that President Wilson showed himself ready to bow. 
As director-general of railroads, William G. McAdoo, under 



The Administration and Politics 359 

date of October 22, 1918, modified a former orcUr as to 
railroad men engaging in politics. The new order permitted 
it in towns where the population was composed largely of 
rail workers. He had not foreseen the result. Or, if lie 
did, it made no difference. The workers obeyed his edict. 
They did not directly take active part in organized politics 
in the 19 18 campaign. They employed others to do it, 
who were not in the active service of the railroads. A 
circular sent out by the Railroad Employes' Department, 
American Federation of Labor, Omaha, addressed to "the 
railroad employes, State of Nebraska," signed by S. II. 
Grace, an officer of the organization, stated: 

The Democratic candidate for United States Senator, John H. 
Morehead, has, through the public press, in answer to our inquiry, 
stated that he favors Government operation of the railroads. It is, 
therefore, to your interest to vote for him if you are of the same 
opinion. 

Making the world safe for Democracy is the duty of all who are 
interested, regardless of the length of time it may require to do it; 
and in order to strengthen the Administration of President Wilson 
men should be elected to Congress at this time who will counsel and 
work for him. 

In view of the benefits already received from the present Admin- 
istration, we, as Railroad Employes, should show our appreciation and 
vote for all Democratic candidates for Gjngress at this time in order 
to show that we, as a class, are with our President, Wood row Wilson, 
first, last, and all the time. 

It was first of all to the class spirit that President Wil- 
son appealed. It was not to the laboring man as such, 
not to the American as such, but the organized crowd with 
a vote that could be swung to him. This was his appeal 
in 19 1 6. The response is indicated by the method em- 
ployed In 19 1 8, as shown In the quotation from the circular, 
put out by Mr. Grace who was only an employe of the rail- 
road employes. 

The politics of the Administration was not satisfied with 



360 The JFilson Administration and the Great War 

these attempted manipulations in the several states and 
in the nation at large and through the various channels 
chosen. It extended to the nation's taxing powers. Speaker 
Champ Clark of Missouri left the Speaker's chair to make 
a speech from the floor of the House against the draft act, 
declaring that to him a conscript looked much like a con- 
vict. The chairmanships of the two most important war- 
time committees of the House, ways and means and military 
affairs, were respectively in the hands of Claude Kitchin of 
North Carolina and S. Hubert Dent of Alabama. These 
three prominent men sought to block measures for carry- 
ing forward the war. 

And it was these, with their sectional associates, who 
showed marked favoritism to the one great industry of 
the South. Ready to tax productions of all kinds from 
the North and West, when a suggestion was made that a 
maximum price be placed on cotton, as had been done in 
the case of wheat, there was such an outburst of rage from 
congressmen from that section that the matter was dropped, 
though the price of its only competitor, wool, was con- 
trolled by the government. These men controlled the leg- 
islative machinery of the country and the President feared 
that if he defied them he might find it difficult to gain his 
end for the future.^ 

Indeed, In view of the fact that under an agreement 
entered into in August, 191 8, the government fixed maxi- 
mum prices on sixty-six items touching leather, the politics 
in cotton became so notorious as to border on scandal. 

The historian would gladly draw the veil over another 
episode in the Administration's political activities in aj 
dangerous way in time of the country's peril, and thus close 
the chapter. 

But history will ask about Leonard Wood and Theodore 
Roosevelt — why? the two most notable fighting men in 

Mn this matter it is enlightening to compare Mr. Wilson's views as 
expressed, prior to his entering upon the duties of the presidency, in his 
"New Freedom," pp. 75, 91, 107, iii, 130-131, and 161. 



The Adminlstvation and Politics -^61 

America were not permitted to fight for their country in 
civilization's cause. 

General Wood had the foresight to grasp the nation's 
needs long before the counti7 was at war. He plaiuK-tl 
the Plattsburg training-camp and executed his plan. It 
appears to have been his chief offense in the eyes of the 
Administration. Yet it was upon this plan that all of 
the training-camps brought into being during the war were 
devised. The Allies knew him, knew his ability, and fully 
expected him to be sent to Europe with the American 
forces. Americans, regardless of political affiliation, ex- 
pected no less. A thorough physical examination by a board 
of capable surgeons showed the baselessness of the Admin- 
istration's statement that he was not physically fit. More- 
over, he had been in Europe during the great conflict and 
knew conditions as no other American mihtary leader knew 
them. His views were so valuable that he was given an 
audience by the President of France. Heard by the Senate 
committee on military affairs, President Wilson was then 
urged to see and hear him. Senator Thomas of the com- 
mittee and a member of the President's own party per- 
sonally urged the President to hear the General on a mat- 
ter of the utmost importance to the entire country. 

On the other hand, Secretary of War Baker,^ the self- 
satisfied pacifist, refused to hear him. The President was 
obdurate. General Wood remained in Washington nine 
days before being ordered by Secretary Baker to Kansas 
to clean up a camp. But otherwise he was ignored by the 
Administration, though the President had dates with many 
others, some of really insignificant relative importance.- 

'Harvey's War IVeckly is authority for a statement showing the Presi- 
dent's officially registered appointments during these nme days: 

Monday, March 25: . 

2:00 p.m.— A newly appointed minister from Honduras, Antonio Lopez- 

gutinez. 
2:15 — The Netherlands Minister. 
2:30 — Senator Hollis. 
5:00 — Representative Helvering. 
5-30— H E. Wills and F. E. Burgess. 



362 The IVtlson Administration and the Great War 

The country was stirred by this conduct on the part of 
the Administration. The Administration offered no ex- 
planation, after the falsity of its statement of his physical 
unfitness was shown. It was assumed it could offer none. 
A dignified, highly-respected, and strictly non-political 
weekly stated : 

The attention of the War Department is invited to the fact that 
its treatment of General Wood carries on the face of it a suggestion of 
discrimination and discourtesy so palpable and disconcerting that it 
may well disturb the confidence of the country at the very time when 
public confidence and public morale are of supreme importance. 

For General Wood is not merely an American and a soldier; he 
is an American of the Americans, and a soldier whose professional 
career has been an unbroken series of successes — administrative, diplo- 
matic, and military. Not only is he the ranking general of the 
American army, an officer of proved and universally admitted ability, 
but by the sheer force of his character and the fine quality of his 
patriotism, he has become one of those really representative Americans 
who are as greatly honored in the Old World as in the New.^ 

Tuesday, March 26: 
2:30 — Cabinet. 
4:30 — Dr. Franklin Martin. 
5:00 — Senator Wolcott. 

Wednesday, March 27: 
2:30 — War Council — Chairman Hurley, of the Shipping Board; McCormick, 
of War Trade Board; Baruch of War Industries Board; Secretary 
McAdoo; Food Administrator Hoover; Fuel Administrator Garfield; 
Secretary of Navy Daniels; and Acting Secretary of War Crowell. 
Thursday, March 28: 
4:30 — Former President Taft and Dr. Lanell. 
5:00 — Commissioner Harris. 
5:30 — E. W. Scudder, Editor of the Newark Neivs. 

Friday, March 29: 
2:15 — Charles Denby. 
2:30 — Cabinet. 

4:15 — Acting Secretary of War Crowell. 
4:30 — Representative Howard. 

Saturday, March 30: No Callers 
Sunday, March 31: No Callers. 
Monday, April i: 
• 2:00 — The Archbishop of York. 
4:30 — Governor Guntor of Colorado. 
5:00 — Mr. George Creel. 
10:00 — Marine Barracks — Army and Navy League Ball. 
l^icsday, April 2: 
Cabinet, A. Mitchell Palmer, and Dr. Garfield. 
*ii8 Scientific American, 542. 



The Administration and Poliiics 363 

And had the President been cai)al)le of risln^r ahovc 
the level of partisan and personal politics to that of a ^rcat 
American, he would have found a place in wliich the ^rieat- 
est living American would have fitted perfccdy in carrying 
forward the great tasks that lay upon the nation in over- 
coming the destroyer of civilization. I'hcodore Roosevelt 
sent to the battle line his four sons, one of whom fouml his 
final resting-place in the eternal camping-ground of I-Vancc 
beyond the enemy's lines. But the great leader himself was 
denied the privilege of gratifying his countrymen's expecta- 
tions. 

Keen was Clemenceau's understanding of the needs of 
the hour when, in May, 1917, the great Frenchman ad- 
dressed to President Wilson a remarkable open letter in 
which he said: 

At the present moment there is in France one name which sums 
up the beauty of American intervention. It is the name of Roose- 
velt. He is imbued with simple, vital idealism. It is possible that 
your own mind, inclosed in the austere legal frontiers, has failed to 
be impressed by the vital hold which personalities like Roosevelt have 
on popular imagination. The name Roosevelt has a legendary force 
in our country at this time, and in my opinion it would be a great 
error to neglect the force which everything counsels us to make use of. 

I only claim for Roosevelt what he claims for himself — the right 
to appear on the battle field surrounded by his comrades. With what 
joy our soldiers have greeted the starry banner! Yet more than one 
poilu asked his comrade, "But where is Roosevelt?" 

In harmony with his treatment of Leonard Wood and 
Theodore Roosevelt, was the President's practice of elimi- 
nating from the nation's service in the time of great need 
its great men in every line of activity, until the situation 
became so appalling as to threaten disaster. Then a call 
was made for such men as Charles M. Schwab and former 
President Taft. 

And so camouflaged was the Administration's system 
of political activity, that the people were led to believe it 



364 The Wilsoti Administration and the Great War 

was statesmanship, until the summer of 19 18 revealed his 
purpose. That President Wilson was one of the most con- 
summate maladroit politicians America ever produced, 
friend and foe alike must admit. He played the game in 
"keeping the nation out of war," played it in getting the 
nation into war, played it in keeping the nation at war 
after hostilities ceased, played with the labor problem and 
with the liquor problem, played it in sacrificing able men 
whom he should have retained, as Secretary of War Gar- 
rison, and in keeping in the background men whom he 
should have been the first to send to the front. Men were 
sacrificed by the ten thousand and money by the billion 
upon the altar of a personal ambition when forbidding 
preparation for the inevitable conflict of arms. In 19 16 
his popularity was high. Then a chief form of appeal by 
a candidate for congressional honors was : "A vote for 
William Hanks, Democratic candidate for Congress, is a 
vote for President Wilson and his policies." Two years 
later the glamor was gone and the form of appeal was gone 
with it. 

It is probably the most pronounced instance in American 
history of a man riding on the high tide of popularity who 
sacrificed an unequalled opportunity to serve America and 
the world to an insatiable but narrow ambition conditioned 
upon small politics — and lost. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

WILSON AND WILSONISM 

Wilson, the Man of Mystery; Wilson, the Much Misun- 
derstood — around these phrases and others like them lias 
already gathered sufficient of the myth kind to build up, 
in the decades to follow, a real Solon or a pseudo-Gracchus; 
enough mystifying specimens to burden the centuries with 
the task of unmasking the historical inaccuracies of the 
present. 

President Wilson is just of the human kind — not more, 
not less; with human capacities, with human frailties. It 
it were to be recorded as a matter of history that he let 
go of truth to accomplish his set purpose, it would be re- 
garded as harsh and unbecoming; or that he undertook de- 
liberately to deceive and mislead the public to attain per- 
sonal ends, it would be resented as a libel upon a large 
historic figure; or that he had an unconquerable passion to 
outshine any other of human kind, there would at once fol- 
low the challenge for the proof. 

Yet, it may be recorded that any citizen who would 
solemnly pledge his word before the whole world that he 
"will accept your judgment without cavil" when asking 
approval at a national election, and Immediately the judg- 
ment is adverse he deliberately prepares to flout that re- 
quested judgment, as in the 191 8 election, any such citizen 
in the ordinary walks of life necessarily forfeits the confi- 
dence of his fellows as a common prevaricator, and takes 
his place in their judgment where he has himself fixed it. 

If, then, a consideration of President Wilson's char- 
acter and characteristics Is prefaced with two simple facts, 
all of the much-declared Mystery-Man disappears and he 

365 



366 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

appears what he actually is — the Human-Man and the more 
likable. The old rule of the Latin poet still holds: Never 
call in the gods to help out of a difficulty until the necessity 
arises. It is most unfortunate for history that too many 
"interpreters" felt that the necessity was upon them. And 
the two simple facts that they so constantly overlooked are, 
first, that President Wilson had an overweening ambition 
for personal ends; second, that his own chosen channels for 
accomplishing his purposes were often outside the limits set 
by present moral standards of society. Keeping in mind at 
all times these two facts, much, if not all, of the so-called 
mystery attaching to Mr. Wilson dissolves as readily as 
the veil of mist in the bright sunshine. Then much of the 
otherwise inexplicable is explained and many of the acts 
of Mr. Wilson that have seemed strange are easily under- 
stood. 

If, indeed, those who have made him to appear largely 
as a Man of Mystery, as Herron, Hapgood, Creel, Baker, 
and Tumulty, had ceased "interpreting" him and his acts 
for the people, there would have been no mystery; and if 
President Wilson's methods had been other than of the 
clandestine and furtive type, if he had dealt frankly with 
the people and their representatives, there had been no need 
of "interpreters" of him and his acts of administration. 
And these were forced interpretations that were given to 
the people from time to time, forced by the President's 
confirmed habit of seclusion and failure to meet the people 
openly and squarely. These interpretations put out so la- 
boriously, at first deceived the people in no small measure; 
but never after the President's partisan appeal just prior 
to the 19 1 8 elections. In that appeal the President was dis- 
robed to nakedness before the country with a swiftness and 
sureness not dreamed of. The interpreters had done their 
last bit of deception upon the people. With that unfailing 
insight of the American people into a moral purpose on 



Wilson and Wilsonism 367 

the part of men in a position of commanding inlluciicf, tlity 
grasped the idea back of the appeal and dealt a blow that 
would have dazed a less obdurate individual. With an 
audacity that amazed and a contempt for public opinion 
that baffled the nation, President Wilson proceeded to carry 
out his previously determined course of personally super- 
vising the Peace Congress in Europe. Taking control of 
the means of communication with his own country untlcr the 
pretext of a war necessity after the war had endeil, as he 
himself declared in his address to Congress In Washington, 
he felt the more at liberty to state to the gathered states- 
men of the world that he had a mandate from his nation 
— with a hardihood seldom found in the annals of states- 
manship. And when done with his self-imposed mission 
there, he returned to his own countrymen and declared that 
the Covenant which he presented to them and which he 
demanded that the Senate, a co-ordinate power in making 
treaties, approve as written, was the "irreducible minimum" 
which the European nations would accept as a compact 
for a league of nations, until Viscount Grey visited this 
country and let the American people know better. It was 
this utter hardness and perversity to moral obligation on 
the part of Mr. Wilson repeatedly exhibited to the people 
that made him the Man Understood, the Man without Mys- 
tery. He stood now before the people just as he was — a 
man who sought to accomplish his purposes through chan- 
nels outside the moral code usually accepted in modern so- 
ciety. His human frailties overcame his human moral 
strength. With the mask pulled off by the people, he was 
seen as his real self. The people turned from him and left 
him in his self-imposed isolation and seclusion. Assuming 
to force the hand of the Senate by a presumptuous appeal 
to the people a second time, the people turned upon him and 
his misrepresentations with a second blow, this time with 
a paralyzing effect that astonished not only the country, but 



368 The IFilson Administration and the Great War 

the civilized world. The President was not misunderstood; 
he was thoroughly understood. The President was not 
misrepresented; he was misrepresenting. 

It cannot be questioned that in his personal relations 
Mr. Wilson was the acme of honor and a fine personality. 
Born and educated in the South until he matriculated at 
Princeton College in 1875 in his nineteenth year, he par- 
took of the qualities of gentlemen bred in the Southland; 
but he cultivated the habit of seclusion and drilled himself 
to the performance of difficult tasks. He set himself apart 
from the people; and while he assumed to speak for the 
people, it was not as one of them. It was in the abstract. 
While of splendid idealism, his idealism almost invariably 
ran counter to the best public thought, because it was in 
the abstract. While a student in Johns Hopkins University, 
only forty miles from the seat of government, he could 
write freely on government without taking the trouble to 
go to the nation's capital to see the government in operation. 
Thus he developed idealism at the expense of prac- 
ticality. It has been said by his admirers that he reminds 
one of Lincoln. If he does, it is chiefly in contrast. Lin- 
coln, too, was an idealist; but he came in touch with the 
people; he was of the people; he came into contact with the 
harsh realities of life. When he was flat-boating down the 
Ohio and the Mississippi, he came into actual contact with 
the horrors of slavery. The conviction that slavery was 
wrong was burned into his soul by this contact, and led him 
to declare that if ever the opportunity offered he would hit 
the thing with a hard blow. With Mr. Wilson it was a 
matter of abstracting upon government in the study, instead 
of going to Washington to see it in operation. In the 
matter of a league of nations he could erect an a priori 
world government without so much as seeing how it would 
affect his own nation when put into operation. 

Cultivating the abstract, he was led to cultivate aloof- 
ness from his fellows. Loving government in the abstract, 



Wilson and Wilsonism 369 

he loved men in the abstract. He appeared to have no very 
real belief in the destiny of the United States as a political 
entity; likewise he spoke freely of "men everywhere," Init 
he did not love men as human beings, as individuals. I Ic 
had less interest, except as it touched him in person, in 
national feeling, that jealous affection for the United States 
as an individual nation, which appeared so strongly in 
two of his predecessors, Cleveland and Roosevelt; likewise 
little interest in men as men, except as groups interested 
him personally, as in the 19 16 demands upon Congress in 
a group that would support him in the election. He couK! 
talk well of matters that seemed to be of interest to indi- 
viduals, but it was to select bodies and his addresses were 
cold. The response was similarly cold. When he met 
great concourses of people in his tour westward to place tiie 
Covenant before the country, it was chiefly artificial and 
cold greetings that he received, lacking in the cordial spon- 
taneity that met Roosevelt in any section of the country 
he visited. 

Comparison has been made of Wilson's style and com- 
mand of English with that of Lincoln. Wilson was college 
bred and a college professor of English; Lincoln was a rail- 
splitter and a back-woodsman purely until he reached ma- 
turity, when he studied law in the loose easy way of his 
day. On the fiftieth anniversary of Lincoln's immortal 
Gettysburg address, Mr. Wilson on the same spot delivered 
the semi-centennial address. The former, though one of 
,the briefest ever delivered, is a classic studied in the great 
universities of the world; the latter, though the set address 
of tht; day, has been forgotten, if ever it was given a 
thought afterward. So, also, with Mr. Wilson's short 
letters. They were commonplace in contrast with Lincoln's 
letter of eternal life to Mrs. Bixby, which he began by an 
ordinary reference to the adjutant general's report. Per- 
haps no finer of Mr. Wilson's style and sentiment is found 
than that in his address accepting, on behalf of the nation. 



370 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

the Lincoln Memorial built on the site of the log cabin 
in which Lincoln was born; and yet it falls far below Mr. 
Lincoln's best. 

The two great men are said to be alike in their spirits, 
both given largely to introspection. Lincoln, as a boy and 
young man, was almost the antithesis of Wilson, however. 
He engaged in and greatly enjoyed the crude sports of the 
early day in the Ohio valley backwoods. Mr. Wilson, on 
the other hand, was given to aloofness in his young man- 
hood days, holding himself apart from the common run of 
mankind, and cultivating the secluded life from his college 
days to the end of his days in the presidency of the nation. 
If ever Mr. Wilson saw an evil that penetrated his soul as 
the sight of slavery which Mr. Lincoln saw as his boat 
floated down the Mississippi penetrated the soul of the 
latter, the world never knew it. If, as Mr. Wilson's 
interpreters declare, he could view the barbarity of German 
warfare which was sinking helpless women and children 
into a degradation beneath that of American slavery of a 
half-century previous, and not have it affect his view of 
public duty, then there is a great difference between the 
spirit of Woodrow Wilson and that of Abraham Lincoln 
as related to God's humanity. 

But these instances are sufficient to indicate that what- 
ever likenesses there may be between Mr. Wilson and Mr. 
Lincoln, the contrasts were so wide and so deep as to practi- 
cally obliterate them. Likenesses are found between any 
two men. It is the contrasts that differentiate them — not 
only the personal contrasts above indicated, but contrasts 
in approaching public audiences. Mr. Lincoln's adc'resses 
to the public, including his debates with Douglas, were en- 
lightening. On the contrary, the addresses of Mr, Wilson 
to enlighten the people upon the purposes of the Covenant 
have no title to be considered as the addresses of the 
scholarly statesman intent upon informing the public ubon 
weighty matters of national moment. He sank to the level 



Wilson and inisonism 3-71 

of substituting personal vituperation for convincing argu- 
ments which he could not command, llis railings at the 
Senate majority which refused to abdicate its constitutional 
functions In obedience to his Imperious will, arc iicrhaps the 
most humiliating episode our history of the prcsiilcncy re- 
cords; and coming from a gcndcman distinguishcil for 
scholarship and culture but adds to its revolting quality. 

Nor Is this chargeable to his changcablcness, a marked 
characteristic. His "interpreters" termed this a quality 
indicative of growth. He himself rather gloried in the 
quality, declaring that "consistency Is the hobgoblin of littk- 
minds." But the common sense of the common people couKl 
see neither sense nor logic in his statement. It raised with 
them the question of common honesty. In speaking to the 
Daughters of the American Revolution on April 19, 19 15, 
he uttered these words: 

America has a heart, and that heart throbs with all sorts of in- 
tense sympathies; but America has schooled its heart to love the 
things that America believes in, and it ought to devote itself only 
to the things that America believes in. 

If his later declaration, made while urging the Covenant 
upon the people In September, 19 19, that it was greater than 
the American government, Indicated a growth, then it was 
a dangerous growth, which the people discovered and 
checked. He had declared that the people of the United 
States should remain neutral, even in thought; when the 
"Lusitania" went down, that we were "too proud to fight"; 
as late as May, 19 16, referring to the war, "with Its causes 
and objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountams 
from which Its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not 
Interested to search for or explore." And yet the causes 
of the war were as well known at that time as they were 
on April 2, 1917, when he advised Congress to declare 
war, not by reason of those "causes," but solely because of 
the German warfare against commerce which had destroyed 



372 The JVihon Administration and tlie Great JVar 

American ships and American lives and was substantially 
a war against mankind. Yet again, in January, 191 8, when 
the country was in the midst of its war preparations, in 
putting forth his Fourteen Points as the "only possible pro- 
gram" for our consent to peace, four of the Points related 
exclusively to those "controversies on the other side of the 
water," previously denounced by him when action on the 
part of the United States was urged by those with vision 
compatible with America's best traditions in statesmanship. 
And still later, in his Baltimore address of April 6, 19 18, 
the first anniversary of American's entrance into the war, he 
referred to the occasion as "this moment of utter disillu- 
sionment." This is what some termed "growth" of the 
President — he having reached the stage which the people, 
as a whole, had reached three years previously. It is but a 
suggestion of the President's opportunism, which is but 
another word for seeking present personal or party ad- 
vantage; and in this case party was but used for personal 
advantage, the only rational explanation of President Wil- 
son's otherwise strange statecraft. 

Notwithstanding this personal relation to his methods, 
perhaps because of it, there was a personal charm and mag- 
netism that was for the moment winning. But it was felt 
to be artificial, with the appearance of listening with defer- 
ence and being governed by the opinion of the listener, until 
out of sight, when, also, immediately out of mind. He was 
seldom seen even by cabinet members. He was coldly intel- 
lectual, caring little for companionship or counsel. To 
the great masses of Americans, he was looked upon as un- 
sympathetic, inscrutable, passionless. Those having official 
business with him transacted their business and left, taking 
away with them no atmosphere of a great personality, none 
of the touch that made Mr. Wilson become a part of the 
lives of other men, such as Lincoln, Roosevelt, Cleveland, 
almost all Presidents imparted. He wore the gray mask, 



Wilson and JViJsonism 37;^ 

and it was never removed. There was no spiritual toiitact 
between President and people. 

The shiftiness and vacillation of the IVesiilcnl, il 
prompted by opportunism, personal advantage, were then 
grounded in selfishness. And it has been directly char^til 
that he was selfish. Certainly they were not due to lack of 
self-confidence, with which he was always abundantly en- 
dowed. His selfishness was indicated by his repeated in- 
junction to take "common counsel," and then taking his 
own counsel; by his ungenerous act in refusing to say to the 
Senate, or its committee, that he had accepted its sugges- 
tions for changes in the league constitution; but making tlr; 
changes in Paris and seeking credit for them. Indeed, it 
was seen very early in his administration, in an episodr 
almost forgotten: He accepted the platform adopted in 
which was urged a constitutional amendment for single 
terms of Presidents; it declared the pledge in these words: 
"We pledge the candidate of this convention to this prin- 
ciple." And when the amendment was proposed in Con- 
gress he denounced it as "highly arbitrary and unsatisfac- 
tory" and declared that any disapproval of his position in 
the issue was to him "a matter of perfect indifference." 

Nor was Mr. Wilson's self-confidence always well 
grounded. Relying upon his own powers of accomplishment, 
when he ignored the American people and the co-ordinate 
treaty-making power of the Senate, in going to the Paris 
Peace Congress, and there practically ignoring the four 
commissioners whom he took with him, with all of the 
prestige derived from the fact that he was the only head 
of a nation, and that the most powerful nation, in the Con- 
gress, he was outwitted; and from the beginning of his 
unwarranted undertaking, began and continued to lose 
ground to the end of his official career. His failure m the 
Congress is noted by a writer who was in the Congress as 
a member of the British corps on economics: 



374 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

It was commonly believed at the commencement of the Paris 
Conference that the President had thought out, with the aid of a 
large body of advisers, a comprehensive scheme not only for the 
League of Nations, but for the embodiment of the Fourteen Points 
in an actual treaty of peace. But in fact the President had thought 
out nothing; when it came to practice, his ideas were nebulous and 
incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas what- 
ever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he 
had thundered from the White House.^ 

This plain statement explains well why he could not convince 
the Senate or the people of the United States that his 
Covenant should be accepted without change — he had not 
thought out the matter to a final conclusion. As he heard 
deficient students reply in his college days as student and 
professor: "Not prepared," so now he. 

Added to this defect was the fact that he lacked leader- 
ship, a fatal lack in an attempt to carry out a large plan 
of constructive work. While he had a consuming passion 
for power, the only weapon he knew and used freely, never 
relinquishing any that he could gain and retain, he could 
not lead men. This was due to the defects in his make-up 
indicated in the foregoing. He could not meet men as his 
equals. He was incapable of team work. So long as any 
one associated with him accepted his viewpoint, all went 
well. But that was not team work; that was becoming his 
clerk. And men with vision are not mere clerks. It is need- 
less to name the strong men of his cabinet who left him. 
Perhaps the most level-headed man associated as such was 
Secretary Franklin K. Lane; and he is the man who said, 
when overruled by Secretary Baker, "the people are not In- 
terested In cabinet quarrels," Men of noted leadership, 
and ready to meet any emergency were displaced by men 
of small capacity for leadership. His essential weakness as 
a leader lay In the fact that he failed to discover public 

^ John Maynard Keynes, "Economic Consequences of Peace," pp. 42-43, 
Harcourt, Brace & Howe, New York, 1920. 



JVilson and JFihonism ^^i; 

opinion and to understand that America is not an autocracy 
but a republic ruled by the majority. 

He stated that he could do but one \.\\\n^ at a flmc — 
that he had a "one-track mind." Wiiilc cn^a^cd in tloin^' 
a thing, in that he was absorbed to the exclusion of all else. 
Some have declared that his was a "one-compartment mi mi" ; 
that he could reach out and open one compartment of his 
brain as a systematic man would reach into a drawer and 
take out a paper, and when done with it return it, forgetting 
all about it in taking up the next. Everybody wanted to 
know what was going on in this mind, which was tliought 
to be of the greatest influence on the destinies of the world, 
when he was at the height of his world power, late in 
191 8. Haughty, he was intolerant of opposition; wanted 
people to agree with him, and did not want to be convinced 
that he was wrong; did not like to have his vision clouded 
or his confidence in his own conclusions shaken. Said one 
of his interpreters: 

Mr. Wilson keeps himself cloistered pondering the facts. There 
is something almost uncanny in the man, in his seclusion, his ear 
deliberately closed to suggestion, sifting and sorting his facts, work- 
ing on them as a mathematician.^ 

This writer also states that Mr. Wilson knew that most 
men reach their conclusions in a superficial way and not 
giving due weight to facts — a method that is without appeal 
to Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Wilson's powers are of a type that does not permit 
him to be the servant of the people. Wliile he spoke much 
of a mandate from the people, his test of what the people 
wanted appeared to be what he had determined to do. His 
type is for solitary rule, not for a government of the people 
and by the people. 

His type is essentially destructive, not constructive. 
When he appealed to the Italian people over the heads of 

'"Woodrow Wilson— an Interpretation," by A. Maurice Low, p. 290, 
Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1918. 



37^ The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

their rulers, it involved the same principle as when he ap- 
pealed to the people as against the Senate. In neither case 
did he succeed. On the contrary, both attempts were flat 
failures. The man who can make such an appeal may not 
be capable of recognizing himself as an enemy of consti- 
tutional government. But if given a free hand, he would, 
perhaps, not see what he had brought upon the nation until 
the forces of disintegration had gone so far that no deter- 
rent could be found to save from utter destruction. His 
example has shown what dangers lurk in granting large 
and unnecessary powers to a willful executive. 

A fatal defect in Mr. Wilson's character was his capac- 
ity for creating division when unity was the demand of the 
situation. He created division in American sentiment prior 
to America's entrance into the Great War, until by the 
continued efforts of the pro-Americans as against the pro- 
Germans the sentiment became so overwhelming as to com- 
pel action by the President; he created division In the Paris 
Peace Congress when harmony on the part of the Allies 
was a crying demand; he created division in his own party 
until, early in 1920, it began to slip away from him and 
became largely a party against him and anything which he 
favored; again he created at first division in American 
sentiment on the matter of a league of nations when senti- 
ment was becoming almost solid for such an association, and 
such division continued until the people began to understand 
Mr. Wilson's purpose when they became almost a unit 
against his Covenant. The Wilson myth was shattered in 
America before it was in Europe; but once the image began 
to totter overseas, the reaction was more pronounced than 
in his own country. The people in America accepted many 
things he said and did in their old-time spirit of raillery — 
and smiled. With Europeans, to whom he had become a 
demigod, when they found that their idol was but human 
clay of a type so different from what they had been led to 



JVilson and Wihonism ^77 

expect, the disappointment was so severe a strain that they 
were furious. He made headway only so lon^ as he was 
able to maintain the illusion that his demands were hacked 
by America; but once the masquerade ended, the tlisiliu- 
sionment in Europe was something terrible. When the na- 
tion entered the armed conflict for justice and liberty, the 
sacrifice made the nation the best beloved in all the world; 
and when it stood ready to take its full share in rebuilding 
the broken civilization, the expectations of humanity were 
the highest. But when he dashed these hopes, here is what 
the French statesman Brieaux, whom America had the 
right to look upon as a friend, said at the end of 1919 : 

Your President came to France fortified by a prestijre which he 
owed to the courage of your soldiers and to the generosity of your 
nation. ... At the peace table he asked us to make heavy conces- 
sions. We tried to make him understand that he was wrong but he 
insisted. . . . Recognize this, that our error in having thought that 
Mr. Wilson spoke for America was excusable. It was the first time 
that one of your Presidents ever came to Europe. You permitted him 
to come and we had the right to assume that he had your word in his 
valise and that he was authorized to say to us: "I speak for America, 
and I alone." 

Thus President Wilson's methods caused, not common, but 
divided counsel among the Allies after the close of the 
Great War and until he left the presidency, and placed 
America in a position of humiliation before the world. The 
fact that European statesmen should have known what the 
United States Constitution required as to the making ol 
treaties and what the invariable practice of Presidents had 
been in conformity with such requirements in great matters 
did not take away the annoying sting of the rebuff, or re- 
lieve of the sense of the division created by Mr. Wilson. 

To say nothing additional to what has been said in this 
chapter as to his political morality, one ground for this 
constant division of sentiment where it should have been 



37^ The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

a determined unit was his constant willfulness in the face 
of new and untried situations; "common counsel" he thrust 
to the winds, though he so often urged it. This was well 
illustrated in his relations to aspiring peoples. Brushing 
lightly aside counsel from any source, he erred in his judg- 
ment that the German people were backing the Imperial 
German Government only because they were compelled 
through force; for the German people backed the Hohen- 
zollern Government to the last. Again, he erred in relation 
to the Czecho-Slovaks, loyal to the last ounce of their man- 
hood to the cause of the Allies and human liberty; for Euro- 
pean monarchies and France had already acknowledged 
their independence when, on September 3, 19 18, Secretary 
Lansing announced that the United States recognized their 
National Council as a de facto government. It was felt as 
a humiliation that the world's great democracy should be 
so tardy in its recognition of the aspirations for demo- 
cratic government on the part of these peoples just released 
from autocracy's domination. He erred In pronouncing 
the counter-revolution, headed by Lenlne and Trotzky ter- 
rorists, the revolution; he had failed to distinguish between 
the government that rose on the ruins of czarism, and that 
which crushed the life out of the only semblance of demo- 
cratic government that Russia had known since the days 
of czarism began. 

And though this may be attributed to the President's 
error of judgment, whether founded In ignorance or not, 
sight must not be lost of the fact of the President's mental 
perversity which is well set out by one of the best-Informed 
observers at the Paris Peace Congress: 

President Wilson is conscious of his power of persuasion. That 
power enables him to say one thing, do another, describe the act as 
conforming to the idea, and with act and idea in exact contradiction 
to each other, convince the people, not only that he has been consistent 
throughout, but that his act cannot be altered without peril to the 
nation and danger to the world. We do not know which Mr. Wilson 



Wilson and fVilsonism ^1') 

to follow — the Mr. Wilson who says he will not do a tliiii^i or the 
Mr. Wilson who docs that precise tiling.^ 

Mr. Wilson's acts were in themselves sufficient to divide 
public opinion until the people became so exasperated as to 
unite against him. Among these acts were his dehancc of 
American history, Including the right of the Senate (o take 
counsel with him; his absolute defiance of the constltutioril 
right of the Senate In the matter of concluding treaties as 
sustained by the United States Supreme Court; his vacilla- 
tion In the face of Impending events of great moment and 
withal his unwillingness to accept advice; his evasions arui 
deceptions to gain a personal or partisan end, after exhib- 
iting great ignorance or extreme carelessness In large mat- 
ters of policy; his haughtiness and peremptoriness in dealing 
with his peers or with other nations, creating antagonism 
where harmony was the chief demand; his insulting epithets 
hurled at the Senate, a part of a co-ordinate branch of the 
government and chosen as directly by the people as he, for 
no reason other than that It refused to sign on the dotted 
line at his command; his meddling In European affairs that 
were none of America's after the great conflict ceased, 
though he wavered and vacillated when Prussian autocracy 
was sapping the foundations of public opinion throughout 
the land, and he then declared that with the causes of the 
war we had no concern — these and multifold other acts and 
expressions of President Wilson kept the nation divided 
when it should have been firmly knitted together for the 
certain conflict, and separated friendly nations when they 
should have been united In policy, and humiliated America 
when It should have remained on the mountain top of the 
world's esteem, and resulted in his own disastrous debase- 
ment In the world's best thought after gaining the very 
pinnacle of power and respect. Leaving the nation leader- 

'"The Inside Story of the Peace Conference," by E. J. DiHon, p. 134, 
Harper & Brothers, New York, 1920, quoting T/ie Tribune, Chicago, July 
31, 1919. 



380 The IVilson Administration and the Great War 

less at a crucial hour by going to Europe threatened bewil- 
dering consequences such as had never come to the nation 
after a war. In the words of the eminent writer previously 
quoted: 

When President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige 
and a moral influence throughout the world unequalled in history.* 

But President Wilson seemed bent upon carrying out 
in practice what he declared in earlier years when writing 
in the privacy of his study, the morals of which, if he lost 
sight of, the people with unerring judgment brought to 
severe condemnation when opportunity offered: 

The President's power of compelling compliance on the part of 
the Senate lies in his initiative in negotiation, which affords him a 
chance to get the country into sucli scrapes, so pledged in the view of 
the world to certain courses of action, that the Senate hesitates to 
bring about the appearance of dishonor which would follow its re- 
fusal to ratify the rash promises or to support the indiscreet threats 
of the Department of State.^ 

Ihstead of meeting a matter four-square, this expression 
indicates his determination to carry a point by fair means 
or foul. When he was hailed in France, England, and 
Italy as the hope of the world, it was the result of two 
false assumptions: That in international policy he was the 
representative man of America, and that when the Covenant 
was incorporated in the peace treaty it was America's 
special contribution to the settlement. By April, 19 19, the 
question was whether he could crystalFize opinion in his own 
country so as to sustain his own point of view of committing 
the country to a place in the concert of powers. The mad- 
ness of his course in attempting his domineering method in 
America failed as it did in Europe. The people would have 
none of the fair-or-foul method suggested in his written 
works. It must be fair or none of it. 

* Keynes' "Economic Consequences of Peace," p. 38. 
'"Constitutional Government," by Woodrow Wilson, pp. 233-234. 
Compare this threat with Brieaux' statement above. 



Wilson and IVihonism 38 i 

It is not strange that, In conformity witli the forc^'oin^r 
characteristics of President Wilson, he was so often taking 
the side that the event showed to he wrong and which the 
better thought of the country felt to he the wrong; though 
the people. In accordance with the best traditions of t he- 
nation, held In abeyance Its own judgment out of defer- 
ence to the Chief Executive until he was shown unworthy of 
such deference, a fact well illustrated in the case of 'i'heo- 
dore Roosevelt who, like almost all Americans, was misled 
by the Administration at the beginning of the Great War. 
Instances abound of this undesirable quality of Mr. Wil- 
son's mental processes. When America's moral sense was 
beginning to feel the stirrings within, he was not concerned 
with the causes and declared for neutrality even In thought; 
and when the conflict ceased and the world needed and 
demanded peace, he refused it to America though he had 
declared that to do so would break the heart of the world. 
When the demands of the situation were insistent that he 
remain at his sworn post of duty in Washington, he took 
himself to Europe and sought to administer the affairs of 
the nation from Paris. When the nation expected his oft- 
proclaimed "open covenants openly arrived at" to be put 
Into operation, he closed all communication between Paris 
and America by taking over all channels of information 
as a war necessity. When America looked to him for some 
word of enlightenment on the Paris processes at the earliest 
opportunity, offered in his Boston address upon his first re- 
turn to his own country^ he Informed the people of the 
impropriety of giving such Information; and when he under- 
took to educate the American public as to the merits of the 
Covenant In his tour of the country in September, 1919, so 
turgid '^ was the stream of his language that people turned 

'Notwithstanding Mr. Wilson's remarkably smooth language, often of 
the most polished style, he displayed remarkable facilit)' in murkiness where 
the importance of the occasion demanded the most terse and clear ex- 
pression. Vivid descriptions of his phrasings have been used to char- 
acterize his language. A few picked up at random are these: "stmiulatmg 
rhetoric," "rhetorical persuasivness," "airy assurapUons," 'rhetorical rhap- 



382 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

away from him in largest proportion where they heard^him 
in largest numbers.'^ They declined longer to follow the 
ignis fatuus of fine phrases seemingly designed to hide some 
ulterior purpose. 

Can anything be added that will help to define the in- 
tangible thing known as Wilsonism? A key-statement of 
his is that uttered during the 19 16 presidential campaign: 
'*I am willing to play for the verdict of history." It was 
looked upon by the best American opinion as a worthwhile 
aim; as an expression of the vision that belongs to states- 
manship. By that time, his "men-everywhere" Idea was 
gaining a prominent place in public addresses and state 
papers. His statement of April 19, 19 15, already quoted in 
this chapter, indicates that at that time he held to American 
tradition. Between that time, however, and the time of his 
touring the country in behalf of the Covenant, in Septem- 
ber, 19 19, when he declared that the Covenant was greater 
than the Senate, was greater than the government, a marked 
change took place in his views of what America means. At 
the latter time he had no word to speak in behalf of what 
America meant or what the Constitution of the nation 
meant to the world, though it was Constitution week. 

This was a gradual change from nationalism, that force 
which had made America a respected power In the whole 
world, to internationalism in which America was to be 
degraded from her lofty position of influence for right- 
eousness among the nations. His declaration of interna- 

sodies," "resounding phrases," "pious platitudes," "smug formulas," "tumid 
rhetoric," "moving accents," "rhetorical generalities," "alluring rhetorical 
phrases," "polished periods," "stately rhetoric," "poetic and eloquent utter- 
ance," "skillful appeals," "resounding generalities," "resounding platitudes," 
"pure rhetoric," "smoothly eloquent assertion," "rhetorical appeal," "unsub- 
stantial rhetoric," 'high-sounding phrases," "platitudes that tickle the ear," 
"rhetorical utterance," "fatal gift of phrase-mongering," "soaring oratorical 
flights," "vain and flabby phrases," "seductive rhetoric," "cloudy rhetoric," 
"vague dissertations." 

' While New York and Pennsylvania rolled up such tremendous ma- 
jorities against Wilsonism in the national election on November 2, 1920, 
they fell below the proportionate majorities through the west where Wilson 
was comparatively strong in 1916 and where he made his direct appeal to 
save the Covenant, September, 1919. 



Wilson and JVilsonism 3S3 

tionalism reached Its height when he had gained the pinnacle 
of his fame. This occurred while in Italy and when he 
addressed the French Socialists, while touring luiropc be- 
fore sitting in the world's Peace Congress. I Ic proclaimed 
internationalism with all the force at his command, even 
assuming that he could back up his statements with the 
army and navy of the United States,** and appealing to 
international socialists as against their governments, as 
against nationalism. From that time to the close of his 
administration he never made a ringing, soul-stirring address 
as to the good that real Americanism could accomplish 
among the sons of men. 

This was logical from the bent of his own mind as imli- 
cated by the character of men whom he placed in important 
positions — Creel, Steffens, Herron, Bullitt, Hale, Hapgood, 
to mention only a few. His return to America witnessed 
encouragement of internationalism and socialism. The lat- 
ter became defiant, even of the Government. Some good 
people failed to see the danger of his appeal, and in diluted 
form re-presented it to the public, the favorite formula 
being, "Now, if only our nationalism does not become too 
strong." And this at the very moment when radicalism, 
encouraged by the process, was seeking to tear the very 
vitals from America — radicahsm, so greatly encouraged 
by Mr. Wilson as to become a definite part of Wilsonism. 
Anarchism was a part of the process. It received definite 
encouragement from the Administration, as shown in the 
chapters on "Disloyalty" and "Russia and Bolshevism." 
When he undertook to frame a world order upon interna- 
tionalism, declaring that it must be accepted "without count- 
ing the cost," he was doing it to the exclusion of American 
nationalism. And as a result radicahsm became so bold 
that he was compelled to take cognizance of it in his 19 19 

«See his threatening statement announced but a few weeks before froni 
his vessel, the "George Washington," as he was on his way to meet the 
assembled statesmen of the world. 



384 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

annual address. But Italy had already turned away from 
his internationalism, resenting his intrusion; France and 
England gave it no heed; and at the first opportunity, Amer- 
ica so emphatically repudiated his suggestions as to leave 
no hope of recovery for his ill-fated foreign doctrines. 

Personal government, as distinguished from constitu- 
tional government, was a marked feature of Wilsonism. 
Making his personal representative, Edward M. House, 
instead of the legally established channels, the means of 
communication with foreign governments; creating the great 
issue between the Senate and the people on the one hand as 
standing for the laws and the Constitution, and himself on 
the other as standing for personal government and inter- 
nationalism; undertaking to initiate a peace policy affecting 
all the Allies without consulting them In the matter; reveal- 
ing a purpose to transform his legitimate leadership into 
what was practically a dictatorship by employing, for the 
establishment of revolutionary doctrines, powers which had 
been created for or assumed by him for the conduct of the 
war — these acts and others of the same character were 
symptoms of the disease. 

Only the future will determine into what niche history 
will place President Wilson. That he has bulked large 
from the time America entered the world conflict, there can 
be no dispute. That a sharp and swift decline came as a 
result of Wilsonism is also a fact cut deeply into current 
events. That early in his administration a literary coterie 
of a certain political cult, not orthodox in Americanism, 
men whom he favored in appointments, began to write him 
down in a definite place in history, artificial though it was, 
is well known to those even moderately informed. That 
his own nation repudiated him and his doctrines In the 
sweeping majorities of November 2, 1920, Is too patent 
to need further statement. But his vacillation, his evasion 
of responsibility In making decision when prompt decision 
was the imperative demand of the occasion, his willfulness 



Wilson and Wihonisvi 385 

and obduracy— these kept him from attaining the maxiinui.i 
of historic largeness which was within his grasj), which had 
been flung to him by the swift tide of events. VVlien civih/.a- 
tion was turning a critical corner he became the Ilanilcl in 
the performance. "Wilson is the most pathetic example 
of wasted opportunities our history or any other history 
aflfords. As a dignified, firm, constitutional President of 
the United States, remaining at home where he belongcJ, 
sharing honors and responsibilities, forgetting Wilson once 
In awhile, he could have gotten anything." '•' 

In view of the foregoing, Wilsonism may be defined as 
the Idea developed by Woodrow Wilson as President of 
the United States, of Internationalism over nationalism; a 
moderate degree of radicalism bordering on anarchism; 
vacillation and evasion of responsibility for decision when 
decision was a clear demand; willfulness and obduracy run- 
ning to personal government and disregarding written and 
unwritten laws; seeking to cover from public view grave 
errors of administration and policy, resulting in duplicity 
and attempted deception of the public; and the sequel of 
announcing open counsel and action, while practicing secret- 
Iveness and using furtive methods. 

The public never lost interest in the notable personality 
of President Wilson to the last moment of his incumbency. 
Their sympathy followed his physical weakness as he left 
the Inaugural ceremonies of his successor and, almost help- 
less, found his way through the capitol to the conveyance 
waiting to carry him from the final scene of his official 
career to his private home. Yet no sympathy followed his 
statecraft. 

That he has left a large Impress upon the nation Is be- 
yond question. That there Is danger to constitutional gov- 
ernment with certain types of men Is evidenced by the 
processes through which he undertook to lead the people 

"Personal letter from Harvey W. Morrow, Omaha, October, 11, 1920.— 
Author. 



386 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

to accept a super-government to replace the American Con- 
stitution. 

Americanism as grounded in the Constitution must be a 
cardinal principle of any man fit to be President of the 
United States. Too great a price has been paid for orderly 
government to permit it to be waved aside upon an untried 
theory. 



CHAPTER XIX 

PROFITEERING 

Grand, noble, inspiring is the Spirit of America in war. 
It has ever been so. Mean, degrading, despised of man- 
kind is that other spirit which takes personal toll of disas- 
ter. The ghoul is found on the field of the destruction 
caused by earthquake, hurricane, flood, or fire. For him the 
extremest penalty imposed by his fellows of the race is 
none too extreme. In his class is the profiteer, who takes 
advantage of the destruction of war. 

History is always curious and prying after facts in 
strange places and in strange ways. "Is it possible," it 
asks, "that there were found men and women so mean and 
so demeaning as to take advantage of the horrors of the 
Great War for selfish gains?" And if so, it wants to know 
further whether these exactions were tolerated by the Ad- 
ministration that looked after the interests of "men every- 
where." 

Of wrong views and taking untenable positions on al- 
most every great public matter pertaining to the Great War, 
whether on preparedness, on pushing it vigorously to a final 
conclusion, on looking toward peace, on peace-making, or 
on readjustment after the conflict ceased, it is beyond the 
possibility of charge against the President that in the mat- 
ter of profiteering he had any personal interest in the deadly 
game of grab. But how did his Administration function in 
this great game? 

When he was entering upon his first terni in the presi- 
dency, his pronouncement was substantially this: "Woe be 
to the business concern or individual that undertakes to 
rule this Administration or to exact toll from the hard carn- 
al? 



388 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

ings of the common people !" He hurled his anathemas 
against those who plundered in the Civil War, of which he 
had read. But this of which he had read was but a minia- 
ture of the real plundering that occurred during his own 
incumbency. It was always well for the bully to talk loud 
when there was no danger; it was another matter to speak 
softly and carry a big stick. 

One prime cause of the opportunity for gambling with 
the Government when the country was rushed into the war 
was the state of unpreparedness in which the country found 
itself when the cause of civilization called across the waves 
for immediate action. A chief outcry against the war was 
that it was forced upon the country by the munition manu- 
facturers because of the opportunity it offered for pelf. 
Unfortunately for this alarm, it came almost wholly from 
two classes: The professional pacifist and the ardent pro- 
German. That the munition-maker had always been a prof- 
iteer, the records make clear. That they were such in 
peace as well as in war, is shown by the figures: 

The American Armor-Plate Syndicate sold Russia armor plate at 
$249 per ton. The United States could not get it at less than $616. 
It ought to be said that the low price to Russia was protested by 
other manufacturers. The protest led to a conference in Paris and 
that to an international agreement on armor plate. Three years later 
the price was lowered to the United States, and from 1896 to 1 9 14 
the government bought plate from the trust at $440 per ton. But, 
according to the report of the present chief of ordnance, Rear Ad- 
miral Strauss, it was making the same plate in a factory of only 
20,000 tons' capacity at $229 per ton. For powder which it makes 
in its own factories at thirty-six cents per pound, the government paid, 
in seven years, prices varying from fifty-three to eighty cents. 

And this writer furnishes other valuable data touching this 
matter.^ 

* "The League of Nations," pp. 102, 103, by Horace M. Kallen. Marsh- 
all Jones Co. 



Profiteering/ 389 

While these transactions were takinij; jilacc imdtr t In- 
law, others were outside the law. The airjilanc sc;nKl;il, the 
shipbuilding contracts, the almost ciulltss rainiliciitiun <»| 
deals put through in the various branches of the \\':ir De- 
partment — these made it look like one unified network of 
grab; it looked as if the Administration was functioning; 
better along these lines than in getting the real war machine 
into motion. In the middle of 19 18, it was disclosed 'ny 
the Department of Justice, illegal transactions had gone so 
far as to involve contractors, agents, and manufacturers in 
soliciting, in Washington, government war orders under 
agreements to pay illegal commissions. Simultaneously with 
these announcements, raids were made on hundreds of busi- 
ness ofiices of manufacturers throughout the United States 
in search of papers to show the scope of the wanton practice. 
These contracts made for the government ran into the 
hundreds of millions of dollars, making a large profit for 
the commission-fee agent as well as for the manufacturer 
obtaining the contract.- 

Thc rush and hurry incident to the unprepared state of 
the nation when war was upon it, after two full years of 
warning, created the opportunity for the profiteer. It gave 
no opportunity to select with any reasonable degree of 
deliberation either the brain or the material forces that 
were to direct the nation's latent energy for repelling the 
onslaughts of the mightiest war machine the world had ever 
known. President Wilson declared with much complacency 
that the equanimity of his usual course of thought could 
not and should not be disturbed. It was one of his general 
statements, without reference to the concrete facts in the 

^As illustrative of this t>'pe of profiteering in manufacturers' contracts 
in the war, there is cited the case of a contract drawn up in a W ashin.eton 
hotel, whereby it was agreed that one Bittan was to pay the other partv 
a five per cent commission on a contract for about 100,000 "'"C^f' ^ =^ 
six per cent on all subsidiary contracts. With the statement '^nt the $5000 
cash payment asked was for an official in the Q"'-''-^"'"f "f .'''^^'^ '"V^ 
in Washington, the assurance was given that they ^""'^.;'';"'". ^^^'^'^J, 
whenever the government was in the market. Butan paid the $5000 and 
the transaction was completed. 



390 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

case, that lay at the bottom of so much mischief to his ad- 
ministration. His thought became disturbed. His whole 
administration was upset. For now something had to be 
done. At first the people did not know what was being done. 
Senator Chamberlain, of the President's own party, pretty 
completely overturned the Administration's equanimity by 
his charge in his New York speech that the War Depart- 
ment had ceased to function. Among the things to be done 
was to get guns and anything else that might look like 
preparation, no matter how or where. ^ 

How far petty and grand profiteering in high places 
of the Administration became a virus that infected wider 
circles of the Administration, and yet wider circles of busi- 
ness after the war, can never be determined. That it under- 
mined greatly the moral stamina of the nation there can 
hardly be a doubt. It was only a few months after the 
uncovering of the old-guns deal, that complaints were be- 
coming general that rent-profiteering was the rule in the 
great centers where war contracts were being carried out, 
such as shipyards. The government found it necessary to 
stay the process. At Wilmington the workers were notified 
by the landlords to move out, unless they would agree to 

^ In May, 1918, after Senator Chamberlain's New York address, when 
the War Department was laying before the House Committee on Appropria- 
tions its plans for carrying out the ordnance program, it developed that in 
the schedule was an item for $-150,000 for the purchase of thirty old guns 
from Francis Bannerman, who had an assortment of old guns, and whose 
place of business on an island in the Hudson River was known as Banner- 
man's Arsenal ; and that these were guns which the government had sold 
five years previously at $87.67, now to be purchased by the government at 
$15,000. Until this hearing, there was no publicity to the transaction. 

And as illustrating the method of setting in operation the brain forces 
of the nation, when the emergency was upon it, the instance is cited of 
Bernard M. Baruch, former chairman of the Vi^ar Industries Board and 
later an adviser to President Wilson in the Peace Congress, and John 
D. Ryan, head of the Anaconda Copper Company and who was placed at 
the head of the aircraft-production service, two very capable men, who 
were selected to organize the copper interests of the country to sell copper 
to the government at prices fixed by the War Industries Board. The 
Philadelphia North American of August 13, 1919, is authority for the state- 
ment that, under this arrangement, the copper sold to the War Department 
aggregated $153,334,478 in price, the copper interests making a clear profit 
of $50,000,000, or over 30 per cent, as shown by the House investigation 
of ordnance expenditures. 



Profiteering ]()i 

pay a greatly increased rental. The government (Icdan-.l 
that the landlord who attempted to profit tluis at the ex- 
pense of the shipyard employes or to eject the worker, 
would be dealt with in a similar manner by the government. 
At the same time, the government undertook to construct 
houses for its workers at some of the industrial centers. 
Other remedies were instructions to the local assessors by 
the cities to increase the assessed value upon the Irasis of the 
increased rent; local committees on rent profiteering iK-ing 
established in thirty cities through the home-registration 
service to call upon profiteering landlords to show improve- 
ments and expenses justifying the rent increases demanded; 
and, in case of refusal, to publish the facts in full without 
comment. 

This profiteering reached out into every branch anil de- 
partment of civil life after the clash of arms was silenced. 
It was not because the nation's supplies had been exhausted. 
America's great resources had scarcely been touched. Now 
dealers were not satisfied with a fair profit of ten per cent; 
they advanced prices of goods to make a fifty-per cent profit. 
Profiteers seeing the great amount of money in the hands 
of the workingmen, set about to get it; and the great mass 
of people who had not been fawned upon by the Adminis- 
tration, as had the organized laboringman, in increased pay, 
stood amazed at the steady flow of money from these 
people to whom it came easily. And these millions of men 
and women, paid no more now than before the war, were 
compelled to pay this additional fifty per cent for every- 
thing they had to eat and wear. It was difficult for them 
not to remember these things when they went to the polls 
on November 2, 1920. 

From the time of the armistice there were ebullitions con- 
cerning the government's taking a hand in stopping profit- 
eering. There was nothing visible, to the end of 19 18, 
to support it except talk and note-writing. Yet instances 
were known and publicly cited in which prices charged by 



392 The JVihon Administration and the Great War 

some distributors of groceries netted them from 200 to 300 
per cent, from that time on. 

It was the memorandum of the Federal Trade Com- 
mission's report, made public August 7, 19 19, that removed 
the mask as never before, showing the system of food 
hoarding and of profiteering.^ It stirred the entire country. 
A nation-wide campaign was inaugurated to combat the 
conscienceless pilfering of the people. Co-operation be- 
tween state and federal authorities was sought. In some 
instances stocks of foodstuffs were seized; some profiteers 
sought to transfer the hoarded stocks.^ The declaration 
in the report that unless the packers were stopped, they 
were about to dominate all important foods in the United 
States, as well as the world meat trade, created as much 
discussion by the public as any question since the armis- 
tice. 

Rent profiteering touched a few places during the war, 
outside of government circles. But after the war it seemed 
to fail none. In New York it became so aggravated that 
churches were thrown open to shelter those turned into the 
street. The legislature found it necessary to make new laws 
governing landlords. 

No less than these, did the workmen bring the blight of 

*This report showed no depletion of food stocks. On the contrary, sup- 
plies on hand June i, 1919, ran from 3 to 298 per cent above those of a 
year earlier, yet with a constant and large increase in prices. 

"On August 15, 1919, just eight days after the Commission's report 
became public, a telegram was sent from the governor of Ohio to the 
United States Attorney General, that one Cleveland concern was about 
to remove its hoard to Chicago. Thereupon the federal attorneys in Ohio 
were instructed to take necessary action, should the attempt be made. 

At the same time, the federal attorney at Detroit informed the De- 
partment of Justice at Washington that in three cases he had filed libels, and 
had seized 10,460,000 eggs and 300,000 pounds of butter. 

And the following day there were seized in St. Louis 15,664,880 eggs 
held for seven owners by the Mound City Ice & Cold Storage Company. 

In Newark, New Jersey, forty warehousemen, packers and wholesale 
food dealers were required to appear, with their books, before a special 
federal grand jury to testify as to profiteering in foodstuffs. 

In Buffalo libels were filed involving thirty or forty firms, the stocks 
including 3,590,000 pounds of butter and 3,000,000 dozen of eggs. 

Other sections of the country furnished their quota of these leeches 
sucking the life blood from the public. 



Profiteering y^i^ 

profiteering to the land. One of the worst types of piolit- 
eer during the war, and one of the first, was tlic workmen 
engaged on war contracts, already rcccivinfj; a wa^^c out of 
all proportion to the pay of others, notalily govxriuiurit 
clerks, clerks in banks, sales people in stores, stenographers 
and the vast numbers who go to make up the great American 
citizenship. Taking advantage of the government's needs, 
he threatened and sulked, he shirked, he was a slacker. I le 
was less a better citizen than the poorly-paid clerk; and it 
will be difficult for him to justify his conduct before the en- 
lightened citizenship of his country — as difficult as it was 
for President Wilson to justify his coddling of him, shrink- 
ing before his unwarranted demands. He was as low a type 
of profiteer, whether in building worthless ships, in hiding 
out of sight at nine dollars per day, or by pursuing any 
like course, as was the profiteer In clothing, munitions, or 
food. His kind was encouraged by the Administration, and 
he flourished to the Administration's finish. It is true 
that in mid-summer, 19 19, the President, when organized 
railroad men approached him for another Increase in wages 
or else a decided lowering of living costs, did not accede 
to their demands but went to Congress with the matter. 
Congress declared there were ample laws; that what was 
needed was enforcement. Though the country had been 
earnest and long in its complaints upon the high cost of 
living, the Administration gave no heed to these scores of 
millions, Americans all. It was once more the threat of a 
few organized railroad men that gained his ear, a class 
whose wages had kept approximate pace with living costs, 
while those of the other great millions had not. Eager 
to tour the country In support of the League-of-Natlons 
Covenant, he attempted to pass the responsibility on to Con- 
gress by asking that body to enact what were practically the 
same laws then In existence for the Administration's control 
of profiteering. Neither the war-time food laws nor the 
war-time fuel laws had been changed. 



394 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

The situation was well summarized by an eastern news- 
paper keenly analytical of national situations: 

Manufacturers have looted the purchasing public, not only by 
cornering raw materials and inflating prices, but by shamelessly low- 
ering the quality standards of their goods, until to-day merchants 
who are jealous of their reputations have to fight to get products they 
dare to guarantee as sound. Wholesalers, jobbers and retailers, down 
to the smallest, have joined in the game of grab. Labor, yielding to 
the prevailing spirit, has used its power of organization to get its 
share. Nay, the whole public has been infected, and over the entire 
country there is sweeping a wave of greed, of extravagance, of idle- 
ness, of devil-may-care defiance of all the principles of economics and 
morals.® 

But action of the government in the prosecution of pro- 
fiteers was slow and uncertain. Immediately the President 
went before Congress for action, the Attorney-General 
began warnings through the public press. A blare of trum- 
pets never frightened criminals of their type. The method 
was described as "a gesture made by pointing the finger 
at the profiteers." The President began the crusade by 
making the favorite gesture of a politician incapable of 
doing anything substantial — appealing for legislation. This 
gesture is the special favorite when the politician is dealing 
with economic forces which he does not understand and 
does not so study that he may understand. From that time 
on the oflSce of the Attorney-General gave out threatening 
statements with fair regularity to the end — monthly state- 
ments. The end came October 15, 1920, when the final 
statement announced that the campaign would end Novem- 
ber I — the day before election — one reason for which 
was Insuflficient appropriation to carry on the work, while 
another stated that falling prices made it less needful. The 
people refused the bait. While Mr. Palmer was prose- 
cuting, prices continued to rise; and when the break came, it 
came from other causes. So outrageous had become pro- 

' Philadelphia North Ameriran, January i, 1920. 



Profiteering ^95 

fiteerlng in clothing by the spring of 1920, that what hct atm- 
known as the overalls campaign was started as a protest — 
started as a local impulse, it became a nation-wide pluiiom- 
enon. It grew so rapidly that through wliom or where 
it started was lost sight of. In public oflices and in courts, 
in halls of legislation and private business, overalls were 
worn. Clubs and societies, eagerly formed associations 
and individuals hastened to encourage the wearing of over- 
alls. College undergraduates and high-school pupils, 
learned professors and dignified presidents wore overalls. 
Mayors were inaugurated in overalls; "denim anti calico" 
weddings were solemnized. It was a campaign more power- 
ful than the thunderings monthly from the oflice of the 
Attorney-General of the United States; more effective than 
his prosecutions of profiteers, resulting in 181 convictions 
(one to about each 600,000 people), fines aggregating 
$275,000, and sentences aggregating ten years and ten 
months, at a cost to the government of $500,000. The big 
profiteers were not molested. They met their signal pun- 
ishment in the inexorable law of supply and demand, a law 
beyond the reach of Attorneys-General, Presidents or Pro- 
fiteers. 

It was this law, mightier than peoples, potentates and 
powers, that bore with relentless weight, at first upon the 
suffering people, then upon the shameless profiteer. The 
difficulty with its operation was that the government did not 
see to it that it had free course, and it played into the hands 
of the evil-doers — played by the people to an excess that 
gave the profiteer the upper hand, while debauching the 
former."^ 

Mnstances are as widely spread as the broad land. A few will illus- 



trate 



In New York a leading Broadway clothing house making a whole- 
window display of serviceable suits at $25, was unable to dispose of them 
until the price was marked notably higher. In St. Paul a woman of most 
modest means went to a leading store with $100 with which to Purchase a 
coat, and found nothing satisfactory until the salesman slwwed one at J,oo^ 
She wanted to pay the $100 cash, the balance of $200 on time The lead 
of thP denartment was called and refused; but a little later she returned 



of the department was cal 



396 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

But not spoiling the great masses who were under the 
extreme pressure of high prices with a but slightly increased 
income, it led to resentment everywhere at the profiteering 
in sugar, a staple of home life. Here the mightier law was 
strangled almost unto death. It was one of the things that 
was probably not forgotten by the masses at the polls on 
November 2, 1920. It was in late summer, 1919, that the 
Sugar Equalization Board, in two separate communications 
at two different times, warned President Wilson of sugar 
shortage and that there would be an increase in the cost 
of sugar if he did not agree to the purchase of the 1920 
Cuban crop at the price then offered — 6^ cents per pound. 
He refused to act on these urgent representations. The 
crop was sold elsewhere. Shortly afterward, Attorney- 
General Palmer, without any warrant in law, suggested to 
the Louisiana producers that they were permitted to charge 
17 to 18 cents per pound at the plantation. The Cuban 
planters readily took their cue from these suggestions. The 
price of sugar immediately began to rise by leaps and 
bounds. An increase of two cents per pound meant an in- 
crease of $180,000,000 to the American people per year. 
With sugar at the price of 18 to 22 cents per pound in Feb- 
ruary, 1920, the American people were paying substantially 
a billion dollars tribute to the sugar profiteers, through the 
attitude of President Wilson and his Attorney-General — 
as Harvey's Weekly said at the time : "Because one man 
was omniscient and another hebetudinous." By early May, 
1920, after much false publication of the scarcity of sugar 
in the world, it became known that imports of sugar from 

with the additional $200 and took the coat. A Philadelphia dealer, unable 
to sell a line of silk stockings at $2.50, cleared out the entire stock in a few 
days by marking them up to $4. In a small up-state town in Pennsylvania, 
a merchant was offering at $8 a good shoe that cost him $5.50 a pair. 
An employe in a factory, after looking them over, said he would like some- 
thing better, whereupon the merchant asked him to call later and he could 
satisfy him. Changing the same shoes to other packages and marking them 
up to $15 he made sale to the factory employe, who then informed fellow 
workers of his bargain, and the merchant sold all his $8 shoes at the higher 
figure. 



w 



PrufitceruKj -i,.^ 

all sources for the year ending June 30, 1920, would slio 
an increase of about 14 per cent over those of the prcced 
ing year, making a total of approximately two pounds of 
sugar a week for the use of every man, woman, ami cliihl 
in the country. Sugar prices continued advancing until in 
some important centers was reached the price of 3 ij cents 
per pound; and many grocers would sell It only In llmitL-d 
quantities with other purchases in their stores. Tiiere was 
a clear 20 cents a pound between the import price and the 
retail price — probably the largest scheme of bleeding the 
whole mass of the American people ever forced upon the- 
country by a President contrary to the written advice of 
men expert in the line of the duties laid upon them. When 
the banks refused longer to back these profiteers, the Inlla- 
tion began to disappear, they began to try to save one an- 
other, the price of sugar dropped, after some dealers had 
lost many hundreds of thousands of dollars, and by the 
end of 1920, sugar was selling at 8 cents retail in the same 
cities where it had reached the 35-cent price. 

In February, 192 1, the United States grand jury at In- 
dianapolis accused mine operators and labor leaders of con- 
spiring to mulct the public of every dollar possible, while 
staging a conflict as a camouflage. 

Let it never be forgotten that the interest of the great 
mass of American citizenship is paramount to all others 
combined. 



CHAPTER XX 

RECONSTRUCTION 

Readjustment or reconstruction? All understand that 
it refers to the period immediately following the signing 
of the armistice, when the nation was seeking to return to 
normalcy; and while some writers insist that it was a period 
of readjustment, others understand that it was a period of 
reconstruction. The former would be correct if the coun- 
try were simply getting back to where it was before the 
clash of arms. But there was something more : a reconstruc- 
tion of industrial and social forces. A new world came out 
of the furnace of conflict; much of the dross was gone. It 
would have been a disaster for America to seek to adjust 
herself to the old status. It was the period of Recon- 
struction. 

It was not easy for the world to meet these conditions 
thrust upon it by the Great War. Seven million of the choic- 
est of the world's men slain in battle; 7,000,000 more so 
seriously disabled as to be no longer available as producers 
— these 14,000,000 of the world's most capable laborers out 
of the race created a condition In the economic world that 
required time to meet. In the United States alone 5,000,- 
000 were taken from ordinary occupations to meet the fight- 
ing requirements, while a very large number besides were re- 
quired to manufacture and transport all kinds of war imple- 
ments — all withdrawn from the ordinary course of business 
at a time when there was a correspondingly acute demand 
for men and goods in every part of Christcncfom, confront- 
ing this nation with an accumulated deficit of production and 
productive power. 

While the war was still in progress, the Administration 

398 



Reconstruction ^,u> 

gave some slight attention to matters pertaining to the days 
after. The Council of National Defense, organi/.ec! pri- 
marily for the war emergency, passed, as a permanent body, 
into such reconstruction tasks as seemed imminent. As 
early as June, 191 8, a small staff from it was organized to 
^'survey, classify and digest the reconstruction activities" of 
this and other lands, with instructions to report to the 
proper department. If any other active effort looking 
toward prepartion for the reconstruction period was made 
by the Administration before the war ceased, it is so slight 
as to be negligible. For this reason It was freely chargcil 
against the Administration that it was as unprepared for 
peace as it had been for war. 

When President Wilson was asked to create a recon- 
struction commission, he declined upon the ground that he 
preferred to leave that work to the various war boards. In 
fact, nothing was done, although it was pointed out to him 
at the time that the chief commercial nations of Europe 
were at that very time constituting commissions of their 
ablest men for that purpose. The British were thinking of 
reconstruction the next year after they entered the war; 
and their government, even before Asquith was replaced 
by Lloyd George, had taken action accordingly. The idea 
grew with them, and they were so much impressed with tiie 
importance of the "new world after the war" that an out- 
and-out ministry of reconstruction was created. Not even 
In the darkest days of their fiery ordeal did they fail in 
steady preparation for the day they foresaw after the bat- 
tling should cease. For the entire four years the British 
Board of Trade had been co-ordinating the work; their 
commissions had been at work for months at home and 
abroad gathering data and making ready for the new era. 

The United States Chamber of Commerce addressed to 
President Wilson a letter indicating an anxiety among busi- 
ness men of this country to know what course the Govern- 
ment proposed pursuing. And immediately the armistice 



400 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

was signed he took under consideration the appointment of 
a reconstruction commission to develop a program for the 
nation's return to a peace basis, such commission with ad- 
visory powers only. Nothing came of it. As is now a 
well-known part of the history of the time, he was engrossed 
with international affairs to the almost total exclusion of 
the affairs of his own nation. For nine months the nation 
was plunging toward an economic and social crisis that was 
appalling to contemplate. And the nation's head mani- 
fested a profound unconcern for the seriousness of the sit- 
uation. 

This attitude was Indicated when. In December, 191 8, 
he was asked by a notable gathering of the business men of 
the country for suggestions of guidance. This was the 
Reconstruction Congress, held at Atlantic City, of Indus- 
trial leaders, the most representative and important gather- 
ing of that character ever held In this country. At such a 
time It was of supreme importance. With nearly 5,000 
delegates from all sections of the country, representing 380 
different industries, it was of chief importance because of 
what it proposed to accomplish. This congress, naturally 
looking to the head of the nation for an expression as to 
the Government's point of view in the serious situation then 
confronting the country, asked him to state that position. 
He paused long enough, in his preparations for sailing for 
Europe, to make this amazing reply : 

You may be sure that I would send a message to the meeting if I 
knew what message to send ; but frankly, I do not. It is a time when 
we must all thoughtfully take counsel and apply the wisest action 
to circumstances as they arise. 

In this mood of exalted preoccupation he left the country, 
with no one In the nation's capital for seven months with 
authority to speak or act for the executive branch of the 
government. If he saw the storm clouds gathering over 
the land, he manifested no concern until given a rude shock 



Reconstruction .joi 

by the demands of a few organized railroad men, in the 
summer of 1919, who blundy informed him of (he ihsastcr 
in store unless he quickly awoke from his iiitcrnatioiial 
dream. "Let somebody drop a match, and it will he a 
sorry day for all of us," is what the railroad man saiti, 
truthfully portraying the result of a policy which the rail- 
road men, with the aid of the President, had forcctl ui)oii 
the country. 

An Administration lacking policy, program or leatlership 
at this time became an invitation to an economic debauch. 
A spirit of recklessness seized the country, and "there en- 
sued an orgy of profiteering which caught into its intoxicat- 
ing influence well-nigh every class and group of popula- 
tion." 

Such being the attitude of the head of the Administra- 
tion, there was not much to be expected from the heads of 
the several departments. And whatever effort was made 
was without concerted plan or co-ordination — the same 
weakness that had held the Administration helpless in its 
war efforts. The industrial and social leaders of the coun- 
try, after looking in vain for guidance and constructive 
leadership from that source, concluded to proceed with 
what measure of assistance they could obtain from any 
quarter. It was thought that a federal employers' indus- 
trial body could accomplish something by going to Europe 
and there at first-hand study conditions in the devastated 
part of the world. Accordingly, a litde more than two 
months after the conflict closed. Secretary of Labor Wil- 
son commissioned such a body to go to Europe to inquire 
into the industrial conditions and the method by which the 
industrial leaders and laborers there were meeting the sit- 
uation. 

A suggestion of the results of the lack of a head at 
Washington was found in the antagonism that developed 
between the Department of Commerce and the Railroad 
Administration in the spring of 19 19, while the President 



402 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

was in Paris. The Industrial Board of the department 
had made an attempt at stabihzing prices. This the Rail- 
road Administration attacked upon the ground that it was 
interfering with prices of steel rails. ^ Abolishment of the 
board by Secretary Redfield on May 9, 19 19, brought to an 
end a bitter controversy of almost two months between 
these two federal branches of the public service that were 
very important at that particular time, Mr. Redfield de- 
claring that so far as his department was concerned the 
law of supply and demand would be permitted to govern 
in problems of industrial reconstruction. He later resigned 
his cabinet position. 

But before he resigned, he assumed the position appar- 
ently that the United States should not seek to extend its 
trade until the other countries of the world had had an 
opportunity to gain a firm footing, in the markets of South 
America and other lands. In an authorized interview, he 
is quoted by the Federal Trade Service, published by the 
Publicity Corporation of Washington, as saying: 

We have a great decision to make. It is whether we shall take 
this opportunity and the immediate rich profits it offers, or whether 
we shall restrain our energies for awhile, giving France, England, 
Belgium, Italy, the neutrals and even Germany's reborn people a fair 
and free opportunity to get on their feet. 

And Secretary of Labor Wilson declared, at an even earlier 
date, that we had made about all the provision that could be 
made for foreign trade as a means of securing additional 
markets. "The first thing is to know where the trade can 
be had, and through the commercial attaches of our con- 
sulates operating through the Department of Commerce we 
have kept continually in touch with the possible opportuni- 

' Director-General of Railroads Hines made public a statement on May 
23, announcing that he had been compelled to purchase 200,000 tons of 
steel rails at the steel trust's own price, upon ascertaining that six large 
companies had sent in bids that were identical, not only in price, but as 
to conditions, and that all were in strict accordance with those approved 
by the federal Industrial Board. 



Rcfotistriicliou ^(), 

ties." 2 And he properly added that shipping was an iinpor- 
tant factor to be considered. It was a rcinarkahlc contrast 
with the position of the head of the Department of Com- 
merce himself. 

But in the midst of all the confusion and lack of co-or- 
dination on the part of the Administration at this crucial 
time, there remained one man who maintained his balance 
and who had a plan — Secretary of the Interior, I-ranklin 
K. Lane. He planned to locate the returning fighters on 
the public lands of the United States, of which there were 
millions of acres: 15,000,000 of arid land to which it was 
proposed to bring water for irrigation; 70,000,000 of 
swamp lands that might be drained; 200,000,000 of cut- 
over land, that which was once timbered, from which were 
to be cleared brush and stumps. These he offered to the 
returning men on easy terms. It was a worthy idea. But it 
failed for two chief reasons: First, wages were too good 
at easier employment in great industrial centers; and, sec- 
ond, the Anglo-Saxon of to-day, though his ancestors were 
the greatest subduers of wild prairies and the greatest van- 
quishers of stumps and swamps the world ever saw and that 
with the small 'means of civilized life at hand, wants the 
modern school and church and all that goes with a com- 
munity furnished with these easier means of helping his 
children at once to the higher step in a progressive lile. 
Had life been found less attractive in the larger wages at 
the great centers of life, Mr. Lane's plan would have been 
more attractive. It deserved better consideration than It 
received. 

The foregoing is substantially the efforts of the Atlniln- 
Istration at the beginning of the crucial period known as 
the Reconstruction. Other efforts on its part were defensive, 
as shown elsewhere. ^ They were in no sense aggressive 
reconstructive programs. Even the Conference of Gov- 

* Collier's Weekly, February i, 1919. 
'Chapter on "Profiteering." 



404 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

ernors and Mayors called for the White House March 3 
and 4, while the President was temporarily in the country, 
was of this character, the resolutions then adopted con- 
demning the doctrines which inveigh against God and gov- 
ernment. For then it was already seen to what the Presi- 
dent's recently proclaimed internationalism and his more 
recent dallying with the Bolshevistic doctrines of Russia 
were leading in this country. 

Thus it devolved upon the leadership of the country's 
business men to supply the lack. Even in the midst of the 
rejoicing over victory and peace there ran an undercurrent 
of uncertainty and apprehension in the business world be- 
cause of the realization that the Government faced the 
great change without policy or program. Manufacturers, 
bankers, and merchants had beseiged Washington in vain 
for some suggestion as to a definite plan on the part of 
the Government. Its inertia was again indicated in its 
process of laying down keels by the shipping board and of 
floundering in shipping, while fighting to maintain shipping 
rates ten times as high as before the war and the billions 
put into shipping was rapidly tied up to the docks to perish, 
with no plan or program, and clerks and supervisors no 
longer required crowded the shipping service, eating up the 
government payroll. In contrast, within forty-eight hours 
after the signing of the armistice, the director general of 
the British mercantile marine began demobilizing his forces, 
and in six months had sold more than 1,200 ships, realizing 
more than $300,000,000 without loss; and not a clerk or 
cent of expense in that once vast department of that gov- 
ernment remained. It was completely out of the shipping 
business. 

First in importance in the matter of private leadership 
in the reconstruction period was the Atlantic City Congress 
of December, 19 18. Most prominently announced through 
the public press of all the acts of this congress was the 
roundly applauded declaration of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 



Reconstruction ^,)<; 

that "In these days, the selfish pursuit of personal cnils at 
the expense of a group cannot and will not lon^rcr be tol- 
erated." His industrial creed, as it was termed, ((.ok the 
very important position of recognizing three ecjually inter- 
ested parties in all industrial activity — capital, lahor, and 
the community. This was a matter of fundamental impor- 
tance, as neither of the other two groups had ever seemed 
to think that the great mass of the people had any right to 
consideration In their quarrels that were so disastrous to 
the community at large. 

In the early months after the armistice signing, all in- 
dustries were waiting for "the bottom to drop out of 
prices." But there was a constant rise. Some were of 
opinion that prices were up to remain high permanently 
and made extensive contracts accordingly. But in early 
February, 1920, there began the fall in prices, and it was 
at once realized that manufacturers must at once make a 
readjustment and purchase with greater caution. By this 
time exchange was so out of balance that $69 would enable 
an American to purchase $100 worth of goods In London, 
while $36 in France and $29 In Italy would purchase the 
same amount. 

It was a year previous that there was on all sides the 
great fear of unemployment In the country, bringing into 
existence a considerable quantity of written matter urging 
that all kinds of work proceed at once, of which probably 
the most famous appeal is that of Richard H. Edmonds In 
the Manufacturers' Record, when he said : 

Build that house now; construct that highway at once; huild that 
school, that church; repair that broken pavement; build that parage, 
and even that chicken-coop, now — not to-morrow. Go ahead with 
your plans; speed the nation on the road to full employment, and 
thus hasten the day of individual and national prosperity and safety. 
Preach this from the pulpit, ye ministers of the gospel; act it from 
the pews, ye laymen who profess a love of humanity ; put it into ef- 
fect, ye county, municipal, and state officials; and remember, ye busi- 



4o6 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

ness men of America, . . . that there is something in this infinitely 
higher and more important than the small amount of money involved 
which you think you could save by waiting. 

Government officials, particularly those in high positions in 
the Department of Labor, were urgent in their utterances 
in this direction. 

And the great employers acted upon the idea with 
good results. Indeed, many of them planned for conversion 
of their war plants into peace-time operations as soon as 
hostilities should cease. Such was the plan of the monster 
Eddystone plant at Philadelphia, owned by the Baldwin 
Locomotive Works, and which had made a great record 
during the war. Likewise the Du Pont Powder Company, 
with plants in various states, affords a striking example of 
the foreseeing method of dealing with the employment 
problem precipitated by peace. At that time, of its loo,- 
ooo men and women employes, 80 per cent were engaged 
wholly in war work, three-fourths of these were transferred 
into peace industries with scarcely a ripple, such as chemi- 
cals, dyes, paints, leather substitutes. When the Adminis- 
tration was helpless to point the way, business men pro- 
ceeded without regard to the Government's purposes, even 
though it was the Administration which was responsible 
for an increase of wages for labor out of all proportion to 
the returns for vastly more exacting service to the commu- 
nity, such as teaching. And from these abnormal levels in 
wages and consequently in materials it was known that 
there must inevitably be a sharp recession. And while 
both labor and capital recognized this fact, neither was will- 
ing to make the first concession; and between the two, the 
public met the usual fate of being the chief sufferer. 

In the early months of 19 19, the Employment Service 
of the federal government and of the several States was 
watching anxiously for the bad spots of unemployment over 
the country; and even within a month of the close of the 
fighting reports were received. The reports at the end of 



Reconstruction ^07 

the first week in December, 1918, showed that of tin- 122 
cities reporting to Washington, only 16 showed iiiu-inploy- 
ment conditions; and in 91 of these cities the relations be- 
tween capital and labor were reported good, in S as un- 
settled, and in 5 as acute. In the New Knglaml area, 
Bridgeport reported 7,500 unemployed, Derby i,o(j(), 1 1 art- 
ford 3,000, an increase of 1,500 over the preceding week, 
and Meriden 1,500, an increase over the preceding week 
of 500. The steel and iron industries were laying off men. 
In Boston, Worcester, and Lynn upwards of 23,000 were 
out of employment among textile workers, while many con- 
cerns were on two-thirds time. There was heavy unem- 
ployment among boot and shoe workers, brick-layers, car- 
penters, laborers and machinists. Only in New Hampshire 
and Vermont did the demand for workers equal the supply. 

About Albany a surplus of 6,000 was reported, an in- 
crease of 200 in a week; while Buffalo's increase was 1,000, 
making a total of 20,000. Newark's surplus was 6,000, 
Jersey City's 5,000, Trenton's 3,000; while Pittsburg re- 
ported 12,000 unemployed common laborers, 6,000 semi- 
skilled workers, and 1,000 clerks, besides 1,700 miners; 
and similar reports came from other large industrial cen- 
ters of the Eastern States. Cleveland reported 75,000 
unemployed workers, Dayton 1 1,000, and other Ohio points 
large numbers. 

The middle west, the south, and the Pacific coast all 
reported substantially the same conditions. Of all the cities 
of the country reporting to Washington for the week end- 
ing February 24, 19 19, sixty per cent reported heavy unem- 
ployment — an increase of fifty-eight per cent over the week 
previous and fifty-seven per cent over the week before that; 
the number of cities reporting an approximated equality of 
demand and supply decreased twenty-nine per cent in the 
one week. Every week for the first three months after the 
signing of the armistice showed the same tendency. 

And now, at a rather late day, the Administration was 



4o8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

becoming alarmed and sent out danger signals. November 
19, 19 1 8, a week after the armistice was signed, Roger W. 
Babson, head of the statistical organization which furnished 
merchants, bankers and investors with a periodical "barome- 
ter letter," urged concessions to labor, closing with this 
question: "Shall we all voluntarily give up something, or 
shall we all run the risk of losing everything?" It was 
stated that fundamental economic conditions were bad« 
and that a period of trouble and depression was just ahead 
and could not be sidetracked. The number out of employ- 
ment at the end of four months after the conflict of arms 
closed was formidable, the number between December 3, 
19 18, and January 31, 19 19, being multiplied twenty-five 
times, the number at the latter date being about 1,500,000 
which had increased in two weeks to 2,000,000. President 
Wilson summoned to Washington governors of the various 
States to consider the situation; and while they expressed 
confidence that there was little danger of violence during 
the reconstruction period, there was, throughout the land, 
clearly defined expression of doubt as to the validity of this 
opinion. The United States Employment Service, reorgan- 
ized to find positions for the returned fighting men of the 
nation, practically suspended activities on March 22, 19 19, 
because of the failure of Congress to make an appropria- 
tion for its maintenance. Its agents performed their most 
efficient service in efforts at the demobilization camps to 
put the discharged service men into suitable employment, 
unless they already had something definite in view. And 
through their efforts, communities throughout the land were 
organizing bureaus for this purpose, managed by local com- 
mittees.'* It was a highly commendable plan. 

*The Employment Service showed itself effective in many lines. Start- 
ing as a small beginning in the immigration service, it suddenly leaped to 
a position of usefulness and importance that challenged the admiration 
of the world. Unknown until about January, 1918, as an essential unit 
of service, in ten months it moved 2,500,000 men from peace to war activity; 
and by the middle of January, 1919, operating the reverse process, it had 
placed twenty-five per cent of all war workers who wanted employment. 



Reconstruction ^.on 

But it was severely criticized. It was dcclan-d to he 
one form of the propaganda used by the Adiniiilstraii..,, t(. 
make things appear what they were not. Whlli- tin- holies 
given in the foregoing paragraphs arc from oHicial sources, 
whereby the press of the country was made to bchcvc that 
its continuance was a necessity, the dcckictions arc open 
to question, and in some cases tlic figures tiuiiisclvcs. 
Industry, a newspaper interested in the country's imhistrial 
development, "declared that fewer men were out of work 
at the end of six months after the war ended than in any 
year preceding the war. The Iron Trade Reviezv criticized 
the method of the service in securing the figures as to the 
number of unemployed.'"' The Washington Evening Star 
published figures taken from representative papers in Wash- 
ington, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Detroit, Pittsburg, New 
York, Boston, Cleveland and Buffalo showing that the ad- 
vertising for help in January and February, 19 19, was 
larger by 1,406 advertisements than for the same months 
a year earlier.*' And an inspection of the pages of adver- 
tising in the metropolitan newspapers in late 19 19 and early 
1920 shows page after page given to the most expensive 
advertising for "help wanted." Common laborers were 



In early 1918, it devised plans for effecting the wheat harvest of that 
year with the minimum of loss. Establishing offices in the great centers 
of the wheat belt, speed and efficiency marked every movement of the great 
land army of harvesters numbering nearly 10,000 under its direction. Co- 
operation was sought from newspapers, and other agencies used were mov- 
ing pictures, the national grange, commercial organizations, and rural 
telephone lines. 

Owing to the failure of appropriation to continue its service, the re- 
duction ordered in March, 1919, cut its force 80 per cent, leaving a mere 
skeleton of its former force. 

°In the case of the Cleveland figures, it stated that the Employment 
Service asked for an estimate from its local office there, which, in turn, 
asked for an estimate from the Cleveland Federation of Labor, and 
then the two were to make a guess. This guess was then forwarded to 
Washington where it was given out as fact. 

•The advertising for female help amounted to 265,095 Imes as com- 
pared with 210,443 for the same period of the preceding year. On the other 
hand, the papers selected from eight cities for the same months showed 61,095 
lines of advertising for "situations wanted" (male) as agamst 57,509 
for a year earlier. 



410 TJic JViJson Administration and the Great War 

those most readily taken up in the early days of reconstruc- 
tion. 

The period immediately after the war closed was 
marked by strikes of unusual violence in the United States, 
with the avowed purpose of destroying so-called capitalism 
and orderly government. It is to be regretted that promi- 
nent in this effort at destruction were noted leaders of 
organized labor who herded many of the honest laborers 
like so many sheep into the wrong fold. And it was with 
less basis for strikes than ever known in history. There 
was never less need for increased wages than at that time, 
or for improved conditions of work or living of the laborer, 
as shown elsewhere.'^ The propaganda was actively at work 
blowing smoke into the eyes of the American people, seek- 
ing to blind them to the fact that it was the European 
variety of Bolshevism finding its way in America, And by 
the time of the next presidential election, the people were 
awake to the fact that the broad announcement of Samuel 
Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, 
that it Avas the duty of organized labor to support the party 
and policies of President Wilson, was not sound either in 
sentiment or principle. Plonest laboring men by the hun- 
dreds of thousands repudiated the whole destructionist 
scheme. Said a leading newspaper on the Atlantic sea- 
board : 

Whatever may be the constructive alms of Mr. Gompers and 
his followers in the American Federation of Labor, the purpose Is that 
which was proclaimed on the very first day of the strike by John Fitz- 
patriclc, head of the strike committee: "We are going to socialize the 
basic industries of the United States. This is the beginning of the 
fight." And with radicahsm in control of the basic industries — the 
necessaries of existence — there would be created such a condition of 
civil war as now threatens Great Britain.^ 

' Chapters on "Labor and Wages" and "Russia and Bolshevism." 
* Philadelphia North American of September 30, 1919. 



Rcconstnickon ^ i j 

It was the time chosen by Bolshevism aiul all of its hy- 
brid associates to overturn the best govcniiiunt tlu- world 
ever knew — and for a class purpose wholly. I'lic situation 
was sobering, even alarming, almost desperate, it gave 
serious-minded people pause. But the result of tlic i^zo 
national election was as hard a hit at radical lahorism, with 
which Mr. Gompers was dallying, as it was at Wilsonisin. 
Indeed, upon the statements of both President Wilson ami 
President Gompers, the minds of the two lay alongsiik- 
of each other, and to strike one was to strike both, jhe 
blow was sent home. 

When, in the face of a national calamity, in the suniriKr 
of 19 16, the organized railroad men, aided by President 
Wilson, forced their demands upon the country through 
a servile Congress, they set a pace that was followed by 
all classes where it was possible, for increases in prices 
and costs of living. Had the government conscripted labor 
and capital at the same wages it paid the lighting boys, 
there might have been a modicum of justice in the process. 
But the debauch begun in 19 16 continued throughout the 
reconstruction period. 

The first feeling of timidity and uncertainty, immedi- 
ately following the cessation of hostilities, soon gave way 
to a riot. of money-spending. Hotels everywhere demand- 
ing exorbitant rates were crowded to capacity and travellers 
found it difficult to secure lodging unless engaged well m 
advance. Theaters the country over were doing a record- 
breaking business. High-priced restaurants were patron- 
ized beyond anything ever before known. Dealers in 
jewelry and in the most expensive kinds of men's and wom- 
en's apparel, purveyors of all the infinite varieties of things 
unnecessary and of high cost did an unheard-of business. 
Nor was this on the part of the rich people who could well 
afford to indulge in such a riot of buying. But it was while 
they were turning their suits and having them retailored, 
that men and women working for modest salaries and in 



412 The Wilson A dministration and the Great War 

humble position were freely purchasing of jewelry and gar- 
ments that cost hundreds of dollars apiece. 

Now the country was reaping the reward of the enor- 
mously bulged prices that were forced by organized labor 
upon the country in 191 6. Office boys who were receiving 
$8 to $10 per week were put on the war-plant pay-rolls at 
$20 to $30; unskilled laborers jumped from $15 to $40. 
The farmers were stripped of labor by the lure of the prices 
paid by industrial centers, while his costs were rising, ne- 
cessitating a rise in cost of the food he produced. Then 
labor, finding that its bulkier envelope brought no better 
living, made fresh demands. Building ceased because of 
excessive prices for material and labor, rents shot skyward, 
railroad rates increased — and labor Insisted on higher 
wages. The vicious cycle was in full swing. It was at this 
time that organized railroad men again made demand upon 
President Wilson for further increase of wages unless there 
was to be a reduced cost of living; and while the President 
was discoursing upon "the judgment of society" and dwell- 
ing upon his constructive statesmanship In world affairs, 
A. B. Garretson, chairman of union railroad representatives, 
was frankly describing the contest as one between the cave- 
men when he said: 

In times like these, mea go back to primal instinct — to the day of 
the caveman, who, with his half-gnawed bone, snarled at the other 
caveman who wanted to take his bone away. We leaders are fighting 
for our men, the railroads are fighting for their stockholders, and the 
shippers for themselves. The public will pay. 

It was shortly after this, in late 19 19, that public jour- 
nals were comparing prices and other conditions after the 
close of the Civil War with conditions prevailing at the 
close of the Great War. Referring to the earlier period, 
a New York correspondent of the London Times stated at 
that time: 

This war has brought the levity of the American character out 
in bold relief. The indulgence in every variety of pleasure, luxury, 



Reconstruction 4 1 ^ 

and extravagance is simply shocking. Inhere is something sad.lcniiig 
in the high glee with which the people here look upon a grievous 
national calamity. The jewelers' shops . . . have trelilcd tlirir 
trade; the love of fine dresses and ornaments on tlie part of w.micii 
amounts to madness. They have money and they must enjoy it. 

Suggestive of the increased cost of living ;it that time, 
these figures are cited: 

Eggs jumped from fifteen to tvvcnty-five cents a do/cn, cheese 
from eight to eighteen cents a pound, potatoes from $1.50 to :/i2.25 
per bushel. All necessities rose in value from sixty to one hundred 
per cent. Wages lagged behind, the average increase in all trades 
being about twenty-five per cent. 

But one who passed through the high-living costs after 
the Great War may smile at the foregoing figures, especially 
when it is remembered that the paper-dollar value of that 
time was far below that of gold, while in the reconstruction 
period of 191 9-192 1 they possessed e{]ual value. For 
now eggs went to $1.00 a dozen, and in late 1920 sold 
in the middle West at $1.20; turkeys at Thanksgiving, 1 920, 
retailed at fifty cents per pound. Potatoes were sold at 
$6.00 per bushel, in the spring of 1920, in a distinctively 
potato section of the central Northwest, where butter 
reached $1.00 a pound in a famous'dairying. State. These 
prices fairly represent costs of the time, as affected by 
foodstuffs. 

As touching the building costs in early 1920, an architect 
in a section of the country where the lumber business is 
prominent stated publicly that the general-contract low bid 
of $4,090 on a house in 1915 had been raised to $11,800 
for exactly the same specifications, and that a $4)265 house 
of 19 1 5 would cost $12,950 at the beginning of 1920, while 
number-one maple flooring costing $37 per thousand feet m 
19 16 was held at $200 in February, 1920. 

According to the National Industrial Conference Board, 
during the period from July, 19 14, to March, 1920, the 
increase in living cost was 95 per cent, or about 1.4 P^'f 



414 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

cent a month; but that during the year previous the total 
was 21 per cent, or about 1.75 per cent a month. Begun 
by the reckless extravagance in all directions on the part of 
the Administration, the unprecedented inflation of prices 
was continued by equally reckless buying by the public until 
the first sign of a break came with the overalls movement 
late April, 1920. The hoarders and profiteers tried to 
laugh it out of court as an absurd transitory fad, but it 
proved their undoing. Negligible in itself in the quantity 
of clothing purchased, the movement, by the sympathy en- 
gendered among all classes of the general public, created 
a determined sentiment against swollen prices that was of 
great value at that particular time. 

And while it had been fact that to mention the possi- 
bility of a lowering of wages was taboo, and particularly 
among newspapers, it was evident that in mid-autumn of 
1920, a decisive slackening was shown in dropping over- 
time work. With this elimination came a just demand for 
a higher standard of production per man. From that 
time on there was a constant and strong recession. By De- 
cember of that year there was a sharp decline in wages, in 
many instances upon the initiative of the workers them- 
selves. And as 1921 dawned, men were out of employ- 
ment who, but a short six months previous, could have had 
any one of a half-dozen remunerative positions. Organ- 
ized labor had overshot the mark, creating a deep-seated 
public opposition; now the high wages had disappeared 
in riotous living of a year earlier, and self-respecting men, 
going about looking for something to do, brought back 
into current vernacular the old familiar, but long-lost, 
"tramp." 

The November, 1920, letter to the public, put out by 
the National City Bank of New York stated: 

For the first time in the history of the United States, a period of 
expansion has been checked and prices have turned decisively down- 
ward without a banking panic. 



Reconstruction , \ c 

And for this fact, the banks of the country deserve ^neat 
credit for refusing longer to aid those who were going the 
swift short road to financial oblivion until, about the umUWi.- 
of 1920, the banks of the land called a linn halt to the 
ruinous pace. But so sudden was this step which should 
have been taken earlier, that before mid-December so many 
men were out of employment that governors of States and 
mayors of cities were called upon to take up i)ublic work 
that had been in contemplation. In order that men might 
not suffer through the winter,'' 

And at this very time, dealers of the country were going 
through an ordeal that tested the strongest liber. Saitl 
one of them: 

The world's commerce is going through the fires. . . . The 
elouds are black, but thank God there is sunshine behind the elouds. 
It took neither a bright man nor a courageous man to prosper during 
the boom just past, but you must have a backbone now, you must be 
a fighter in this great game of commerce and you must be prepared 
to fight clean. ^" 

The problem with every dealer In commodities was to get 
rid of his war-priced stocks with the least possible loss 
when the crisis came. Each group of dealers thought his 
suffered most. Each winced under the galling load, yet 
bravely met his fate. The wage-earner who was first to be 
favored by the arbitrary demands upon the nation through 
the President in 19 16, was the last to meet the losses. The 
farmer was probably hit the hardest and complained the 
most bitterly. But all were touched — manufacturer, job- 
ber, retailer, farmer, toller. It was Inevitable that each 
group had to absorb his portion of the loss due to the prick- 
ing of the bubble. There was sympathy with all, except 

"See resolutions of the Manufacturers' and Employers' Association of the 
State held at Jackson, Michigan, December lo, 1920. This severe condi- 
tion of unemployment continued to grow until President Harding called 
a conference in Washington, autumn of 1931 to devise means for its 
abatement. A month later it was said 1,000,000 of the unemployed had 
been put to work. 

^"George H. Capper of Chicago, in December, 1920. 



41 6 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

the profiteer, whether among the capital class or the organ- 
ized-labor class whose production was far below standard 
with an immoderately increased pay coming from the great 
unorganized third party, the large general public, for whom 
no President entered a plea. A full year before the final 
adjustment came, there were warnings of the coming de- 
chne in unprecedented prosperity and high prices, that the 
country was entering upon the final phase of the delirium 
— the delirium of the profiteer in commercial and industrial 
life as well as of the organized labor; the delirium of spend- 
ing without considering the possible lean years of the period 
that was to follow. 

But prices of garments, cost of housing with 1,000,000 
houses fewer than the demands, wages, and pricking of the 
inflation bubble were not all that demanded serious atten- 
tion during the reconstruction days. There was also a 
crying need for education in the spirit of American ideals, 
a need emphasized with the discovery that in some sections 
of the country there had been tampering with schoolbooks 
in the interest of German propaganda. From the splendid 
public service rendered by the schools during the war came 
an impetus to project school effort further into civic and 
national affairs; and this at the very time when the pay of 
teachers was far below that of wage-earners who paid noth- 
ing to prepare for their common toil, resulting in a deplet- 
ing of the ranks of the more competent teachers. So deep 
was the impression the war made upon educators that at 
the meeting of the National Education Association, early 
in 19 19, the greater number of the topics discussed were 
upon the war's reconstruction of educational aims and ideals. 

In all of the great aims of the reconstruction period, 
perhaps nothing surpassed in importance that of this educa- 
tional purpose. On approximately the same plane, however, 
was the insistent demand for social justice, particularly a 
more equitable system by insurance against the hazards of 
sickness, unemployment, and old age, relieving workers of 



Reconstruction , , -, 

the anxieties tormenting beyond entlurancc. '10 this tiul, 
there was a large demand for full recognition of the dignity 
and authority of labor in the scheme of democratic civili/a- 
tion — not merely a group who happened to be of org;ini/iii 
labor and urged the debarment of all who happened not 
to belong to their group, the closed-shop workers, Init 
equally of all honorable laborers. For the disclosures in the 
building profiteering investigations of New York, late in 
1920, besmirched prominent organized labor leaders as 
badly as It did the contractors. And the laborer who is 
ready to smite the honorable laboring man simply because 
he happens not to belong to the organization is not less a 
danger to society than the employer who will smite a labor- 
ing man because he does belong to the labor union. And 
the Investigation revealed the pitiable fact that the Bethle- 
hem Steel operators boycotted dealers who employed union 
men; and union labor boycotted those employing men who 
did not belong to the union. Again it was the great third 
party, the general public, that suffered; and this third party 
was unable to distinguish between the tactics of the other 
two. Both were accursed in its view. 

But the materialism of these two antagonistic forces, 
dominant for the moment, could not persist without extreme 
danger to the nation. It was the force seeking the upper 
hand the first year-and-half after the close of the war; but 
when the people saw through their purpose, the nation 
turned Its back, deserting the materialism for the spiritual 
forces. At the beginning of 19 19, the president of the Uni- 
versity of Minnesota In a public address, relating to the 
spiritual forces operating In reconstruction, declared that 
labor was then face to face with Its most critical sitiiation 
In history, and urged all groups to set their faces in the 
right direction and work for a better mutual undcrstandmg. 
He added: 

Present conditions are calling for the new American. Changes 
have come, and more are coming. The new American must have 



41 8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

initiative, a spirit of independence, and an appreciation of honesty. 
The present period is one of clash between things that are old and 
things that are new. 

This was the sentiment calling for an honest day's work 
for a full day's pay; and a square deal on the part of the 
employer for the employe; and a square deal on the part of 
the union man toward his fellow outside of the union. It 
called for a square deal all around. 

If captains of industry and captains of unionized labor 
were pilfering the great public of the last obtainable nickel 
in a quiet, gentlemanly fashion, others sought their end 
in a less canonical manner, during this period. A crime 
wave swept the nation from the close of the war, with 
increasing pressure and volume, until its crest was reached 
by the ushering in of the year 1921. So violent did it be- 
come that in many cities the police were unable to cope with 
it. New York, Chicago, even Philadelphia, and other cities 
became notorious centers of lawlessness and lax .morals. 
In other places men of the American Legion offered their 
services to help subdue the criminals. Private citizens armed 
themselves for self-defense. Officers were instructed to 
shoot to kill. And when the public became so fully aroused 
that it would not permit itself longer to be trifled with in 
the pursuit of its orderly and legitimate business, the ter- 
rorism began to diminish. ^^ In large measure the great 
impetus given these outbursts of the criminal instinct must 
be attributed to the profligacy and dishonesty of the Ad- 
ministration in dealing with the public during the Great 
War. 

While this deplorable side of human nature was mani- 
festing itself; while shameless employers were battening 
on some employes; while no less shameless labor leaders 
were aiding in the pilfering of the general public, it was 
a great relief to know that God was not lost sight of in 

"The character of the criminal features changed, but not immediately 
the degree. In November, 1921, United States Marines were placed on 
guard to protect the mail against robbery, with instructions to shoot to kill. 



Reconstruction .\\,) 

the greatest period in which it was man' privilcjrc to live. 
Though the ill-starred Intcr-Church World Movement cre- 
ated a feeling of depression, it taught valuable lessons. 
And other movements of world-wide import came into being 
in individual denominations. Scarcely had the clasli of 
arms ceased, when these denominations began to make ap- 
peal, for world-rebuilding of civilization, for sums running 
into the hundreds of millions, additional to regular expenses. 
After all the endless millions poured out for welfare work 
in the war, it seemed like an unwise move to call for other 
millions at such a time. The Methodist church started 
the appeals by asking for $85,000,000, or, conditionally, 
$105,000,000; it received $120,000,000. The Baptists 
then asked for $100,000,000 and other prominent denomi- 
nations in similarly large sums. 

In the year 1920 lay the crisis of reconstruction. The 
most dangerous corner was turned in safety, the speed hav- 
ing slackened. As the year died away, an age passed into 
history. The supreme efforts of Bolshevism to capture the 
great democracy of the western hemisphere, materially 
aided by the indifference if not actual sympathy of the Ad- 
ministration, failed. Falsifying organized-labor leaders 
were taught a severe lesson in the trouncing it, together with 
Wilsonism, received at the hands of the great mass of the 
people in the national election of that year. Profiteers and 
domineering captains of industry were shown that a new 
day had dawned. Social justice and higher ideals of even 
the traditional Americanism were given a new impetus. 
The world looked brighter than ever before. President 
Harding's harking back to the Americanism of Washuigton 
and Lincoln, in his inaugural address, stirred the great mass 
of the people to new enthusiasms. 

Never again should the nation be permitted to be head- 
less in the severely exacting days of a crisis. 



CHAPTER XXI 

INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION 

From its foundation, the nation has been grateful to 
those who went forth in time of peril to fight its battles. 
One manifestation of its gratitude has been in caring for 
the disabled and aged veteran, and for his widow and chil- 
dren. The large aggregate of its pension bill ^ for wars 
preceding the Great War is but suggestive of other care it 
has bestowed, such as soldiers' homes, orphans' schools. 

During the Great War there was added a new and 
greatly improved feature to the pay of the man In service 
and those dependent upon him. This was an allotment by 
the government to the wife and child left at home, in part 
deducted from the man's pay, in part paid from the United 
States treasury, but all sent direct to the wife by the gov- 
ernment. Most beneficent in its conception, the execution 
of this law became a farce and a national disgrace by reason 
of the Administration's failure to meet these payments as 
they became due; and the anxiety of the fighting man for 
his wife and babe at home became to him a greater horror 
than facing the guns of the enemy war-machine.^ 

A yet greater improvement upon the government's plan 
for caring for the fighting man and his dependents was the 
law prepared by Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. 
The Act of October 6, 19 17, permitted each man in the 
service to take out a life insurance policy to the amount 
of $10,000, for the payment of which the government was 
responsible. No safer insurance was ever known in all the 

*The total to June 30, 1920, was $5,830,815,717, of which $5,502,445,815 
was for Civil War pensions. 

' See chapter on "Labor and V^ages." 

420 



Insurance and Covipcnsaiion ^2 1 

world's history, and none at so low a rate. The insurrd 
IS permitted to carry this insurance for five years after peace 
shall have been declared by presidential proclamation. 

The same law granted the fighting man compensation 
for disabdity mcurred in the service; and, in case of his 
death, to his widow and children, or other relatives depend- 
ent upon him. At the same time provision was made for 
rebuilding the men after their fight in the war was over, 
so that they might continue the battle in life's keen struggle 
on a more nearly even footing. It undertook to rehabilitate 
the disabled so as to restore them, at least in some meas- 
ure, for useful activity, indemnifying them, so far as may 
be, for the loss occasioned through any incurable lessening 
of efficiency. 

It was the most advanced position ever taken by any 
government since governments began to exist among men, 
in a matter of this kind. At the time of the enactment of the 
law it was apdy described as "the most generous piece of 
legislation ever written on the statute books of a grate- 
ful nation." And the nation assigned large credit to those 
who conceived and brought it forth. 

By the end of July, 191 8, the total amount of insurance 
taken by the nation's fighting men was $25,000,000,000, an 
amount exceeding the fondest dreams of the most sanguine, 
that for July alone being $4,000,000,000. At the close of 
the war, the total had grown to $39,669,198,000, taken 
by 4,539,048 men, the average per policy being the amount 
of $8,740. The claims made for payment on these policies 
amount to $900,000,000 during the war activities; and dur- 
ing the same period the premiums paid In on all policies 
amounted to $200, 000, 000. •'' Great energy was displayed 
by the officials having the matter In charge to sec that, so 

*The law, embracing the allotment, insurance, compensation, and rr- 
habilitation features, originally provided compulsory allotment of at least 
$15 monthly to the wife. The government's allowances were made only 
on request and after payment of the compulsory allowances. The gov- 
ernment allowed $15 for wife alone, $25 for wife and one child, $32.50 
for wife and two children, and $5 for each addilional child up lo the 



422 The JVilson Administration and the Great War 

far as may be, every man in the service was insured. The 
success in the widely scattered sections of Europe was due 
in great measure to the efforts of 35 officers and 65 men 
who left Washington and on Christmas, 19 17, sailed from 
New York to urge the importance of insurance upon the 
men. 

This just provision for the fighting men of the nation 
must be attributed, at least in very marked measure, to 
Secretary McAdoo, as one more of the notable things his 
great brain was able to accomplish for the country. When 
the bill was drawn, he gave to the public through the usual 
news channels the statement that the scandal connected with 
the old pension system, in vogue up to that time, was to 
be avoided; and that the American public, as well as ad- 
ministrative officials, would be spared the humiliation of 
having repeated the unworthy conduct that had attached 
to the old pension system. The idea caught the eye of the 
American people, and they were misled by not inquiring 
into the basis for any such statement. Even intelligent men, 
those accustomed to investigate and to set before the public 
only well-established facts, were relying upon Mr. Mc- 
Adoo's statement.* 

That the various laws providing pensions for the sol- 
maximum of $50. For one child alone $5 was allowed; for two, $12.50; for 
three, $20; for four, $40; and $5 for each additional. 

The compensation feature, which originally allowed a man $30 a 
month for total disability, was increased to $80 by the amendment known 
as the Sweet bill, which became law December 24^ 1919; and thereunder, a 
man with wife, from $45 to $90; with wife and one child, $55 to $95; with 
wife and two or more children, $65 to $100. 

There is preserved in a steel cabinet in the insurance division of the 
War Risk Bureau a paper of rare historic significance. It is the original, 
grimy with the soil of the trench, bearing the names of those who signed 
on it for insurance the night before going out at daybreak into No Man's 
Land, signed under a strong enemy offensive, some of the signers never 
to return. It is preserved with the sacredness of the last will and testa- 
ment of those boys. 

■"In the Editor's Preface to the publication, ^/Effects of War upon In- 
surance, with Special Reference to the Substitution of Insurance for Pen- 
sions," issued as No. 6 of Preliminary Economic Studies of the War, by 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, appears this statement: 
"The old-fashioned method of pensions was unsatisfactory from several 
points of view. Not only was it inadequate in numerous instances, but it 



Insurance and Compensation ^2t 

diers In wars preceding the Great War were abused is wril 
known. All were based upon disability of the applicant up 
to a few years before the Great War shook luiropc. The 
Act of October 6, 19 17, the basic law governing In the 
Great War, is also based upon disability; ami, in case of 
widows, the provisions are not greatly unlike those govern- 
ing pensions. When two widows claim the same compensa- 
tion, the same kind of evidence will be required to determine 
their claimed rights as has always been required since the 
Government existed. A man who was not In the service, 
but claims that he was, will have to seek to establish his 
right to the compensation just as men always have In the 
past. If an ex-service man claims that he was disabled in 
the service or in any manner provided by law, that claim 
win have to be established by human records and human 
testimony, just as It has been heretofore. And unless human 
nature has undergone a revolution since October 6, 19 17, 
there will be the same tendency to corruption, to Intrigue, to 
securing something for nothing that there always has been. 
It may be lessened; but even that is doubtful, if there is 
any basis for an opinion in the duplication of wives who 
appeared for allotment upon the same man's service, even 
before the author of the law had left office, or the war was 
concluded. The law Is great, the greatest of the kind ever 
enacted by man; but that Is hardly sufficient reason for mis- 
leading the public as to its unequalled merits. In brief, in 

afforded many opportunities for corruption, political intrigue and unfair 
distribution." 

The learned author of this publication states (p. 153) with perhaps 
something more of reserve: "Pensions have not infrequently been used 
to further political ends. Considerations of fairness and equity as be- 
tween individual pensioners have been so often disregarded that the old 
pension system in the United States became a reproach to the representa- 
tive form of government. The generosity of a grateful people to those 
who gave their lives and services to the perpetuation of the republic wai 
prostituted by selfish considerations. 

"The contrast between the old system of pensions and that provided 
by the war-risk insurance acts of 1917 is most striking. The feature of 
compensation, so far as such an end is possible, is made the basis of the 
new laws." 

Name of Bureau later became Veterans Bureau. 



424 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

the underlying idea of disability in this law, as in previous 
enactments, it seems that three words, "Compensation for 
disability," have been substituted for the single word "Pen- 
sion." And already charges are being made of political 
intrigue in seeking advantages additional through Congress; 
and, to their credit be it said as a matter of early history 
in the affair, the ex-service boys as a whole are standing 
firmest against it. The one great, distinguishing, and bene- 
ficent feature of the law is the provision for rehabilitating 
the disabled fighter and financial aid to his wife and children 
while he is undergoing the rebuilding process. There is 
nothing in it to prevent intrigue, corruption, whether politi- 
cal or other, or scandal, more than in preceding laws. 

The War Risk Bureau originated when the Great War 
began in Europe. It began in September, 19 14, with the 
intention of providing facilities for the insurance of Ameri- 
can vessels, cargoes, and seamen against the risks of war, 
and had as its office two small rooms in the basement of 
the Treasury Building in Washington, and three years later 
the Bureau had only 93 employes. 

Then came the great law of October 6, 19 17, creating 
the military and naval divisions for consideration of allow- 
ances to the fighting men and their dependents, and swiftly 
it became the largest bureau to meet the immediate demands 
upon its energy. In August, 19 18, the employes numbered 
over 8,000, while by the following March they had in- 
creased to more than 17,000. These were officed in eighteen 
widely separated buildings, of which the insurance division 
alone occupied four. By the late summer of 19 19, the 
number of employes was reduced to about 15,000. Later 
all were officed in one building of eleven stories. 

At the time when this work was so heavily thrown upon 
the bureau, it was necessary to scour the country for help, 
and green clerks without any office experience whatever were 
accepted, and yet the cry was for more clerks. 

Added to this impediment was the more serious one, be- 



Insurance and Compensation 42^ 

cause the more fundamental, of undertaking to cstahlisli 
it in a new bureau without organization and :it a time when 
every conceivable organization facility of Government was 
employed to the utmost in forwarding measures for the 
battle-front; a bureau without proper records and without 
the proper trained force of clerks. And this was in face of 
the fact that the Bureau of Pensions, thoroughly organized, 
with a large trained office force in operation for decades, 
with records and the card index system, with its own work 
lessening by reason of the depleting of the Civil War pen- 
sion lists, could have handled the matter most cfficicndy. 

It appeared to be another manifestation of the Admin- 
istration malady of seeking something new upon the ground 
that the old and tried must be corrupt or untrustworthy; of 
disregarding experience and probable results. The results 
soon appeared. Speaking of the administration of this 
notable statute, President Wilson said : 

This nation has no more solemn obligation than healing the hurts 
of our w'ounded and restoring our disabled men to civil life and op- 
portunity. The Government recognizes this, and the fulfilment of 
the obligation is going forward, fully and generously. ... It is 
merely the payment of a draft of honor which the United States of 
America accepted when it selected these men and took them in their 
health and strength to fight the battles of the nation. They have 
kept the faith. Now we keep faith with them. 
The words were nobly spoken. But what of the event? 
In any great and new undertaking suddenly thrust upon 
a new organization, particularly governmental organization, 
there are sure to be mistakes and resulting complaints. But 
what reason ever existed for withholding the pay and allot- 
ments, small though they were, from the fighting lads and 
their wives and babes at home when they went willing to 
pay the price with their lives, while men enjoying the com- 
forts of home who did not leave their firesides to go into 
the trenches were regularly paid two to four or six times 
as much from the United States treasury, never missing a 



426 The JVilson Adviinistration and the Great War 

pay-day on schedule time? What reason ever existed for 
the failure of an efficient administration of the trust to 
which the President so eloquently referred? 

Yet, after fifteen months from the armistice which 
brought the armed conflict to a close, nineteen months after 
the F'ederal Board for Vocational Training was organized, 
the Administration was not keeping faith with those who, 
the President declared and the world knew, had kept the 
faith. Of the more than 300,000 injured in the war, more 
than 200,000 were registered as disabled. Of these, iio,- 
000 were recognized as eligible for training under the 
Board of Vocational Training, and there were placed in 
actual training slightly over 24,000, of whom, after nine- 
teen months, 217 had been placed in useful and gainful 
occupations at a time when positions were crying on all 
hands for persons to come and occupy. 

In the War Risk Bureau, complaints arose from every 
section of the country by the tens of thousands. The clerks 
were occupied, they worked hard enough to bring results. 
But it was the treadmill process. There ensued delay, 
confusion, and aggravation of claimants who should have 
had immediate attention. The administration of the office 
was severely criticized, both from within and from with- 
out. Affairs in the Bureau were topsy-turvy and apparently 
without head to any portion of it, without capacity to 
manage a large undertaking. It but emphasized Senator 
Chamberlain's statement that the Government had ceased 
to function — an outstanding characteristic of the Adminis- 
tration, though as many as 3,000 clerks in Washington were 
working on the list of 110,000 eligible for vocational train- 
ing, at the beginning working under a code of rules compris- 
ing 522 sections. The Federal Board of Vocational Educa- 
tion denied with vigor the charges of neglect against it, ex- 
cept as to delays due to the War Risk Insurance Division. 

This was the one bureau of the Government where, 
above all others, once the nation was fully in the war, ex- 



Insurance and Covipcnsai'ion ^in 

pedltlon was the great demand. It sliould have met its 
obligations to the splendid fellows wiiu went to the front at 
least as promptly as it did with those whose profiteering; 
was reinforced by contracts whose pre[);uation rei|iiired 
great time and the nicety of exactness, or the olHcials who 
remained in Washington from the President down. 

Overwhelmed by the mass of business for which it 
was utterly unprepared, the War Risk Bureau became a 
mass of inefficiency. Under these circumstances. Secretary 
McAdoo asked Colonel Henry D. Lindsley to accept the 
position of Director of the Bureau, in the iiope of saving 
it and preventing billions of dollars of insurance hipsing. 
Colonel Lindsley accepted upon condition that he be given 
a free hand to effect necessary reforms and to introduce 
business methods. When he found the indescribable conili- 
tion of affairs in the Bureau, he asked Secretary Glass, 
who In the meantime had succeeded McAdoo, to aid in the 
removal of some obstacles that existed in the endless red- 
tape, so that he might meet the requirements of the law 
looking toward the real aid that he found was denied the 
soldiers and sailors of recent service. In reply, Secretary 
Glass asked for Colonel Lindsley's resignation. He and 
all his assistants promptly resigned, leaving this most im- 
portant bureau practically without a head — a tragedy m 
the nation. 

This new and great bureau had fallen into disrepute. 
Demoralization, utter and profound, appears to have set- 
ded down upon its operations. A special committee, with 
Charles E. Hughes, former Republican candidate for Presi- 
dent, at its head, was appointed in mid-summer, 19 19, to 
investigate the situation and devise some way for extricat- 
ing it from its sad state. The country received something 
of a shock when informed by this committee that three- 
fourths of the men who had taken out insurance had failed 
to keep up their payments, though with every advantage 
of governmental organization, authority and backmg. And 



428 The JVihon Administration and the Great War 

the Government literally placarded the entire country in a 
campaign urging the insured to keep up their insurance. 
And just before the holidays, end of 1920, large display 
advertisements appeared in the newspapers urging friends 
to present the insured with receipts showing premiums paid 
up to that time as a Christmas gift. 

So disastrous was the failure of the bureau to func- 
tion, that the complaints became so grievous as to make the 
whole country feel that it was scarcely less than an outrage 
against the boys who suffered at the front and who were 
now made to suffer doubly. And at a conference held at 
Indianapolis, Indiana, early in November, 1920, the na- 
tional commander of the American Legion declared to 
the department adjutants from thirty states that it was 
necessary for the Legion to place itself between the dis- 
abled service men and government incompetency. Middle 
of the following month, a Montana delegation went to 
Washington to seek relief from Congress, and in that state 
cases of neglected disabled men became so glaring as to 
threaten legal steps to compel action. 

The enormous load placed upon this newly organized 
bureau was sufficient to swamp any organization at the be- 
ginning, an error chargeable to the Administration. The 
new bureau failed to meet the requirements of the situa- 
tion, when, after the war had been closed for more than 
two years, it was still floundering while the disabled men 
were suffering and unprovided for. As late as October, 

192 1, a special Senate committee reported that to July i, 
of that year, there had been 388,000 applications for vo- 
cational training, but only 5,000 had been rehabilitated, 
and added: "It is with deep regret that we report this 
melancholy fact." 

The country will never look kindly upon any organiza- 
tion or institution that neglects its disabled fighters. For 

1922, however, the expenditures for disabled ex-service 
men will be $510,000,000. 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA 

There is an abounding literature upon the Spirit .,1 'yr,, 
some of it boastful, all of it cheerful. It creates :m ex- 
hilarating spirit among real Americans. There is ample, 
also, upon the Spirit of '6i, which, however, partakes ot 
something of a sectional character, though it relates to the 
preservation of the Union. There is a lesser literature 
upon the Spirit of '98, when America as one man Hew to 
arms to redress the outrage of Spanish tyranny. And tliere 
are other Spirits which have gained a place in American 
history, even if they do not grip present-day American 
thought. 

It remained, however, for the conflagration which be- 
gan its devastation of Europe in the summer of 19 14, to 
bring forth the real Spirit of America. In '76 there was 
no America; in '61 it was a divided America; and in '98 
it required so little of America. But in 19 14-19 18 there 
was a real demand for the genuine American Spirit from 
the very moment disaster to civilization was threatened by 
the destructive forces at militarism's command. And this 
spirit promptly began to take shape, once the purpose of 
Prussianism was discerned. True, there was propaganda 
spread insidiously throughout the land by the Prussian forces 
at work and by the destructive forces of anarchism in our 
own land, most of which were operating in Germany's be- 
half, and the no less insidious forces of pacifism among 
American citizens led in large measure by those in high places 
in Administration circles. As leaders of the American 
thought there stood forth a few souls preeminent in their 
Americanism, who grasped the situation and understood 

429 



430 ^/'^' J^yHson Administration and the Great War 

how the various forces in operation were related to the 
preservation or destruction of American institutions. It 
was an extremely unfortunate moment for America that 
none of these outstanding men were found in governmental 
positions. It is no less unfortunate that those in the Admin- 
istration who did undertake to represent the genuine Amer- 
ican spirit were excluded from the Administration counsels. 
The statements put forth by Administration leaders at 
first confused, then baffled, American opinion. When 
America was attacked, deliberately and murderously, by 
the German government in the sinking of the "Lusitania," 
sending to the bottom of the sea innocent men, women, and 
children, there was such an outcry at the outrage, which 
was known clearly to be an outrage, that President Wilson 
felt called upon to state that the people should not be seized 
with hysteria, that he could not be unbalanced from his nor- 
mal course of thought, and that some people were too proud ' 
to fight. This the Spirit of America looked upon as scarcely 
less an outrage than that committed upon the "Lusitania." 
The American Administration had been looked to to give 
guidance to American thought and purpose in the devastat- 
ing conflict of arms in Europe. But it now knew that it 
had been looking to the wrong source. Even Theodore 
Roosevelt, sane and clear-eyed citizen that he was, admitted 
that he had been misled by assuming that those in high au- 
thority had information which he and other private Ameri- 
can citizens did not possess; but from that moment he be- 
came the embodiment of the American spirit, and to him 
the American people turned for guidance in the hour of dis- 
tress.^ 

^ School books in New York were ordered changed because they con- 
veyed an erroneous idea of this great American, then still living. In 
December, 1918, Superintendent of Schools William L. Ettinger notified all 
high-school principals to eliminate all reference to Theodore Roosevelt's 
attitude toward the Great War in its earlier stages. These are the por- 
tions ordered eliminated: 

The Germans invaded Belgium August 4, 1914. The same day our 
official proclamation of neutrality was issued. Two weeks later Presi- 
dent Wilson sent an appeal to the American people in which he said: 



The Spirit of J ni erica ^ . , 

So pronounced was the spirit of America in the cmkt- 
gency that tens of thousands, not relying upon the Admin- 
istration's lead, crossed the line into Canachi and cnhstcd 
with the Canadian forces in order that they mi^ht ^it int.. 
the fight of right against wrong; while yet other thousands 
crossed the seas to enlist directly with the British or hrench 
forces. 

But America became fully aroused by the gravity of 
the situation. Then neither the President nor a supine 
Congress could prevent that stirring of the American spirit 
which has always been profound in times of natioiuil crisis, 
or where right is matched against wrong. 

And there was probably never a greater manifestation 
of eagerness to serve than was found in America in the 
first weeks the nation was in the war. The sum of the effort 
that grew out of that impulse for service was tremendous, 
incalculable. 

And in it all, there was found nowhere a finer mani- 
festation of the real spirit of America, the spirit to serve, 
than was found in its institutions of higher learning, where 
it might be thought to be most apathetic. P^or there was 
a large and growing class in all of America's older colleges, 
commonly known as the rich or well-to-do class, city bred, 
who accepted college life largely as a social tradition, that 

"Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true 
spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and 
friendliness to all concerned." The following month ex-President Roose- 
velt in a magazine article wrote: "It is certainly desirable that we 
should remain entirely neutral, and nothing but urgent need would 
warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other." 
Replying to this statement in the New York text-books, former President 
Roosevelt declared that he had assumed, as he had a right to assume, 
that the national Administration was dealing fairly with the American 
people, knowing the inside facts of the diplomacy in connection with the 
Great War, instead of misleading and egregiously deceiving them by its 
conduct of foreign affairs; and that it was under this misapprehension 
that he had written the words quoted. He objected strenuously and 
righteously to school books quoting him when he was laboring under a mis- 
apprehension, as was all America, because of the deception practiced by 
the Administration upon the people; and not quoting his thorough .American 
spirit after he was put into possession of the facts as to neutrality through 
channels outside of the Administration. ^^ 

In this connection see also the chapter "Looking Toward Peace. 



43^ The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

was moved to a deeper seriousness by the events of war. 
A large proportion of them entered the military or naval 
forces as soon as possible after our declaration of war. 
They met danger, endured discipline, and suffered privation 
in the finest spirit. Practically all of the leading colleges 
of the nation were transformed into army posts, and scarcely 
a man was found shirking his duty — colleges that were 
thought to be beyond the reach of war, whether on the 
plains of the West or in the mountains of the East or on 
the seaboard. The men in the colleges possessed of this 
spirit quickly grasped the situation and were ready for the 
utmost trial and the supreme sacrifice. 

It was in June of the year 1917. The occasion was a 
college commencement. Many of the young men of the 
college had already entered the fighting ranks of the nation, 
so that the college was depleted by a high percentage of its 
student body. The ample rains had carpeted the expansive 
lawns with a perfect green. The sky overhead was of the 
deepest blue. The air was balmy. The warmth of the 
sunshine permitted the choice of summer garments. The 
mountains round about were as great fortresses, and at 
their base flowed the gentle stream through the undis- 
turbed quiet of the valley. Platoons of student soldiers 
were in regular formation of battle or of maneuver. The 
alumni of the century-old institution had gathered from every 
section of the nation. Young ladjes in their gayest summer 
costumes, gazing upon the scene, wore the smile becoming 
the perfect day it was. The procession across the campus 
headed by the institution's president was a thing to be re- 
membered. The oratory of the day was different from the 
oratory of other days. The whole procedure was quiet and 
without ostentation. Boys from the institution, boys from 
the homes of those who had returned for the events of this 
great day, were in the ranks in other sections of the country 
or were crossing the seas to engage in the death struggle 
of autocracy against democracy. This scene, wonderful 



The Spirit of /hncrica 4 \ ^ 

in its conception, surpassing in its iinprcssivtricss, ouKl 
be repeated whether in the mountains of New l'".n^laml (tr 
in the plains of Kansas or Oklahoma. It was, in tlic ii>n- 
crete, the American spirit as manifested in the outwar^l 
form among the most intelligent. 

In the early days of the war, they were joincil l)y (he 
tens of thousands of comrades from every walk of Hfe — a 
thing to remember with pride. But no less a demonstra- 
tion of magnificent loyalty was the spectacle of id, ()()(),()<)<■) 
young Americans quietly assembling at their polling places, 
and placing their lives at the disposal of tiieir government, 
to which, at a later date, were added 14,000,000. As finely 
phrased by President Wilson: "This is in no sense a con- 
scription of the unwilling; it is, rather, selection fr(jni a 
nation that has volunteered in the mass." 

And all these, like the men they were, stood ready to 
meet the shock of battle in the manner of America's best 
tradition. Many made the supreme sacrifice ; all were ready. 
America never exhibited a finer spirit on the battle-front, 
or one more universal. This spirit was well illustrated in 
the unequal conflict in which the 8,000 oflicers and men com- 
posing the Marine Brigade engaged near Chateau Thierry 
on June 5, 19 18. This was to stop the German thrust at 
Paris, and was thrown into the breach at the crucial hour. 
The marines, in the fighting, took Lucy-le-Bocage, cleared 
Belleau Wood, and captured Bouresches. But before it 
could be relieved at the end of the month, the brigade had 
lost 126 oflicers and 5,073 men. 

This was not exceptional, save for the opportunity for 
sacrifice which it offered. A writer in a national weekly, 
as he saw it on the American battle-front from Vaux to Sois- 
sons, gives this incident: 

All our boys lay stretched exactly in the same direction, as if by 
some mysterious magnetic current they had been pointed toward some 
spiritual pole— the pole of their avenging purpose. They lay stretched 
exactly in the line of the advance, head toward the foe, and bodies 



434 ^'/'^' Jyilson Administration and the Great JVar 

still beautiful and lithe, while the Germans were in huddles at the 
bottom of shell holes.^ 

The nation Is very proud of the war record of its splen- 
did fellows over there. At Belleau Wood; at Chateau 
Thierry; In the dashing sweep by which the St. Mihiel 
salient was wrested from the enemy after It had been held 
with a grip of steel for four years; In the dogged, terrible 
weeks of deadly combat In the Argonne our men added 
laurels to the American arms as fine as any In our history. 

It Is the same story by all of them — the very old story 
told over and over. It Is the same story which had been 
writ large across the pages of history whenever the deeds 
of American soldiers have been recorded. Never staling In 
the telling, It thrills American hearts at every repetition, and 
never did It thrill more than In this, the latest telling. 

The only thing that stopped the victorious American 
soldiers on the trail of the German armies was an order 
Issued on the day the armistice became effective. The news 
that the German command had thrown Into the lines op- 
posite the United States army Its last available division 
came simultaneously with the order to American divisions 
to halt In their tracks at ii a. m., November ii, 1918. 
The news of the armistice was sent by telephone, telegraph, 
radio, and runner to all headquarters. The formal field 
order, timed fifteen minutes after the armistice was In 
effect, furnishing written confirmation of these, runs as 
follows, and is the last field order of the Meuse-Argonne 
drive : 

I Army, Am. E. F. 

II November, 1918, 11:15 H- 
SECRET. 

FIELD ORDERS 

NO. 112 (MAPS: No change.) 

I. (a) Yesterday the enemy threw into the line opposite our 3rd 
Corps his last available division on the western front. 
^ James Hopper in Colliers, December 14, 1918. 



The Spirit of America 4^{; 

(b) An armistice with Germany has been sl^mcil an.l ill h., 
tilities cease at ii hours, November nth. 

(c) The Allied Armies hold themselves in rc.ubiicss for fur- 
ther advance. 

2. The I. American Army while holding its present tiunt mil 
prepare for further advance. 

3. (a) ARMY CORPS, ARTILLERY AND SERl KAIS. 
The present line attained will be organized in depth. Tr(M)ps will 

be disposed so as to obtain the maximum rest and comfort consistent 
with the necessary arrangements or security and with preparations for 
further advance. 

(X) No troops will pass the line reached at 11 hours, Novem- 
ber nth, until they receive further orders. 

All communication with the enemy is forbidden penduig further 
instructions. The cessation of hostilities is an armistice only. ;ind 
not a peace, and there must be no relaxation of vigilance. The troops 
must be prepared at any time for a rapid forward movement. 

Special steps will be taken by all commanders to insure the strict- 
est discipline and to be prepared for any eventuality. Troops must 
be held well in hand and higher commanders will personally inspect 
all organizations with the foregoing in view. 

4. Administrative details — No change. 

5. P. C.'s. and exes of liaison — No change. 
By command of Lieut. General Liggett: 

H. A. Drum, 

Chief of Staff. 

OFFICIAL: 

G. C. Marshall, Jr. 

Assistant Chief of Staf¥, G-3. 

Preeminent as an aid to the fighting spirit is the con- 
sciousness of a worthy cause. Then comes the maintenance 
of morale, a mighty factor in any cause in which co-opera- 
tion is essential. The Administration did well to recog- 
nize the value of the manly sports in developing this cle- 
ment. To this end, it made liberal allowance, and cannot 
be given too high credit therefor. 

August I, 19 1 8, The War Department made announce- 
ment that for use in training-camps, the Department, with 



436 The JFihon Administration and the Great War 

$250,000, had purchased sufficient material to equip all 
the training camps with sporting goods. This included 
17,500 sets of boxing-gloves, 7,000 baseball bats, 21,100 
baseballs, 3,500 play-ground baseball bats, 10,500 play- 
ground balls, 3,000 Rugby footballs, 7,000 soccer-balls, 
3,500 volley-balls. 

At the Great Lakes Naval Training Station alone were 
used 7,000 baseballs for the season of 19 18. At the same 
station, footballs were ordered by the gross, and sweaters, 
jerseys, stockings for football, and the like, were ordered by 
the car-lot. 

At the same time the War Department made public 
the statement that the amount of clothing delivered since 
April I, 19 1 8, as shown by the latest statistical report of 
the Clothing and Equipage Division of the Quarter-master 
Corps, was as follows: 4,373,000 pairs of spiral puttees; 
55,958,000 pairs of woolen stockings; 10,507,000 pairs of 
woolen breeches; 8,069,000 woolen coats; and 5,377,000 
overcoats. 

It was not strange, therefore, when the American sol- 
dier returned from his service overseas that he was found 
to be self-restrained, self-contained, and at the same time 
ready to be helpful. It was on the train out of Rockford 
(Camp Grant) that carloads of soldiers, on their way 
home from discharge, were met constantly. One could 
hardly have felt that he was among those who had gone 
through trials like Chateau Thierry and the Argonne. No 
loud word was heard in a two-hours' ride toward Madison; 
no discordant note. The train was crowded. There was 
every opportunity to become noisy and more or less fluent 
in uncouth language. There was none of it. Some were 
studying time-tables; some asked questions of the half-dozen 
civilian passengers, to get a true idea of home conditions, 
or told how New York was closed to those not from the 
metropolis and how open-armed was Chicago in the warmth 
of its welcome ; some eagerly devoured the news of the lat- 



1 



The Spirit of Amcyica .j^-^ 

est edition of the city papers, while others were deep in thr 
magazine short story; yet others were readin^r books to 
which they had fallen heir, or trying to catch up in llic mat- 
ter of lost sleep. 

One thing was markedly noticeable : As the last woman 
left the car there was an eager scramble to light pipes, 
cigars, cigarettes. Not a suggestion, however, of smoking 
in the presence of a woman in the coach was to be seen or 
heard anywhere. 

It is none too strong to accord with the facts to say that 
the world had never possessed such an army as that which 
went forth from field and factory, from rail and boat, from 
office and street-cleaning force, from college professor's 
chair and scavenger's dump, known as the Yankee army. 
They went forth to fight the world's battle for democracy 
with those other nations that had stood the shock of the 
mightiest military machine the world had ever seen until it 
was difficult to stand longer under a strain such as history 
had not, till then, recorded. If the Roman legion was effi- 
cient, the free spirit of the American doughboy was more 
efficient. If the Prussian military machine was mighty, the 
free fighting spirit of the American doughboy was mightier. 
If the Spartan was taught to have his entrails gnawed out 
by a wild beast rather than complain, the American dough- 
boy of the "lost battalion," ^ or any other, would gnaw roots 
of trees and plants to keep himself alive in order to send 
defiance at an overwhelming enemy in a more worthy cause. 

That President Wilson was capable, on occasion, of 
rising to the highest flights in real appreciation of things 
accomplished was demonstrated on various occasions. Such 
an occasion was his tribute to the American army and navy, 
on December 2, 19 18, when he said: 

Their officers understood the grim and exacting: task they had 
• Under command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Whittlesey, outnum- 
bered overwhelmingly when surrounded and commanded by the enemy to 
surrender, defiantly refused, though without food, sustamed life by eatmg 
the bark of roots until relieved. 



438 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

undertaken and performed it with an audacity, efficiency and unhesi- 
tating courage that touch the story of convoy and battle with im- 
perishable distinction at every turn whether the enterprise were great 
or small. . . . Such men as these hardly need to be commanded and 
go to their terrible adventure blithely and with the quick intelligence 
of those who know just what it is they would accomplish. I am proud 
to be the fellow countryman of men of such stuff and valor. Those 
of us who stayed at home did our duty ; the war could not have been 
won or the gallant men who fought it given their opportunity to 
win it otherwise; but for many a long day we shall think ourselves 
"accursed we were not there, and hold our manhood cheap while any 
speaks that fought" with these at St. Mihiel or Thierry. The mem- 
ory of those days of triumphant battle will go with these fortunate 
men to their graves ; and each will have his favorite memory. 

Nor were the Allies unappreciative of this fighting spirit. 
Expressing what was the general sentiment of the Allies 
toward the Yankee soldier, the French Government, on 
January i, 19 19, paid this tribute to America's dead in 
France : 

The French government wishes to express its profound sympathy 
and gratitude to the American families whose sons have met a glorious 
death on French soil during the war. It wishes to share in their 
mourning. The graves of the young soldiers of America are as 
sacred in its eyes as are those of their French comrades and it will 
take the necessary measures to provide that they shall be respected 
and tended with a reverent and patriotic care. 

And while it was at all times admitted that to the men 
who went through the trial of battle America gave its 
thanks and admiration, it was realized that the men who 
did not "get across" were ready and eager and would have 
given of themselves to the glory of the flag and the suc- 
cess of our cause as freely as those who laid down their 
lives in battle. 

But fighting was only one form of the spirit of the 
American soldier. Dashing, heedless, dare-devil in their 
spirit on the field of battle, the American soldiers won other 



The Spirit of America 439 

and finer tributes than these— tributes calculated to stir all 
as profoundly as any that were won by their conduct in 
the smoke and uproar and fiery hell at the front. Tlic 
Marquise de Nosilles, in a letter to a New York friciui, 
used these words : 

Bring a smile on somebody's face! That seems to be the motto of 
all Americans over here. Sugar plums, chocolate, gasoline, tires, deli- 
cious white bread, all luxuries now unknown, are given to tiie French 
by your people. One of the things that touches me most is the love 
of the Americans for little children. In all villages you can sec little 
tots shrieking out in laughter while a huge boy in khaki romps ab<jut 
for their own particular amusement. 

As if this were not enough she proceeds to give an in- 
stance of a poor, shriveled granny seeking to cross a muddy 
street along which the motors were running wildly, and 
fearful lest she be caught in the mud and between the ma- 
chines, when a big burly United States soldier picked her 
up and trotted off across the street and set her down in 
safety. And she refers, in her letter to the inborn gentle- 
ness of the men, who did not forget their mothers and 
sisters at home, and who were always glad to extend the 
friendly hand to children. Tributes like these fell as thick 
as showers on our passing regiments by the hands of women 
and children once left in the brutal wake of war. 

Every American that is 100 per cent a man cannot but 
tingle with pride when he reads of deeds like these, as 
much as he does when he reads of the dare-devil lighting 
fury of the same men when they hurled themselves against 
the brutal Germans who wrought all the wreck and ruin 
possible. His eyes, blazing with pride in the warrior, may 
become dimmed as emotion unsteadies his frame when he 
sees in the same man the cheery, light-hearted, bright-taced 
soldier in khaki, carrying the burdens of the weak and help- 
less, romping with laughing children, sharing his food and 
scanty luxuries with the hungry and heart-sick victims of an 
inexpressible wrong. It was all possible. There was no 



440 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

sentimentalizing. It was all in the routine of the day's 
work — the instinctive matter-of-course routine of the gentle- 
man. 

When the first of the American forces landed in France, 
France was almost bled white. They had good reason to 
feel downcast, though there was not a thought of surrender. 
And when the French people saw the laughing, singing, 
rollicking youngsters from across the sea marching through 
Paris as if it were a mere holiday affair, they stood aghast. 
Horrified at the thought that these men could ever be of 
service in battling the German war machine, they turned 
aside with drooping spirit. They had not seen anything 
like it; had not conceived anything so incongruous. It was 
beyond the stretch of the splendid French imagination. But 
it was all there, and was all true, as the noble French dis- 
covered to their delight, when the opportunity came to face 
the machine. 

But the Spirit of America manifested itself not alone 
in the fighting man. The same spirit that pushed him into 
the hell of battle, was breathed into those who had to re- 
main at home. It manifested itself In many and diverse 
forms. 

The housekeeper accepted the suggestions of Herbert 
Hoover, Food Administrator, as a religious decalogue; if 
the householder did not act with religious care upon the sug- 
gestions of Fuel Administrator Garfield as to how to run 
his furnace or sift his ashes or the many details as to the 
saving of fuel, it was because he understood it less readily. 
When the Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo asked the peo- 
ple to buy bonds to help the nation, they bought, often 
skimping themselves in the actual necessaries of life for the 
purpose. 

But nowhere was the Spirit of America more freely and 
openly shown than in comphance with the simple request of 
the American Red Cross Society that everything in the na- 
ture of tin and tinfoil be saved and turned into its hands. 



The Spirit of America 4^, 

In this small act of service, dicrnificd cKlerly gentlemen vied 
with young men and maidens in gatheriiij^r f,-,,,,, the side- 
walks, even from the gutters of the cities and towns and 
the country villages, all scraps from cigarette wrappings 
or cigars or any other source that would he a compliance 
with the Red Cross request— all for the sake of the spirit 
which it manifested and not with any thought or suggestion 
of money remuneration. 

One feature of the developments growing out of 
America's relations to the Great War that accomplished 
much for the better community spirit throughout the land, 
was the helpfulness rendered by neighbor to neighbor and 
by community to community. It is to the credit of the 
Administration that it gave great encouragement to this 
spirit; and It should be recorded as one of the ennobhng 
features of the Administration's relation to the Great War. 
Mrs. A. would take care of the children of her next-door 
neighbor Mrs. B, while the latter visited the downtown cash- 
and-carry store to make purchases for herself or for both. 
Mrs. C. would gather all the neighbors her automobile 
would carry and together they would visit the store where 
they could make purchases for their families to the best 
advantage. Mrs. D, made her home the center for collect- 
ing all the clothing to take care of the needy chllilrcn in 
her immediate vicinity. And Mrs. A. and Mrs. B. and 
Mrs. C. and Mrs. D. with all their neighbors gathered at 
the home of some one of them for the forenoon or the 
afternoon or the entire day to knit and sew and do any other 
work that was necessary to relieve the suffering not only in 
their immediate vicinity but In the large community, per- 
haps to clothe some Belgian orphans brought to America 
or to provide clothing for suffering humanity across the sea. 
There came also the larger service when the neighbors of 
a whole community would meet at the public library or m 
the public-school building or In the guild-hall or m the 
church to carry on the larger and broader work for the Red 



442 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

Cross. Thus there developed in America that neighborly, 
home-like spirit, which was the spirit of Jesus when he was 
upon earth, that became so helpful in administering to the 
acute conditions that arose after the war due to the unrest 
and the uncertainty in the settlement of the social problem. 

Republics, and democratic nations generally, have been 
accused of being slow in action, and probably not without 
reason. But once America took a decisive stand, there 
was never any question of the achievement. With 2,000,- 
000 men in France, and with the assurance of 5,000,000 
more ready, had the war continued until the middle of the 
next year; and with a war budget of more than $25,000,- 
000,000 for the year 19 18, the conviction that the demo- 
cratic system was necessarily inefficient was dispelled. The 
nation was turning out rifles at the rate of more than 3,000,- 
000 a year — a rate that was constantly increasing — ma- 
chine guns at the rate of more than 400,000 a year, with 
shells, shrapnel, and small-arms ammunition in correspond- 
ing quantities. Whereas in 19 17 the nation was turning out 
13,000 rifles monthly, a year later they were being turned 
out at the rate of 264,000 every month. 

With every man from 18 to 45 years of age registered 
for military service, with most of the nation's industrial 
plants transformed to factories of war materials, with clubs, 
schools and miscellaneous buildings every day converted into 
hospitals, with all the agencies of transportation becoming 
avenues of traffic leading directly to the front in France, 
with homes half deserted because the members were en- 
gaged in Red Cross work, in selling bonds to carry on the 
war, in gathering funds for the Y. M. C. A. and other wel- 
fare agencies, — with all these the American spirit was being 
manifested in its real form in the American nation. 

By the middle of October, 19 19, announcement was 
made that 8,000,000 American women, aided by many boys 
and girls, produced in the twenty months ending February 
28, 1919, more than 371,500,000 relief articles, valued at 



The Spirit of America ^.^^ 

approximately $94,000,000, for the benefit of Aincru.ui 
and Allied soldiers and sailors and destitute civilians, lie- 
sides this, the report of the American Reel Cross, covering its 
activities during the war, showed that 23,822 of America's 
women enrolled themselves as Red Cross nurses; while 
others who remained at home, through the canteen service 
of the Red Cross furnished refreshments such as sand- 
wiches, candy, cigarettes, ice-cream, etc., to soKliers and 
sailors 39,948,733 times. All of this was done at an oper- 
ating cost of only 1,7 per cent. 

Indeed, the ardor and unanimity witli wliich the Ameri- 
can people enlisted in the cause of democracy ami iiuuie it 
virtually a national religion is one of the outstanding phe- 
nomena of history. 

The artists of the country'played a very important part 
in the manifestation of the American Spirit during the war, 
through posters, large and small, on billboards occupying 
as many feet as the space to be had permitted. Picture 
posters of rare beauty and aptitude were placed before the 
people showing facts that were essential for the informing 
of the public upon the great needs of war. Space for these 
posters was amply and generously donated by individuals, 
organizations, and municipal and state bodies — on promi- 
nent vacant lots, in front of courthouses, on church lots, on 
the grounds of state buildings — anywhere and everywhere 
that they would serve the desired end. 

They were among the many influences uniting to win 
the war. Not much was written about them, though they 
weighed heavily for victory. It was the National Pictorial 
Publicists Association, of which Charles Dana Gibson was 
the head, that took in hand the chief part of this work. It 
might appear a little out of order to consider the pencil 
and brush as weapons of warfare; but these are the facts 
that the story of the war brings to light. To win the war, 
the boys had to be fed and armed; to buy food and guns, 
money was needed; to raise money, an appeal had to be 



444 ^^^^ JVilson Administration and the Great War 

made. The poster, the painting, the cartoon were used 
with telling effect to drive home the appeal. 

The most noted and highest paid artists of the country 
banded into this Association to give their service freely for 
the maintenance of morale and cultivation of donations 
or money. Between April 17, 19 17, and November 15, 
19 1 8, fifty-eight departments worked steadily to create the 
national spirit through posters and pictured stories. Seven 
hundred poster designs, 287 cartoons, 60 paintings for the 
Food Administration, and 1438 labor drawings were turned 
over to the Government free by the organized artists. The 
posters are to perpetuate the art of the decade through the 
centuries, as every war poster has been preserved by the 
Government. 

In the conduct of the great mass of Americans of Ger- 
man blood there was a fine and enduring testimonial to the 
power of America's spirit. It stood steadfast and with 
marvelous patience under the lash of humiliation. But these 
Germans that were so loyal to the land of their adoption 
were an offset to the disloyalty of Germans of distinctly 
pro-German sentiments who stood for the Fatherland rather 
than for the land to which they had come to secure their 
education, gain a livelihood and more, but of which they did 
not actually become a component part. There was none 
among all the races of earth that were ready to endure 
more than the distinctively American of German blood. 

As the reply to the un-American doctrine of these pro- 
Germans, backed by the international Socialists, the Ameri- 
can Legion gave expression to the ringing American doc- 
trine in the preamble to its constitution as follows: 

For God and Country we associate ourselves together for the fol- 
lowing purposes: To uphold and defend the Constitution of the 
United States of America, to maintain law and order, to foster and 
perpetuate a 100 per cent Americanism, to preserve the memories and 
incidents of our association in the Great War, to inculcate a sense 
of the individual obligation to the community, state and nation, to 



The Spirit of America 445 

make right the master of might, to promote peace and good will .,ti 
earth, to safeguard and transmit to posterity tlie priiuiiilcs of ficc- 
dom, justice and democracy, to sanctify our comradeship by uiir devo- 
tion to mutual helpfulness. 

But one of the rich fruits of the war was the arousing 
of the American spirit throughout the nation. This mani- 
fested itself in the adoption of loyalty pledges, a ilctcrmiiia- 
tion to serve the country better, to stand for service to others 
rather than for personal selfishness or personal glory. 

A typical stand of this character is that of the people of 
Spokane, Washington, in adopting a loyalty pledge in April, 
19 1 9. Among other things stated are these: 

I am proud that the United States of America is my country, the 
Stars and Stripes my flag. No matter from what race I sprang, or 
what nation may claim my friendship, my watchword shall be, 
America first. A citizen by birth or choice, I will ever strive to 
make my government revered at home and respected abroad. I 
believe in open, just and honorable covenants with other nations to 
establish, in keeping with the laws of God, a world of justice and 
peace. . . . 

Therefore, I pledge to my country the love of my heart, a true, 
constant and absolute loyalty; I pledge respect and obedience to her 
laws. I pledge my property, my service, my honor, and, if need be, 
my life, to defend her. I pledge allegiance to my flag and to the 
republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and 
justice for all. 

And the Spirit of America marches on and in many 
divisions. When the national assembly of the American 
Legion was in cession at Minneapolis on the first anni- 
versary of the signing of the armistice, the chairman, Colo- 
nel Henry D. Lindsley, as the hour of 11 o'clock ap- 
proached, stated to the assembly: 

We are approaching the moment when the world ceased that great 
struggle which resulted in victory for democratic peoples all over the 
world. I am going to ask every delegate here to rise and bow his 
head as the moment arrives, thinking what it means, particularly to 



446 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

those comrades lying on the other side, who made the supreme sacri- 
fice for the cause of free people. 

Let us have a thought in our hearts and our prayers because these 
men, our comrades, went there and gave their lives in the great cause. 

Every delegate rose and stood with bowed head as 
faint organ notes sounded through the hall. Eleven strokes 
of the clock marked the first anniversary of Germany's sur- 
render. 

As the last echo died away, the organ pealed out the 
"Star Spangled Banner." The massed ranks of delegates 
standing, furtively wiped away tears. 

And why all the awful sacrifice? Why were Americans 
willing to enact this tragedy in a million homes? 

The President undertook to assure the American peo- 
ple that this great nation had put itself behind some abstract 
principles, and that it was for these that the people striving 
at home and the fighting men in the conflict of battle were 
putting forth every energy they possessed. There was prob- 
ably not one soldier, either at home or overseas, who ever 
thought for a moment that he or the country was carrying 
on a war "against the attitude of the balance of power" 
or in behalf of the Fourteen Points, or to establish a League 
of Nations. 

But they knew what they went out to fight for: they 
were fighting the Germans, because the Germans were bru- 
talizing mankind, violating international law, and destroy- 
ing people's homes and happiness and liberty. Nor was 
there a man among them who would not fight again for the 
same thing. 

The story is related of a young American soldier found 
dead on the battlefield of France on whose body was found 
a card with these words: "America stands for freedom and 
justice and is always ready to give the lives of her citizens 
that all the world may be freed from tyranny and live in 
peace and happiness." It is not known who wrote these 



The Spirit of America 447 

words. Printed by hand, they were unsigned and undated. 

And where was this mighty power lodged, which lirovc 
America with all her energy into this war, compelling her 
Administration to accept her dictum of no neutrality, ot' 
not too proud to fight, of no peace without victory? 

The English writers took the view that in any democ- 
racy like America there is an oligarchy, whether of intellect, 
of interest, or of mere popularity. In the present instance 
they declared it was the sovereign will of the President that 
carried the American people into the war. A writer cited 
the case of conscription, which, in America, became a law 
over night, though 3000 miles separated America from the 
scene of conflict, while it took England two years because 
their democracy would not accept an oligarchy. 

As w^as well pointed out by a noted American publicist, 
this was a misapprehensi'on of the American point of view, 
admitting that the people of the United States were singu- 
larly united and obedient to leadership but stating that the 
English comment failed to find a true interpretation of the 
fact. This American writer says : 

This nation has never bowed to "the sovereign will of the Presi- 
dent." It has respected the voice of individual conscience. It beheld 
in the conduct of Germany an inexpressable wrong of gigantic pro- 
portions. It shuddered but it did not hesitate to judge or condemn. 
Millions, tens of millions, of men in America wanted to fight Ger- 
many when the will of the President was not yet for war, and chafed 
under the neutrality of their Government. Thousands of our young 
ment went to Canada and to France, in order to help in defeating 
Germany before any "sovereign will" had expressed itself in the 
United States. Here was a peaceful nation that did not want peace, 
but victory; a nation that would have accused and cursed itself if 
it had not been allowed to fight. The "oligarchy," if there be one, 
responded to the "sovereign will" of an aroused people, not to the 
leadership of a President. It adhered to him in war, not because he 
commanded it, but because it had commanded him. 



448 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

And he declared that the principle involved was not 
the enunciation of the Government; "it was a deep-seated 
and almost universal declaration of the national mind." ^ 

In his annual report in 19 18 Secretary Baker showed 
that In the nineteen months elapsing from the declaration 
of war to the signing of the armistice, the army created an 
embarkation service which succeeded in shipping overseas 
2,075,834 men and 5,153,000 tons of cargo. Even these 
large figures do not tell the whole story. For time was 
required in drafting and training the men and for organiz- 
ing the production of supplies, and most of these stupendous 
movements occurred in the last half of our active partici- 
pation in the war. From January i, 191 8, to the signing 
of the armistice, a period of ten months, the army embarked 
1,880,339 men and shipped 4,660,000 tons of cargo. Noth- 
ing to compare with the movement of these numbers of men 
and tons of supplies across the Atlantic is known to the mili- 
tary history of the world. 

An epochal chapter of the world's history has been 
closed. The tragedy has been enacted. Those who initi- 
ated the crime against civilization that personal aggrand- 
izement might result have been overwhelmed. The curtain 
has dropped on the horrid scene. Autocracy has crumbled. 
Democracy is supreme. Though America played a belated 
part, its spirit was ready from the beginning. The be- 
numbed soul of America has re-awakened. Other demands 
upon her vital energies will be made and met. Her sons 
and daughters will crush any autocracy that rears its head, 
however Insidious In method or comely In form. They will 
maintain constitutional government that liberty and justice 
may live; and through the nation's vitality, happiness may 
spread to all mankind. 

Applying the challenge of Colonel John McCrae's "In 
Flanders Fields" to America's own brave dead in France, 
the answer, to-day as then, is : 

* David Jayne Hill, 209 North American Review, 18-19. 



The Spirit of /America 44^^ 

Rest ye in peace, ye Flanders dead. 
The fight that ye so bravely led 
We've taken up. And we will keep 
True faith with you who lie asleep, 
With each a cross to mark his bed 
In Flanders fields. 

Fear not that ye have died for naught. 
The torch ye threw to us we caught. 
Ten million hands will hold it high, 
And Freedom's light shall never die! 
We've learned the lesson that ye taught 
In Flanders fields. 

And perhaps nothing that came from lip or pen dur- 
ing the Great War surpassed in vivid expression of Ameri- 
ca's passion, now as on the yesterday, those thrilling words. 
Yet there is always to be persistently kept in mind the in- 
spirational words of such men as Washington when he de- 
clared: 

The unity of government, which constitutes you one people, is 
also now dear to you. It is justly so; for it is the main pillar in the 
edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquillit) at 
home and your peace abroad ; of your prosperity, of that liberty which 
you so highly prize.^ 

Until America loses her vital spirit, she will be ever 
ready to rise and crush any attempt from within or without 
to overthrow constitutional government, civil liberty, and 
the opportunity for the legitimate pursuit of individual or 
community happiness through orderly and well-established 
channels. To quote the heartening words of President Wil- 
son's successor, a contrast with the "Covenant greater than 
Government:" 

To make the real America to which we all aspire, we must have 
distinctly an American spirit, and must become a race born of a 
national inspiration. 
'Farewell Address, 



CONCLUSIONS 

From the foregoing pages, some fair conclusions touch- 
ing the relations of the Wilson Administration to the Great 
War would seem to be : 

1. In the first place it should be remembered that at 
the beginning of his term in the presidency, Mr. Wilson 
held in his hands the high hopes of the nation; and for two 
chief reasons: First, as Governor of New Jersey he had 
gained for himself, whether rightly or otherwise is not 
here discussed, a reputation for standing by the people; 
and, second, he made large promises, as shown in his book, 
"The New Freedorn," ^ which is "the result of the editorial 
literary skill of Mr. William Bayard Hale, who has put 
together here, in their right sequences, the more suggestive 
portions of my campaign speeches," as stated by Mr. Wil- 
son in the preface. Relying upon these two facts, a reputa- 
tion and promises, one following directly upon the other, 
the people placed full confidence in Mr. Wilson's disinter- 
ested purposes and his capacity. 

2. When the demands of the Great War were upon 
the nation, not from the European point of view, but from 
the standpoint of Americanism and for humanity's sake, the 
Administration appeared to be honeycombed with a pacifism 
most deadly to the rousement of the people to the hour's 
great needs and with a leadership possessed of a tendency 
to lean toward Germany's cause rather than toward that 
of the Allies, notwithstanding that the latter were hero- 
ically battling with inadequate equipment against the fright- 
ful barbarities of the greatest war machine known to all 

*"The New Freedom, a Call for the Emancipation of the Generous 
Energies of a People," Doubleday, Page & Company, New York, 1913. 

450 



Conclusions a - 1 

human records. Witness to this is the part taken l.y the 
Secretary of State in pro-German meetings and his dalljing 
with pro-German societies and individuals. Trcacliciy and 
perfidy were permitted full sway in the land, as witness the 
hostile acts of the German and Austrian ambassadors. 

As if this were not sufficient, when it was found that 
there was a real Secretary of War in the cabinet, he was 
displaced by a pacifist of so pronounced a type that his acts 
or do-nothing plans sickened his own people, declaring that 
no preparation for the inevitable conflict was to be hurried, 
since the war was 3,000 miles away, and who thanked God 
that, when the country was plunged into the thick of batde, 
it was without preparation. And as a result, the country 
was stampeded into such a furor of haste, disorder, con- 
fusion, and waste as to result in great unnecessary sacrifice 
of life, the development of profligacy, and all the kindred 
evils of the unwarranted situation, following the clear note 
of warning sounded on all sides except the German. 

3. Once the country was in the mighty conflict, and even 
before that event. President Wilson would take a stand that 
met the demands of the patriotic mind of America; and 
would then waver in his purpose. Thus American senti- 
ment was divided, when unity was the stern demand of the 
hour. 

So pronounced became this vacilladon of the Adminis- 
tration as to lead those urged to stand by the President to 
inquire where he stood. Moreover, he had placed in promi- 
nent places for influencing the public, men whose American- 
mindedness was severely open to question — men like George 
Creel, William Bayard Hale, Lincoln Steffens, and numer- 
ous others, to all of whose writings attached more or less 
of oflicial flavor. And while he showed his zeal for the 
cause of preparedness by marching at the head of a parade 
in its interest in Washington, he could as insistently and per- 
sistently urge leniency toward the murderous anarchist 
Mooney who set a bomb that killed and maimed scores in- 



452 The fVilson Administration and the Great War 

terested in a preparedness parade in San Francisco, giving 
no adequate reason therefor. 

Indeed, there was such a leaning toward pacifism at the 
first, and latterly toward the so-called liberal minds, those 
willing to adopt internationalism even to the undoing of 
constitutional government, that the question was raised as 
to the quality of the Americanism Mr. Wilson was willing 
to represent. 

4. As the Great War approached its close, Mr. Wilson 
seemed glad to accept all power lawfully conferred upon 
him and to usurp other powers to some end never made 
clear by him to the nation; as witness the taking over of 
wire control after the close of hostilities, a power granted 
him for war purposes only. The people gladly confer ex- 
tensive powers, with all the privileges attaching thereto, 
upon an Executive who is with the people and who pro- 
poses to use it solely for the people's benefit. They de- 
terminedly resist its appropriation for some remoter pur- 
pose. 

5. War Is always a matter for most serious considera- 
tion before undertaking It. So many possibilities are in- 
volved as to make the issue uncertain. The Great War 
was no exception, with this consideration noted: That with 
the two sides so nearly balanced, there was assured in ad- 
vance an outcome favorable to the side on which the United 
States would throw Its great weight, not merely because 
of Its resources, both In men and material, but because of 
the moral Influence upon other neutrals. And It Is a mo- 
mentous responsibility that rests upon the shoulders of any 
regime that carries to a conclusion a war of unexampled 
proportions. No fair-minded man will deny to the Wilson 
Administration due credit for Its share In the vast undertak- 
ing. And once It threw Itself Into war-making as a business 
for the time being, it made prodigious strides, whatever may 
have been Its previous shortcomings. For this the people 
were pleased to give, and to this day do give, all credit. 



Conclusions ^^i 

The difficulties were legion, and far beyond the vision o| 
ordinary men do these difficulties project themselves. 

6. But difficulties piled mountain high do not warrant 
shirking. To meet them as the occasion requires is one 
of the glories of Americanism, one of the duties and one of 
the marked privileges that belong to high position and great 
power. Besides, the people cheerfully placed themselves 
at the ready disposal of their Chief Executive and with their 
might support his worthy efforts. Yet, they want to know 
that he Is right — at least approximately right; and they like 
the idea of reciprocal confidence. They are willing to 
trust him even after he has made many mistakes and serious 
blunders. But there may come a time, in the course of 
events of his own shaping, when their confidence is sapped, 
when their trust is gone and the last tie of moral obliga- 
tion to him is sundered. This was never more true in the 
whole history of the presidency than during President Wil- 
son's Administration. Buoyant with hope at the beginning, 
the people wanted to trust him to the end, but felt so out- 
raged as events succeeded one another in swift course that 
the cord was snapped. 

7. True, they remembered that Mr. Wilson was their 
President; they knew him as the legal Chief of their nation. 
They further knew that he was a very sick man — so ill 
and so secluded that a committee from the Senate waited 
upon him to ascertain his condition and whether able to 
carry on the onerous duties of his office; when it found hmi 
sufficiently alert to Inform them that Senator Moses could 
be assured, though he might be disappointed. But the peo- 
ple felt that his conduct warranted the withdrawal of their 
confidence from his measures and proposed measures. 

8. They remembered with satisfaction his bold declara- 
tions against organized and established wrongs; they dis- 
trusted his favoring classlsm. At first divided over his 
vacillation and shirking in the face of German brutalities, 
they finally carried him in their sweep against Prussian 



454 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 

militarism and butchery. They were stirred when pacifism 
was found rampant in official circles and by the discovery of 
public enemies at the nation's capital and within the shadow 
of the White House, under the protection of the Admin- 
istration, in the persons of the Ambassadors of Germany 
and Austria threatening to destroy the integrity of the na- 
tion. They massed almost solidly against the delays and 
consequent wastes of the war preparations, and yet more 
against the carefully planned deceptions to cover the blun- 
derings of the Administration. They resented President 
Wilson's telling them that any member of his cabinet was 
as good as any he ever knew, when they knew better. They 
took determined position against the alleged liberalism, 
amounting practically to Germanism and socialism, found 
in the men officially seeking to create an artificial public 
opinion through an enforced reptile press. They stood 
by him when the war was forwarded to the utmost of the 
nation's capacity and resources, they gave him unstinted 
support when he declared there was to be no peace with 
an unsubmitting Germany. They resented his individual 
efforts at peace when other nations equally to be considered 
and having suffered vastly more should have been consulted. 
They applauded his swift and certain, as well as devastat- 
ing, reply to Germany's peace proposals made through Aus- 
tria. They took him severely to task for his partisan ap- 
peal in the congressional elections, fall of 191 8, and sharply 
turned down his proposal that he be given carte blanche 
liberty to become their "unembarrassed spokesman" at the 
peace table; and, though they were willing to hear him yet 
again, he from that time completely forfeited their confi- 
dence. They defiantly resented his taking control of all 
of the nation's wire lines as a war measure after the war 
was ended, and no less his secrecy in the Peace Congress 
after proclaiming zealously open counsels. They became 
deeply concerned over his undertaking to bind the Govern- 
ment to unprecedented obligations at a time when the coun- 



Conclusions ^(jr 

try had had no opportunity to express itself upon the issue, 
closing the freedom of the nation's action, and his faihjrc 
to explain it intelligently after declaring that he coiiKi make 
it all clear. They showed their sympathy in his illness, hut 
little with the cause that produced it. And as a finale, 
they concluded that the best way to he rid of Wilsonism 
was to administer the most crushing rebuke within their 
power; and this was done in the overwhelming defeat of 
his party in the presidential election of 1920, which he 
zealously supported. 

9. Beginning with his act forcing the Adamson bill 
through a servdle Congress immediately prior to the presi- 
dential election at which he was a candidate for re-election, 
a piece of legislation prepared and whipped through Con- 
gress by a class for its own benefit as against the people by 
a subterfuge, President Wilson continued his favor to that 
class. Against this classism the people turned in its wrath 
with swift and unerring precision, once they grasped the 
facts. 

10. The people are more trustworthy on the problems 
of maintaining national integrity and freedom of action 
than a Chief Executive who may have some ulterior pur- 
pose in view, once they are permitted to view the situation 
as it is and not have it discussed only in a closet. 



INDEX 



Act of October 6, 1917, 419 
Adamson Law 

forced through Congress, 51, 59, 

unionism a result, 58 

what it granted, 52 
Advance veto cancelled, 358 
Air-mail service inaugurated, 152 
Airplane scandal, 113 
Allen, Governor, iii, 134 
-Allies and Bolshevism, 192 
Allotment of pay to fighters, 42 f, 

,423 
America confused, glad, 10 
America-First Association, 232 
American Legion, 223, 418, 428, 445 
American Magazine, 228 
American students in Germany, 11 
Amidon, Judge Charles F., 230 
Anderson, Judge George W., 63 
Ansell, Samuel T., 134, 136 
Archibald, James F., 21 
Armaments 

and naval power, 267 
President Harding on, 266 
Secretary Hughes' program, 266 
threat by President Wilson, 266 
Armistice, 259 
Arnold, Stanley, 203, 207 
Article X of the Covenant, 341 
Associated Press, iii, 162 
Athletics in war, 435 

Babson, Roger W., 408 
Baker, Newton D. 

controlling the press, 116, 163 

on courtmartial system, 135 

and deceptions, iii 

described, 107 

evasions of, 114 

large army asked, 324 

opposed national security, 113 

reply to criticism, 134 

and slackers, 117, 231 
_ stand against Bolshevism, 219 
vice and liquor, 172, 175 

stated war 3000 miles away, 128 

457 



Raker, Ray Stannard, 276 
Balfour, Arthur, 24^, 307 
Baimerman guns, 414 
Bartholdt, Coiit^rcssinan, 12 
Beck, James M., if;, 246 
Beer officially medicine, 186 
Belgium's claim, 288 
Berkman, Alexander, 202, 206, 227 
Bernstein, Herman, 191 
Bernstorff, Count, 21, 223, 224, 2^1 
Blast, The, 201, 205 
Bolshevism 

and Allies, 192 
brought to America, 199 
Herman Bernstein on, 191 
and Herron, George D., 192 
Nicholas Murray Butler on, 191 
President Wilson's message on, 
201 
opposed, 191, 197 
supported, 191, 196 
Vladimir Bourtzeff on, 194 
Borah, Senator, reads Treaty, 301 
Borglum, Gutzon, 113 
Boy-Ed, Captain, 23 
Bourtzeff, Vladimir, 194 
Brandegee, Senator, 308 
Brest-Litovsk, 189, 191, 23s, 273 
Brieau, M., quoted, 377 
Brumbaugh, Governor, 13 
Bryan, William J. 

address in New York, 19 

to German-American scxaeties, 

22 
on Treaty adoption, 313, 315 
Buchanan, Frank, 22 
Bullitt, William C, 193, 287, 308 
Burian, Baron, 240 
Burleson, Albert S. 

drives employes to A. F. of L., 

142 
given wire control, 145 
later, cable control, 150 
mean policy of, 141 
news control by, 159 
reply to criticisms, 146, 152 
tergiversation of, 348 



458 



Index 



Burnquist, Governor 

condemns Creels falsehoods, 228 
nominated as a loyalist, 232 

Butler, Nicholas Murray, 192 

Cables taken by Government, 150 

action criticized, 132 

returned to owners, 151 
Calder, Senator, 76 
Candy supplied the army, 35 
Capper, George H., 415 

Senator, 59 
Chamber of Commerce of the U. S. 

address to President Wilson, 399 
Chamberlain, Senator, on 

courts-martial, 135 

failure of War Department, 124, 
128, 130, 156, 390 

neglect of fighters, 133 
Christian Science Monitor, 160, 232 
Churches and the Covenant, 338 
Civil Service, 347, 348 
Clark, Champ, 27, 355, 360 
Clemenceau, Premier 

address to England and America, 



293 
announced 



of the 



as president 
Peace Congress, 267 

on Balance of Power, 268 

on Bolshevism, 195 

in conflict with President Wilson, 
294 

reply to by President Wilson, 269 

on Roosevelt in the army, 363 
Cleveland, President, 347 
Coal, dirty, 48 

dumped at curb, 48 
Cochran, W. Bourke, 202, 203 
Colby, Bainbridge 

for liquid efficiency, 179 

to Russian Bolshevists, 197 
Colleges in the war, 431 
Collier's Weekly 

Secretary Wilson in, 403 

on wire control, 151 
Commission on Camps, 170, 172, 

Compensation for disability, 421 
erroneous idea on, 422 

Congressional Record, 116, 305 

Connick, Harris D. H., 72 

"Conscientious Objectors," 26, 27, 
117, 231 

Constitution week, ignored by Presi- 
dent Wilson, 339 

"Constitutional Government," 380 

Co-ordination, lack of, 130 

Correspondents of newspapers, 160 



Cost-plus system, 56 

Council of National Defense, 29, 

170, 172, 399 
Court-martial system, 135 
Covenant of League of Nations 
and the churches, 338 
Article X of, 337, 341 
propaganda at public expense, 335 
Covenanters, 334 
Creel, George 

book excluded library, 224 
chairman committee on publicity, 

22, 109 
close to President Wilson, 224 
failure admitted, 155 
Minor a friend of, 213 
a representative of, 2n 
nd propaganda for Administra- 
tion, 119 
for Germany, 120 
quality of Americanism of, 451 
resigned, 120 
Crime during Reconstruction, 418 
Crowder, Enoch H. 

on meaning of draft, 57 
patriotic record tarnished with- 
out cause, 137 
and work-or-fight order, 57 
Czernin, Count, 237 

Daily News, Chicago, 283 
Daniels, Secretary 

criticized, 171 

for clean men in navy, 172 

on shipbuilding records, 80 
Danzig, 286 

Day, James R., 338, 344 
Daylight saving, 45 
Debs, Eugene, 62 
Deception, official, no 
Denman and Goethals, 68 
Densmore report 

condemned by grand jury, 207 

prepared in secret, 205 
Dent, S. Hubert, in, 355, 360 
Department of Commerce, 401 
Dernberg, Bernhard, 15, 223, 224, 

226 
Dillon, E. J., quoted, 379 
Dirty coal, 48 
Draft, the service, 25 

meaning of second, 57 
Duluth and fuel saving, 43 
Dumba, Ambassador, 21, 22 
Du Pont Powder Company, 406 

Ebert, Herr, quoted, 273 
Eddystone plant, 406 



Index 



•^'0 



Elections, in 1916, 20 

President Wilson's appeal in 1918, 
355 

reply to the appeal, ;?56 

results of in 1918, 357 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 69 
Employment service 

aided labor policy, 56 

criticized, 409 

origin of, 57, 408 

suspended, 408 
Edmonds, Richard H., 405 
Educational ideals, 416 
England, at beginning of the war, 

9 
transported American troops, 82 
Enlisting for the war, 25 
Espionage Act, 229 
Evening Mail, New York, 227 
"Evidence in the Case," 16 

Federal Board of Training, 426 
Federal judges and disloyalty, 229 
Federal Trade Commission's report 

on profiteering, 392 
Federal trade service, 40 
Field order ending the war, 434 
Fighters and labor, 6i 
Flag-Day address of President, 23 
Fleet corporation, 67 
Food 

administrations of Allies, 37 
administration of after war, 38 

charge against, 39 
consumption of by the army, 34 
Control Law, 29 
increase of, 33 
law for control proposed, 33 
prices, 36 
profiteering in 
ancient, 39 
recent, 31, 392 
substitutes, 29, 36 
urgency of, 28 
Ford, Henry 

loses Republican primary, 354 
supported pacifism, 18 
Fosdick, Chairman, 173 
Fourteen Points 
origin of, 235 
in peace congress, 293 
in peace proposals, 237 
what they provide for, 235 
France 

aided America, 82 
and war loss, 322 
and the war's start, 9 
militaristic, said Wilson, 322 



France, lliwari!* li.ilvhrvi-im, Hff, 

trcattncni of aft.r war, 294 
Francis, Daviii K , i>;<j 
Fraiikfiiricr. I'dix, 20J 
Fuel 

price of, 41, 47 

dirty coal, 48 

saving of, 42 
Fuel Atliniiiistration 

origin of, 42 

outcry against, 43 

Gardner, Representative, on thr na- 
tional security, 22 
Garfield, Harry A. 

appointed Fuel Adniiiiistrator, 42 

criticism of, 49 

fixed fair wages for miners, 6j 

and gasless Sundays, 46 

not responsible for fuel shortagr, 

49 

order against dirty coal, 48 

order to deliver at curb, 48 

resigned otlicc, 63 

wisdom of course, 49 
Gasless Sundays, 46 
Gas failure in war, 127 
Garrison, Secretary of War 

displaced, 18, 107 

energy of in national defense, 138 
Garretson, A. B., quoted, 412 
Geddes, Sir Eric, 71, 250 
Genoa Conference, 220 
George, Lloyd 

excused peace delays, 271, 285 

and origin of the Fourteen Points, 

235 
on ships' importance, 66 
on trying the kaiser, 277 
on under-production, 62 
Gerhardt, Mayer, 226 
German-American Alliance, 12, 14. 

225 
Germanism in the United States, 

228 
Germans loyal to United S^ate^ 23a 
German societies with good names, 

18 
German universities, teaching of, 11 
Gilbert, Joseph, 227 
Glasgow, W. A., 33 
Goethals, George W., 68 
Gompers, Samuel 
labor patriotic, 60 
and Reconstruction, 410 
urged support of Wilson, 410 
Grey, Edward 

on the Covenant, 343, 3^7 



460 



Index 



Grey, Edward, a storm center, 9 
Governors and Mayors 

asked to give employment, 415 

conference of, 404, 408 
Gronna, Senator, 226 
Grunau, John, 59 

Habits of President Wilson, 368 

Haldane, Lord, quoted, 170 

Hale, Willianri B. 
American-mindedness open to 

question, 451 
among President Wilson's eulo- 
gists, 193 
confidential agent of Wilson, 230 
a Hearst writer, 228, 230 
publicity writer for Germans, 228 
put together "New Freedom," 450 

Hanson, Ole, quoted, 219 

Hapgood, Norman, lauded Wilson, 

193 
Harding, Warren G. 

asks as to shipbuilding, 73 

called disarmament conference, 

266 
called unemployment conference, 

^'5 . . , .. 
on appropriations tor snips, 77 

inaugural address cited, 419 

Harvey, George 

on Secretary Baker's speech, 108 
on Secretary Baker's delays, 115 

Harvey's Weekly 
on Herr Ebert, 273 
misplaced trust in Baker, 139 
on Peace Congress delays, 271 
on pro-Germanism, 229 
on secrecy in Peace Congress, 284 
on sugar profiteering, 396 

Hays, Will H., 349 

Hearst papers, 228, 231 

"He kept us out of war," 20 

Herron, George D. 

Quayle on appointment of, 192 
Nicholas M. Butler on, 192 
on President Wilson, 192 
on the social revolution, 196 

Hertling, Count, 237 

Hexamer, J. C, 14 

Hill, David Jayne, quoted, 340, 448 

Hillstrom case, 210 

Hines, Walker D., Director-General 
and Department of Commerce, 402 
explained railroad deficits, 104 
on railroad wage increase, 95 
warned railroad strikers, 96 

Hodgson, Captain Samuel H., 135 

Hog Island shipyard, 70, 72, 75, 79 



Hoover, Herbert C. 
chairman of commission on food 

and supply and prices, 28 
Food Commissioner, 29 
workmanship of efficient, 29 

House, Edward M. 
confidential clerk of Lloyd George 
and Mr. Balfour constantly 
with, 288 
diplomacy of extolled, 162 
on peace delegation, 262 
Secretary Lansing on, 316 

Hughes, Charles E. 

report of, on War Risk Bureau, 427 
disarmament proposals, 266 

Hunt, Frazer, 301 

Hurley, Edward N. 

head of Shipping Board, 69 
ignored shipping men, 70 
issued erroneous statements, 70 
neglected existing facilities, 69 
New York address, 70, 77 
no defenders of, 76 

Industrial conference, 63 

Industrial Relations Commission 
aided anarchy, 204 

Industry on unemployment, 409 

"Insurance, Effects of War upon," 
422 

Inner Council, 277, 281 

Insurance in war 
amount of, 421 

law of October 6, 1917, on, 421 
President Wilson on duty to, 425 

International Workers Defense 
League, 202, 206, 208, 210 

Iron Trade Revieio on unemploy- 
ment, 409 

Jackson Day banquet, 312, 315 
Jefferson, Thomas, on treaty mak- 
ing, 303 
Johnson, Hiram W. 

followed President Wilson on 

tour for Covenant, 340 
quizzed the President on secret 
treaties, 307 
Journal, of Providence, 16 

Kahn, acted chairman, iii 
Kaiser to President Wilson, 12 

prosecution of, 277, 280 
Kallen, Horace M., quoted, 388 
Kellogg, Senator 

on classifying rail workers, 54 

on taking over wires, 149 

on railroad deficits, 104 



II 



Index 



4^1 



Keynes, John M., quoted, 374, 380 
Kitchen, Claude, 355, 360 

Labor, decreased production, 62, 78 
and the fighting man, 60 
and politics, 349 
was it loyal, 60 

Labor polic>' first adopted, 56 

Labor unions 

in government employment, 58 
sought railroad control, 92 

La Follette, Senator 

against Lenroot's nomination, 353 
answered by Roosevelt, 227 
St. Paul address of, 227 

Land for fighters, 403 

Lane, Franklin K. 

in Industrial Conference, 63 
level-headed in work, 374 
planned to employ fighters, 403 

Lane Committee 

fixed coal prices, 41 
overturned by Secretary Baker, 49 
report of Wage Commission, 52 

Lansing, Secretary 

as peace delegate, 262, 265 
contradicted President Wilson, 333 
harshness of Wilson toward, 306 
on kaiser's culpability, 277 
saw danger of peace delays, 272 
witness on Covenant, 337 

Law, Bonar, 251 

League for Preservation of Amer- 
ican Independence, 36 

Leagvie of Nations 
constitution read, 330 
fight on begins in America, 335 
at Jackson Day dinner, 341 
in the past, 325 
in the Peace Congress, 274 
people question, 338 
people stirred against, 339 
propaganda for, 335 
Roosevelt on, 327 
to be entwined in Treaty, 330 
voted on in Senate, 341, 342 
Wilson's changing views on, 328 
Wilson went to country on, 337 
League to Enforce Peace, 238 
Ledger, Philadelphia, 193, 295 
Lee, W. C, 59 
Lenroot, Irvin L. 

replies to disloyalty charge, 351 
nominated, 353 
Letter carriers, 140 
Lewis, Senator 

campaign aid to Wilson, 351 
on peace conversations, 247 



Lightlcss Tuesdays, 4<; 
Lincoln atui \\'ilsf>ii, 368-370 
Liiullnrg, Charles A., 232 
Liiulsiev, Henry D. 

appointed, War Risk Hiirenti, \?.^ 
asked to resign, 427 
commander American Legion, ,j}<; 
Li(|uor 

"booze versus hrcail," ly; 

Congress against, 177 

and cfhcicncy, 180 

execution of laws against, iSi 

favored by President Wilsofi, iRz 

and CJerinan-Anierican Alliance, 

179, 225 
lawlessness of, 176 
opponents of, 180 
opposed by President Wilson, 17^ 
prohibition of in effect, 1S6 
Secretary Baker's appeal to elim- 
inate, 171; 
Secretaries Baker, Daniels, and 

McAdoo on, 174-175 
supporters of, 180 
Loans, 27 
Lodge, Senator 

against a negotiated peace, 253 
offered resolution on powers to the 

President, 246 
on suppression of news, 161, 163 
reply to Wilson on separate 
treaty, 305 
Lost Battalion, 437 
Low, A. Maurice, quoted, 375 
Lowell, President 

on the Covenant, 331 
on the peace drive, 238 
Loyalty of political parties com- 
pared, 357 
"Lusitania," the, 19, 22, 113, 43° 

McAdoo, William G. 
accomplishments of, 90 
appointed Director-General of 

Railroads, 84 
asked five-year Railroad control, 

91 ... 

as to railroad men in politics, 

359 
devised war insurance law, 420 
opposed liquor on railroads, 175 
resigned office, 91 

McLemore resolution, 23 

McMaster, John B., quoted, 18, 24, 

43 
Mail 

and cost of periodicals 
curtailment of dispatches of, 143 



462 



Index 



Mail, delay in delivery, 143 

failure of investigated, 142 

force in defending, 418 

to soldiers, 131 

zoning of, 145 
Mail-planes, 152 
Makino, Baron, "not too proud to 

fight," 333 
Mann, James R., 131 
Manufacturers' Record, 405 
Marine Brigade, 433 
Marshall, Vice-President 

regretted pacifist measures, 244 

on Bolshevism in the United 
States, 220 
Martens, Ludwig C. A. K., 214 
Mayors and Governors 

asked to employ idle, 415 

conference of, 404, 408 
Mediation Commission, report of on 

Mooney case, 205 
"Men everywhere" and Wilson, 369 
Merchants Association of New York, 

142 
Merchant marine low, 81 
Metropolitan Opera House address, 

. 2+3 . 
Mexican editors at White House, 329 
Minor, Robert A., and Administra- 
tion, 212 
Money-spending riot, 411, 414 
Mooney, Thomas J., 62, 201, 202, 

208, 212 
Morgan, Postmaster, 348 
Morrow, Harvey W., 229, 385 
Moses, Senator 

gives humorous view of Treaty, 

302 
President Wilson to, 453 
questioned President Wilson, 308 
Municipal inefficiency, 171 
Munitions, failure, 132 

improvement in production of, 126 
Mystery of Wilson, 366 

caused by "interpretations," 366 

Nation, The 

on jazinary, 288 

suppressed, 159 

treats on suppression, 159 
National Security League on Creel's 

activities, 224 
Nebraska pro-Germanisra, 229 
Nelson, Senator 

on shipbuilding, 72 

veteran loyalist, 227 
Neutrality in thought, 72 
"New Freedom," the, 360, 450 



News and Mr. Burleson, 159 
Neivs, The Detroit, 160 
Newspapers 

arrogance toward, 157, 158 

censored news of, 158 

humiliated, 164 

right and loyal, 168 

shackled, 156 

suppressed, 160 
New Ulm, 228 
New York Merchants' report on in- 

efficienct mail service, 143 
Non-Partisan League 

defended Berkman and Goldman, 
227 

disloyal, 232 

origin of in North Dakota, 226 

propaganda of in North Dakota, 
II 

supported by Rumley and Creel, 
227 
North American, Philadelphia 

on Belgium's treatment in Peace 
Congress, 291 

on government railroading, 102, 
103 

on profiteering, 390, 394 

on purposes of Samuel Gompers, 
410 

on suppression of news, 165 

on Wilson's nebulousness, 329 

sums peace conversations, 248 
North American Review 

on "conscientious objectors," 118 

David Jayne Hill in, 340, 448 

George Rothwell Brown in, 156 

on deficiency in production, 78 

quoted, 114 
Northcliffe, Lord 

on peace conversations, 250 

on Wilson's going to Europe, 266 

thirteen principles of, adopted in 
Peace Congress, 237 
North Dakota, propaganda in, 11 

Official Bulletin, The, 154, 155, 203 

O'Hare, Kate, 62, 227 

Official denial, the, 160 

Oklahoma, draft resistance in, 27 

Olin, John M., Review of Mooney 
Case, 204 

O'Leary, Jeremiah, 22 

Order ending fighting, 434 

Ordnance collapse, 122 

Orlando, Premier 

break with President Wilson, 296 
on the inner council, 271, 281 
and Wilson's Fiume attitude, 294 



Index 



4^M 



Outcry against peace conversations, 

246 
Overalls crusade, 395, 414 
Owen, Senator, 315 

Pacifism's consequences, 24 
Pacifists influenced Administration, 

19 
Palmer, Attorney-General 

in profiteer prosecutions, 394 

prosecutions of violators of liquor 
laws, i86 

ruled that beer was medicine, 186 
Papen, von, 23 
Paris almost taken, 22 
Peace Congress 

announcement of President Wil- 
son's intention to attend, 260 

commissioners to, 262 

early criticism of, 274 

no records of, 299, 337 

opened, 267 

preliminary meeting for, 265 

preparation for, 263 

propaganda from, 295 

secrecy of, 281, 283, 284 

threatened break in, 282, 297 

two important commissions ap- 
pointed by, 267 
Peace conversations 

how received, 250 

summarized, 248 
Peace making 

false propaganda in, 295 

France against German counter- 
proposals in, 273 

German outcry against terms, 
272 

perils of delays in, 272, 273 

public opinion affected by false 
propaganda in, 295 

Senate attacked the Covenant in, 

^75 . ^ . , 

Wilson agamst France in, 276 
Wilson and secrecy in, 281 
Wilson's delays renewed German 
hopes, 274 

Pennington, Edmond, 90 

Pensions paid after wars, 419 

Perils in peace delays, 272 

Peterson, James A., 227 

Phrasings of President Wilson, 381 

Pittman, Senator, 347 

Plattsburg Camp, 21, 361 

Plumb Plan, 94, 97 

Political campaign of 1916, 234, 347, 
349; of 1918, 351 

Political campaign cards, 364 



Politics 

"is adjourned," ■^e,.^ 
cainini(l;ijji'd, 363 
in iiricc-fixin;;, ■^(,o 
iiiurnid, 3<;6 
Preparation for \v;ir, l.irk of. 3^, 

76 
Preparedness day, President Wilmn 

on, 23, 451 
Press agent, the, 160 
Post, The, Washiiigioi), ijs 
Prices in reconstruction, 411 
Primary elections, Wilson in, jso 
Prinkipo Conference, 192, 193, 19$, 

196, 198 
Profiteering 

among laborers, 392 
ancient, 39 

due to preparation failure, 389 
how to overcome in war, 391 
Federal Trade Commission's Re- 
port on, 392 
in government contracts, 389 
in rents, 390, 392 
in sugar, 396 
outside of the law, 389 
prosecutions of threatened, 39;, 

394 . 

spasdomic prosecutions, 395 
Prohibition 

execution of law, 181 

war-time and constiluliona! in op- 
eration, 186 

Wilson's course in, 181 
Propaganda 

extent of, 11 

for the Covenant, 335 

for Germany, 10 

for Thomas J. Mooney, 204 

influence of, 12, 13 

method of, 15 

not fully known, 11 

purpose of, 12 

revealed, 16 
Providence Journal, 16 
Public Health Service, 174 
Public information, committee on, 

109 
Public Ledger, Philadelphia, 295 

Quayle, William A. 

on Bolshevism's method, 193 
on peace conversations, 253 

Radical publications in New York, 

215 
Railroads 

employes of, in politics, 359 



464 



Index 



Railroads, government control of 
asked, 91 
aligning of forces on, 92 
began, 84 
failure of, 97 
regulative process under, 83 

restored to owners' control, 103 
Railroad Administration 

advanced costs, 85 

conflicted with Department of 
Commerce, 401 

courtesy required by, 88 

disillusionment as to accomplish- 
ments, 90 

improved service of, 87 

McAdoo director of, 84 

methods of, 87 

policy of, 85 

and railroad officers, 85 

traffic under, 89 

trained women agents, 88 
Railroad Labor Board, 105 
Railroad Strike, October, 1921, 65 
Rapallo Treaty, 220 
Reconstruction 

aims of in Great Britain, 399 

and the banks, 415 

and Bolshevism, 411 

and business men, 406 

Congress at Atlantic City, 400, 
404 
Wilson's address to, 400 

and Council of Defense, 399 

created anxiety, 405 

and crime, 418 

and demands of social justice, 416 

and Department of Commerce, 401 

education during, 416 

materialism in, 417 

neglected, 400, 403 

prices during, 412 

and Secretary Lane's plan, 403 

spiritual forces during, 418 

unemployment during, 406, 414 

wages during, 409, 412 
Red Cross and soldiers, 132, 443 
Redfield, Secretary 

conflicted with Railroad Adminis- 
tration, 401 

on extending trade, 402 
"Remember Mooney," 202 
Reparations, German, 278 
Reptile press, 163 
Responsibility, evasions of, 113 
"Review of Mooney Case," 204 
Rhinelander, Bishop, 13, 14, 17 
Riot of spending, 411 
Robins, Raymond, 189, 217 



Roosevelt, Theodore 
combatted 

German-American Alliance, 225 
Non-Partisan League, 227 
pacifism, 156 
denied army service, 24, 360, 363 
desired in public affairs, 19 
directed American thought, 17 
to Felix Frankfurter, 205 
missed at death, 270 
on a league of nations, 327 
on loyalty, quoted, 233 
statement as to neutrality, 234, 430 
textbooks misquoted, 234, 430 

Rumely, Edward A., 227 

Russia, greatest loser in war, 190 

"Russian Bolshevik Revolution," 236 

Scandals, two outstanding of war, 

121 
Schwab, Charles M., 75 
Sclent fie American 

on ignoring General Wood, 362 

on mail zoning, 145 
Secrecy in Peace Congress, 281, 284 
Secret Service, 224 
Secret treaties, 307 
Self-determination, 291 
Senate against League Covenant, 275 
Shantung, 286, 333 
Shipbuilders, real, 69, 74 
Shipbuilding 

costs, 77 

Representative Shirley on, 78 

results of policy of, 75, 77 

vast plan for, 79 

records made in, 80 
Shipping Board 

accomplishments of, 71 

created, 67 

deficit of, 82 

headed by Hurley, 69 
Ships 

importance of, 66 

loss of, 68 
Shirley, Representative, 78 
Sibert, William L., on war gas, 127 
Simmons, Roger, 217 
Simonds, G. A., testimony of, 216 
Sinking of vessels by Germany, 20 
Slackers and the Administration, 230 
Smoot, Senator, 353 
Smuts, General, drew Covenant, 330 
Social evil 

and city government, 171, 172 

and the public, 174 

and training camps, 173 

and war, 172 



Index 



46^ 



Societies during the war, 18 
Spirit of America 

artists in, 443 

in colleges, 431 

in communit}' helpfulness, 441 

in community life, 447 

in conduct when free, 440 

in American Legion, 445 

in home life, 442 

in registration for service, 433 

in relief work, 442 

in her soldiers, 437, 439, 440, 442 

on the battlefield, 439 

President Wilson on, 437 

why fighting spirit, 447 
Spokane loyalty pledge, 445 
Sporting goods in war, 435 
Spry, Governor, to Wilson, 2io 
Standing by the President, 18 
Star, The, Kansas City, 22, 316 

Montreal, 161 

Washington, 409 
State Department to Austria on 

peace move, 241 
Steenerson, Representative, 146, 147 
Steffens, Lincoln 

American-mindedness of, 451 

commissioner to Bolshevists, 293 

with Robert A. Minor, 212 
Stephens, Governor, to Wilson, 209 
Stettinius, Edward, 112 
Stevens, Basil M., 118 
Stevenson, Archibald, 112 
Strikes 

during Reconstruction, 410 

on wires, 148 

of October, 1921, 65 
Sugar, 30, 36 
Sun, New York, 262 

Taft, William H. 

of League to Enforce Peace, 343 
on stern implacable war, 238 
given publicity on Covenant, 167 
with Wilson on Covenant, 326, 

331. 335 
Tank failure, 127 
Teachers' pay, 55 
Thirty-nine senators, 331, 334 
Thomas, Senator, 361 
Times, New York ■ 

on election appeal, 357 

published aircraft report, i6s 

punished, 161 
Tirpitz, Admiral, 67 
Tonnage of the world, 68 
"Too proud to fight" 

Makino, Baron, 333 



"Too proud to fight," President Wil- 
son, 20 
Tope, Homer W., 178 
Tour of country for Covenant, 310. 

337 
Townley, Arthur C, 227 
Transcript, Boston, 112 
Transportation of troops, 81, 134 
Treaty of Peace 

and church bodies, 312 

and colleges, 312 

controversy over encouraRcd by 

President Wilson, 303-304 
execution of, 321 
expounded by President Wilton, 

308 
first vote on by Ser.ate, 311 
Germany's evasion of, 322 
inconclusive, 321 
how made up, 302 
leaked to America, 301 
presented to the Senate by Pre- 
sident Wilson, 303 
provisions of, 319 
provoked bitter contest, 304 
read to the Senate by Senator 

Borah, 301 
rejection 

first time, 312 
responsibility for, 313, 315 
second time, 313, 315 
stages of antagonism to, 304 
Treaty with France withheld, 316 
Tribune, The, Chicago 
and Ford's suit, 352 
Frazer Hunt, correspondent of, 
and leaking of Treaty, 301 
Tribune, The, New York 
poll on Italian crisis, 297 
on Wilson's European trip, 261 
on Wilson's publicit}' abroad, 282 
Tumulty, Private Secretary, 212 

Unemployment, 406, 409, 414 
Unionizing government service, 58 
United German-American Societies, 
22 

Van Buren, D. C, 21S 

Van Dyke,, Henry, 16, 17, 239, 256 

Vanderlip, Frank A., 272 

Venereal disease, 170 

Venizelos, Premier, 291, 292 

Veterans Bureau, 423 

Veto, advance, 358 

Vice in war, 170, 174 

Vienna Congress, 271 



466 



Index 



Vocational Training Board 
denied charge of neglect, 426 
eligibles recognized by, 426 
failure to aid men charged, 426 

Vollmer, Henry, 22 

Wadsworth, Senator, 116 

Wages of railroad employes, 54 

Walsh, Frank P., 204 

War Department 

neglect in casualty lists, 132 
failure in munitions program, 122 
improvement in munitions, 127 

War diet, 29 

War Risk Bureau 

administration force resigned, 427 

complaints against, 426 

failure of, 427 

growth of, 424 

Lindsley, Henry D., director, 427 

origin of, 424 

War Weekly 
on Germanism in America, 229 
on Secretary Baker's delays, 115 
on Secretary Baker's speech, 108 
on treatment of Leonard Wood, 
361 

Watterson, Henry, 151, 331 

White, Henry D., 262 

White House conferences, 307, 311, 

337 
Whittlesey, Charles W., 437 
Wilson, Secretary of Labor 
and Densmore report, 207 
chairman mediation commission, 

203 
shielded those making false report 

in Mooney case, 207 
on trade extension, 402 
Wilson, President 

address of at Manchester, 269 

address to D. A. R., 371 

appealed to class spirit, 359 

cold in manner, 369 

and "common counsel," 373, 378 

compared with Lincoln, 368-370 

created divisions, 376 

demand as to critical piiblica- 

tions, 164 
destructive in t^^pe, 375 
disloyalty struck by, 23 
disregarded people's appeals, 53 
first draftees addressed by, 26 
explained Article X in Treaty, 308 
flag-day address, 23 
followed by Senator Johnson, 340 
handiwork of in Treaty, 286 
haughty, 375 



President Wilson, headed flag-day 
parade, 23 
heeded organized labor, 51 
held people's confidence, 450 
ignorant of secret treaties, 307 
incapable of team work, 374 
and internationalism, 382 
and "interpreters," 366, 371 
intervened to save Mooney, 208 
influence of in primaries, 350 
man of mystery, 366 
mental perversity of, 378 
method of work, 368 
and nationalism, 380 
neutrality address, 14 
and personal government, 375, 385 
personal relations of, 368 
phrasings of, described, 381 
place of in history, 384 
political appeal of in 1918, 355 
reply of to Clemenceau, 269 
results of labor policy of, 59 
self-confidence of, 373 
spoke in the abstract, 368 
taken ill on Covenant tour, 340 
taking wrong side, 481 
urged to hear General Wood, 361 
unfair to the nation, 16 
vacillating, 395 

Wilsonia, 291 

Wilsonism defined, 385 ^ 

Wire control 
chaos in, 146 
criticized, 145, 146 
method of taking over, 150 
news wire, 159 
purpose of taking over, 151 
rates increased under, 146 
returned to private control, 151 
request of Burleson in taking con- 
trol, 145 
strikes under, 148 

Wiseman, Sir William, 288 

Wood, General Leonard, 21, 361, 362 

World, The, New York 
on court-martial system, 135 
on Creel and the Official Bulletin, 

155 
on President Wilson's 1918 elec- 
tion appeal, 357 
on prohibition enforcement at in- 
ception, 186 
on wire control, 151 
Workingmen, British, on war, 237 
Work-or-fight policy, 57 

Zimmerman notes, 21, 226 
Zone system of mail, 144 



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